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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to find the answer to the broad question: How 
can the benefits of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the so-called, 
information society (I.S.) be extended to rural-peripheral regions and communities? To achieve 
this, some insight is provided into the more recent developments of the I.S. as an evolving 
theoretical conception as well as a political vision; and it is showed how much these perceptions 
are in line with, and how much they have been projected onto, the actual socio-economic 
processes on three spatial and political scales. 
Information Society means much more than the growth in ICTs. The socio-territorial 
inclusiveness of the advantages they offer is a central issue in this work; however, these benefits 
are seen as coming from the mutual and complicated interactions between society and these 
technologies. The broad definition of access used in this work also reflects a non-techno-centric 
view. Besides, the main approach in this research is a social geographical one; and I.S. is 
observed from the position of rural-peripheral regions in particular.  
The key concepts of access and (socio-technological) networks are used as analytical 
tools in investigating how the problem of inclusiveness is seen, monitored and influenced on 
various spatial and political scales by different actors: ‘top-down’ by global forums and the 
European Union, as well as in two selected countries (Finland and Hungary); and bottom-up by 
local communities in rural-peripheral regions. 
The findings from both the theoretical and empirical investigations indicate that 
without systematic (policy) intervention, disparities in access in the I.S. and the traditional 
spatial inequalities in socio-economic developments mutually reinforce each other. So far, this 
has caused rural-peripheral regions to lag persistently behind economic centres and urban areas. 
The case studies also indicate that there exists (yet, not a clear-cut) division of responsibilities 
between the various spatial scales in terms of improving access and inclusiveness.  
The Finnish and Hungarian national developments (I.S. realities and visions, 
institutions, strategies and programmes) are given a more detailed insight in the dissertation. 
The Nordic example is often referred to as the welfare model of a highly developed I.S., while 
Hungary, as one of the transition countries loaded with problematic legacies, is still looking for 
its own special way to achieve similar success and recognition. It is found that although, the 
respective I.S. models of Finland and Hungary differ in many ways, both their spatial patterns 
in access, and their policy objectives are rather similar and in tune with the broader international 
guidelines and processes. Despite the differences in for instance, their historical developments, 
social structures and behaviours, some of the fundamentals of the Finnish welfare model (e.g. 
inter-institutional networking, on-line public services targeting citizens and businesses) could be 
successfully transplanted into the Hungarian I.S. strategy as long as enough caution is paid to 
necessary adjustments. Likewise, interesting local developments and creative civil action in 
Hungary can potentially be a rich resource for learning to any country where ICTs need to be 
better matched with the needs of rural society and economically disadvantaged peripheries.  
In fact, in the spirit of mutual learning, the dissertation culminates in a short account of 
cooperation between Finnish and Hungarian local actors across national borders, who try to rely 
both on their respective national institutions and their shared European framework in realising 
their joint community intranet. This example brings top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
together, highlights the obstacles emerging from cultural and technological differences, 
underlines the importance of the human (mental) factors in access, and emphasizes the (under-
utilised) potentials of innovative ‘cross-border’ (horizontal) networking. 
A major conclusion is that cooperation between various actors in a network 
configuration is a key condition for bridging the digital divides across countries and regions, as 
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well as for peripheries to developing their livelihood. Therefore, I.S. should be, and most 
recently, has been understood more and more as a communication society, the welfare of which 
is based on connectedness, horizontal cooperation, interactivity and learning between spatial-
administrative levels, organisations and people. Connectedness and learning however, are only 
supported, and not de facto, granted by the new ICTs. 
 
Keywords: information society (I.S.) policies and strategies, Hungary, Finland, European 
Union, ICT adoption and access, regional development, rural-peripheral areas, local I.S. 
projects.  ISBN: 978-952-219-114-4
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 1
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
 
This dissertation takes a multi-scalar 
spatial approach in understanding the 
phenomenon that is most frequently referred 
to as ‘the Information Society’ (I.S.). Its 
focus is the social and territorial 
inclusiveness of the emerging I.S. The 
research carried out (2002-2007) for the 
studies included in this book was concerned 
principally with the situation in rural-
peripheral regions, and aimed to respond to 
the following broad question:  
How can the benefits of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and the 
so-called, information society (I.S.) be 
extended to rural-peripheral regions and 
communities? 
In order to find the answer, more 
concrete research questions have to be 
specified, which are also relevant to the 
selected set of targets of empirical analysis. 
Nevertheless, breaking up this general 
enquiry into deliberate and geographically 
relevant sub-questions requires an analytical 
approach. 
This initial question contains at least 
three preliminary assumptions, which all 
bring up a complexity of concerns and 
further questions. The first such assumption 
is that ICTs mean benefits to society, they are 
‘good’, and the same positive significance is 
attached usually to the concepts of 
information, and especially, knowledge. 
Their goodness however, is not intrinsic, they 
are social products, and their implementation 
and their relevance to society is where their 
benefits can manifest. Rural-peripheral 
regions are usually distinguished as special 
social contexts; therefore it is important to 
understand what particular ways these 
technologies may be introduced to them. 
Information Society as a development 
concept must have a special implication to 
the populations and the economies of these 
regions. What are the mechanisms that bring 
about (or restrict) the benefits of ICTs, how 
do these mechanisms work in the rural-
peripheral context? Understanding fully the 
relationship between society and the ICTs is 
crucial to successfully decrease the extent 
and occurrence of digital divides. 
Another claim is, however, that 
information society is not inclusive of 
everyone, e.g. there are rural-peripheral 
communities and regions even in the 
developed world which are excluded from its 
advantages. (From among several competing 
terminologies, I.S. is the phrase chosen in 
this book, but definitely not in a techno-
centric way but in its broadest socio-cultural 
interpretation.) This is relatively easy to see 
the point of, with the exception of one 
problem: to really see what is included and 
what is excluded, one needs to have a clear 
idea, delineation of the ‘thing’. However, it is 
common knowledge, that neither societies 
nor technologies are static – so then, what is 
the baseline, the fixed point for 
inclusion/exclusion or for comparisons? How 
can the I.S. be defined and measured, and 
who is to give that definition and 
measurement? Certainly, there is no lack of 
definitions in policy documents across the 
world, but quite the reverse, there is an 
almost infinite number of them. Probably for 
a good reason, they contain as many 
commonalities as much they differ in their 
foci on I.S. What is expected from I.S. by the 
different stake-holders, potential actors? 
‘Information Society’ is not only a moving 
target, but a political-social construct, and 
therefore very subjective and flexible.  
Finally, it is also suggested that 
there should be ways to help the situation in 
rural peripheries. Who should be 
responsible? Is that the national government, 
is it the IT companies? Or is it the local 
communities directly affected? Whose 
interest(s) are involved in this problem? 
Also, relating back to the problems of 
definition and inclusiveness, what is the 
spatial-administrative scale (level) on which 
the impartiality of the I.S. can be / should be 
attained. 
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For the reasons mentioned above, 
the first part of this dissertation is devoted to 
providing conceptual clarification of 
different meanings behind key terminology, 
and giving an insight into the more recent 
developments of the I.S. as an evolving 
theoretical conception as well as a political 
vision. Only after this, it becomes possible to 
see who has potentially the power and means 
to act, and where; as well as to establish what 
can be done, and by what means, in order to 
extend the advantages of I.S. to rural-
peripheral regions.  
 Beyond these, it is important to note 
that the rural context also, is an abstraction: 
though rural-peripheral regions have certain 
distinctive common features, they are all 
embedded in their own national backgrounds, 
individual cultural settings, economic 
circumstances and path-dependences (hence 
is also, the problematic delineation for policy 
what can be considered ‘rural’). 
Consequently, the second, empirical section 
of this dissertation contains comparisons 
across European countries, and in more 
detail, describes the situation in rural regions 
from two selected states, Finland and 
Hungary. These two national contexts are 
dissimilar enough for to prove the existence 
of analogies, general truths, but are also 
similar enough to justify that certain cultural, 
economic, historical, etc. features are 
especially responsible for  the  emergence  of  
Figure 1. Key concepts and their linkages  
different I.S. development pathways or even, 
‘models’.  
There are three more or less distinct 
aspects present in every part of this work:  
One is related to the complexities of 
access – on the interaction surface between 
ICTs and society. The second is related to 
networks, and the problem of governance and 
co-ordination. Thirdly, the empirical chapters 
show what extent the described theoretical 
perceptions and political visions are in line 
with, and how much they have been 
projected onto, the actual socio-economic 
processes on three different spatial, political-
administrative scales. These three aspects are 
underlying the concrete Research Questions 
(see below) and are defined and applied as 
analytical tools in the empirical studies. All 
three have a relevance to policies and 
practices aiming at a spatially-socially 
inclusive I.S., yet the first one concentrates 
more on the objects of policy (what to 
influence?), the latter two are focussing more 
on the actors, their inter-relationships and 
responsibilities  (who and how should  
influence things?)  
So quite a few fundamental concepts 
arise that can be understood in divergent 
ways. In Chapter 2 they are clarified for the 
purposes of the current work, and explained 
also in the context of recognized social 
theories. Figure 1 below summarises them 
within a theoretical framework. 
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Based on the arguments above, the 
initial and general enquiry is broken up into 
concrete Research Questions (RQs) which 
identify the actual objects for investigation in 
the empirical studies. Set already into 
specific geographical contexts, the RQs in 
this dissertation are the following: 
 
RQ 1: What are the factors behind the 
differentiation in access, the emergence of 
digital divides concerning the rural 
peripheries of developed countries? 
 
RQ 2:  What are the suitable points of 
intervention to help resolve digital divides? 
What are the different actors’ roles and 
responsibilities at a) the international or 
European, b) the national and c) the regional 
/ local levels in order to achieve a spatially 
more inclusive I.S.? 
 
RQ 3:  Is the diffusion of ICTs or the 
emergence of an I.S. making horizontal 
interactions and flows more powerful, and 
thus administration and decision making 
more transparent and democratic? 
 
RQ4:  What can Hungary learn from 
the achievements of the ‘Finnish model’? 
 
These four research questions indicate the 
chain of arguments and explanations towards 
answering the broad question, starting from 
elementary processes leading to more 
complex issues such as the potential transfers 
of I.S. practices and models.  
 
 
1.2 The case studies in the dissertation 
 
The case studies in the empirical 
section represent different geographical 
scales (political-administrative levels) and 
various sets of actors, and are themselves 
composite in terms of perspective and 
methods.  
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 5, the 
concrete geographical scope of the empirical 
investigation zooms in from the international 
and European processes, perceptions and 
actions to the developments in selected rural 
regions and communities in Finland, and in 
Hungary, via descriptions of the respective 
national strategies and observable sub-
national tendencies. Similar issues are 
investigated on all these different scales. 
There is a vertical-hierarchical connection 
between them based on inclusiveness in 
terms of territory and (to different extents,) 
policy-making. Besides, these scales emerge 
also as actors in the same ‘horizontal’ socio-
political network. Considering this duality of 
positions, the interrelations of these scales 
and actors are a most interesting field for 
investigation.   
In Chapter 3, I describe how 
international organisations have approached 
the problem of equality in the I.S., and 
especially, what the European Union has 
been trying to do for an inclusive I.S. I 
describe the main interests and motivation 
behind these efforts, and what methods 
international actors can rely on; and 
especially, what tools the EU can employ to 
achieve an advanced and fair ‘e-Europe’. It 
becomes obvious from these investigations 
that the international scale, and political-
administrative level has strong limitations in 
competence, yet it does have a very specific 
and irreplaceable function in providing 
guidelines, forums, networks for innovation, 
and some co-ordination and control of 
processes. 
In Chapter 4, I give accounts of the 
relevant national developments and policy 
development in Finland and Hungary, and 
their respective approaches to, and positions 
within, their European context. The Nordic 
example is often referred to as the welfare 
model of a highly developed I.S., while 
Hungary, as one of the transition countries 
loaded with problematic legacies, is still 
looking for its own special way to achieve 
similar success and recognition. An 
interesting consideration may be at the end, 
the possibility for mutual learning despite the 
differences in for instance, their historical 
developments, social structures and 
behaviours. Chapter 4 also provides the 
background information for the respective 
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regional and local initiatives in these two 
countries, which are the subject of the next 
chapter.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I describe the 
general trends in sub-national inequalities in 
these two countries, and regarding certain 
aspects of access; and I continue shifting 
attention towards the smaller but even the 
more crucial players: the local and regional 
initiatives which by trying to match the 
expectations and opportunities coming from 
their national and European backgrounds, 
have managed to achieve a lot in terms of e-
inclusiveness in their rural societies.  
The last case study (5.4) lets us 
zoom out again partially as it gives an 
account of the encounter of the two national 
cultures in the form of cooperation in 
planning a joint development project by rural 
- local actors from a Hungarian village and a 
set of Finnish rural communities, much 
within the European context.  
This relatively short account is 
particular for its special approach and 
methodology, and has a distinctive and 
important role in the dissertation. It is the 
outcome of action research: the cooperation 
between local actors across considerable 
physical and cultural distances was triggered 
by my personal involvement first as a 
researcher, a mediator, a voluntary 
interpreter, then as advisor and assistant. 
Besides, this ‘story’ is a kind of a connecting 
point of many threads woven in previous 
theoretical and empirical chapters: the co-
operating partners themselves rely heavily on 
ICTs and (local, international) networks in 
order to achieve local rural- development; 
they act across geographical, and 
administrative-political borders; and they are 
challenged and inhibited by not only 
technological and economic asymmetries, but 
cultural differences, too. Furthermore, their 
work has been embedded in and greatly 
influenced by, the European and their 
respective national frameworks, interests and 
actions.  
This way, this experience rounds up 
all the empirical investigations pointing at 
possible interconnections and interactions 
between the many spatial-political scales 
dealt with in the dissertation, and showing 
how intricate connection there is between the 
means and the ends, the tools and the 
purposes, of developing the I.S. Although it 
is definitely  
Every case study on these three 
spatial and political-administrative levels 
contributes to the explanation of more than 
one of the RQs, and they all represent some 
solutions or problems related to access and 
networks. I start each empirical chapter by 
posing three sub-questions to be answered in 
their own separate summary sections.1 
However, the fullest comprehension of the 
problem comes from cross-analogies, 
changing and repeated patterns, and concrete 
linkages between the cases, which are 
discussed mainly in the final conclusions and 
synthesis (Chapter 6), i.e. in answer to the 
four Research Questions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See more details on the structure and empirical 
chapters in 2.5 ‘Research design and methodology’. 
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In search of an a priori or 
theoretical answer to the general opening 
question, the meanings of well-known, yet 
ambiguous and ‘fuzzy’ concepts will be 
examined, as well as some hypothetical 
linkages between them. Figure 1 above 
provides a framework of these ideas; the 
conceptual arena within which dissertation 
operates. 
The first section of this chapter (2.1) 
provides some insight into the many ways of 
interpreting and dealing with (e.g. 
measuring) information, knowledge, and 
technology. These fundamental concepts are 
crucial to the understanding of some current 
processes related to technological 
development and influencing the (spatial) 
organisation of society and economy. The 
variety of perceptions on information, 
knowledge and technology explains also the 
divergence between the conceptualisations of 
the set of ongoing social and economic 
phenomena that may be encapsulated in the 
term information society. I.S. is discussed in 
2.2, first as part of the political rhetoric and 
as an object of planning, then based on what 
scholars from a variety of scientific 
disciplines consider important in this issue; 
and I also emphasize the essentiality of the 
interaction and overlaps between these two 
fields. 
In 2.3, I proceed by inserting the 
fundamental concepts into the context of 
human geography, giving brief accounts on 
some of the spatial concerns arising from the 
previously mentioned interactions between 
the human intellect, the features and needs of 
society, and innovative technology. The 
notions of access and network are introduced 
and defined in 2.3 for the purpose of 
employing them as central analytical tools 
later on, in the empirical sections of this 
book. Besides, these two concepts are built 
up from the three fundamentals discussed in 
1.1 and have strong relevance to both 
political and academic debates about the I.S. 
‘Access’ and ‘network’ help to see 
information, knowledge and technology in 
spatial terms and to set the ‘I.S. 
phenomenon’ into a geographical context: 
digital divides are manifest also spatially; 
and the territorial heterogeneity of social and 
technological networks, as well as the 
inequalities in the many dimensions of access 
are useful aspects for studying and 
influencing regional development. I highlight 
the possible conceptual connections between 
regionalisation and networks drawing on 
ideas such as those proposed by the actor-
network and social capital theories. 
As such, the concepts of access and 
network help bridging over ‘the cognitive 
gap’ between the broader theoretical starting 
points (2.1-2) and the observed social and 
spatial phenomena and patterns (Chapters 3-
5). Furthermore, they also function as 
cornerstones in formulating the precise 
research questions; and, in search for the 
answers to these enquiries, they link together 
the different case studies by providing the 
common main aspects of empirical-analytical 
investigation.  
Finally, regional development (and 
policies), ‘regionness’, bonding-bridging 
networks and digital divides operate and 
manifest in diverse scales and involve many 
different actors. It is important to identify 
these because of the multiscalarity of the 
investigations presented in this work: 
ultimately, I.S. is a result of the interactions 
and intersections of horizontal and vertical, 
individual to global processes, conflicts and 
forms of cooperation. 
  
 
2.1 The fundamental concepts:  informa-
tion, knowledge and technology 
 
 “Where is the Life we have lost in living? Where is 
the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the 
knowledge we have lost in information?” 
T.S. Eliot (1888-1965): The Rock, 1934 
 
In popular media, political 
proclamations, and in academic papers 
dealing with the on-going transformative or 
revolutionary processes, information, 
 6
knowledge, and technology are frequently 
used terms. They usually indicate something 
positive such as opportunities, 
competitiveness, growth, and development; 
yet they are most often (dis)credited with 
rather unclear and imprecise meanings. 
These words have taken up some abstract, 
symbolic air; akin to the ways ‘cyber’ 
(cyberspace, cyber terrorism), ‘digital’ 
(digital age, digital gap, digital rights), ‘e-’ 
(as in e-government, e-commerce, e-health), 
and ‘virtual’ (virtual community, virtual 
university), etc. have entered our reality, or at 
least have become the essentials of ‘cyber 
hype’. After all, information society (I.S.) is 
part of the political rhetoric and media 
fashion, which may make its integrity 
questionable when used, for instance, in 
academic writing.  
Why have information, knowledge, 
and technology become the objects of such 
remarkable attention? Where is their 
significance, their positive value rooted? 
Having no illusions about the scale and 
intricacy of such a venture, at least an 
attempt should be made here to conceptualise 
these universal ideas. This is necessary 
because different schools of thought around 
the I.S. may be traced down to the various 
approaches taken up towards these different 
forms of intellectual capital. Also, I wish to 
call attention to the natural conceptual 
overlaps as well as the often unconscious and 
self-inductive, but sometimes intentional 
simplification of their meanings for certain 
purposes. The latter may lead to exaggerated 
fears and expectations, misunderstanding and 
misplaced strategies, failing projects in the 
fields of policies and application.  
 
 
2.1.1 Conceptualising information 
 
There is vast literature on the 
definitions and distinctions of information 
and knowledge, and besides philosophers, 
epistemologists, and linguists, 
mathematicians and informaticians, as well 
as experts in education, psychology, 
sociology and other social sciences, or 
knowledge-managers like librarians, have 
been for long interested in the topic. 
Starting with information, 
cybernetics deserves a mention, which pro-
vides one of the foundations of information 
theory. Cybernetics was introduced by nature 
scientist Wiener2 (1948), who defines 
information as probability, and claims that its 
simplest form is a choice between two 
equally probable simple alternatives (0 or 1 
in the binary scale), and thus “the number of 
choices made and the consequent amount of 
information is infinite” (Sveiby, 1994/98). 
Besides pointing out the quantifiability, 
measurability of information, Wiener also 
launched the tradition of thinking about 
information as something organised into a 
system, connected to decisions, feedback 
mechanisms in communication and control 
(Farkas, 2002:73). These two 
conceptualisations of information – as 
quantifiable objects, i.e. facts, and as a 
process, that is, communication - are innate 
to the thinking of system theory, informatics 
and computer science.  
The mathematician Shannon3 
defines information as a purely quantitative 
measure of communicative exchanges. As 
claimed by the information theory rooted in 
                                                 
2 Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) born in the U.S.A., was 
primarily a mathematician. Besides mathematics and 
cybernetics, he published works also on mathematical 
physics and philosophical issues. His work 
“Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the 
Animal and the Machine” (1948) was based on 
findings about the role of bioelectric signals (Sveiby 
1994/98). He was greatly influenced by Leibniz, and 
he used the Greek word ‘kubernetike’ (steersman of a 
ship) to describe “the theory of regulation and of 
signal transmission applied to technical devices, living 
beings and even societies” (ISSS). 
3 Claude Shannon (1916-2001), a mathematician in 
the U.S., had a degree in electric engineering as well, 
and worked for the Bell Laboratories for almost three 
decades. His paper titled “A mathematical theory of 
communication” initiated the subject of information 
theory, and the idea (which was then yet new) to 
transmit pictures, words, sounds by sending a stream 
of 1/ 0 -s via a wire, also originates from his new, 
linear schematic model of a communications system 
(Bell Labs Computing and Mathematical Sciences 
Research Division). 
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Shannon’s definition, it is indifferent whether 
it is a fact, a judgement, a lie or just nonsense 
that is communicated: according to him, 
everything transmitted over a telephone line 
is information.4  He attributes the word 
‘information’ not only with a technical 
meaning but also, a measure (binary digits, or 
in short, bits). For instance, the physicist 
Bekenstein however, does not share this 
point of view. He claims that information has 
many levels of meaning, various relations to 
‘truth’, and several forms and purposes, 
based on which he distinguishes between a 
simple sensory input, a message, a pattern, or 
an influence (2003:58).  
There have been a few social 
scientists bold enough to enter the perilous 
field of information theory. Anthropologist 
Bateson5 maintains for example that “the 
elementary unit of information – is a 
difference which makes a difference” 
(Bateson, 1072:453, his italics). This is in 
harmony with the etymological-semantic 
origins of the term ‘information’: it is derived 
from the Latin verb informare meaning ‘give 
form to’ (Oxford English Dictionary). 
Therefore information is the form that is 
given to some ‘mass’ to distinguish it from 
the rest, and also, it is the ‘system’ that 
Wiener argues for (as opposed to Shannon’s 
‘chaos’).  
                                                 
4 It is interesting to observe that in this case, two 
mathematicians, and at the same time, defined 
information in two opposite ways: Wiener described it 
as the order, the system in things; while Shannon 
regarded it as entropy, as chaos. It is interesting to see, 
nevertheless, that for some other authors who attempt 
to define ‘information’, having a truthful, valuable 
meaning is a basic requirement. Shannon’s critiques 
suggest that his model should rather be called “signal 
transmission theory” instead of “information theory” 
(Sveiby, 1994/98). 
5 Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) was born in Britain, 
and moved to the United States later. He was involved 
in many different areas of study: he moved through 
zoology, psychology, anthropology and ethnology. He 
was not only a contemporary but also a colleague of 
Wiener and Shannon, and several other thinkers of 
cybernetics. His best known writings are included in 
his books, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 1973, and 
Mind and Nature, 1980 (Associazione Oikos). 
By contrast, there are enthusiasts, 
who consider ‘information’ already as the 
alpha and omega of basically everything. The 
following citation from an IT magazine 
declares this passionately: 
  
Information is an activity. Information is a life form. 
Information is a relationship. Information is a verb not 
a noun, it is something that happens in the field of 
interaction between minds or objects or other pieces of 
information. Information is an action which occupies 
time rather than a state of being which occupies 
physical space. (Wired, March 1994) 
 
One can discover some confusion 
even in the definition provided by the 
prestigious Oxford English Dictionary, where 
information is linked both to knowledge and 
communication. 
 
Information is “Knowledge communicated concerning 
some particular fact, subject or event; that of which 
one is apprised or told; intelligence, news.” (Oxford 
English Dictionary) 
 
So ‘information’ can refer to both 
facts in themselves, and the transmission of 
them. Yet the term ‘knowledge’ included in 
the quote above, gives reason for some alert: 
are information and knowledge in any way 
equal to or directly, identical with, each 
other? Some on-line encyclopaedias, such as 
wordiq.com in fact, deliberately warn the 
reader about the richness of these concepts 
and the fact that these notions are closely 
related, but not identical, and that they are 
often misused, even confused: 
 
Information is a term with many meanings depending 
on context, but is as a rule closely related to such 
concepts as meaning, knowledge, instruction, 
communication, representation, and mental stimulus. 
(…) Although many people speak of the advent of the 
"information age," the "information society," and 
information technologies, and even though 
information science and computer science are often in 
the spotlight, the word "information" is often used 
without careful consideration of the various meanings 
it has come to acquire. (Word IQ defining 
‘information’) 
 
Society has always been organised 
around information, since it is a key resource 
for decision-making. People make millions 
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of simple and complicated choices every day 
of their lives based on the information they 
receive directly or indirectly. Companies 
invest in obtaining information about 
demand, competitors, innovation and the 
regulatory environment; so do political 
decision-makers act and communities 
organise themselves: relying on the pieces of 
information they gather through different 
channels. Of course, these actors themselves 
supply and disseminate information, too. 
Information management is a crucial task to 
all, ranging from national scientific networks 
and regional information systems to local 
organisations and individual citizens. Being 
cut from information permanently usually 
leads to serious malfunction. Information, 
though not in itself, can mean a competitive 
advantage. Yet this depends not only on its 
quality (its shape, its credibility, validity, 
relevance, confidentiality or publicity, its 
timing and speed of delivery, etc.) but on the 
ability of the decision-maker to process and 
use it adequately in certain situations. 
Dispatching, receiving, interpreting and 
utilising information by unprivileged groups 
and communities in the rural/peripheral 
regions is even the more important 
concerning the risks of their further falling 
behind the rest of society in socio-economic 
development.  
 
 
2.1.2 Conceptualising knowledge 
 
There has recently been an 
explosion of information, yet this does not 
necessarily mean an increase in knowledge 
(Dénes, 2000). Information may be a crucial 
resource, yet it can contain much noise and 
disorganisation; it is “its value of utility 
which matters, not its quantity” (Farkas 
2002:53; translated by S.N.). The most 
common stance is that as structure contains 
more information than chaos, by 
‘engineering’ information (i.e. by ‘adding 
value’ to, by selecting, construing and 
updating it) it can be turned into knowledge 
(Sveiby, 1994/98). It seems, put in a  simple 
way, that while some kind of (not necessarily 
direct and inter-personal) communication is 
usually a prerequisite for information, 
knowledge is not an indispensable, but only a 
potential ‘outcome’ of information.  
Bell6 defines knowledge as “a set of 
organised statements of facts and ideas, 
presenting a reasoned judgement or an 
experimental result, which is transmitted to 
others through some communication medium 
in some systematic form” (Bell, 1974:175). 
The keywords here are ‘organised’, 
‘reasoned’, ‘communicated’, and 
‘systematic’, distinguishing knowledge from 
news and entertainment. Bell claims that his 
definition concentrates more on what is 
known. 
Machlup’s7 is a broader, more 
comprehensive approach; and a subjective 
interpretation. “(A)ccording to the meaning 
which the knower attaches to the known, that 
is who knows and why and what for” 
(Machlup, 1962:21), there are five types: 
practical (professional), intellectual (i.e. 
fulfilling one’s intellectual curiosity), small-
talk and pastime, spiritual / religious, and 
unwanted knowledge.8  
                                                 
6 Daniel Bell is known for his theory of the post-
industrial society (1974), and proposes economic and 
occupational definitions of the information age. 
7 His work to identify the ‘information industries’ 
links Fritz Machlup (1902-1983), an Austrian-born 
economist closest to the economic conceptualisation 
of the I.S. phenomenon; see more below (p. 33). 
8 Bell argues that definitions by Machlup and others 
are neither wrong nor right: they are “boundaries of 
usage”. For the purposes of social policy, however, i.e. 
to determine the allotment of societal resources, he 
feels the need to propose a restricted, utilitarian 
definition that of knowledge “objectively known”, or 
“intellectual property” (Bell 1974:175). By the latter 
he means certified, socially recognised publications, 
which are value-judged by the market, by 
administrative or political decision-makers or by 
peers, commissioned by the communication and 
educational media, etc. This narrow definition is 
required for ‘measuring’ knowledge, too.  
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 According to Polanyi9, knowledge 
is action oriented, a dynamic process itself. 
This means that knowledge or the process of 
knowing is synonymous with ‘learning’. 
Also, Polanyi and several other thinkers on 
the subject argue that there are ‘tacit’ 
(underlying, implicit, unreflected, or 
informal) and ‘focal’ (explicit, codified) 
levels of knowledge. In the course of the 
cognitive processes, we use implicit / tacit 
knowledge as a tool to gather more (explicit) 
knowledge, some of which will be 
incorporated into the former. Human beings 
are constantly switching between these two 
levels, and hence our basic ability “to blend 
the old and well-known with the new and 
unforeseen”, without which we could not live 
in the world (Sveiby, 1997). Another 
important thesis of Polanyi’s is that 
knowledge is public as well as to a high 
degree, personal. Knowledge contains very 
personal emotions, so-called passions (e.g. of 
discovery), and it is socially communicated, 
expressed. “Socially conveyed knowledge 
blends with the experience of reality of the 
individual” (Sveiby, 1997).  
Knowledge is a term increasingly 
dominant in discourses of development, 
especially through its being essential in 
innovation processes (e.g. Calestous and 
Yee-Cheong, 2005). 
What Andersson (1989) suggests as 
a hierarchy of knowing deserves some 
consideration, too. The order he proposes is 
based on how rules are followed. The lowest 
level of knowing is skill: it means following 
rules which can be controlled by the subject 
itself. On the next stage, rules are established 
by a social context outside the individual (a 
professional institution, or a tradition), and 
pursuing them results in obtaining know-
how. Know-how is ‘procedural knowledge’, 
and it involves problem solving. The highest 
level of knowing is competence or expertise, 
                                                 
9 Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) born in Hungary, 
started his career by gaining doctoral degrees both in 
medicine and physics in Budapest and Karlsruhe. 
After emigration to Britain, he shifted to social science 
and philosophy. His most famous work is Personal 
Knowledge (1958). 
which is in fact, know-how complemented 
with the ability of reflection: being able (and 
entitled) to not only submit but change or 
influence the rules themselves. Expertise is 
“a relation between individual actors and a 
social system of rules” (Sveiby, 1997). All 
three levels contain elements of both tacit 
and focal knowledge as two, complementary 
dimensions of the same knowledge. 
Thrift points out that “social 
knowing” or the constant practices of 
creating the stocks of knowledge (Thrift 
1996: 97) are embedded in time and space. 
The actors’ capacity to use and generate 
knowledge is limited by these contexts, i.e. 
by their biographically distinctive 
experience.  Besides, the availability of 
empirical knowledge10 has always been to 
some extent, spatially uneven, regardless of 
the current technology. The distribution of 
knowledge in society depends on the various 
aspects of social structuration (gender, age, 
race, class, state and region) and their 
different combinations; and “is associated 
with institutional nodes like home, school, 
university or office which form a set of 
points that selectively channel the life-paths 
of actors according to their membership of a 
particular social group” (Thrift, 1996: 114). 
Even knowledge that is only indirectly linked 
with practical needs, but which tries to “unify 
a number of bodies of knowledge into one 
whole, as knowledge about knowledge” 
(Thrift, 1996: 105; i.e. “natural philosophy”) 
evolves through a long period of time and 
depends on the availability and type of the 
stocks of knowledge it builds from. In this 
sense, or ‘timespace-geographically’ (May 
and Thrift, 2003), the accumulated 
knowledge stocks in a specific location or 
region may therefore be understood simply 
as ‘culture’.  
To put it briefly, knowing and 
learning are subjective, relational, space and 
time dependent. Yet, “the fact that 
                                                 
10 Thrift describes empirical knowledge as the kind of 
knowledge that can be distanciated in time and space 
from the experiences, e.g. in codified, printed, 
digitalised form (Thrift 1996: 103). 
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knowledge is physically available does not 
mean that it has to be acted upon nor that it is 
unquestioned or undisputed” (Thrift, 1996: 
97). It does not mean either, that it is 
interpreted and used as relevant to the given 
context. Knowledge definitely has ‘a 
geography’, and therefore must play an 
imperative role in regional development, 
which is discussed in 2.3. 
 
 
2.1.3 Measuring, selecting and managing 
information / knowledge 
 
In view of the above, let us now 
consider the following statements, the likes 
of which are rather common in mass media 
articles and political speeches, and which 
also have made their ways into academic 
accounts:  
 
The amount of knowledge in the world has doubled in 
the past 10 years and is doubling every 18 months 
according to the American Society of Training and 
Documentation … (Gonzalez, 2004 – the author is 
Enterprise Information System Training/Computing 
Administration Manager) 
 
This is the “Information Age”. Half of what we know 
today, we did not know fifteen years ago. The amount 
of knowledge has doubled in the last fifteen years and 
is said to be doubling again every eighteen months. 
(Wetmore, ‘Productivity Institute, Time Management 
Seminars’ CT USA, on ‘Speed reading’) 
 
Explosion of the information - There are projections 
that enunciate that the total amount of humanity 
knowledge doubled from 1750-1900, and that this one 
doubled again from 1900-1950, and from 1960-1965 
(…) According to the projections for the 2020, the 
knowledge can be doubled every 73 days. 
(Appleberry, 1992; in a university speech titled 
“Changes in our future...” – quote taken from 
Morgan.)  
 
Most of these statements are based 
on measurements of such as the volume of 
scientific articles (which method in fact, Bell 
suggested, too)11, or expenditures on R&D, 
                                                 
11 Bell relies on the calculations by a university 
librarian, F. Rider, and D. Price’s more generalised 
findings: “In recent years we have become 
accustomed to the statement that the ‘amount’ of 
etc., so they are based on the assumption that 
the input in the production or the sheer 
quantity, of symbols directly equals the 
‘amount of knowledge’. There is no need 
after having mustered up the above theses 
and definitions to explain why these claims 
are at least, suspicious.   
To be fair, not all popular accounts 
refer to knowledge as to something 
quantifiable and compare volumes of human 
knowledge across time confusing not only 
information, but the dimension of data flow 
with knowledge. The missing links between 
data (through information) towards 
knowledge, and then, to know-how and 
expertise constitutes the active and creative 
mind of the individual persons and their 
social contexts (rules, traditions, networks). 
An implication to the significance of the 
Mind and also, the role of technology as a 
tool, is made in the following extract of a 
news report: 
 
Worldwide information production has increased by 
30 percent each year between 1999 and 2002, 
according to the team led by professors Peter Lyman 
and Hal Varian of the School of Information 
Management and Systems. (…) "Remember, it's not 
knowledge, just data," cautioned Lyman. "It takes 
thoughtful people using smart technologies to figure 
out how to make sense of all this information." 
(Maclay, 2003; UC Berkeley News.)  
                                                                          
knowledge is increasing at an exponential rate (…) in 
the early part of the eighteenth century, the Yale 
library possessed somewhere around 1,000 volumes.. 
had continued … to double every sixteen years… ” , 
“‘it seems beyond reasonable doubt that the literature 
in  any normal, growing field of science increases 
exponentially, with a doubling time in an interval 
ranging from about ten to about fifteen years’” 
(1974:177; 180 quote from Price, 1961). Bell 
discusses the idea of the limit of growth, a saturation 
point in a theoretical S-curve. However, the S-curve 
model is only applicable to close systems, fixed 
environments. To Bell’s credit, however, it is 
important to note that he recognised the difference 
between (the utilitarian, objective) ‘gross’ and (the 
socially complicated, subjective) ‘net’ measures of 
scientific knowledge: “To plan for social policy on the 
basis of such plotted curves would be highly 
misleading. To deal with such questions, we have to 
turn to less ‘exact’ but sociologically more meaningful 
observations on the patterns of the development of 
knowledge” (Sveiby, 1974:185).  
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As soon as one leaves the level of 
‘bits’ and data becomes at least a symbol, 
with a meaning that makes sense to at least 
one human being, a cacophony of ideas is set 
off. We face all the problems and conceptual 
ambiguities mentioned above. The progress 
from data to knowledge and wisdom is far 
not simple or linear.  
Consequently, the further we get 
from data and facts, the least measurable 
these entities turn out to be - as they become 
more and more socially sensitive and shaped. 
Measuring the amount of existing knowledge 
possessed by a society, or in a field of 
science, or weighing the knowledge an 
individual has, is of course, nonsense. How 
much has been forgotten, how much do we 
actually preserve in our minds? What is 
useful and relevant knowledge (and to whom, 
and when…)? What knowledge is more 
useful and important than other knowledge? 
How can an outsider know the ‘amount’ of 
knowledge an individual holds? Even the 
person him- or herself does not know. Then 
there is a problem occurring at the point of 
communication (or ‘publication’): what, and 
how well do I communicate (publish) in a 
particular situation? How does the receiver 
understand and integrate the meaning of my 
communication? What is the real importance, 
the weight of a scientific article? (The 
citation index?) These are just few of the 
questions that point at the inaccuracy of 
attempts at measuring the growth in the 
quantity and ‘flows’ of information, skills, 
know-how, and knowledge.  
Furthermore, there are authors 
concerned with such phenomena as 
‘information overload’ and ‘information 
anxiety’. The former is a term introduced by 
Alvin Toffler as early as in 1969. After three 
decades everyone in the developed world 
understands through their own experience 
what this concept means, and how it feels. 
Sveiby (1997) makes an important 
observation concerning the un-fixed nature of 
information, which has been accentuated by 
the latest technological developments:  
“digitised information in networks like 
Internet has no ‘final cut’ … (a)s in oral 
tradition, it is copied and added in a 
continuous process”. This phenomenon 
increases our sensation of the information 
overload.  
Closely related to this is ‘information 
anxiety’, which means “the black hole 
between data and knowledge”, i.e. the 
frustration that is triggered by the constantly 
widening gap between what we comprehend 
and what we think we need to, or should 
understand; which in fact limits people to 
being only seekers of, and not allowing time 
for them to reflect upon, knowledge 
(Wurman, 1989; Breivik, 1997). 
A trend towards ‘relative ignorance’ 
has been noticed lately (Charter), which is 
triggered by the recent technological 
development: ICTs have increased our 
individual technological capacity to process, 
exchange, etc. information, while our mental 
capabilities to deal with it are constant. Even 
with technology to help the individual (i.e., 
even with our “social capacity”, that is the 
combination of all individual capacities and 
ICTs), “the amount of knowledge that each 
of us hold as individuals is becoming a 
smaller proportion of the total amount of 
knowledge held by society”12 The result is 
that we are becoming relatively more 
ignorant compared to the total knowledge 
that society produces and embraces.  
The capacity to critically detect what 
makes sense and what is valuable in a 
definite situation – at a certain time and in a 
peculiar place, to a given person or group of 
people, for a certain purpose – helps elevate 
the pressure of the information overload. 
This ability (or as Hemingway put it once in 
a rather colourful and straightforward way, 
the “crap detector”; Jeffs – Smith, 1999: 26-
27) is partly a learnt skill: one obtains it 
through formal and informal education, via 
practice, and in the course of social 
interaction. The tools are diverse, yet some 
sort of communication is always involved in 
the process. In addition, the given social 
                                                 
12  Note here again, the quantitative approach to 
knowledge and the confusion of the concepts 
‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. 
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context, determined by both place and time, 
defines the value, the relevance of 
information and knowledge. 
 So, neither information nor 
knowledge can be observed and interpreted 
in themselves, quantified and weighed in an 
absolute way, isolated from their human, 
social (geographical) contexts, detached from 
time and space. In the courses of complicated 
processes, ranging from those occurring 
within the individual mind (the microcosm, 
the unique identity, life-history of and the 
consequent perception and understanding by, 
the individual), to the inter-personal 
interactions guided and driven by rules, 
traditions, institutions, and requirements 
defined by a community or society (and 
culture), pieces of information and 
knowledge are being constantly re-valuated 
and contested. The blurriness of the 
conceptual borderline between information 
and knowledge, and the disturbing issues of 
measurability, ‘information overload’, 
‘relative ignorance’ and ‘information 
anxiety’, are all rooted in human and social 
contextuality. The involvement of the 
individual and collective minds is both the 
origin and the resolution of the same 
problem.  
To sum up the above, I see 
information as a collection or shape of facts 
and events that condition our choices. 
Information is communicated and via the 
intervention of intelligence, overview and 
interpretation it may become knowledge. 
Skills are practical knowledge that develop 
through application (experience), and can be 
further transformed into special know-how in 
a particular environment through internal 
trial and error as much as through external 
(social) criticism and suggestions. Finally, 
our wisdom is being enriched over time 
while knowledge is overviewed in reflection 
to, and contested with, that of others and of 
earlier times. Obviously, this is not a linear 
process, and the factors of time, spatial and 
social interactions, review, communication, 
and learning are increasingly significant 
along the intricate paths from facts to 
wisdom.  
2.1.4 Technology: ICT realities  
 
“The problem with communication ... is the 
illusion that it has been accomplished.” 
George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) 
 
“The more elaborate our means of 
communication, the less we communicate.” 
Joseph Priestly 
(English Chemist and Clergyman, 1733-1804) 
 
It may not be surprising having 
understood the reflections above, that the 
term ‘technology’ has several levels in 
meaning, too. First, according to the Czech 
philosopher, Richta, it covers “the material 
entities created by the application of mental 
and physical effort to nature in order to 
achieve some value” (1963; my italics). As 
such, it can be a simple tool or a complicated 
machine. One may include here manuals and 
instructions on how to use these tools, too. 
Second, there is an interpretation as 
technique, meaning the current state of our 
knowledge how to combine resources to 
make the desired products, how to solve 
problems and fulfil needs. So, technology, in 
this meaning, is some sort of knowledge. 
Third, it may be perceived as a cultural 
force; e.g. in these terms was the invention of 
writing a technological one (Borgmann, 
2006).  
How do these different meanings of 
‘technology’ relate to ICTs – information and 
communication, or network technologies? 
Firstly, in concrete, materialised form, ICTs 
include an endless record of visible and 
tangible machinery, equipments starting with 
telephones, radio and television sets, 
computers and their all related input / output 
peripheries and extensions (modems, 
memory cards, digital cameras, and so on); 
big servers, the physical network 
infrastructures; mobile phones and related 
objects like transmitter stations, etc. This is 
an ever growing list particularly because of 
their convergence with the broadcasting 
media as well as other breakthrough (e.g. 
bio-, nano-, etc.) technologies which blurs 
the borders between categories, and 
multiplies solutions.  
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Secondly, none of these ‘smart 
gadgets’ would function properly, or could 
be joined into a single network without the 
‘techniques’ of digitalisation, shared 
protocols, languages etc., not to mention the 
skills and knowledge about how to use and 
combine them, that is owned, developed and 
exercised by people. The various types of 
network technologies through which the 
World Wide Web and on-line services in 
general may be accessed belong here as they 
are constructed of a great diversity of 
material components and are the results of 
converging techniques, too. 
A great number of competing 
network solutions (infrastructures, techniques 
and services) for narrow and broadband data 
transmission have emerged through 
innovations driven by the needs of society. 
The oldest technologies that have been used 
are analogue telephone lines combined with 
modems, and ISDN. They are commonly 
defined as narrowband connections, and are 
often considered outdated if not a sign of 
disadvantage13. Certainly, they provide for 
only slow data transmission, and a dial-up 
mode of connection (the latter usually means 
pay-per-minute); as opposed to the much 
faster broadband technologies, some of 
which involve flat-rate pricing allowing 
unlimited usage. This difference matters a lot 
concerning consumer behaviour – meaning 
how much, when and for what Internet is 
used. 
There is a multitude of rival and 
complementary technologies that can deliver 
broadband services, and each of them has its 
                                                 
13 However, ISDN (Integrated Services Digital 
Network) was a great breakthrough in the early-
nineties because it can make simultaneous data 
transfer and voice services possible along the same 
telephone subscription line. It is true though, that its 
original ‘baseband’ version does not exceed the 
capacities of the analogue line solution (both can 
support data transfer rates of 64 Kbps). There has been 
a development towards a B-ISDN (1.5 Mbps), yet it 
could not become wide-spread due to the emergence 
of more economical, reliable and efficient solutions, 
such as cable TV and xDSL. This is an example of 
competing cycles of diffusion and adoption (see 
below, in this same section.) 
limits in terms of coverage (or range, from 
less than 1 to several thousands of 
kilometres), data-speed (i.e. bandwidth 
capacities between a couple of Mbps to 
several Gbps), costs and reliability. 
Broadband solutions are commonly grouped 
into fixed-line and wireless technologies.  
The fixed broadband solutions can be 
based on existing infrastructures (xDSL, 
cable modem, powerlines), as well as 
networks that have to be constructed from 
scratch (fibre lines).  xDSL systems utilise 
the twisted copper pair that traditionally 
facilitates voice services. The hybrid fibre-
coax cable-TV networks provide the basis for 
cable modem connections, and powerline-
broadband utilises the power lines feeding 
into the subscriber’s home for transmitting 
signals. Optical fibre networks have the 
highest capacity, but they need a lot of 
investment as they are separate from existing 
infrastructures. They may carry signals 
directly to the subscriber or to a node (in the 
street, in the block) where they are combined 
with other broadband solutions that make the 
ultimate links to individual households. 
Wireless broadband technologies 
include for example: data transmission via 
microwave (which have approx. 5 km reach 
but low data rates); Wi-fi (that is usually a 
highly local system providing radio 
connections to the end users), Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (with two-way, high-
speed capabilities and large coverage but a 
delay in transmission), and 3G mobile 
networks (yet, with lower data-speeds).14  
It is important to note here that the 
network technologies described above cannot 
be put in any from-poorest-to-best order: 
their assessment is along at least four 
dimensions (coverage, costs, reliability and 
speed), and each has its weaknesses and 
strengths. The contexts where they are 
applied matter a lot: the peculiar 
geographical setting (e.g. the topography, 
                                                 
14 3G:  traditional GSM technology up-graded with an 
overlay of GPRS; also called: UMTS – Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications Services. The exact 
technical information in this section is extracted from 
Corning Inc. 2005. 
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settlement patterns), potentially supportive 
existing infrastructure, and various aspects of 
social-economic demand. The importance 
lies in the way ICTs match these 
circumstances and requirements the best; and 
therefore, it is difficult to compare 
infrastructure across the spatial-social 
diversity based on absolute technological 
attributes (e.g. measuring digital divides 
merely in terms of bandwidths; see more on 
this in 2.3.2). Frequently, the solution in 
place is some sort of unique combination of 
several technologies (permitted by 
techniques of convergence).  Yet, there is a 
technocratic and commercial tendency 
pressing for the most state-of-the-art ICTs (in 
this case, usually meaning the greatest 
bandwidth), and can easily lead decision-
making astray. 
The relationality of these network 
solutions is also evident in their competing 
cycles of diffusion and adoption. The 
emergence of a new technology (product, 
service; e.g. ADSL) that promises to fulfil a 
specific societal function (e.g. digital 
network for communication) at a higher 
quality or / and at lower costs than old 
solutions (e.g. ISDN) take over the latter, and 
disrupts their S-curves of adaptation.15 
However, there can be many uncertainties 
involved that shape these curves and the 
timing of the disruption is often planned and 
calculated by the investors to maximise 
profit. 
Although the emphasis in the above 
discussion is on internet-technologies, it is 
important to note that the more traditional 
info-communication tools and techniques 
such as different kinds of printed and 
                                                 
15 The diffusion or life cycle of an innovation, a 
technological trajectory can be represented graphically 
by a logistic or so called ‘S-curve’ of cumulative 
adoption: it is made up of an initial phase of 
innovators and early adopters, a dynamic rise or 
‘takeoff’ period, and a stabilizing phase of late 
adopters. It plots the percentage of adopters on the 
vertical axis with time on the horizontal one. Its 
original concept coined by the French sociologist 
Tarde (1903) was furthered by American sociologist 
and communications researcher, Rogers in his work 
titled ‘Diffusion of innovations’ (1962).  
broadcasting media still play important roles 
in the society today. However, they are 
increasingly getting digitalised and available 
on the net via, and converging with, the new 
ICTs, following and generating social 
demand. In fact, this way they become 
themselves part of the on-line content. 
(Consider for instance, Skype, as an example 
for services between on-line to land-line 
telephones; e-books and e-journals; 
local/national radio stations and TV channels 
globally receivable via the Internet: are they 
‘technologies’ or content?) People, having 
previous knowledge and experience of the 
traditional media forms may use more and 
more frequently their digital ‘equivalents’, 
realising at the same time both the relative 
shortcomings and the new potentials of 
digital ICTs. 
 So finally, recognising the 
mutuality and the interactions between 
society and technology (and recalling the 
quotation from above), one is led to the 
cultural interpretation of technology in 
general, and of ICTs, in particular. This 
cultural approach is unavoidable when 
studying regional inequalities in the I.S. 
 
 
2.2 Understanding Information Society 
 
The concepts of information, 
knowledge, technology, have been frequently 
applied to signify current changes in society, 
and used in the context of the rise of an 
Information Society. It causes me some sense 
of discomfort when I have to use this term, 
though: there are as many connotations and 
definitions attached to it as many times it 
occurs in academic, political or more popular 
texts and speeches. On the other hand, it is 
just a term, a fashionable symbol; the debate 
should not be focused on how a set of 
phenomena should be called but more on the 
nature of the processes that have emerged in 
the world, in our lives and society, and the 
reason why they could set off the production 
of such terms. Neither do I endeavour here to 
provide a clear-cut definition. Information 
society is a blurry but easy to remember 
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catchword which, like a ping-pong ball, 
bounces back and forth between political 
rhetoric and academic language; yet during 
this game it is constantly criticised, contested 
and re-conceptualised. With no intention to 
replicate earlier accounts (e.g. Beniger, 1991; 
Pintér, 2004; Farkas 2002; Karvalics, 2002; 
Webster, 2002), I give a brief summary of 
the intellectual challenges and solutions 
concerning this problem in order to explain 
why it is the cultural conceptualisation of the 
I.S. that I reckon the most relevant approach 
for the purposes of this work. 
 
 
2.2.1 Information society: a border concept 
and political rhetoric 
 
Politics or governments are 
interested in a ‘social problem’ only if they 
perceive in it some kind of a ‘political 
problem’, if they see it as a challenge, a 
potential source of crisis, a threat to national 
security, or a chance to lose their position in 
global competition (Farkas, 2002:32-33). 
This is definitely true for the I.S. as a social 
problem, and therefore it is a highly political 
issue, too, starting already with its 
definition.16  
In fact, the term ‘information 
society’ was coined for political purposes by 
the Japanese sociologist, Yoneji Masuda 
(1905-1995). He was the leading character of 
the “Japan Computer Usage Development 
Institute” in the 1970s, a project initiated by 
the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade. 
JACUDI was in charge of drafting a far-
reaching plan for the country titled "The Plan 
for Information Society – A national goal 
toward the year 2000", the English version of 
which was published in 1980 with the title 
"The Information Society as Post-industrial 
Society." The original work incorporated 
status reports on the Japanese efforts as well 
as Masuda's views, anticipations and 
recommendations concerning the societal 
                                                 
16 See concrete examples below in Chapter 3 (UN, 
EU), and especially in sections 4.2.2 (Finland), and 
4.3.4 (Hungary). 
effects of the complex technological systems 
he then saw unfolding. (Montagnini, 2003.) 
Throughout the past few decades, 
there have been other examples of scholars 
working for their governments writing 
reports about or recommendations for, the 
elaboration of technological programmes or a 
national I.S.: Brzezinski (security advisor 
under Carter’s presidency and chief expert of 
globalisation – 1969), Bell (chief theorist on 
the post-industrial society – 1973),  Sola Poll 
(theorist of the ‘free flow of information’ – 
1983),  Reich (the inventor of the ‘National 
Information Infrastructure’) in the United 
States; Nora and Minc (with their report on 
the information society for the president – 
1978) in France; and Lyotard (the author of 
the report about knowledge in the I.S. for the 
government of Quebec – 1979) in Canada; all 
drafted their visions instructed by some 
governmental department. (Montagnini, 
2003.)17 In most of these cases, the 
terminology lived on both in the political 
language and academic debates, corroborated 
by mutual reference. 
 Yet, the issue of the I.S. is a 
sensitive and a much ‘hyped’ one. 
Consequently, definitions are rarely neutral, 
for they always show who is defining the 
object and for what purpose. There is an 
extremely high number of stakeholders. 
Economic and consequently political 
interests are enormous in technology for the 
reason that the ICT industries comprise the 
most competitive and profitable sector of the 
‘new economy’. These technologies, 
converging and adapting to fit more and 
more purposes, have infused virtually all 
social and economic activities. Their 
significance in the overall transformation 
                                                 
17 The relevant works: Bell: The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting 
(1973); Brzezinski: Between Two Ages. America’s 
Role in the Technotronic Era (1969); Lyotard: The 
Postmodern Condition (1979); Nora – Minc: 
L’informatisation de la société, Paris, La 
documentation française, 1978; Reich: The Work of 
Nations. Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century 
Capitalism (1991); Sola Pool: Technologies of 
freedom (1983).  
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gets a special, as well as an exaggerated 
accent because direct / indirect financial 
interests in technological innovation, 
investments in ICT infrastructure and 
network services influence critical decisions. 
Besides, ICTs and the printed and 
broadcasted media (along with their on-line 
forms) are closely connected, the latter being 
not only dominant users, but stakeholders, 
advertisers of the former. Definitions of the 
present era and society are of great 
significance not only for social theory, but in 
‘practice’, since policy needs to draw on 
abstract concepts and symbols, too. Yet, 
definitions are frequently (ab)used by 
political and corporate propaganda, and 
obscured by the ‘independent’ media. 
On the other hand, some grand 
expressions are loosely defined or inaccurate 
for a just reason: they are so-called 
“boundary concepts”, i.e. due to their 
fuzziness, they are “able to reorganize 
debates between different disciplines, 
discourses or fields of life”, and “facilitate 
interdisciplinary dialogue” (Miettinen, 
2002:18). They may stay imprecise for their 
entire life span, and “continue to play an 
important heuristic role in the construction of 
new knowledge”, and the dynamics of 
scientific ideologies (ibid. 20).18 This must 
be the way also how I.S. is getting anchored 
in everyday thinking and is transformed into 
an object of planning.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Miettinen (2002) gives a through account on this 
problem concerning the term “national innovation 
system”, (which is a boundary metaphor) relying on 
various other authors. An interesting point is that 
scientific ideology makes claims “under the pressure 
of pragmatic needs” which “go beyond what has 
actually been proved by research” (ibid. 20). Policy 
exerts pragmatic pressure on science: tentative 
boundary concepts that otherwise encourage a rich 
interdisciplinary debate in academic circles, are 
simplified for policy, and extended beyond what is 
scientifically proved. Then science again, tries to 
clarify the concept taking a critical stance to political 
rhetoric. 
2.2.2 Making sense of our times: attempts by 
science 
 
The ‘information age’ (or by 
whichever term we might call the 
phenomenon) has had a relatively long 
history as a subject of academic thinking, 
along which a diversity of approaches and 
explanations have emerged, all trying to get a 
grip on the main features, some criteria 
suitable to identify, and even measure ‘what 
is new’19. Although the various definitions of 
the I.S. are not mutually exclusive, and most 
of their thinkers are difficult to position 
explicitly into a single school, they do vary 
considerably according to their emphases. 
Adopting more or less the categories 
proposed by Webster (2002), we can 
distinguish between: 
 
• … technological, 
• economic-occupational, 
• and spatial-cultural  
 
conceptualisations of the transformations 
under way (see Table1 below). The scholars 
representing the various perspectives come 
from a rather wide range of disciplines 
(nature sciences, informatics, sociology, 
philosophy, economics, and social 
geography). Although all agree to the point 
that ‘information’ has a special relevance in 
the present world, they are divergent in their 
understanding and explanation of “what form 
this information took, why it was central to 
our present systems, and how it was affecting 
social, economic and political relationships” 
(Webster, 2002:2). Table 1 lists some of the 
strands of thinking (and the years and titles 
of major publications) on the topic, loosely 
categorised into a ‘school of approach’ to I.S. 
from the technocratic points of view to more 
holistic stances. A few of the main 
characteristics and tendencies (i.e. ‘inputs’)
                                                 
19 Criteria and measures are looked for partly because 
of the pragmatic pressure by policy. See also 2.2.3.  
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  Table 1. Theoretical perspectives on the I.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Input’ - main features 
observed ‘Output’ -- consequence Proponents (relevant works) 
 
Technological innovations 
First phase (1960s):  micro-
electronics, miniaturisation, 
robotics 
Second phase (1990s-): digital 
revolution, space & biotech. , 
artificial intelligence and 
nanotech. (and the convergence 
of all the above) 
Moore's Law, Digital 
Revolution, and the expansion 
of the Internet. 
 
 
Techno-deterministic  
utopias or dystopias 
 
(T.-enthusiasm/optimism 
or T.–phobia/pessimism) 
Tidal waves of technological 
development. 
Being global, prime, equal, and 
‘unterritorial’… 
 
(Futurologists:)  
 
Toffler (1972; 1980),  
Naisbitt (1984),  
Pearson (1998; 2005)  
 
 
Negroponte (1996, 1998) 
 
Speed technologies 
 
Dromological societies, 
deterritorialisation 
 
Virilio (1977) 
 
The volume of technological 
innovation, the scale of its 
diffusion in social–economic 
activities. 
 
The third “tidal wave”.  
‘Creative destruction’ 
(Schumpeter) and Kondratiev’s 
long waves of economic 
development. 
Neo-Schumpeterian school  Great 
Britain 
(Also some political documents: 
e.g. Charter on Global 
Information Society -G8 Summer 
2000 Meeting)  
‘Information public utility’ 
infrastructure. 
 
Informational communism 
I.S. as post-industrial society 
 
Masuda (1980) 
 
The weight and growth of 
primary and secondary 
‘information industries’; 
knowledge-production 
workers. 
 
Information-based economy  
Machlup (1960s) 
Porat (1977) 
 
The rise of the service sector, 
the white-collar jobs. 
 
Post-industrial society. 
Consumerism. 
Bell (1973) 
Know-how as raw material 
New labour force: ‘thinking 
smart’, inventive, developing 
and exploiting networks. A 
global super-class. 
 
 
Weightless society, new 
capitalism; ‘living on thin air’.  
Inequality as an acute feature of 
modern societies. 
 
Leadbeater (1999, 2000) 
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“Symbolic analysts” 
Restructuring, globalisation, 
fluidity of capital and 
production, vertical 
disintegration of corporations. 
 
A new post-Fordism. 
Space of flows. 
Reich (1991) 
Castells (1998/2000) 
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Network logic, flexibility. A 
new and powerful elite. A split 
between the Net and the Self. 
 
Informational capitalism and its 
black holes. 
Network society. Digital divide. 
…Fourth World. 
 
Castells (1998/2000) 
 
 
Death of the sign, more and 
more information and less and 
less meaning. 
 
A post-modern world dominated 
by signs, hyper-reality, an age of 
spectacle. 
 
 
Baudrillard (1983) 
 
Information flows, spatial logic 
of electronic information 
networks, capital ‘travelling 
light’. 
Flexibility, short-term 
mentality, uncertainty vs. 
security. 
 
The devaluation of space in 
certain spheres of life. 
Liquid modernity. 
 
Bauman (2001) 
 
Abundant information, scarcity 
of time and attention/reflection. 
New principles in the 
legitimation of knowledge in 
society. 
Search for anomalies and 
paradoxes. 
 
 
‘Performativity’ and ‘paralogy’ 
as legitimating principles in the 
postmodern condition. 
Little narratives as opposed to 
meta-narratives. 
 
Lyotard  (1984) 
 
The explosion of symbols, 
rising virtuality. 
 
Economies of signs and space, 
consumer capitalism. Media-
laden society. 
 
Lash and Urry (1994) 
Urry (2002) 
Webster (2002) 
 
C
ul
tu
ra
l-s
pa
tia
l  
   
…
. 
Economic globalization, fast 
information flows through ICT 
networks, accelerated pace of 
consumption. 
Increasing differentiation, 
pluralism along with 
homogenization and 
unification. 
 
Time-space compression. 
Disruptive spatiality and the 
postmodern condition. 
Harvey (1989) 
 
 
The changes in the 
Habermasian public sphere – 
media, Internet, citizen 
participation. 
Individualization of social 
inequality. 
 
The fluidity of interaction, 
sharing competence; new 
mass-behaviours, social rituals; 
stress from interaction 
overload…  
Cyberdemocracy, electronic 
democracy. 
Radicalised modernity 
Reflexive modernisation and 
surveillance. Late modernity. 
Risk society. 
 
Interaction Society. 
 
Poster (1995),  Friedland (1996) 
Giddens (1990) 
Beck (1986), Graham (2001) 
Webster (2002) 
 
 
 
Wiberg (2004) 
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that these theorists start off from or centre 
their arguments around are also given, as 
well as the ‘systems’ or general phenomena 
(era, society, economy) within which they 
examine these processes. 
The different interpretations 
indicate some succession or evolution in 
thinking. In general, the earliest theories 
were determined and focussed either 
technologically or economically; while 
lately, an increased interest has emerged in 
the social, spatial, political-cultural and 
even, psychological implications (i.e. both 
the broad-scale reasons and consequences) 
of the emergence of the new technologies. 
The recognition of the various strands of 
change as more complex in themselves, as 
well as being mutually interrelated, is an 
observable tendency, too.  
The reason for this might be in fact 
very simple: ICTs and network technologies 
have relatively recently diffused enough for 
to set off certain more visible and already 
examinable social processes. Specifically, 
we may talk about a continuous learning of 
the I.S. through social experience and 
expectations: technology and society are 
both in a constant flux, and the I.S. itself, 
unfolds only gradually. Nonetheless, this 
learning is not completely linear, some older 
accents and ideas have been recurrent, re-
adopted by more recent theories (see the 
years of publication in Table 1, for 
instance). 
First, the proponents of the 
technological perception all believe that 
technologies or ICTs themselves embody 
and have given rise to the ‘information age’, 
and some also claim that these technologies 
(their volume, diffusion) and their ‘produce’ 
(information  transmitted) can be thus 
suitable measures for gauging I.S. 
development. This later attempt at 
measuring the scale of change through the 
volume of ICT diffusion was natural in the 
60s and 70s when there was a tendency 
towards a positivist or quantitative approach 
in all fields of science (partly for the reason 
of the availability of supporting technology 
itself, i.e. data processing tools). Yet it is 
important to note that this stand, at least to 
some extent, has been kept up by policy 
makers ever since for practical reasons. 
Digital divides20 are often measured merely 
in terms of the amounts of PCs, hosts and 
servers, or cellular subscriptions compared 
to the number of population or households. 
There are several problems with the 
technological standpoint. Based on 
Webster’s argumentation (2002), I consider 
the following as the most important.21 First, 
the ‘information’ prefix in the I.S. term 
suggests more than just technology as the 
main attribute of the society and its 
transformation (unless one defines 
information as bits, for instance – or 
technology as information). Second, 
probably the most striking and critical 
ambiguity regarding the technological 
conceptualisation is related to the issues of 
measurement, and consequently, the basic 
delineation of the I.S. None of the advocates 
of this approach have succeeded in featuring 
ICTs accurately enough to make them useful 
as reliable measures, i.e. it has not been 
clearly stated which technology and to what 
extent is required to qualify an I.S. (see the 
arguments in e.g. 1.1.1 and 1.1.3). 
Considering the diversity of ICTs, their 
dynamic evolution and creative 
convergence, the selection of indicators 
requires careful consideration, and even 
more caution is needed when interpreting 
patterns of inequalities based on them.  
It might not be of any serious 
consequence that the difficulty of 
measurement is simply ignored by popular 
futurists (“the new technologies are 
announced, and it is unproblematically 
presumed that this announcement in and of 
itself heralds the information society”; 
Webster, 2002: 11), yet this attitude is also 
taken up without much contemplation by 
scholars, and politicians. Those, who use 
ICTs as major indices of an I.S. often 
uncritically presume that they are sufficient 
to mark a new society. Thirdly, and related 
to the above, technological determinism is at 
                                                 
20 See in 2.3.2. 
21 Selected from Webster, 2002. 
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the core of the ICT-based definition of the 
new society, the flaw of which is well-
known and understood: technology cannot 
be separated from society as an external 
force (invented by whom and why?), i.e. 
having an impact on people making them 
adjust to it.   
Second, the economic conceptual-
lisation of the information era is interested 
in the economic weight of ‘informational 
activities’, while the occupational approach 
focuses on the changes in the employment 
structure. They differ from the technology-
oriented approach in terms of their 
emphasis, since it is on the transformative 
impact of information itself rather than that 
of the related technologies. This is explained 
by the emergence and increasing weight of 
‘informational jobs’ such as those of a 
designer, a deal-maker, an image-creator, a 
musician, a biotechnologist, a genetic 
engineer, and a ‘niche-finder’ (Webster, 
2002: 14) – all occupied with some ways of 
manipulating information. Both the 
economic and the occupational theories 
require the separation of certain activities 
within the economy which, on the basis of 
some criteria, could be regarded as 
‘informational’ as opposed to ‘non-
informational’ elements of the economy. 
Also, according to the established 
categories, both approaches employ 
statistical methods to measure and delineate 
the I.S.: they argue that I.S. is achieved 
when and where the majority of jobs is 
found in information work; or when and 
where the information sector dominates the 
(national) economy. Yet, there are 
considerable difficulties in the attempt to 
define, for statistical purposes, exactly who 
does information work and who does not 
(Kasvio, 2001). It is important to note that 
Castells (1996), also considers the 
transformations within the social-
occupational structure significant in his 
‘new paradigm’, related to which he talks 
about the emergence of a new and powerful 
intellectual elite, if not a distinctly new 
‘class’, and the expansion of information-
rich occupations. However, he criticizes the 
classical theory of ‘post-industrialism’ as he 
highlights some of the reasons why the 
traditional handling of this matter is 
questionable. Primarily, he is judicious of 
the simplistic way of describing the re-
structuration processes as a shift from 
agriculture to industry, and then to services, 
and argues that the specific nature inherent 
to the new technologies themselves, gives 
rise to rather diverse and complicated 
developments in occupational structures. 
Furthermore, Castells points out that there is 
no homogeneity within the set of activities 
labelled as ‘services’, meaning that not all 
the jobs in this sector are ‘informational’ to 
the same extent. Also, the primary and 
secondary sectors contain some 
‘informational’ labour. Though category-
forming and statistical methods may be 
indicative of certain trends, any more in-
depth analysis necessitates a socially more 
comprehensive scrutiny, and “the unit of 
analysis … will necessarily have to change” 
(Castells, 2000: 247).  
Finally, the advocates of the 
cultural and spatial conceptualisations (see 
Table 1) respond to the technological and 
economic-occupational approaches by 
proposing their very post-modern positions. 
Through their own elaborate efforts of 
understanding the world, they prove that the 
mission of constructing a concise, compact 
and universally accepted theory is in fact, 
impossible22. And so they leave little doubt 
as to the crudeness and simplicity of the 
technocratic or economic-occupational 
interpretations. Moreover, they question the 
meanings and conditions of technology, 
knowledge, and even, of development. 
The thinkers of late or post-
modernity raise more troubling questions 
than provide answers. Most of them reach 
down to fundamental social-philosophical 
disciplines such as phenomenological, 
                                                 
22 This is often articulated in critical reviews written 
even about great ‘syntheses’ such as the one provided 
by Manuel Castells in his distinguished trilogy, “The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture” 
(1996, 1997, 1998); e.g. reviewed by van Dijk, 1999, 
and Z. Karvalics, 2002:20-23. 
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ontological, epistemological and ethical 
debates23. In general, these theories, though 
they have ICTs somewhere ‘in mind’, look 
much more deeply into the diversity of 
social and economic processes and their 
interactions than the previous 
conceptualisations. They rather qualify than 
categorise or gauge changes. They draw 
from a broader set of disciplines ranging 
from sociology, geography, economics, 
politics, psychology, information science, 
philosophy, linguistics and semiotics, and all 
sorts of media related domains – and they 
are the most enthusiastic about exploring the 
‘confluence’ of all these fields. They surely 
look for the anomalies and the paradoxes 
more eagerly than for positive truths. They 
explore a system of transformations where 
clear-cut and easy-to-generalise, linear 
causalities are rarely found.  
Also, they are all concerned with 
either or both the modification of time / 
space relations, and culture.  These two 
issues, in fact are inseparable. Culture is 
indivisible from the relations society has 
with time and space, as they are the 
principle ‘material’ dimensions of human 
existence. Culture is the "set of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional 
features of society or a social group … 
[their] lifestyles, ways of living together, 
value systems, traditions and beliefs" 
(UNESCO; World IQ). While time / space 
relations and our awareness of them, as well 
as our perceptions of our lives and 
‘positions’ within these fundamental 
dimensions are being transformed, our 
relations to the elements of culture contained 
in the definition above, are being modified. 
Surely, this argument retains its validity 
when reversed: (social) space and time are 
constructed through social existence and 
creativity; which in fact, is embodied by 
culture. Consequently, the spatial and 
cultural approaches to the information age 
                                                 
23 Ontology is the study of ‘being’ (what is; 
existence, reality). Phenomenology is the study of our 
experience. Epistemology studies how we know. 
Ethics studies what is right and what is wrong — how 
we should act.  
are connected at several points, the spatial 
and cultural ‘symptoms’ belong to the same 
‘syndrome’ of the informational age.  
The technological approach to 
information age draws a more-or-less 
straight arrow from technology to society. 
The economic and occupational arguments 
take the technology – information / know-
ledge linkage as fixed and given, and then 
go on to connect the latter to social-
economic development in a similar fashion. 
In contrast, the cultural-spatial analysts do 
not take anything for granted, one-
directional or even, linear. When it comes to 
defining the role of technology, they take up 
the perspective of the social shaping of 
technology24. Simplified it may seem, yet it 
is true: “technology is society.” 
“Technology does not determine society: it 
embodies it. But nor does society determine 
technological innovation: it uses it” 
(Castells, 1996/2000:5). Or we can consider 
the problem to be similar to the popular 
‘chicken and the egg’ question.  
It is not surprising considering their 
focus (i.e. the “absence of criteria we might 
use to measure the growth in signification”; 
Webster 2002: 57-58) that the spatial-
cultural approaches try to quantify or define 
a new society the least among the 
conceptual endeavours presented. Therefore 
it is probably “the most easily 
acknowledged” (ibid: 18), the least 
debatable yet also, the least ‘pragmatic’. 
This is not coincidental: maybe there is 
really no way to rate the advance of social 
transformation like that, to measure I.S. in 
order to define it. The cultural shift is ‘in the 
air’, everyone is aware of it; still it has no 
clear borders. Advocates of this perception 
                                                 
24 The theory of Social Shaping of Technology (e.g. 
MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985, William and Edge 
1996) rejects the view of ‘the social construction of 
technology’ that technology does not shape human 
action; and it does not accept either, the technological 
deterministic assertion that technology follows its 
own developmental path independent from any 
human impacts. SST incorporates, however, the other 
main elements of these two theories: technology 
influences society, and society shapes technology.  
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of the I.S. “rarely attempt to gauge this 
development in quantitative terms, but rather 
start from the ‘obviousness’ of our living in 
a sea of signs” (ibid: 19.)  
 
 
2.2.3 The problem of defining an era 
 
Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a 
beginning. 
George Eliot (1819 - 1880),  
from "Daniel Deronda" 
 
It is obvious from the above that a 
great diversity of phenomena is related in 
some way or another to ICTs and the 
‘informational revolution’. Yet, may we 
regard these conditions as signs of a 
revolution, the birth of something radically 
and distinctly new, or rather as the 
momentary outcomes, part of a continuous 
evolution?  
We seem to have an inclination for 
adapting grand concepts, labels that we can 
attach to societies, countries, or an era: 
doing this in order to make sense of what is 
happening to our world. However, it entails 
several difficulties: “it involves trying to 
identify the major contours of 
extraordinarily complex and changeable 
circumstances” (Webster 2002: 1; also 
Dessewffy, 2004). When having the 
opportunity to look at the subject (e.g. a 
social system, period) either from a greater 
distance in time (in their continuities) or 
from a comparative perspective (contrasting 
their contemporarily existing forms), we 
face the constant need to redefine, or at least 
refine and further qualify, the generalising 
terminology with attributes like ‘emerging’, 
‘developing’, ‘advanced’, or ‘liberal’, 
‘authoritarian’ or  affixes such as ‘pre-’ and 
‘post-’, etc. Indeed, it is true: “(w)e always 
name eras and movements ‘post-’ or ‘neo-’ 
when we don’t know what to call them” 
(Naisbitt, 1984). This also suggests probably 
that people always feel that they live in the 
time of ‘parenthesis’, of transition; in an 
uncertain time between eras.  
Defining society, economy or the 
times we are living in is by far not an easy 
task, especially if one claims that they bear 
the distinct marks of ‘unprecedented’ or 
‘revolutionary’ changes. First, one needs 
much circumspection as to the continuities 
and discontinuities of social and economic 
development over time. What makes the 
difference, and what is the level of 
dissimilarity, the degree of novelty that is 
sufficient for distinguishing a ‘new era’ or 
‘new society’? Where is the line between 
two epochs, or two concepts?  “When does 
one date a social change …?” (Bell, 1974: 
174). How shall we name the current or 
emerging era at all? In the present work I 
mostly use ‘information society’ (I.S.) or 
‘information era’ for the most recent 1-2 
decades, yet not indicating that I consider 
this the most suitable or exclusively correct. 
As Martin says, it seems that ‘information’ 
has “become so important today as to merit 
treatment as a symbol for the very age in 
which we live” (1988). Even though some 
authors prefer to name the new epoch by 
other terms (e.g. Bell’s ‘post-industrial’ 
society, Castell’s ‘network society’), the 
concept of ‘information’ is in the centre of 
their arguments. All the same, why and how 
is information or knowledge new and more 
significant than before? As it is showed 
above, already their meanings are much 
contested, therefore, it is not surprising that 
when they should come to be a measure or 
criterion of socially, economically, 
financially, and of course, politically 
sensitive phenomena, the debate and 
criticism over their semantic value becomes 
even richer and more frantic.  
Second, I.S. appears to be raised on 
the foundations of different social, 
economic, and political systems and diverse 
cultures.  Consequently, there is at least as 
much variation as many commonalities 
between ‘information societies’ existing or 
taking shape. Theorists, as well as 
politicians are divided also on the issue 
whether I.S. is a fact of life already, or it is 
something we are heading for: are the 
ongoing changes already part of the 
phenomenon, or just leading societies 
towards, transforming them into, an I.S.? So, 
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where and when is there an ‘information 
society’? 
Thirdly, we should be aware of the 
fact that it is rather difficult to remain 
objective regarding this question. It is 
relatively easy to consider a recent period to 
be the most eventful, the fastest and most 
spectacularly changing times, in contrast 
with the long-gone, ‘historic’ days: the 
present (complemented with our anxiety 
about its implications to the future) can 
appear to be more significant and eventful 
than the, (normally…) unchangeable past. 
Our perception of the time-factor is 
influenced by history books, too: they 
shorten the flow of events; select what the 
authors consider important, while omitting 
other incidents. The past thus being 
shortened for our perception, we expect the 
present time to flow equally fast, and hence 
is our impatience and anticipation 
concerning our current period. Also, it might 
well be that these days we (or at least, a 
great number of people) simply get more 
information on current happenings in the 
whole world than ever before. Could it be 
possible that some people overestimate the 
significance of the recent changes 
influenced by personal involvement or / and 
pressurized by the media? Whose 
information society are we discussing 
about? 
Nevertheless, information, know-
ledge, technology and society get their 
meanings only in terms of space and time, 
and hence are very important objects for 
both a social geographical enquiry and 
regional development policy to consider. 
Therefore, I am inclined to agree much with 
the cultural interpretation of the I.S. and 
propose that soft variables should also be 
considered when assessing causality 
regarding the rate of and spatial inequalities 
in, the development of the I.S. Having 
established this, the following section picks 
up the thread of theoretical argumentation 
started in 1.1 to proceed by discussing some 
spatial manifestations of the conceptual 
fundamentals, and their concerns for 
regional policy in the current information 
era. 
 
 
2.3 Knowledge & technology in social-
economic geography 
 
2.3.1 Time-space and technology 
 
The sense of a shrinking world has 
intensified and become more pervasive in 
the past 150 years with industrialisation, the 
development of transportation and ICTs at 
least, in the industrialised regions. This 
‘shrinking’ is connected to three main 
processes. One is the conquest of the 
‘friction of distance’ or the feeling that 
“places are ‘moving towards one another’” 
(Allen and Hamnett, 1995:17), i.e. time-
space convergence. Another phenomenon is 
the way formerly isolated places getting in 
contact with each other (time-space 
distanciation; Giddens, 1990). Finally, and 
as a result of these two, we can experience 
the acceleration of the pace of life (time-
space compression), “so … that the world 
sometimes seems to collapse inwards upon 
us” (Harvey, 1989:240).  
Yet, these are not simply an 
outcome of the new technologies: it would 
mean taking up the stance of technological 
determinism, “ignoring the social processes 
in which technology is embedded” (Stein, 
2001). Neither can it be claimed that 
compression is taking place evenly, 
everywhere and for everyone. Therefore, the 
prediction of some authors concerning the 
demise or the end of geography (Toffler, 
1972 and O’Brien, 1991 respectively) 
should not be taken seriously. 
Besides, having understood the 
basic ‘realities’ of ICTs and the main lines 
of their innovative evolution (see 2.1.4) one 
should also be aware of the existence of 
technological myths.25 No doubt, 
                                                 
25 The ideas mentioned do not represent the whole set 
of positive and negative expectations attached to 
ICTs, and are included here only to indicate the 
weight of attitudes and convictions in the formation 
of the technology–society relationship. Naturally, 
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theoretically, digital networks have the 
capacity of bridging over distances in a very 
short time (if not instantaneously), and make 
global economic activities possible from a 
single location. There is a popular motto 
saying that ICTs make it possible for people 
to reach ‘anyone – anywhere – anytime’. 
Based on this, ICTs have been thought of as 
a kind of panacea to the problems of spatial 
inequalities, rural depopulation and urban 
congestion. However, solutions such as 
distance learning, e-work, and 
telemedicine/-conferencing can only 
potentially and partially help to carry out 
certain functions from great distances.26  
ICTs are supposed to be time-
savers, too, and it is assumed that flexibility 
in terms of working time and location will 
give people more free-time, change their 
daily routines, leisure choices, and the lives 
of families. Furthermore, ICTs are expected 
to help equal opportunity, as allegedly, these 
networks can distribute certain resources 
evenly. Yet again, these claims are most 
probably valid in case of certain cultures and 
social groups only – provided the existence 
of other important conditions.  
It is important to note that, the 
significance of physical proximity and 
personal interaction has remained or even 
has grown along with the ICT 
developments.27 This is valid considering all 
                                                                         
these are not only myths but possible and on-going 
phenomena; the relevant cause-effect relations 
however, need to be examined critically.   
26 See e.g. work decentralisation – electronic cottages 
(Toffler); as well as a critical account on the 
teleworking utopia by Lyon (1988). Telework has for 
long been thought to become dominant in certain 
sectors so much that it would have an influence on 
settlement patterns (encouraging, for example, 
counter- or desurbanisation, or solving the problems 
of over-agglomeration) – yet it has not diffused 
pervasively but selectively in terms of regions and 
sectors, and mostly in part-time employment. 
(McQuaid et. al., 2003.) 
27 Consider these comments, for instance: “Face-to-
face is particularly important in environments where 
information is imperfect, rapidly changing, and not 
easily codified, key features of many creative 
activities” (Storper and Venables, 2004:351). 
“Technology can be effective for transmitting 
types of social communication: between 
companies, their employers and employees, 
teachers and their students, not to mention 
the field of healthcare, civil associations, 
clubs, families, and friends (e.g. Storper and 
Venables, 2004; Wellman et. al., 2002; 
DiPiro, 2002). The explanation is but a 
natural one: “human beings and other social 
animals have a nervous system that links 
emotion to vocal and facial expressions, as 
well as other physiological reactions” 
(C.A.P.), which are important for forming 
bonds, establishing confidence. 
Negative myths have also been 
common:  some fear estrangement from 
reality, or the homogenisation of culture 
across the world, and the dilutive impact of 
the global web on local values and identities. 
Yet, can we seriously believe that ICTs 
mean the end of geography? Not, as long as 
it is human beings using and creating these 
technologies. 
To sum up the above, there has to 
be a distinction made between realities and 
myths concerning the world-shrinking 
powers of technology according to the 
following aspects: what technology is used 
for the communication between what kinds 
of people, where and for what purposes. 
ICTs in certain situations, for a certain 
period of time are truly distance-bridging 
technologies and to a given extent, have the 
capacity to make physical / geographical 
distance and location irrelevant. Yet, all 
these factors which are important for 
considering this problem are defined 
spatially and culturally: at the end of the 
day, there is geography.  
 
 
2.3.2 The many sides of access  
 
It is suggested by the assertions above 
that information is more than data, and 
knowledge is more than a collection of 
information (and both are also non-static as 
they denote the processes of ‘communi-
cation’ and ‘learning’ respectively). Also, it 
                                                                         
information but cannot directly influence a career as 
well as personal interaction” (DiPiro, 2002). 
is understood from the cultural-spatial 
arguments on I.S., that although, ICTs bear 
some peculiarities to the recent processes, 
the human factor is of up-most significance. 
A simple economic way to look at 
this is that people’s needs and their 
matching creativity produces technologies, 
and ICT applications are delivered and 
rolled-out following, perceived and real 
social demand. Consequently, there are 
some complications: supply of, and demand 
for ICTs may differ to an extent that some 
form of ‘digital divide’ occurs28. Yet to 
understand this fully, there is a need to 
define what I mean by demand, by 
explaining how I understand access. 
‘Access’ has been a key word in 
both developing and benchmarking I.S. As a 
verb, generally it means the fact of coming 
to, reach, contact, to have the right to enter; 
and as a noun, it stands for “a means, place, 
or way by which a thing may be approached; 
a passage way to” (Webster’s). Accordingly, 
and placing the term into our context, there 
are people who have access to ICTs, and 
those who have not. Furthermore, there are 
people who have better access to these 
technologies (or access to ‘better’ 
technologies) than some others do. The 
distinction again, is deeply rooted in the 
quantitative vs. qualitative approaches to our 
core concepts (i.e. technology, information, 
knowledge). Besides, differentiating 
between these two points bears a 
considerable significance when thinking 
further, because the measure and quality of 
access are leading to other issues such as 
‘information haves and have-nots’, and the 
different types of digital divides. The 
meanings of ‘access’ and ‘divides’ are as 
thick as those of information and knowledge 
or I.S. itself. 
                                                 
28 The digital divide defined by OECD (2001:5): “the 
gap between individuals, households, businesses and 
geographic areas at different socio-economic levels 
with regard to both their opportunities to access 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of 
activities.”  
For some, access might have a very 
straightforward connotation with regard to 
ICTs: the fact of having connection to the 
hard infrastructure, Internet (e.g. Z. 
Karvalics, 2002:74; Farkas, 2002:120 
defining “access gaps”) at a workplace, 
school, home, a ‘public access point’ such as 
a library, an Internet café, a ‘nettikioski’ in 
North Karelia, or a village telecottage (see 
Chapter 5); or the instance of owning a valid 
cellular subscription.  
 
 
Figure 2. The four interconnected sides of 
access and the digital divide. 
 
 
However, quite noticeably, most of 
these examples are already a combination 
and coincidence of at least two important 
occurrences. One is the potential physical 
access; the other is financial access. The 
former is tied more to the supply side, ICT 
network infrastructure and services 
provision by telecommunications 
companies. The latter is related to the 
income level of potential users and 
subscribers (i.e. solvent demand in 
economic terminology). These two are in an 
intricate relationship. In a free market, 
private investment into infrastructure and 
services obviously follow solvent demand. 
More service providers appear in regions 
where there is higher demand detected or 
assumed. More competition push prices 
down, which may encourage demand 
further.  Yet,  potential  physical access does 
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not necessarily lead to new users, while an 
insufficient level of solvent demand 
observed or assumed in a region results in 
the unwillingness on the part of the ICT 
investor to supply the physical network and 
services there. The fact that ICTs are 
developing, and indeed, very fast, 
complicates this level of access further (e.g. 
bandwidth makes a difference in the quality 
of service).   
Furthermore, one may distinguish 
mental access as an important step up 
towards taking a fuller advantage of ICTs as 
users. Its significance is frequently 
emphasized: digital literacy, ICT skills, 
general educational levels and occupational 
orientation, age, openness, culturally pre-
determined attitudes, etc. contribute to how 
well an individual can ‘access’ – find, and 
especially, select, as well as extract, process, 
use, transmit, etc. – information in a 
conscious attempt to ‘understand’, to learn 
and teach; and ultimately, to improve his or 
her (or their community’s) quality of life. As 
deficiencies in the skills, abilities, 
knowledge and attitudes often (but not 
always!) coincide spatially with lower 
income levels (and consequently, poor 
financial accessibility of ICTs), problems 
may accumulate in certain peripheral 
regions within and beyond the level of, 
countries.  
Finally, when talking about the 
usefulness, the real advantages gained from, 
and the positive impacts of using ICTs, it is 
necessary to consider the issue of content 
(Szakadát, 2001). Access to content is the 
stage where the real worth or utility of 
exploiting ICTs is realised, where the actual 
difference (relevant information / 
knowledge?) they make to our lives may 
manifest. The availability of rich, relevant 
and diverse content that consists of reliable, 
safe, appropriate, user-friendly, interactive, 
etc. services is one of the most important 
motivating factors for the potential users of 
Internet (who may or may not have all the 
means of physical, financial, and mental 
access).  This side of ‘access’ again, is very 
much interconnected with the others. Certain 
quality or level of technology (physical 
access) is a prerequisite for some types of 
content (e.g. higher bandwidths for 
multimedia, video-conferencing, etc.). 
Mental access has relevance here, too, as a 
skilled and motivated user has the potential 
to shape, to contribute to the content: e.g. to 
create locally-regionally relevant websites, 
use the Internet for marketing, paying tax, 
open forums, or initiate the formation of 
virtual societies.29 
Also, the wider the network gets 
(i.e. the higher the number of people, 
organisations linked to it) and the richer the 
content becomes, the greater the necessity 
and the motivation will be for the non-users 
to connect; an example for the phenomenon 
generally referred to as positive network 
externality, or network effect30. Considering 
the regional development potentials of I.S. 
developments, this highest level of access, 
i.e. to content, has probably the most direct 
consequence to the well-being and 
sustainable growth of local economies and 
communities, and also, to the 
competitiveness and efficiency of national 
economies.31  
                                                 
29 See the variables in Appendix 4: each variable fits 
more or less into some of these components of 
‘access’.  
30 The network effect was described by Robert 
Metcalfe, the founder of Ethernet. A telephone 
network is a simple example:  a single phone is of no 
use, while with every new phone added to the 
network, the number of possible connections 
increases, and it does so exponentially. The larger the 
telephone network grows, the more valuable it 
becomes. The same situation occurs with software 
matching certain operation systems or certain 
hardware (PCs): the more successful network may 
eventually dominate the market. See also 2.3.3 
below.  
31 Certainly, the above categorisation is not 
revolutionary or exclusive; it is very much existent in 
critical thinking. Many authors discuss the same issue 
using just slightly different terminologies. For 
instance, Groot and Sharifi (1994) differentiate 
between accessibility (meaning physical presence of 
infrastructure), affordability (covering the 
economic/financial conditions) and availability 
(relating partly to the feature of content). Viherä 
(1999) argues that three main factors -- access, 
competence/skills and motivation – explain the 
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These four dimensions of access 
being so much interdependent, measuring 
their levels can be a tricky problem. Physical 
and financial accesses are relatively easy to 
gauge by means of indicators of living 
standard, economic development and the 
availability and price of network 
technologies and services (e.g. because 
about these, quantified information is easier 
to find); yet even these can present some 
controversy (see some examples in 3.3.2).   
  
 
Figure 3. A possible framework for bench-
marking e-government 
 
The mental / educational factors 
and access to content are more difficult to 
lay hands on. For instance, benchmarking 
the development of e-government; i.e. on-
line public services for citizens and 
businesses, is a very complex task. These 
services need to be examined along two 
main lines: their existence (quantity) and 
their sophistication (quality). Figure 3 shows 
                                                                         
differences in communication capabilities of people, 
as well as the existence of digital divides. ‘Access’ in 
her terminology mean both the physical and financial 
components, ‘competence’ is a narrower definition of 
the ‘mental access’ I use, and ‘motivation’ (“the 
utility gained from communication” – Eskelinen et 
al., 2003) may include elements of content, the user’s 
culture and financial considerations. 
a survey framework on on-line availability 
and sophistication, which was used in a 
benchmarking exercise ordered by the 
European Commission. 
Furthermore, the actual usage of 
these services, the real traffic and the 
feedback by the clients, etc. should be 
included as well to get a full picture of the 
development of ‘e-government.’ Adequate 
legislation to facilitate and secure for 
instance, on-line transactions and telework 
are also crucial component of what I 
consider access to content. All these aspects 
require much qualitative research. 
As a final point, the different 
‘sides’ of access may be distinguished 
according to the semantic steps along the 
line of data–information–knowledge, or in 
view of the different interpretations of the 
‘technology’ concept. The way they 
mutually influence and build upon each 
other can be understood in terms of the 
various approaches to the I.S. 
 
 
2.3.3 Networks of people and technology 
 
The important role of 
communication and cognitive exchanges 
between the individual and the collective 
minds were mentioned in the 
conceptualisation of information and 
knowledge. Social networks provide a 
significant medium for these interactions. 
‘Networking’ seems to be an inherent 
feature of ICTs. So the integration of these 
two (the social and the information and 
communication technological networks) – 
become rather straightforward considering 
also that technology may be defined as 
creative technique, productive knowledge, 
and cultural force. 
A number of contemporary social 
theories explore networks, and some of them 
also relate to technologies and even more 
concretely, to ICTs. First of all, one should 
consider some arguments in Actor-Network 
Theory   (ANT),   which itself,  has emerged 
(Based on: Capgemini, 2006: 5: Figure 1; 
enhanced) 
1. Information provision 
2. One-way interaction (downloadable forms) 
3. Two-way interaction  
Availability on-line Stage 0 
Stage 1 
Stage2 
Sophistication 
4. Transaction (full 
electronic case handling) 
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from science studies32, and incorporates 
non-human network elements. In short, an 
actor-network is a heterogeneous and 
extremely relational structure of aligned 
interests, where:  
1 the actors’ (individuals or groups of 
people) ability to get others into action and 
to enrol allies by convincing them to share 
their visions and goals comprises the power 
operating (in) the network; these various 
persuasive courses in fact, create the 
network. 
2 These processes, positions and 
actions are also controlled, influenced and 
strengthened by other, also non-human 
constituents, which are assumed to have 
some agency capacity as well: material 
things, mechanical devices, elements of 
nature, codes, documents, images, and 
inscribed programs of actions (i.e. the so-
called non-human ‘actants’33 in the 
network);  
3 The discourses and representations 
give purpose, identity and position to 
everything and everyone in the network 
(Ryder, 2004; and Thompson, 2003).  
Also, the act of ‘networking’ and 
the notion of social capital are inseparable. 
                                                 
32 ANT was developed in the 1980s by Bruno Latour 
and Michel Callon, members of the Paris group of 
Science and Technology Studies, which explores the 
ways social, political, and cultural values shape 
technological innovation and scientific research, as 
well as how science and technology influence 
society, politics, and culture (Latour, 1987; Johnston 
et al,  2000). Originally emerging as a tool for 
analysing the social nature of scientific 
experimentation and technological knowledge, ANT 
spread to cover various other areas: the nature of 
space, place and time; representational processes; the 
forms of market exchange; management practices and 
strategies, the mechanisms and forces of political 
power; etc. (Thompson, 2003).  
33 Actants can be human actors and non-human 
elements, but only actors can put actants in 
circulation in the system (Ryder, 2004). According to 
ANT, actants are mobile in a sense that they are 
rearranged, reconfigured through the network of 
places and agencies, via the process of ‘translation’ 
(Thompson, 2003: 72-73). 
Since its first definition by sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu in the early 1980s (1983/86), most 
scholars discussing it have agreed that social 
capital is “capital captured through social 
relations”, and partly re-invested into social 
interactions and networking to produce 
profits” (Lin, 2001: 19), It is composed of 
“those characteristics of social structure or 
social relations that facilitate collaborative 
action and, as a result, enhance economic 
performance” (Johnston et al., 2000: 746; 
referring to Putnam, 1993). The ways social 
capital achieves this are: 1) the facilitation 
of the flow of otherwise not available, but 
useful information; 2) the influence of social 
ties on critical decision-making agents; 3) 
offering “certifications of the individual’s 
social credentials” (his or her social capital, 
networks); and 4) the reinforcement of 
identity and recognition, i.e. a sense of 
belonging and emotional support, as well as 
public acknowledgement from shared 
interests   (Lin, 2001: 20; italics in original 
text). Social capital therefore, is both a rich 
mixture of relational assets such as trust, 
norms of reciprocity, mutual tolerance, and 
civic engagement, and the source of 
producing these resources.34 
These features of social 
organisation are also the prerequisites for 
communication and good networking, while 
they (i.e. the stock of social capital) are 
(re)produced through the same networking 
practices. In their ‘governance-approach’ to 
regional policies, a group of Nordic scholars 
applied the Social Capital Theory 
(especially Bourdieu’s more spatially 
relevant approach). They prove in their case 
                                                 
34 See the national examples below (Chapter 4) about 
the general significance of social and political trust in 
the democratisation of society, and how it has been 
influenced (boosted and eroded) by recent 
developments in Finland and Hungary. The growing 
realisation of its crucial role in sustaining both 
democracy and economic growth, is evident from the 
immense literature that has emerged since the mid-
nineties discussing social and political trust in the 
disciplines of sociology, anthropology, political 
science and theory, economics, psychology, history, 
philosophy, management and organisation studies. 
(See for instance, Delhey and Newton, 2003 for a 
concise summary of theories about social trust). 
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studies that utilisation and reproduction of 
social capital in socio-spatial practices are 
central to the ‘coping strategies’ of small 
communities and peripheral regions (see 
books and studies by Bærenholdt and 
Aarsæther 2001, 2002). On the one hand, the 
locally internal networks represent and 
enhance ‘bonding’ (Bourdieu: ‘social field’ 
of insiders): strengthen shared identity; yet 
also, can give rise to exclusivity, narrow-
mindedness, hostility for ‘the other’. There 
are territorial and mobile forms of bonding: 
placed-bound communities are examples for 
the former, virtual communities and 
international NGOs represent the latter. On 
the other hand, bridging practices are 
usually combinations of territoriality and 
mobility. External linkages create bridges 
between the different social fields: a reach to 
new resources or markets; opportunities to 
receive information, fresh ideas, and to 
encounter different techniques and culture; 
and possibilities for diversification and co-
operation. Yet they can open up a 
community more, to external threats, too, 
and so increase its vulnerability.  
Not surprisingly, ICTs have great 
potentials for the networking dimension of 
local/regional coping strategies. These 
technologies have the capacity to make ways 
of communication easier, cheaper, faster, 
more diverse and flexible – which attributes 
are increasingly important for remote and 
relatively sparsely populated areas. A group 
of Canadian researchers published much 
evidence for the impact of Internet35 on 
social capital: it proved supplementary in 
terms of social network contact, and it 
seemed to increase organisational and 
political ‘participatory capital’ (Wellman et. 
al., 2001 and 2002). Although Internet does 
not necessarily affect the general sense of 
community (territorial bonding), it at least, 
supports new forms of belonging, such as 
on-line (virtual) communities (mobile 
                                                 
35 Barry Wellman and his colleagues at the University 
of Toronto carried out a survey among North 
Americans in 2000 to explore the effect of Internet on 
the accumulation and reproduction of social capital. 
bonding). ICTs may be a special tool to 
form and present to the outside world an 
image of the place or a product (on-line 
‘marketing’), as well as it can facilitate the 
reproduction of social capital through 
‘mobility’ and ‘autonomy’ of human beings, 
things and information (territorial and 
mobile bridging).  
Finally, there is an interesting 
connection between bridging and bonding as 
regards ICTs and communities. Wellman 
and his colleagues claim that the use of 
Internet does not seem to cause feelings of 
alienation from the community, but it can 
indirectly strengthen a sense of common 
identity by encouraging participation of 
social actors, and improving associational 
synergy and integrity of organisations (i.e. 
bonding) within. This aspect is especially 
crucial when fending off sudden external 
threats, when emergency decisions have to 
be made, and it is also important to the 
efficiency of representing common interests. 
In short, “social networks in cyberspace” 
complement, and interact with (i.e. build on, 
and extend the reach of) ‘traditional’ social 
networks; and offer social capital that may 
transcend time and space (Lin, 2001:212).  
Social networks are ever-changing 
configurations of governing power. They 
tend to be more horizontal than vertical, they 
are usually non-hierarchical and 
decentralised, at least as opposed to 
‘ordinary’ government structures. They are 
also unstable and difficult-to-pin-down 
because they are relational: the flows in the  
network continuously alter the relations 
between the members, who may also 
disconnect or reconnect almost at any time. 
The civil sector or civil society is one major 
arena where self-organised networks are 
essential36 and are based on mutual and 
                                                 
36 However, in some Post-Socialist countries, it has 
been observed that not all kinds of networking 
strengthen the role of civil organisations. The very 
autonomy of civil society (i.e. its confidence in its 
own power towards the political society, and its 
ability to cooperate with the political society) can be 
corrupted by embedded elitism which is tightly 
linked to the tradition of drawing on informal 
networks by individuals, instead of using institutions 
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transactional trust among members: its 
strength is inclusiveness, fast adaptation and 
reconfiguration; its weaknesses are 
instability, unaccountability and 
unreliability.  
Through their positive network 
externalities (defined above in 2.3.2), 
beyond a certain mass of users, the networks 
facilitated by ICTs increase in values not 
only in economic but in social terms. 
Certainly, it is easy to presume the 
amalgamation of social and ICT networks 
just by imagining human beings (social 
actors, organisations) at terminals, hubs and 
nodes. Social actors improve and extend the 
technological net according to their needs 
and add their human network(s) to it, while 
the ICTs reinforce and broaden the social 
web. The result is a nearly organic system of 
man and technology with rich flows of 
information, ideas and knowledge along the 
connections. At least, in theory: because 
though undoubtedly, social and 
technological networks co-exist, their 
inclusiveness, complementariness and co-
functioning also depends very much on the 
completeness of ‘access’ (in its intricate 
meaning discussed above) across society 
and space, which gives rise to further 
questions.  
 
 
2.3.4 Geographical digital divides37 
 
It is often revealed that global 
changes have led to higher risks of 
exclusion, or at least increased 
disadvantages for those fragments of society 
and places / regions / countries which for 
some reason or other have been switched off 
from the network (e.g. Castells, 1996/2000). 
                                                                         
in pursuit of interests (see more on this below in 4.3.1 
and Korkut, 2005).  
37 Some arguments in this section have been drawn 
from the theoretical introduction of my study titled 
Social Capital and ICTs in Local Development: The 
Case of the Hungarian Telecottage Movement, 
published in Marginality in the 21st Century: Theory, 
Methodology and Contemporary Challenges (eds. 
Jones, Leimgruber and Nel, 2006). 
Inequalities and competition in terms of 
‘information economy and society’ occur on 
different regional levels. The global network 
of flows (of information, knowledge, 
innovation, wealth and power) have 
different densities in space because some 
nodes and prominent hubs are more able to 
facilitate links and can utilise the flows more 
than other places / economies according to 
their better features of access (in its full 
meaning).  
In the course of many positive 
feedback mechanisms, the digital divides 
can be widening between the developed and 
developing parts of the world, the rural and 
the urban, as well as between privileged and 
deprived groups within societies, 
accumulating on already existing disparities 
in wealth, political power, innovation 
capacity, education, etc. In the new 
economy, connectivity and inclusion mean 
adaptability and advantages, while 
disconnectedness and exclusion result in 
vulnerability and deprivation. Parts of the 
hinterlands of major network nodes of 
‘informational development’ may stay 
isolated and peripheral despite their 
geographical proximity to centres of 
dynamics due to having no (socio-
economically and not just infrastructure-
wise) functioning network-links with those 
centres. The assumption that advantages 
‘trickle down’ to the poor and the peripheral 
can only be justified to a limited extent 
(Wyatt et al. 2000).  
As a consequence of a neo-liberal 
global market, some metropolises are bound 
to grow in size and in their relative 
importance as hubs of the networked world 
economy. On the other hand, there are 
regions on all possible territorial scale from 
neighbourhoods to major parts of continents, 
where neither the basic physical 
infrastructure nor the human resources are 
close to being sufficient for integration into 
the global flows of information, innovation 
and wealth – pushing them further back in 
development relative to the rest of the world.  
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2.3.5 Scales and actors 
 
Since spatial and social inequalities 
had become widely prominent, academic 
and political attention started to be more 
concerned with the idea of a socially and 
environmentally sustainable and ‘fair’ I.S. 
The problem in economic (and regional) 
development policy, although it has recently 
been posed in a globalising context, has not 
changed much since the mid-twentieth 
century: to what extent and by what means 
need market processes be controlled, 
regulated, interfered with?38  Different 
regions and places can be characterised with 
specific combinations of relatively mobile 
and more immobile and place-bound 
development factors, or assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Geographical scales and actors. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Consider, for instance the polarised theories by two 
influential economists of the 20th century, John M. 
Keynes and Milton Friedman on free market and 
public intervention. Based on the experience of the 
Great Depression in the 1930s, Keynes could not 
trust market forces left alone, while Friedman argued 
that governments should have limited rights to 
interfere. Though neither ideological strand has been 
completely justified or excluded since, there have 
been certain phases of economic development when 
one or the other was given more legitimacy by 
policies. For instance, the recent globalisation of 
markets has given more momentum to this debate 
which in part, has led to questioning nation-state 
competence and a call for stronger sub- and 
supranational entities. 
From among those which are 
especially connected to ICT- and 
knowledge-based developments, investment 
in the physical and technological 
infrastructure represent the former type, 
while the latter include the spatially 
(historically, culturally) embedded features, 
such as social capital. My assumption is that 
these two categories, even if not in a clear-
cut way, can provide some guideline to 
define responsibilities of development 
policies on different spatial (administrative) 
levels concerning ICTs. 
Besides the entire vertical of 
political-administrative levels, public, 
private and civil actors on each scale have 
their special interests and roles in 
developing ICTs, information flows and 
capacities in knowledge production. I 
assume that their cooperation is especially 
vital for the functionality of networks and 
for the efficient operation of the decision-
making vertical. 
One of the central issues 
investigated in this dissertation is the 
possible cooperation and the division of 
work between these levels and actors for the 
enhancement of access and a spatially 
balanced development of the I.S. Therefore, 
when looking at the examples chosen to 
represent each geographical scale, the 
linkages defined in Figure 4 above are 
important aspects for analysis.   
 
 
2.4 Summary and the elaboration of 
hypotheses 
 
The introduction starts with the 
general and more abstract enquiry: 
 
“How can the benefits of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and the 
so-called, ‘information society’ (I.S.) be 
extended to rural-peripheral regions and 
communities?” 
 
This matter is elaborated further, 
divided into four concrete research questions 
focussed more on the actual case studies:  
  
Public 
 
Private 
 
Civil 
Internat. 
   
National 
   
Local - 
regional 
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RQ 1: What are the factors behind the 
differentiation in access, the emergence of digital 
divides concerning the rural peripheries of developed 
countries? 
RQ 2:  What are the suitable points of 
intervention to help resolve digital divides? What are 
the different actors’ roles and responsibilities at a) the 
international or European, b) the national and c) the 
regional/local levels in order to achieve a spatially 
more inclusive I.S.? 
RQ 3:  Is the diffusion of ICTs or the 
emergence of an I.S. making horizontal interactions 
and flows more powerful, and thus administration 
and decision making more transparent and 
democratic? 
RQ 4:  What can Hungary learn from the 
achievements of the “Finnish model”? 
 
The four RQs however, work with 
the complex ideas, the so-called analytical 
tools of access and network, and the 
concepts of geographical scales and actors, 
using them in the context of rural-peripheral 
areas.  
Therefore, the aims of the 
theoretical explanations above were: 
 
• to define the fundamental notions 
behind these concepts (knowledge, 
information, technologies);  
• to show how the different 
conceptualisations of the I.S. use these 
fundamental notions; and 
• to clarify the meanings of the 
analytical tools, which provide the linkages 
between the abstract, theoretical and the 
particular, empirical investigations about the 
development of I.S. in this book.  
 
A brief summary of the results of 
these investigations – also indicating the 
directions towards answering the general 
theoretical question – is attempted below. 
Information and knowledge have 
always been regarded as critical assets and 
processes in society, and their meanings 
have always been contested and, confused. 
Yet along with the emergence of the new 
technologies to process, collect and very 
flexibly, cheaply and efficiently, distribute 
them, they have become more influential to 
socio-economic development or at least, 
their impact have become more 
conspicuous. Yet, the new technological 
hype has not helped much to clarify the 
meanings and the import of these two 
concepts. On the contrary, it mystifies them 
further, either equating them with each other 
and with the technologies themselves, or 
elevating them to a level beyond all other 
social and human factors. Nevertheless, the 
fact that these concepts have drawn so much 
attention and discussion indicates that there 
is something intriguing about them, and 
their relationships with each other. 
No matter whether taking a 
technocratic or a cultural-humanistic 
perspective to the issue, developments 
related to the I.S. in general are inevitably 
divergent in society and across geographical 
space because all the factors behind ‘access’ 
are unevenly available or given.  
Furthermore, the development and 
utilisation of ICTs are expected to be not 
merely about regions and countries trying to 
keep pace and prevent the digital divides 
from widening further (i.e. about ‘not being 
a looser’), but can be seen as a means to 
positively stick out and take over in the 
regional competition. This has to be 
recognised by governments and other actors 
on different scales, whose interest on the one 
hand, is to build competitive information- 
and knowledge based economies and 
societies, and on the other hand, face the fact 
of persistent inequalities.  
Concerning both targets – 
efficiency and equality – the necessity arises 
to measure developments in order to 
understand, direct, react to, and monitor 
processes. Keywords are (e.g., the flow of) 
information, the (speed and diffusion of) 
technological development, and (the 
production and ownership of) knowledge, 
yet the selection of their units of 
measurement poses serious difficulties. The 
(at least) four dimensions of ‘access’ in the 
context of the I.S., require a more qualitative 
and differential-relational approach to the 
problem of digital divides.  
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Finally, networks, communication, 
and the reliance on ICTs are of significance 
on the one hand, to the whole I.S. concept in 
general, and on the other hand, in particular, 
to the joint (net)work of different social and 
other actors in shaping strategies, learning 
from each other, carrying out development 
projects (which in turn, may themselves aim 
at developing some aspects of I.S. in 
underserved regions, marginalised 
communities and social groups, etc.). 
Consequently, there must be a great variety 
and number of stake-holders, actors, drivers 
and interests in developing the I.S. on many 
spatial scales and political levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The relationships between the 
main research questions and the key 
concepts. 
 
Territoriality – or geography – 
matters in the emerging I.S. so long as most 
of the factors that are attributive to the 
quality of access (to information, 
knowledge, ideas, welfare, services, etc.) are 
deeply embedded in culture and are 
therefore, place-bound. And they definitely, 
are. 
Figure 5 above indicates the 
relative measures of relevance of the key 
concepts (access, networks, scales and 
actors) to the individual research questions. 
 
 
2.5 Research design and methodology   
 
The design of this research may be 
described either with a focus on its outcome 
(Figure 6), or with a consideration of the 
process itself (Figure 7).  
In line with the above perspectives, 
and in order to answer the RQs, my research 
has evolved into a special multiple-case 
study design, where developments, 
institutions and practices on different 
geographical scales represent the units of 
analysis. As it is indicated in Figure 6, the 
material can be distributed into bigger and 
smaller ‘boxes’ ranked along these spatial  
(and political-administrative) scales, the 
former ones containing, and serving as 
contexts to, the latter.  
Following a discussion of international 
approaches to the I.S. phenomenon (the 
guidelines set by the United Nations and the 
European Union, in Chapter 3), I introduce 
two national case studies in Chapter 4: the 
visions, strategies, institutions and policies 
in Finland and Hungary, and the actual 
national developments concerning their 
advance towards or in, the information 
society.  Finland and Hungary have reached 
different levels in I.S. development along in 
some way, dissimilar paths, which has an 
impact on their presentation in this work: the 
Finnish case is portrayed mainly through its 
institutional framework (the national 
innovation system), while the developments 
in Hungary are shown more in a sequential 
manner, showing the different phases of 
political recognition and commitment to the 
I.S. project.  
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 (Source: modified after K. Yin, 2003:40) 
CONTEXT 
Local/regional 
unit of analysis  
National case 2 
Local/regional  
unit of analysis 
UN 
National case 1 
Local-local 
cooperation  
EU
(Source: modified after Yeung, 2003:454) 
Abstraction and deconstruction 
Types of data 
• primary data 
• secondary data 
• oral histories 
• reports 
Tracing networks of actors 
• multiple sources of data 
• participant observation 
• methodological opportunism 
• different spatial scales 
In Situ research  
• Multi locational research 
• Scope for research cooperation 
   (interdisciplinary & cross-border) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Case study design: “embedded multiple units of analysis” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Process-based methodological framework. 
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In Chapter 5, the national studies 
are followed by accounts of regional-local 
‘bottom-up’ initiatives to improve the spatial 
equality of access in both countries, seeking 
possible points of connection within their 
respective national and international 
agendas. This latter aspect is especially 
relevant to the last section of this chapter 
(5.4) where the planning of a joint project by 
local activists in Hungary and Finland is 
described and analysed. 
There are some aspects of my work 
which are difficult to present by means of 
this relatively simple and static model, 
however. As the example of the Finnish-
Hungarian co-operative efforts indicates, 
local-regional I.S.-innovations can have 
direct linkages to European programmes and 
networks and local actors have the 
opportunity to work together even across 
national borders. Also, the relevant forums 
of the United Nations, the European Union, 
the states of Hungary and Finland, and the 
examined regions and communities within 
can be seen in several respects as partners 
and actors in a more horizontal way, 
complementing each other in competence.  
Besides, the five-six years of 
research to ‘track down’ such an evolving 
phenomenon as the I.S. is, involved much 
going back and forth between the different 
scales, cases and projects; it was a gradual 
and non-linear process. Preliminary results 
inevitably led me to shift my focus to 
different scales and to take up new 
perspectives, approaches, methods, and 
even, to formulate some new questions. 
Therefore, as indicated in Figure 7, 
a process-based methodological framework 
describes the research done for this 
dissertation better: it shows the dynamic 
relationships between concrete sources, 
methods, and the positions taken up by the 
researcher.  
Due to the epistemological shift 
(i.e. from a more positivist and quantitative 
to a rather subjective and qualitative 
approach), the style of my writing and the 
method of presenting my research results 
also vary: towards the end of the 
dissertation, there are more boxes of 
descriptive or narrative text, as well as more 
photos inserted in the dissertation.  
Regarding the diversity of the units 
of analysis, a multitude of different sources 
and methods were necessary. Political 
manifestos, visions and strategies were as 
important as statistics and rankings were; 
and were sources of information especially 
in the research presented in Chapters 3 and 4 
(i.e. the international and the national 
studies). Numerical facts related to ICT- 
supply and -usage, published by companies 
and other organisations are plentiful 
especially on the national spatial level. 
Nevertheless, the speed of technological 
change, and the confidentiality of 
information about ICT take-up make it 
difficult to maintain standardised methods of 
data collection and analysis across the many 
geographical scales of investigation. Figures 
(maps) and tables of ranking are inserted in 
this work primarily to describe some of the 
recent tendencies, general digital divides, 
and the relative positions of the examined 
regions and countries. They are presented 
also for the purpose of underlining the 
ambiguities and problems that occur in 
measurement and quantification, faced by 
policy-makers themselves. 
Questionnaire-based surveys, 
personal interviews (much supported by the 
ICTs themselves), were employed especially 
in the local-regional case studies (Chapter 
5), i.e. researching bottom-up initiatives and 
projects. These were useful to make up for 
missing information from written 
publications, as well as to find more actors 
involved. They were used also for the 
purpose of triangulation with findings from 
other sources and in the (inter)national case 
studies (e.g. the small survey of European 
telecom decision-makers). Local narratives 
were relied on to find evidence of more 
delicate networks; and to understand the 
influence exerted by higher levels of 
coordination, regulation and intervention 
into different aspects of the I.S.-
developments. Learning in situ about 
specific practicalities, the limitations and 
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opportunities in project development was 
also crucial: personal observation and some 
action research (for the last section of 
Chapter 5) helped better understand the 
human factors underlying the developments, 
and the functioning of socio-technological 
networks.  
The process-based framework also 
indicates a continual abstraction-
deconstruction of meaning and evidence; the 
outcome of which is the formation of the 
final conclusions.  
So, the following three chapters 
present the empirical work done within this 
multi-scalar and process-based framework: 
the description of the international concerns 
and processes (Chapter 3); then, the 
presentation of the national developments in 
Finland and Hungary (4); following this, a 
report on regional and local strategies and 
projects, particularly in the rural peripheries 
of these two countries, concluded with a 
special personal account on the joint plans 
and efforts of two (Hungarian and Finnish) 
groups of local innovators for ICT-tooled 
community development (Chapter 5).   
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3 BEYOND NATIONS: TEN 
YEARS OF PROMOTING AN ‘I.S. 
FOR ALL’ 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: approaches and 
methods 
 
Given its complexity, and the 
multitude of definitions and stakeholders in 
the subject, a wide range of methods can be 
implemented researching the I.S. In this 
chapter, I present three lines of study that 
use different sources and techniques, yet 
which are linked together in order to answer: 
a) What shifts in objectives can be 
recognised in the international and 
especially, the European guidelines to 
promote the development of an inclusive 
I.S., particularly in terms of access and 
digital divides? 
b) When and in what forms did the local and 
regional dimension enter the global and 
European perceptions of the I.S.? 
c) What functions have these international 
organisations, and especially, the EU, taken 
up in developing the I.S.? What is the best 
way to define their roles?  
A major digital divide has existed 
on the global scale between the developed 
and the developing world which urged the 
United Nations to initiate a global forum for 
the I.S.: the World Summit of the 
Information Society has included a wide 
assortment of participants, not only the 
leaders of transnational ICT businesses and 
national governments, but representatives of 
sub-national regions and civil groups, too. I 
start with a brief account on the emergence, 
the limitations, and especially, the 
importance of this forum on the 
international level.  Following this, I give a 
more detailed description of the 
development of the I.S. debate within the 
European integration reflecting both its 
competitiveness and the equality goals, and 
the available tools for the EU to exert its 
influence on its Members in this domain. So 
this first section is a presentation of 
conflicting interests, the changes in 
perspective, focus and political rhetoric, and 
an analytical account of the most influential 
forums, institutions, decisions and strategic 
papers, especially from the last ten years, and 
with particular concern to the spatial 
diversities and the territorial inclusiveness of 
the I.S.  
Next, I employ a spatially 
descriptive-statistical method relying mainly 
on secondary data collected between 2000- 
2004 on the divergent national developments 
in terms of many variables that can be closely 
or loosely related to the diffusion of ICTs, as 
well as to the more broadly defined I.S. 
Without any intention to be comprehensive in 
the selection of maps presented, I highlight 
some advantages and limitations of this 
approach, which in fact, is customary in the 
exploratory material backing up political 
documents and decisions.   
The final part of this chapter in a way 
connects the European to the national, and the 
sub-national:  it reports on the purpose, the 
circumstances and the results of a survey 
turning attention directly to policy-makers 
and telecom regulators in different individual 
European states. It is an attempt to analyse the 
differences and commonalities in their 
opinions and actions regarding the 
subnational territorial inequalities in the 
diffusion of ICTs, and to contrast the findings 
to overall national performances in I.S. 
developments, as well as with the prospect of 
integrating national I.S. policy frameworks on 
the European level. 
The foci of the different studies are 
nevertheless, related; they are complement-
tary: some common conclusions are provided 
at the end of this chapter with regards to 
access, networks and actors, and answering 
the three questions above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38
3.2 The global context: the UN World 
Summit of the Information Society  
 
There have been two distinct 
strands of discussion concerning ICTs and 
the socio-economic developments in the 
‘information age’ which had led to the 
World Summit of the Information Society in 
Geneva (WSIS, 2003), a UN forum under 
the co-ordination of the ITU39. One is 
focussed on the technological 
infrastructures40, the other includes a much 
broader set of issues such as the ownership 
and use of knowledge, media and 
communication. The origins of the former 
may be traced back to the 1970s while the 
latter started in the early eighties.  
Ó Siochrú, spokesman of the CRIS 
Campaign41 argues in a critical article that 
despite the fact that much of the academic 
debate already handled the ICTs as tools, 
and not as determinants of social change, 
“means and ends were getting confused” in 
the field of policy from the 1980s onwards: 
the “corporate-driven modernist notion that 
technological innovation would solve social 
problems took hold in the sector” (2004:3). 
Certainly, the global urge to privatise and 
liberalise the telecommunications sector has 
found good justification in this approach. 
Yet ultimately, it has subjected 
technological development to profit-making 
“irrespective of the impact on social 
development and inequities” (ibid.) Global 
disparities in access nonetheless, had 
become obvious by the mid-nineties, and so 
                                                 
39 The International Telecommunication Union is an 
organization within the UN where governments and 
the private sector coordinate global telecommu-
nications networks and services. Its headquarters are 
in Geneva, Switzerland. 
40 See the description of esp. the technological and 
economic lines of thinking on I.S. in 2.2.2. 
41 CRIS: Communication Rights in the Information 
Society. CRIS is a civil movement with the purpose 
to help communication about the WSIS among civil 
society entities and “to ensure that communication 
rights are fully incorporated into the WSIS process, 
agenda and output.” (www.crisinfo.org) 
for instance, the term ‘digital divide’42 was 
coined. The political paradigm was still not 
changed; instead, further liberalisation was 
assumed to bring the cure eventually.  
The other strand of debate leading to 
Geneva was more concerned with 
communication (and its subjects and objects,  
its regulation, its freedom, etc.), as well as in 
its special stress on human rights – which, 
embedded in the context of global geopolitical 
tensions, triggered this movement on the 
international level in the first place. In the 
years around the turn of the 1970/80s, the 
widespread debate among governments 
concerning media and communication 
exhibited an unprecedented diversity of 
opinion, partly due to the rising voice of less 
developed countries in the UN, and their 
concerns about cultural and media 
imperialism (NWICO)43. This 
communication-strand recognises that 
information and communication have an 
important role not only in terms of the 
economy, but also culture and politics44; i.e. 
in society in general. Therefore its focus is not 
the tools, but the circumstances of their 
application, their owners and users, and the 
content communicated through them.  
Unsurprisingly, these cultural issues 
had to be put off the agenda due to pressure 
by private media industries and powerful 
                                                 
42 See also 2.3.2 and 2.3.4. 
43 ‘The New World Information and Communication 
Order’ constituted a forum about media representations 
of the developing world. Its central element was the a 
report by the ‘MacBride Commission’ (Many Voices 
One World, 1980)  which analysed problems related to 
mass media and news, and suggested a new 
communication order to enhance peace and human 
development (Brown-Syed, 1993; Padovani and 
Nordenstreng, 2005). 
44 This strand in political thinking is closer to the 
cultural conceptualisations of the information age 
(2.2.2), and embraces issues which are often stressed as 
the difference between the meanings of the 
‘information’ and the ‘knowledge(-based) societies’, 
for instance. ‘Communication society’ or ‘interactive 
society’ (e.g. Farkas, 2002:25, 137) is probably the 
most recent response to the technocratic rhetoric, 
emphasizing even more the importance of the human 
agent, and the dynamics inherent to the whole problem.  
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lobbies. Nevertheless, some journalists’ 
organisations and the academia kept the 
discussion up (the MacBride Round Table, 
1989-1999), drawing civil society actors 
into it (e.g. CRIS). Besides, a great number 
of other NGOs started to raise further 
questions concerning internet surveillance, 
the concentration of media ownership, 
commercial censorship, and so on. (Ó 
Siochrú, 2004)  
At last, the Geneva WSIS in 2003 
provided an opportunity for the convergence 
of these two perspectives, and room for 
interaction between a diverse set of civil 
actors and those organisations and 
governments who were drawn to the 
meeting by the technological interests in the 
I.S. In planning the WSIS event, the ITU 
still adopted the old ideologically-driven 
claims, i.e. the concept of an I.S. utopia 
based merely on the extension of ICT 
infrastructure, regarding the latter as the 
core issue of information and knowledge 
dissemination. However, provoked by this 
the civil society used the event to point out 
the faults in this way of thinking and policy 
making. The WSIS in Geneva therefore was 
forced to deal with a broad set of issues, and 
to depart, at least in its Declaration of 
Principles, from the mainly technocratic 
approach (see Box 1).   
The recognition of the need to 
respect spatial diversity and to deal with 
inequalities on various scales is indicated 
also in the WSIS Plan of Action, which 
delegated certain tasks to be done by 2005 
(the Tunis Summit) by designated actors 
from different sectors and various 
administrative-political levels. National 
governments were asked to create showcase 
examples of public-private or multi-sector 
partnership and to draft their national e-
strategies. They were also advised to be 
early adopters themselves as model users of 
ICTs in their own administration and 
practices. International organisations and 
financing institutions were called on to 
develop their own strategies, and to report 
their experiences of mainstreaming ICTs. 
The UN Secretary-General was asked to 
establish a special working group on Internet 
Governance for “an open and inclusive 
process that ensures a mechanism for the full 
and active participation of governments, the 
private sector and civil society” (WSIS/P.A., 
2003:6). Also, the Digital Solidarity Agenda 
was put forward:  a call for mobilising 
resources in the developed world and the 
private sector, in order to give the poor 
countries the necessary technical and financial 
assistance for capacity building, technology 
transfer, and their cooperation in R&D, etc. 
Finally, the need was emphasized for 
international cooperation in research to define 
benchmarking indicators to measure the 
magnitude of the digital divide, and to 
construct and launch a “composite ICT 
Development (Digital Opportunity) Index” 
which would facilitate the monitoring of 
international progress in terms of the 
implementation of the key principles and 
actions of the WSIS (WSIS/P.A., 2003:13).45  
There is much criticism about the 
WSIS failing in terms of concrete suggestions 
for viable solutions, in terms of clear formal 
commitments (Ó Siochrú, 2004), and that its 
documents paint “a wholly utopian picture of 
an ‘Information Society’ that grossly 
oversimplifies and generalizes a complex 
issue”, because their vision was 
“technologically deterministic” as they 
‘fetishized’ ICTs by using, for instance, the e- 
prefix as often as possible (Pyati, 2005)46. 
One should however, be wary of exaggerated  
                                                 
45 This was carried out by a consortium called the 
Digital Opportunity Platform, who formulated the 
Digital Opportunity Index (DOI) to track progress in 
180 economies, using data from 2004/2005.  
46 Pyati uses a textual-analytical approach to interpret 
the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Actions 
of the Geneva Summit. The author measures the 
frequency and place of use of certain fundamental 
terminology, such as I.S., inclusive, people-centred, 
knowledge society, ICTs and digital opportunity; and 
points out that most of these are either not at all or 
ambiguously defined in these documents; and says this 
is a sign of oversimplification and technological 
determinism. However, similar observations may be 
made concerning most of the international manifestos, 
about any other sector of the economy or field of social 
life. Pyati’s argument that “language is a powerful 
conveyer of biases, viewpoints, and values” cannot be 
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anticipations. Global summits like the WSIS 
cannot but result mostly in generalisations, 
guidelines and key principles, no-one can 
reasonably expect them to prescribe 
concrete measures, solutions for problems 
                                                                         
acceptable as a reliable ground for such conclusions 
unless one ignores the context and the purpose of the 
communication.  
on every political and regional level, 
especially considering the complexity of the 
I.S. debate. The language of these documents 
is accordingly visionary, metaphoric, relying 
on emblematic expressions, not necessarily 
meaning that there is no real content, research 
and rationale behind the statements.  
There are only few issues that can be 
dealt with in considerable depth on the global 
level. The situation of the highly indebted 
poor countries is such, as well as the 
international management of the Internet. 
Actions concerning these two were in fact 
more elaborated by the Summit than others: 
the subjects of ‘digital solidarity’ and 
‘Internet governance’ were pushed forward to 
the next phase in Tunis (WSIS, 2005).  
On the other hand, there are some 
statements in the texts which, above and 
beyond the evocative style and syntax, more 
directly express a positivist attitude 
concerning social and technological 
developments; for example, in the 
introduction of the Plan of Action: “The 
Information Society is an evolving concept 
that has reached different levels across the 
world, reflecting the different stages of 
development” (2003:1). It is not explained 
what those levels and stages are; neither are 
the aspects and units of measurement 
specified based on which the positions of 
individual countries should be monitored. 
Instead, it is implied that the progress towards 
a fully developed I.S. is a certain and single 
process, during which ICTs are adopted by a 
society to an ever growing extent. Still, just 
three points below, a perspective is articulated 
which indeed, differentiates between 
individual states and their social 
developments: it is proposed that specific 
targets for the I.S. need to be established “as 
appropriate, at the national level… taking into 
account the different national circumstances” 
in order to facilitate the assessment of 
progress; i.e. more relative to the given 
country’s position rather than to be compared 
internationally.  
All things considered, the most 
essential achievement of the WSIS has been 
the extensive and visible participation of civil 
• The establishment of ICT public access points; 
• different (free, open source, proprietary) 
software models  to ensure affordable access 
to everyone; 
• assistive technologies to access public domain 
information; 
• the promotion of awareness and literacy in 
ICTs; 
• integrating social groups with special needs 
into the I.S.; 
• capacity building to ensure a sustainable I.S.;  
• a “global culture of cyber-security”; 
• “supportive, transparent, pro-competitive, 
technologically neutral and predictable policy 
and regulatory framework reflecting national 
realities” for a “people-centred I.S.”; 
• government intervention to correct market 
failures in underserved rural-peripheral areas; 
• efficiency gains for SMEs (small and medium 
sized enterprises) via the deployment of ICTs; 
• the protection of intellectual property and the 
dissemination of knowledge to encourage 
creativity and innovation; 
• the adoption of “open, inter-operable, non-
discriminatory and demand-driven” 
international standards in ICTs; 
• a multilateral and democratic management of 
Internet, as a global and multilingual facility; 
• the responsibility of local authorities in 
providing applications that are user-friendly 
and adapted to local needs; 
• local/regional digital content representing and 
promoting cultural diversity and heritage; 
• the independence and pluralism of the media;  
• raising a ‘Digital Solidarity Fund’.  
Box 1. Major issues in the Declaration 
at the WSIS in Geneva (WSIS/D, 2003). 
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organisations and their encounter with 
public and private actors in the discussions 
of I.S.-related problems. The WSIS 
provided space for inter-regional and inter-
cultural discussions and the clashing of 
diverse interests between sectors, 
international, national and subnational 
actors. Also, it meant a significant step 
towards creating a more balanced political 
debate somewhere halfway between the 
over-politicised NWICO movement and the 
private sector dominated technocratic 
perspective.  
The fact that the produced 
documents bear some ambiguities and traces 
of conflicting view-points may well be the 
outcome of this. Almost certainly, the most 
interesting discussions, and much of the 
knowledge-transfer and networking were 
happening anyway, in the many parallel 
thematic workshops of the Summit; as well 
as the meetings, forums and publications 
that prepared and followed the event. The 
following lines from a member of one of the 
1,740 participant organisations in Tunis47 
indicate the significance of this: 
 
ICTs can only be seen as one of many tools available 
to promote sustainable human development. (…) 
Regional and global networks offer opportunities for 
exchanging information, learning from each other 
and joint actions at local level. The specific talents of 
each participating organisation contribute to an 
overall greater impact than if a single organisation or 
regional network worked alone. If we really manage 
to work in synergy with each other, developing a 
system to manage knowledge, both local and regional 
projects will benefit immeasurably.  (…) Global 
networks, such as the GKP have the ability to support 
policy development at local level by sharing 
knowledge and experiences. Singly we are weak; 
together we can make an impact. (GKP -- member K. 
Delgadillo, Executive President of Fundación 
ChasquiNet) 
                                                 
47 At the Tunis WSIS, more than a third of the 
partaking organisations were NGOs and civil society 
entities, i.e. over 6,000 people of the total, almost 
20,000 participants (WSIS/T. 2005). GKP is Global 
Knowledge Partnership, defining themselves as “the 
world's first multi-stakeholder network promoting 
innovation and advancement in Knowledge for 
Development (K4D) and Information and 
Communication Technologies for Development 
(ICT4D)” (GKP portal). 
3.3 Information Society under EU guidance 
 
3.3.1 From Bangemann to Lisbon and the e-
Europe Action Plans 
 
In the course of the 1990s, the idea of 
the ‘information society’ was undoubtedly 
becoming a key consideration in economic 
political decisions in Europe, as well; both in 
the individual countries and on the level of 
integration. The first initiatives for the 
construction of the physical network 
infrastructures were made by major 
technology manufacturers and telecommuni-
cations service provider companies. Later, the 
states having recognised the significant 
potential for economic development offered 
by the sector, started the liberalisation of the 
national ICT markets. Yet, this was carried 
out in very heterogeneous, country-specific 
ways (starting at different times, carried on 
with varying impetus, and accomplished to 
different degrees.) At the same time, most of 
the European countries raised their R&D 
budgets and implemented regulative and 
subsidising instruments to enhance the 
readiness and receptiveness of their human 
resources.  In several cases these measures 
were systematically incorporated in national 
‘I.S. strategies’. 
During the second half of the decade, 
the European Union, then of 15 Member 
States, took up I.S.-related regulative and 
strategy making tasks, too. This was based on 
the general recognition that information and 
knowledge-based development is the only 
way for Europe and its individual states to 
retain and strengthen their competitiveness as 
opposed to the USA and the Asian rivals. In 
this regard, urgent action was demanded. 
So, on the threshold of the 
emergence of the world-wide Internet, (and 
ten years ahead of the launch of the WSIS) in 
its Brussels meeting of December 1993, the 
European Council placed an appeal that a 
report should be prepared by a High-Level 
Group on the Information Society, made up of 
twenty international experts and headed by 
Martin Bangemann, for the Council’s meeting 
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on 24-25 June 1994 in Corfu about this 
problematic issue. 
To sum up just the main messages 
of the Bangemann Report, some thoughts 
are worth to select in connection with what 
roles and significance were linked to 1) the 
ICTs, 2) the people, 3) the market and 4) the 
EU in the up-and-coming Information Age; 
and what benefits and risks were envisioned. 
(See also the list of contents of the 
Bangemann Report in Appendix 1). 
Firstly, as to the nature of the 
technological revolution, the Report 
suggested that it was “a revolutionary tide, 
sweeping through economic and social life”; 
it would add “huge new capacities to human 
intelligence”, and would change “the way 
we work together and the way we live 
together”. This was a rather deterministic 
way to express the complexity of 
relationships between technologies and 
social development, yet there were some 
indication of a less direct connection in the 
statement that “(t)he information revolution 
prompts profound changes in the way we 
view our societies and also in their 
organisation and structure.” (Bangemann, 
1994: Ch. 1) 
Secondly, and in my view, more 
importantly, it was declared that “(t)oday 
technology is in search of application” while 
“societies are searching for solutions to 
problems based on intelligent information.” 
The significance of this observation lies in 
its focus on the human and social ‘use’ of 
the ICTs:  their applications that are 
invented by people help the solution of 
known problems in society.48  
All things considered, “the added 
value brought by the new tools, and the 
overall success of the information society 
will depend on the input made by our 
                                                 
48 In fact, it  has been since even more emphasized 
that ultimately, it is the user who  shapes the 
applications, and more recently concrete forms of 
integrating clients’ and customer’s observations and 
recommendations have become a popular practice 
among software developers and public organisations 
alike in the more developed information societies,  
partly facilitated via the new media offered by ICTs. 
people, both individually and in working 
together.” These people represent a richness 
of culture and creative diversity (frequently 
referred to as a source of competitiveness for 
Europe in the world), which also, can be 
supported by the information infrastructure, 
which is: “an extraordinary instrument for 
serving the people of Europe and improving 
our society by fully reflecting the original and 
often unique values which underpin and give 
meaning to our lives.” (Ibid.) 
Thirdly, the authors urged the EU to 
put confidence in market mechanisms as the 
motive power to bring Europe into the 
Information Age. This meant a call for 
concrete actions on the parts of both the 
European and the national actors: the 
promotion of entrepreneurial mentality to 
enable the emergence of new dynamic sectors 
of the economy; as well as the creation of a 
common regulatory framework in order to 
bring about a competitive European market 
for information services. By contrast, the 
Report openly rejects the continuation of 
more public money, financial assistance, 
subsidies or protectionism (Info Highway, 
1994):  
 
The Group believes the creation of the information society 
in Europe should be entrusted to the private sector and 
to market forces. (…) The market will drive, it will 
decide winners and losers. Given the power and 
pervasiveness of the technology, this market is global. 
The prime task of government is to safeguard 
competitive forces and ensure a strong and lasting 
political welcome for the information society, so that 
demand-pull can finance growth, here as elsewhere. 
(Bangemann, 1994: Chapter 1).  
 
So the concrete recommendations to 
the Member States in order to speed up the 
ongoing process of liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector were the following 
(ibid.: Ch. 2):  
• infrastructure and services still in the 
monopoly area were to be opened up to 
competition;  
• “non-commercial political burdens 
and budgetary constraints imposed on 
telecommunications operators” were to be 
eliminated; and  
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• clear timetables and deadlines are 
needed to be set for the implementation of 
the practical measures towards these goals. 
Fourthly, some concern was 
expressed about Europe’s unity and 
cohesion in taking measures and in 
developments: national approaches were 
still too inconsistent, and this could decrease 
anticipated benefits. The first countries to 
enter the I.S. would gain the most and be the 
ones to set the agenda for the followers. 
Europe had a lot of strength and good 
chances (having “major technological, 
entrepreneurial and creative capabilities” 
already). However, there was the question 
“whether this will be a strategic creation for 
the whole Union, or a more fragmented and 
much less effective amalgam of individual 
initiatives by Member States” (Bangemann 
1994: Ch. 1). Besides, several issues had 
been elevated onto the common European 
level, with a lot of tasks entailed that needed 
to be tackled with a joint effort; and 
according to the Group, the I.S. was the 
means to achieve many of these objectives.  
The Report outlined a vision of the 
benefits that the I.S. would bring to the 
citizens and the economy of Europe. For the 
citizens, it would be a ‘more caring’ society 
with a considerably higher quality of life 
with a greater choice of services. For the 
content creators, it was expected to offer 
new opportunities to make use of their 
creativity. Europe’s regions would have 
new ways to strengthen and express their 
identities and cultural wealth; peripheries 
would find novel ways to solve problems 
caused by their geographical remoteness. 
Administration, services by governments 
would become transparent, efficient, and 
responsive to citizens’ needs. Business in 
general and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in particular, would have 
better access to training and other services, 
as well as a new means to communicate 
with customers and suppliers; therefore they 
would be able to reform their organisations 
to become more efficient and competitive. 
Telecom operators and hardware / software 
suppliers, i.e. the IT industries of Europe 
would get a huge domestic market to supply, 
test, and develop their products and services 
in. 
Finally, the experts warned that deep 
changes brought by the informational 
revolution would present Europe with a major 
challenge: “either we grasp the opportunities 
before us and master the risks, or we bow to 
them, together with all the uncertainties this 
may entail.” So, the greatest risk perceived 
was that if no action was to be taken, Europe 
would probably lose out in the global 
competitiveness game, and its affluent 
markets could be snatched away by the 
competitors overseas.  Another danger lurked 
in the possibility of the emergence of a “two-
tier society of haves and have-nots”, “in 
which only a part of the population has access 
to the new technology, is comfortable using it 
and can fully enjoy its benefits” (ibid., my 
italics). Attention was drawn to the fact that 
public awareness of ICTs was limited, and 
there was a risk that individuals would refuse 
to be part of the new information culture, and 
use its instruments.  To avoid this, “(f)air 
access to the infrastructure will have to be 
guaranteed to all, as will provision of 
universal service, the definition of which must 
evolve in line with the technology.” It is 
remarkable that it was already obvious to 
these experts that technological development 
would be so fast that the actual meaning of 
‘universal service’ would have to be revised 
from time to time. Besides:  “A great deal of 
effort must be put into securing widespread 
public acceptance and actual use of the new 
technology. Preparing Europeans for the 
advent of the information society is a priority 
task. … Education, training and promotion 
will necessarily play a central role.” (Ibid., 
my italics.) 
The claims in the Report made in 
1994 are still relevant, despite the fact that it 
contains undoubtedly, much technological 
determinism (with more optimism than 
reservations concerning the impact of ICTs). 
From a distance of ten years, one cannot help 
but credit the Report for its great ability of 
foresight. In fact, very few new issues have 
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emerged since; the problems brought up by 
the Bangemann Group have been recurrent 
in the succeeding political documents and 
manifestos in Europe (and as indicated 
above, in the UN), only differing from time 
to time in the stress put on each; and in fact, 
most of the problems have not been solved 
since. 
The most straightforward and 
urgent requirement called for in Europe in 
the year 1994, was to liberalise the 
telecommunications market and let its forces 
work undisturbed. On the other hand, 
concerns with inclusive and useful social 
applications, and the problem with 
peripheries appeared in a nascent form, too 
– according to some analysts, as a peculiar 
feature of the European approach to I.S. as 
opposed to the American model.49 However, 
only very vague ideas were given as to the 
‘how’ of public intervention and regulation 
for the sake of a fair I.S. The problem was 
known to the Bangemann Group and the 
necessity of some intervention by means of 
‘universal services obligation’50 was also 
mentioned. Yet the issue of liberalisation 
                                                 
49 According to Malagrinò, the terms of ‘Information 
Highway’ and ‘Information Society’ are 
representatives of the American and the European 
approaches respectively, to the same problem. The 
US model lays the emphasis on the role of basic 
infrastructure, assuming that applications are a direct 
result of technological development, while the 
concept of I.S. used in EU policy stresses the need to 
push applications, considering the infrastructure 
‘just’ as a tool,  the expansion of  which inevitably 
depends on the requirements and demands coming 
from the applications themselves. (Malagrinò, 1998). 
As the applications are related  more closely to 
specific social functions and needs than the narrowly  
interpreted technologies (i.e. the more physical forms 
of network infrastructures), the European approach  
is considered  by some to be relatively more ‘socially 
sensitive’. 
50 Universal service obligation (USO) is “an 
obligation imposed on one or more operators of 
electronic communications networks and/or services 
to provide a minimum set of services to all users, 
regardless of their geographical location within the 
national territory, at an affordable price.” (EC portal, 
Summaries of the Union’s legislation). See more on 
the importance of USO to regional development in 
3.3.4. 
was more imperative at the time for both 
Europe as a whole, to be competitive, and for 
the Members to achieve a harmonised, 
standard level in their telecommunications 
infrastructure and services. The private sector, 
without any doubt greeted these commitments 
with applause and expectations, and waited to 
see how legislation in the individual countries 
would fall in line with them. 
The next major step in the 
development of the European I.S. policy was 
the so-called Lisbon Strategy in March 2000: 
the European Council embarked on a ten-year 
strategy “to make the EU the world's most 
dynamic and competitive economy.” The 
economic, social and environmental renewal 
of the EU was seen as indispensable, so no 
wonder that the eEurope initiative 
(implemented in June 2000)51 was an integral 
part of this Strategy. It proclaimed its aims to 
bring ‘”every citizen, home and school, every 
business and administration into the digital 
age and online” (COM (99) 687), and to step 
up Europe’s transition towards a knowledge 
based economy. It recognised and responded 
to “the need for the Union to set a clear 
strategic goal and agree a challenging 
programme for building knowledge 
infrastructures, enhancing innovation and 
economic reform, and modernising social 
welfare and education systems” (Lisbon 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 
par. 2).  
Soon after, the Action Plan 
expressively labelled “eEurope: Information 
Society for All” was issued along the same 
lines of intention. It put great emphasis on the 
need for the developments to be socially 
inclusive and to help diminish major 
disparities in living standards. The eEurope 
initiative has been realised in two phases, with 
an important shift in focus according to how 
well the expected results had turned out. The 
eEurope 2002 Action Plan (agreed at the 
Feira European Council, June 2000) included 
a total of 64 targets to be achieved by the end 
                                                 
51 The source of the following information on the 
eEurope initiatives is the European Commission’s I.S. 
portal (EC, 1995-2004).  
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of 2002, and concentrated much still on 
increasing connectivity (‘quantitatively’; in 
order to exploit the advantages offered by 
the Internet). It was supplemented with 
eEurope+ to cover the candidate countries.  
However, the effective use of the 
Internet had not improved as fast as 
connectivity. Therefore, in March 2002, the 
European Council in Barcelona called on the 
Commission to draw up a new plan, and as a 
consequence, the eEurope 2005 Action Plan 
was adopted by the Council in December 
2002.  It centred on “the widespread 
availability and use of broadband networks 
throughout the Union by 2005 and the 
development of Internet protocol IPv6; [and] 
the security of networks and information, e-
Government, e-Learning, e-Health and e-
Business” (Barcelona European Council, 
Presidency Conclusions, par. 40). To some 
up, attention moved towards ‘qualitative 
improvements’: increasing the availability 
of high quality infrastructure, on-line 
content, attractive services and applications, 
and the encouragement of organisational 
change.  
The above indicate a clear shift 
from the concerns related to competition in 
the telecom market and the provision of 
basic infrastructure towards the promotion 
of high-speed networks, intelligent 
applications, and the improvement of and 
investment into human ‘infrastructures’ or 
human capital, i.e. upgrading the  
networking abilities of not just the 
technologies and applications, but of the 
people themselves. Considering the fact that 
the latter, the human factors are to a great 
extent spatially bound, and differ across 
rural-urban, core-peripheral contexts, the 
2002-2005 eEurope developments have had 
an important implication to regional 
development that surfaced in several 
European initiatives addressing inequalities 
in the I.S.  (see examples in the following 
section). 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 European I.S. and the “open method of 
co-ordination” 
 
In fact, eEurope has kept the ‘rules of 
the game’ established by the Bangemann 
Report despite this shift in focus. I.S. is not a 
self-contained common policy with a separate 
budget, and eEurope is not a public 
expenditure programme.  
A reason for this may be that the 
major motive behind the eEurope initiatives 
has been to achieve efficiency for an 
increased global competitiveness, and so the 
EU is willing to take on little extra 
expenditure. Yet the expectations for both 
direct and indirect returns from the growth of 
a European I.S. are high. The argument was 
early established that besides the straight 
contribution by investments into ICTs to 
economic expansion, and the direct way 
technological progress in the information 
technology industries would increase growth 
through product and process innovation, the 
diffusion of ICTs would extend benefits to the 
rest of the economy (private firms and public 
services alike) and increase efficiency gains 
and savings there, too. Working methods and 
processes could be reorganised to make them 
much more proficient with the help of the new 
technologies, but it was also recognised that 
higher skills were an inevitable pre-condition 
for this, too. 
Closely related to this, the other 
reason for not having a separate common I.S. 
policy on the European level is that I.S. 
development by nature can only be a cross-
sectoral venture. There are funds and 
programmes already functioning which can be 
mobilised for enhancing the different 
components of access for certain purposes.  
I.S. is not the only field of socio-
economic development where there is a need 
for vertical and horizontal policy integration 
and “the identification of problems cutting 
across levels of government as well as sectors 
and institutional policy domains” (Faludi, 
2004:1020). Urban policy, territorial 
cohesion, social protection, research and 
innovation are areas where novel governance 
modes and a ‘post-regulatory’ mode of 
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planning (as opposed to the ‘Community 
method’) have been experimented with on 
the European level. These new approaches 
are referred to also as the ‘open method of 
coordination’ (OMC). Some features of 
OMC are (Ahonen, 2001; Faludi, 2004; 
Hodson and Maher, 2001): 
• It complements top-down with 
bottom up approaches, yet the intricate and 
complex balance of power depend much on 
the participation of social partners. 
• There are guidelines instead of 
regulation; political commitments instead of 
treaty obligations. It is a non-binding mode 
of operation. 
• Its important tools are 
benchmarking, the dissemination of best 
practices, mutual learning and peer 
pressure. 
• It is a manifestation of multi-level 
governance, decentralisation; demonopoli-
sation of knowledge in terms of the relations 
between both EU and member states, and 
the nation state and its regions. 
• It is applicable both in the 
European and a great variation of national 
set-ups. 
Besides the non-binding and 
budgetless character of eEurope, there is 
further evidence for the European approach 
to I.S. being an example of the OMC. First, 
the Union aims at a construction for I.S. 
research and development within which one 
may operate supported by already existing 
budgets, such as the following: 
• The Framework Programmes of the 
European Community: since the mid-
eighties, the European Union (EC) has been 
conducting a policy of research and 
technological development based on multi-
annual framework programmes since 1984. 
• The eTEN, as a part of the broader 
trans-European network policy of the EU 
(TEN: since 1995), is designed to support 
the deployment of telecommunication 
networks based electronic services with a 
trans-European dimension. Its priority areas 
have been on-line government and health 
services, the participation of older people and 
the disabled in the I.S. (eInclusion), on-line 
learning, increasing user confidence and 
security of e-services, and encouraging SMEs 
to participate in the e-economy. For instance, 
eTEN can provide up to 30% of costs of 
deployment in case of a new service; and it 
focuses on innovative projects which cannot 
be financed from private money, and which 
propose trans-European services. (EC portal: 
eTEN.) 
• The Structural Funds: an evaluation 
study published in 200252 confirmed that the 
Structural Funds make a significant 
contribution to promoting the I.S. For the 
period 2000-2006, their estimation of SF 
going to measures in this field was 10 billion 
euros, and half of the regions they surveyed 
gave priority to I.S. in their distribution of the 
Funds. 
Political objectives have got 
increasingly complex and interrelated, 
reaching far beyond a single sector. Besides, 
with time, social-economic impacts started to 
surface, and from the interactions of different 
lines of policy, and from conflicting interests, 
new problems occurred. To understand and 
solve them, research and legislation 
concerning the I.S. have become increasingly 
important on the European level. Table 2 
indicates the awareness of the former, and 
shows how the range of fundable I.S.-related 
research activities has got more diverse and 
demand- (ICT usage, content, social impacts) 
oriented  in  perspective  within the successive  
                                                 
52 The study (Information Society and Economic and 
Social Cohesion – the role of the Structural Funds) was 
prepared for EC DG Regional Policy by a consortium 
with a diverse membership: a private company 
Technopolis Ltd, the Community programme IRISI, 
the non-profit organization eris@, (see more below 
about the later two) and a professor at the University of 
Athens.  This is an example for both monitoring and 
the cooperation between different social partners and 
the Commission (See Technopolis Ltd. et al. 2002). 
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Table 2. The European Community’s Framework Programmes for R&D since 1994 and the 
weight of I.S.-related themes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source: EC CORDIS and DG for research) 
Notes: * Total budget here excludes Euratom, which has received around € 1 billion euros per 
programme period. **in addition to the priority themes, I.S. related research could also be funded in 
under parts of the FPs; e.g. in FP5, there were at least seven other related activities such as the Marie 
Curie Actions on ‘Human resource and mobility’, or programmes to develop research infrastructures 
(GÉANT and GridS).  
 Total 
budget 
(billion €) 
 
I.S. priority themes (programmes)* Budget share of I.S.   
(%) 
 
FP4 
1994-1998 
 
 
13.2 
ICTs 
- information technologies (ESPIRIT) 
- telematics 
- advanced communication technologies and services 
(ACTS) 
 
28 
16  
  7  
  5 
 
FP5 
1998-2002 
 
 
14.9 
User-friendly I.S. (IST)  
- systems and services for the citizen; 
- new methods of work and electronic commerce; 
- multimedia content and tools,  
- essential technologies and infrastructures  
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
FP6 
2002-2006 
 
 
 
16.3 
Information Society Technologies 
- applied IST research addressing major societal and 
economic challenges 
- communication, computing and software 
technologies 
- components and micro-systems 
- knowledge and interface technologies 
- IST future and emerging technologies 
Citizens and governments in the knowledge-based 
society 
- knowledge based society and social cohesion 
- citizenship, democracy and new forms of governance 
In total: 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2 
 
   26 
 
 
FP7 
2007-2011 
 
 
 
50.5 
 
Within “Cooperation” (1),  
- ICTs (1) 
 
Within “Capacities”(2): 
- Regions of knowledge  
- Research infrastructure 
- Science in society  
(and some more themes within with smaller budget)  
In total: 
        
 
18 
 
      6  
  
 
 
 
24 
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EC Framework Programmes since the year 
of the Bangemann Report.  
Research was in high demand 
concerning the territorial inequalities in 
terms of the different sides of access (which 
task has caused much headache to every 
actor involved.)53 Nevertheless, closely 
related to the eEurope initiatives, and 
financed under different ICT-related 
programmes of the European Commission, 
the SIBIS project (2001-2003) completed 
the task of developing innovative I.S. 
indicators that enable the monitoring of 
developments in the Member States; and 
BISER did the same for the regions of 
Europe (1998-2002). Both relied heavily on 
National Statistical Institutes and supra-
national organisations (Eurostat, OECD); 
and they created indices focusing on several 
different domains of the I.S., and published 
their output in form of detailed handbooks.54 
Consequently from the dispersed 
nature of funding sources across many 
different support schemes, there is a great 
need for forums and channels that connect 
actors to the possible resources and practical 
knowledge. Besides, as Malagrinò remarked 
in 1998, the regional dimension of 
developing the I.S. (which has been indeed, 
part of the ‘grand visions’, expressed in the 
Bangemann Report and the eEurope 
documents) was “independent of the 
context” to which these visions were applied 
(Malagrinò 1998). This vacuum has been 
since more or less filled in by initiatives 
started ‘from below’, by the regions 
themselves. Organisations such as Eris@ 
and its IANIS network have been successful 
in strengthening and networking of regions 
of Europe in order to help them find their 
own ways and good practices in the 
‘information age’.  
Important precedents (in addition 
to, of course, the Bangemann Report and 
                                                 
53 Some of the difficulties which are likely to arise 
during such benchmarking ventures are introduced in 
3.3.3 and 3.3.4. 
54 SIBIS: Statistical Indicators Benchmarking the 
Information Society; BISER: Benchmarking I.S. in 
European Regions. (See References). 
other key initiatives by the Community) were 
activities launched by the European 
Commission in 1995 and 1997 involving sub-
national authorities. The first one was a pre-
pilot scheme named the Inter-Regional 
Information Society Initiative (IRISI) set up 
by six European regions55 to promote I.S. on 
this spatial-administrative level. RISI gave 
support to 22 regions during the period of 
1997-98 for the preparation of regional I.S. 
strategies. This assistance took the form of 
methodology workshops organised especially 
to train and inform regional managers and 
their consultants.56  
Another important achievement was 
the recognition by the participating regions 
that there was “indeed much to gain through 
cooperation and collaboration in this field” 
(IANIS) on a longer term as well: they would 
therefore need to facilitate continuous debate 
about concrete applications and services and 
on key policy issues. Soon, in 1998, a non-
profit organisation, Eris@ − the European 
Regional Information Society Association − 
was formed by 28 founding regions. Its 
membership has grown to 48 by early 2007 
(including 45 regional members and 3 private 
companies). 
IANIS is the Innovative Actions 
Network for the Information Society, a                   
programme managed by Eris@. It is  
committed to “sustain and further develop 
inter-regional networking, … widespread 
sharing of information, experience and good 
practice through an electronic 
communications platform, physical and 
virtual newsletters, workshops, seminars, 
annual conferences …”, “in the context of the 
I.S. and Structural Funds’ investments for to 
design, develop, maintain, and provide access 
to an e-Region Hub with a Projects’ 
Database…” (ibid.) These international 
networks and forums of sub-national I.S.- 
                                                 
55 IRISI: North-West England, Sachsen, Nord Pas-de-
Calais, Valencia, Central Macedonia and Piemonte. 
56 The Finnish North Karelian I.S. strategy was drafted 
within this support scheme, too. See 4.3 and Appendix 
6 for details. The Paraddis programme of the West 
Finland Alliance was also granted support by RISI 1.   
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developing actors fulfil an important role in 
the dissemination of special know-how and 
best practices, and encourage engagement in 
partnerships and joint projects (see some 
examples in Chapter 5).  
 
 
3.3.3 I.S.-disparities between countries in 
Europe 
 
Soon after the Bangemann Report 
had been adopted, individual member states 
drew up their own national information 
society strategies one after the other echoing 
the EU guidelines and priorities57. Their 
advancements towards fulfilling the 
requirements of the Bangemann Report and 
its follow-ups (‘Lisbon’ and the eEurope 
initiative) have varied, however.  The 
countries of the EU and wider Europe have 
taken or chosen different paths towards the 
I.S. Naturally, their demographic, economic, 
physical-geographical, historical, political 
and cultural, etc. diversity has an important 
share in this.  
As mentioned above, the EU has 
since the beginning been looking for the 
appropriate ways to measure what the rates 
of developments have been, and how 
individual countries differ from each other 
in their speed of progress ‘on the road to the 
I.S.’ On the national level, a more or less 
reliable set of statistical data on ICT-supply 
and take-up as well as data for variables 
related to human capital have been compiled 
and up-dated annually by the Eurostat and 
other organisations58, mostly relying on 
information provided by national statistics 
institutes.  Despite the limitations and 
ambiguities (i.e. concerning the relevance, 
standardisation of the indicators across 
fifteen or even more countries, and the 
problematic practice of quantifying certain 
                                                 
57 Early (1994-1996) examples were: Finland, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Germany, and 
Ireland. 
58 For some examples, see also 4.2.1 for Table 5 
listing the top ten countries in 2004 according to the 
I.S. Index by IDC and the paragraphs on the Network 
Readiness Index and its components created by 
W.E.F. 
socially complicated trends), these data could 
certainly provide  more tangible evidence for 
the divergent nature of I.S. developments 
across the continent.  
An early analysis59 shows that 
already in the second half of the 1990s, the 
EU countries could be relatively easily 
categorised into sets of ‘leaders’, ‘fast 
followers’ and a group of those ‘lagging 
behind’ in technological and knowledge- 
related developments. A clear north-south 
division had emerged in both of these aspects 
within the EU15 space by the late-nineties. 
The Nordic region was an obvious leader in 
ICT developments and take-up, as well as in 
investments into and some features of, the 
human resources. The southern Members on 
the other hand, were lagging behind 
considerably. Those countries which followed 
the ‘leaders’ relatively closely formed a rather 
heterogeneous group, each having strengths 
and weaknesses in different fields, and  
consequently, they were the least stable in 
their positions, their  future perspectives 
probably  being the most sensitive to national 
policy decisions that were to be made towards 
the end of the decade.  
It is interesting to note also that the 
relative positions of the countries in the scales 
of both the ‘ICT-’ and ‘knowledge-related’ 
development did not correlate as much as one 
may expect with the levels of general 
economic development (GDP per capita); 
outliers were found especially among those 
towards the top of the lists (e.g. Finland and 
Sweden were positive outliers). 
 This allows for at least two 
assumptions. Certain aspects of individual 
national strategies and social-cultural systems 
can differentiate in terms of I.S.-development 
between countries of equal wealth. Besides, 
while high GDP does not necessary entail 
high values in ICT-related socio-economic 
developments, low GDP is usually a 
significant barrier to progress towards an I.S. 
(see for instance 4.3.2 about Hungary). 
With the launch of the Lisbon 
Strategy and the introduction of the relevant 
                                                 
59 See the maps and diagrams in Németh, 2005: section 
II/1.A (Licentiate Thesis, University of Joensuu). 
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Figure 8. Charges by Internet service 
providers in EU15+10, 2001. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Telephone tariffs for Internet 
connection in EU15+10, 2001  
(Note: not adjusted to price levels.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Local telephone call costs 
adjusted to national price levels in 
EU15+10, 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Level of competition among 
Internet service providers in EU15 +10, 
2000. 
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World Bank) 
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action plans, more attention was paid to 
monitoring developments. This manifested 
also in the publication of more comparable 
I.S. / ICT-statistics during the first years of 
the new millennium: on a greater number of 
related variables, and including also new 
EU-candidate countries in the comparisons. 
The series of thematic maps below present 
the situation across twenty-five countries of 
Europe, i.e. a ‘hypothetical’ EU15+1060, in 
this very crucial and eventful period both 
concerning technological progress and in 
terms of I.S. strategic developments. They 
show the spatial inequalities according to 
just few selected variables from the 
available statistics that could fit into the 
categories of indicators describing a broadly 
defined I.S., proposed for instance, by 
Castells and Himanen (200161; see a list of 
possible indicators in Appendix 2). These 
variables may be used to show the 
development towards an I.S. where:  
• ICTs are widely used and accepted;  
• which is also competitive, 
innovative, and intelligent;   
• caring and equal in opportunities; 
• free, open to the world, and trying 
to be environmentally friendly.62  
Many, especially the last two sets 
of, these attributes are difficult to measure 
and compare across countries. The first 
group of variables, linked to the supply and 
take-up of ICTs, is perhaps relatively easier 
to ‘map’ in Europe based on numerical data, 
yet as it is illustrated below, their 
interpretations are still not straightforward.  
                                                 
60 ‘EU15+10’ means the old member states, eight of 
the accession states in 2004 (i.e. excluding Malta and 
Cyprus) and the most recent entrants, Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
61 See more about this work in Chapter 4. 
62 This is undoubtedly a rather utopian, or at least, 
optimistic approach as to the direction of the current 
social evolutions, yet at least it provides a vision to 
strive for; and matches the spirit of EU and UN 
manifestos. 
First, the maps in Figures 8-11 show 
differences across Europe in terms of some of 
the factors behind physical and financial 
access to ICTs63 (telephone and Internet 
services). Figures 8-10 indicate national 
disparities in a direct way, i.e. in telephone 
calls and Internet connection (subscription 
where the cost and/or dial-up) tariffs.64 It is 
important to note that Figures 10 and 11 are in 
a way, complementary, and should be 
considered together. There are countries  
where Internet costs appear only in terms of 
subscription fees and others where it contains 
only the expense of a telephone call; yet in 
case of some countries, users are charged for 
the Internet connection in both ways.65 
Figure 11 gives a similar message 
but indirectly via the levels of competition 
between Internet service providers (ISPs), 
since low competition most often means 
higher prices and less choice (i.e. lower 
quality of service) for the customers.  
Despite the limitations to the 
interpretation of Figures 10-11, some 
observation may be made, for instance, 
concerning the group of East-Central 
European countries (with few exceptions66): 
where competition among ISPs is lower, 
Internet usage is more expensive, and 
therefore, as indicated in  Figure 19 below, is 
less common.  
High subscription fees surely 
discourage people from becoming users of 
ICTs, yet the material barrier is not the only 
                                                 
63 See 2.3.2 about the different dimensions of access to 
ICTs and information.  
64 In Fig. 8 and 10, the values are adjusted to national 
price levels, so they contain some information about 
the ‘relative affordability’ of these ICTs. 
65 It is difficult to interpret these two maps in detail, 
and make straight comparisons. The measures of the 
two variables are not convertible to match; Internet 
service can be of different Kbit/s rate and provided in 
different consumer packages; and it is not clear which 
ISPs – the incumbents or major competitors – provided 
the data.  
66 According to the categories in the maps, exceptions 
from this regularity are Hungary and Slovakia, where 
competition among ISPs is higher than most of the 
CEECs, yet the percentage of users in the population is 
low. 
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Figure 12. Combined gross enrolment in 
education in EU15+10, 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Number of scientists and 
engineers in R&D in EU15+10, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Internet hosts per 1,000 
inhabitants in EU15+10, 2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. The quality of legislation of ICT 
use in EU15+10, 2000. 
 
 
Laws related to ICT use  
(1 - 7 = from the least to the 
most favourable; 
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one. Figures 12-13 represent European 
disparities in terms of two possible 
indicators of ‘mental access’ or the position 
and value of knowledge and technology in 
society. A generally higher educational level 
of the population and a technology-oriented 
profile of national R&D not only encourage 
the creation and diffusion of ICTs, but – 
coupled with wide-spread acceptance and 
use – they increase their utility to society.   
Figure 14 maps Europe according 
to a popular indicator of the I.S.: the number 
of hosts in relation to the total population of 
a country. This only roughly represents the 
number of directly-connected computers in a 
country (ITU, 2006). Not all Internet host 
computers are identified by two-digit 
country codes (some bear three-digit codes, 
e.g. .org, .com, .int, reflecting the nature of 
the organization using the computer), so 
classifying hosts according to national 
economies is not a straightforward task. All 
hosts without national credentials are 
assigned to the United States. What is more, 
hosts identified with country codes can 
easily be located physically in other 
countries. Therefore, the number of Internet 
hosts shown for each country can only be 
considered an approximation. Having 
acknowledged this, one can observe the 
general north-south and west-east divisions 
again, yet the additional diversity may or 
may not be indicative. 
As mentioned above, legislation is 
an important pillar of I.S. policy (3.3.1), and 
is an important precondition of developing 
on-line content (2.3.2). With the 
diversification and expansion of electronic 
services, and with the convergence of the 
different media and the commercial and 
political activities, regulations concerning a 
great number of subjects are essential to 
make the usage of ICTs socially safe and 
functioning. Such issues are access to public 
information, audiovisual policy, 
competition, computer crime, consumer and 
data protection, digital signatures, domain 
names, electronic commerce, gender 
equality in access, intellectual property, 
minors and the Internet, international mobile 
roaming, etc. (Glatz, 2002; EC thematic 
portal). 
What is more, I.S.-related legislation 
needs to be continuously and frequently 
reviewed, negotiated, harmonised and 
amended on both the European and the 
national levels due to the rapid technological 
developments. Figure 15 depicts the 
differences between the 25 countries in terms 
of their advancement in establishing a 
favourable legal control of these social-
technological interactions.  
Figure 16 indicates territorial 
inequalities according to another content-
related indicator of the I.S.: the availability of 
on-line services provided by governments. 
This may be linked with the fashionable 
concept of e-democracy; though it can refer 
simply to “the use of information technology 
… to overcome the physical bounds of 
traditional paper and physical based systems” 
(Pascual, 2003).  
 
 
 
Figure 16. The level of government on-line 
services in EU15+10, 2000.  
 
 
Since about 2000, the UN has been 
regularly ranking the countries of the world 
according to hundreds of features of e-
government websites and services. Here 
Government on-line services 
availability rate (1 - 7 = from 
lowest to highest; 
2000, UN) 
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again, the general pattern within Europe is 
confirmed. 
The European Commission has also 
been emphasizing the need to develop and 
monitor the availability of e-government 
services, especially since the eEurope 2002 
initiative. The objective than was to achieve 
“generalized electronic access to main basic 
public services by 2003”. Attention to this 
issue was kept up at the Seville European 
Council (2002), where the continuation of 
this initiative was ensured by eEurope 2005. 
Then it was emphasized that these electronic 
services need to be interactive, relevant, and 
accessible for all, and should exploit the 
potentials of broadband networks and multi-
platform access (Capgemini, 2006)67.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. The number of fixed line and 
cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants in EU15+10, 2001. 
 
Parallel with political declarations, 
while in 2001, only three benchmarking 
indicators were used and 17 countries were 
                                                 
67 To date, there have been six annual reports on 
benchmarking the availability and sophistication of 
on-line public services across Europe, ordered by the 
European Commission’s DG for Information Society 
and Media, for the purposes of the eEurope 
programme.  
covered, the last benchmarking exercises 
relied on more complex models (see Figure 3 
in 2.3.2) and added new indicators, covering 
28 European states. These more recent results 
showed much development over the last five 
years in terms of both sophistication and 
availability of on-line public services. Yet  
considerable differences have remained 
between old and new EU member states (not 
that much  between North and South, 
however), with the outstanding exceptions of 
Malta and Estonia.68  
Finally, Maps 17-19 present 
disparities in Europe in terms of demand and 
usage rather than ICT provision (supply). The 
aggregate number of fixed line and cellular 
subscriptions indicates the status of telephony 
in general. It covers up the internal dynamics 
between the two technologies, the 
occurrences of ‘leapfrogging’69; but allows 
for figures higher than 100 per 100 
inhabitants  since  some  people can have both  
 
Figure 18. The number of personal computers 
per 100 inhabitants in EU10+15, 2000. 
 
                                                 
68 The full report is accessible on-line (see the 
References).  
69 By leapfrogging, in this context I mean mobile 
subscriptions by households that had no fixed line 
connections earlier. 
Fixed line & cellular phone 
subscriptions per 100 pop. 
(2001, UN)  
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wireline and mobile subscriptions at the 
same time. Therefore, the information this 
picture conceals can be retrieved only from 
additional timeline data on both types of 
technologies. In some countries, mobile took 
over before wired telephones could diffuse 
more (e.g. Hungary); in others, after a close-
to saturation point, the number of fixed line 
subscriptions decreased somewhat with the 
emergence    of    cellular   technology   (for 
instance, Sweden)70. Again, the lag of some 
new member states in the eastern peripheries 
was striking in this respect, where fixed line 
subscriptions started increasing from a very 
low level in the nineties, and mobile 
telephony had not yet diffused widely by 
2001. 
 
  
 
Figure 19. The number of Internet users per 
100 inhabitants in EU15+10, 2001. 
 
The indicator ‘Internet users per 
100 inhabitants’ covers a variety of different 
type of usage: access from work, home, 
school, public access points, etc. Also, as 
admitted by a UN benchmarking unit, 
surveys differ across countries in the age 
groups of users included, and in the time and 
frequency of usage they cover, which poses 
                                                 
70 Main lines per 100 inhabitants in Sweden: 68.3 in 
1994 and 63.4 in 2004 (Lumio, 2006:2). 
some problems in comparisons (UNCTAD, 
2005). 
In summary, the maps in Figures 8-
19 indicate that there was still rather 
considerable differentiation between the 
EU15 and the 10 ‘enlargement countries’ 
around the Millennium: generally, the North-
South slope has remained, and a very 
prominent West-East dimension of disparities 
is added to it. Nevertheless, some diversity 
among accession countries can be seen, too, 
yet to account for the relative advantages of 
some states in the region like  (in different 
aspects) Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, necessitates further 
and more in-depth research.71  
As the basic physical infrastructure 
(e.g. digitalisation of the fixed telephone 
network) and the penetration of certain basic 
applications and services (e.g. PCs and 
mobile phone subscriptions) in the society 
had approached their saturation levels in the 
higher tier countries, and there, some 
convergence had taken place, new questions 
came up:  
Firstly, even within the countries 
more advanced in I.S., subnational spatial 
and social inequalities have persisted to 
certain extent. Secondly, attention shifted 
from the supply to the demand side of the 
technological infrastructure and services, as 
well as to the diffusion and efficiency of such 
specialised applications as e-business, e-
banking, flexible telework, the combination of 
ICTs and education, e-governance, and the 
on-line, network-supported forms of 
healthcare. Although these applications are 
mentioned in the WSIS Declaration and the 
EU guidelines, national legislators have 
placed different emphases on them. Thirdly, 
the different societies had accepted the new 
technologies with varying degrees of 
openness and ‘readiness’, according to their 
cultural differences. It is very probable that as 
a result of a combination of the cultural and 
                                                 
71 Some understanding may be obtained below in 
Chapter 4.3 concerning Hungary. An account on the 
factors in the success of Estonia is provided in Frank 
and Németh, 2004 (see the References).  
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policy-related specificities, some more or 
less distinct models of the I.S. have been 
taking shape. In the following, the findings 
from a survey with national legislators 
across Europe are summarised in support of 
these claims. 
 
 
3.3.4 Actual and perceived sub-national 
disparities across Europe 
 
Background information to the survey 
 
In this section, some of the 
concerns and results of a survey are 
presented that was carried out during early 
2004 to contribute to the project 1.2.2 of the 
ESPON programme72 (see Box 2 for more 
information). 
The expansion of the telecommuni-
cations sector, the developments of ICT 
investments, networks and services are 
definitely a good example for the recent 
internationalisation of socio-economic 
processes; where there is an evident need for 
reform and the integration of, the national 
policy frameworks. So it is not a 
coincidence, that two ESPON research 
projects were directly related to ICTs and 
the I.S. in Europe. 
Project no. 1.2.2 was the first in 
order, titled Telecommunication services 
and networks: territorial trends. Its tasks 
were to draw together and analyse spatial 
data on especially the supply side of the 
telecommunications sector in terms of both 
the mature ICTs (basic fixed voice 
telephony, mobile telephony, personal 
computers and the Internet) and the leading 
edge technologies (broadband technologies 
                                                 
72 The lead partner in the Transnational Project Group 
1.2.2 was CURDS (Centre for Urban & Regional 
Studies) at the University of Newcastle (UK). The 
other partners were: the School of the Built 
Environment at Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh 
(UK); CEIDET at the University of Aveiro 
(Portugal); and the Karelian Institute, University of 
Joensuu (Finland).  As a member of the Finnish team, 
the author of this dissertation was personally 
responsible for analysing the completed 
questionnaires. 
and Internet backbone networks). This was 
attempted not only at the macro- and meso-
levels   (i.e. concerning  trends  observed  in 
terms of Northern / Southern / Western / 
Eastern Europe; and disparities between 
countries), but also on a micro-scale (sub-
national regional developments).  
Project no. 1.2.3, Spatial aspects of 
the Information Society looked at the 
performance of regions in terms of a more 
comprehensive definition of the I.S.:  not only 
the readiness for and intensity of, using ICTs, 
but their impact on socio-economic 
development (shifting attention more to the 
demand side and the content-related variables; 
see Appendix 5 about the index in). Figure 21 
below includes the map produced in this 
project on the findings from the subnational 
analyses. (See also 5.2 for more results from 
ESPON 1.2.2 about Finland.) 
However, data availability was a 
problem for the international research team, 
especially on the micro-level, i.e. about the 
sub-national territorial trends. Regional 
statistics were non-existent or information 
was commercially sensitive concerning 
particularly the demand for ICTs and network 
services. Assembling a standardised dataset 
on all three scales and for all the 29 countries 
very soon proved to be an impossible 
undertaking. 
The researchers involved carried out 
a survey to obtain at least some of the missing 
information. Questionnaires were sent to the 
national authorities to find answers to some 
central questions. Do ministries and 
regulators of the telecommunications sector 
perceive regional inequalities in ICT-
provision as a problem in their countries? Is 
there any centralised practice to monitor the 
sub-national trends in ICT supply and demand 
in these countries? Do national governments 
see it necessary and appropriate to interfere 
with market processes and if so, what tools of 
intervention they have in order to decrease 
sub-national disparities? 
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In addition, telecommunications 
companies were surveyed to get their 
perspectives on these same concerns.  
Having no ministry and regulator 
responses from over half of the ESPON 
countries caused some problems for drawing 
more general conclusions. Yet, the private 
sector was even less responsive; therefore I 
give a brief account of the results based on 
the information given by ministries and 
regulators especially. (For the questionnaires 
and more detail on the exercise see 
Appendix 3 and ESPON, 2004: 1.2.2 Third 
Interim Report). 
 
A summary of answers to the questionnaires 
 
Based on the answers from thirteen 
European countries (a mere 44.8% response 
rate), the following observations can be 
made answering to the three main questions 
phrased above. 
 
1 Perception of regional inequalities and 
their patterns 
 
The respondents were greatly 
divided on the degree of subnational 
disparities in telecom networks and services, 
yet there is no regularity in terms of the 
countries’ geographical position in Europe, 
neither in terms of their EU membership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small and wealthier states like 
Denmark and Switzerland naturally see 
territorial differences insignificant. (See Table 
3 for more details.) 
The territorial patterns of inequa-
lities with respect to telecom networks and 
services were judged most concentrated in 
Norway, Finland, Austria, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia and Romania, and relatively less 
concentrated in Estonia, Switzerland and 
Lithuania.73 More precisely, patterns were 
defined as shown in Table 4. 
Answers varied also concerning the 
perceived factors causing these regional 
inequalities. However, reasons attributable to 
market forces prevailed:  
• Since liberalisation, developments 
were reported to be getting more uneven in 
Norway, Austria and Hungary. 
 
                                                 
73 The Danish respondent did not answer the question, 
which might be a sign of no territorial perspective in 
telecommunications regulation there. Yet it is more 
probable that there have been strong territorial 
concerns and as a result, infrastructure is particularly 
spatially even, hence a territorial perspective is not 
needed any more in this regard. Is Denmark already 
making ‘the next step’ in development: trying to create 
more demand among the consumers after establishing 
physical access? The respondent from Malta argued 
that their country also, is too small to have territorial 
patterns. 
One of the major concerns of the EU has been its internal cohesion, as a condition for its stability, 
growth and competitiveness. After several years of preparation, the European Spatial Development 
Perspective (ESDP) was approved in 1999 in Potsdam (EC, 1999; Faludi and Waterhout, 2002). Its aim has 
been to help eliminate the contradiction that while processes affecting territorial development are increasingly 
international and ‘Europeanised’, spatial planning has remained a strictly national affair. The ESDP offers a 
trans-sectoral and proactive approach to planning, and employs a spatial framework to co-ordinate a wide 
spectrum of policies placing great emphasis on sustainability and social cohesion. Though it is a legally non-
binding document, and has no implementation instruments and funding mechanisms on its own, ESDP has had 
an influence on national developments by defining new concepts and perspectives to offer a way for some 
policy integration across Europe (Fritsch, 2006:9; ESDP 1999; Faludi, 2006). 
To back up and apply the proposals for policy integration initiated in ESDP, much knowledge about 
the territorial structures and trends was needed. Therefore, the research programme European Spatial 
Planning Observation Network (ESPON) was launched in 2002 by the Commission. The objectives of 
ESPON were to carry out “applied research and studies on territorial development and spatial planning seen 
from a European perspective in support of policy development” (www.espon.eu, 2002-2006). It comprised 
over thirty research projects covering and involving the 29 countries of the ‘ESPON space’.  
Box 2. Basic information about the ESDP and ESPON.  
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Table 3. Perception of sub-national regional inequalities in the provision of telecommunications 
networks and services 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Patterns of spatial divergence in telecommunications networks and services as 
perceived by national authorities in Europe 
 
 
 
• The cost of service provision, scale 
of markets, lack of assured profit were 
factors listed by all respondents.  
• The lack of competition was given 
as a reason in Estonia, Finland, Norway, 
Austria, Lithuania and Hungary (too much 
competition was not a problem anywhere). 
 The dominant role of market forces 
was much confirmed in the responses given 
by telecommunications companies. The 
catchment-population and business 
considerations were far the most important 
factors mentioned in their roll-out and 
network development decisions. Some 
companies clearly stated that they follow 
pure    economic   criteria   (in  Norway  and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria), others mentioned some more 
complex data-bases informing them about 
consumption patterns of their potential and 
existing clients. 
There are less profitable regions. 
The companies labelled sparsely populated 
parts of countries (e.g. in Finland and 
Norway) and rural areas far from back-bone 
and local nodes (in Austria), as well as 
regions outside clusters of attraction 
(Portugal) as less profitable. ADSL, high 
speed data access, optical fibre network, and 
in some cases even ISDN were services 
mentioned as not available in these regions 
because of low telephone density and 
consumption in these areas.  
Returning to the ministries and 
regulators, the open question on the patterns 
 (ESPON 1.2.2 survey results, March 2003)  
Very uneven Uneven Generally even Very even 
Greece 
Norway (Ministry) 
Hungary 
Lithuania 
 
Austria Finland 
Sweden 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Denmark 
Switzerland  
Malta 
 
* Note that the scale is very subjective; it was not determined what uneven and even mean in absolute terms. 
 Countries written in bold were EU Members at the time of the survey, and I added Norway and Switzerland to 
this group. The rest are the new accession states.  
 (ESPON 1.2.2 survey results, March 2003) 
Patterns of inequalities Respondents* 
Capital vs. rest of the country AT, HU, LV, EL; somewhat RO, NO, FI 
Major cities vs. rest of the country: LT, LV, NO, FI, S, HU, RO, EL, AT 
Urban-rural / core-periphery dichotomy EE, LT, FI, NO, RO, CH; somewhat AT, EL, HU 
Natural obstacles (mountains, islands) EE, AT 
Rich vs. poor stressed in RO, somewhat in LT and HU 
* The ISO country codes represent either the Ministry or the regulating authority responsible for the 
telecommunications in the given country. 
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of competition was not clear to half of the 
respondents. Those who understood it 
mentioned urban and densely populated 
regions   vs.   rural   and   peripheral  areas,  
or residential as opposed to big consumers 
as main distinctions. The Greek respondent 
mentioned the fact that different 
technologies show different patterns: in case 
of mobile telephony, the level of 
competition does not differentiate between 
regions, while most of the telecom service 
providers concentrate on densely populated 
core regions. Generally, ICT investors aim 
to cover the whole country, but there are 
some services that are not available in 
certain regions. Also, telecom companies 
mentioned the fact that there was a territorial 
specialisation in certain alternative (yet not 
equivalent) technologies: ADSL is more 
concentrated in metropolitan areas, while 
some companies   provide remote, sparsely 
populated regions with fixed wireless 
access. Finally, an important issue is the 
actual degree of competition in the TCT 
sector. In Denmark only, was competition 
assumed to be perfect. In Austria, Estonia, 
and maybe in Greece, it was claimed to be 
almost perfect across territories (except for 
some regions, or few obtrusive companies, 
and at least in case of the more basic 
services). There were problems mentioned 
in Sweden and Hungary. In Finland and 
Norway competition was claimed to be not 
working across territories, as there were 
regions not benefiting from it at all. The 
Lithuanian and Romanian respondents did 
not give any account on this, for 
liberalisation of the sector had taken place a 
few months before the survey in both 
countries (1st Jan. 2003). 
 
2 Any monitoring by the national 
governments? 
 
Concerning monitoring and 
transparency, only two (Nordic) countries 
(Sweden and Norway) reported the 
existence of some practice of public 
monitoring and publication of territorial 
developments in telecommunications 
networks and services. Some spatial data on 
ICTs was published in Hungary, too, but it 
was not specified.74 
As far as telecommunications com-
panies and data provision were concerned, 
they expressed that country level data were 
certainly given and published; data on the 
regional and municipal levels, however, 
were not available to the public for business 
secrecy reasons generally. Two operators 
promised to provide information to the 
research team and emphasized that data 
could be utilised “only for non-commercial 
purposes.” Others clearly denied it or 
referred to the fact that official data 
collection is done by the national regulator. 
 
3 Any intervention necessary and done to 
reduce regional differences? 
• Universal Service Obligation 
(USO), though respondents from member 
states referred to the relevant EU directives, 
was usually said to be limited to narrowband 
(basic fixed telephone services that enable 
cable + modem access). A bit more extended 
it might be in Norway, where leased lines 
were included, and in Denmark, where 
leased lines and ISDN were mentioned to be 
covered. In some accession states USO was 
very new or not yet in force (e.g. Romania) 
in early 2003.  
• Further liberalisation was men-
tioned as a priority measure in Lithuania, 
Finland, Norway75 and Austria; by contrast, 
liberalisation is not mentioned in Denmark, 
Sweden, Estonia and Hungary at all. 
Considering the fact that liberalisation in the 
sector  took  place  at  very different times in  
 
 
                                                 
74 In Hungary, ISDN and cable TV data are available 
at NUTS 3 level, published by the Central Statistical 
Office. 
75 Note the contradiction here, i.e. between this claim 
and that liberalisation was said to have caused further 
spatial divergence in Norway, and inequalities were 
seen as a problem. 
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Figure 20. The position of some European countries according to (y) the perceptions of 
inequalities in the provision of  telecommunications networks and services (TN&S) and (x) the 
public will to intervene – as seen by their responsible national authorities 
Note: Values were calculated from the responses by means of a simple scoring method based exclusively on the 
information given by the respondents. A(R.) and A(M) stand for the perspectives of the telecom regulator and the 
Federal Ministry of Economy and Transport in Austria, respectively. NO(R.) and NO(M.) indicate the telecom 
authority and the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Norway, respectively. Respondents from other 
countries were from either the regulators or the ministries (In total, there were 15 responses to the questionnaire, 
from 13 European countries.) Clustering of the countries is done based on visual (and subjective) judgement: the 
question marks indicate other possible ways of grouping.  
(Németh in ESPON 1.2.2; survey results, March 2003). 
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Figure 21. I.S. performance in NUTS 2 regions according to the ESPON 1.2.3 I.S. index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Frank et al., 2006:115). 
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these countries, their reasons must vary. 
Nevertheless, this question divided the 
countries rather distinctly. 
• More effective monitoring and 
regulation is considered to be a solution in 
Lithuania, Finland, Sweden and Norway, 
but not at all in Estonia, Denmark and 
Austria.  
• Obligations imposed on telecom-
munications companies concerning both 
territory and population coverage existed 
only in Lithuania, Switzerland, and Greece. 
There was a population coverage 
requirement in Sweden and Norway. In 
Austria, the Ministry claimed there was 
obligation to cover rural areas in turn for 
urban licence, yet the Regulator did not 
make any mention of it. There were no 
coverage-obligations imposed on 
telecommunication companies in Finland 
and Denmark; and neither in Romania (“so 
far”) but in fact all responses by its 
respondent gave the impression that things 
might happen in the future, which can be 
true, or can just indicate a sign of 
uncertainty, or optimism. Malta reported a 
“100%” obligation to cover the territory. 
• The extension of USO to the 
broadband   sub-sector,      and   funding   to 
support USO were not mentioned as existing 
or possible tools for intervention in any 
countries but in Norway and Hungary. (Yet 
in Hungary, the answer to what extent USO 
had already been imposed was unclear.)  
• Funding to support regional and 
local infrastructure projects was a concern in 
Sweden, Hungary and to some extent in 
Finland, but not elsewhere. 
• Funding to stimulate demand 
locally is claimed to be a tool in Finland and 
Hungary only, and in Norway to some 
degree.  
• Public-private partnership was 
mentioned by the respondent from 
Lithuania, and somewhat by the Norwegian 
and Hungarian authorities.  
The question whether EU Structural 
Funds should be used to support investments 
into telecommunications networks and 
services brings out considerable differences 
between the respondent countries. Market 
forces were perceived basically sufficient in 
Estonia (“no SF can replace market forces”). 
By contrast, the relevance of the Structural 
Funds and national development plans was 
acknowledged in Lithuania, Sweden, 
Hungary, Malta, Romania, Greece and 
Austria. The Norwegian and Swiss 
authorities found this question not 
concerning them; the Finnish and Danish 
respondents gave no answer. 
• Finally, there was no link 
mentioned at all between telecommuni-
cations policy and spatial planning in most 
of the countries. According to the 
respondents from Norway and Sweden, as 
well as from Hungary, some integration, 
cooperation exists in their countries. Yet the 
worth  of  and  the  necessity  for,  closer co-
operation in policy making was expressed 
by several respondents. 
The view of the private sector on 
what measures were necessary to decrease 
territorial differences was rather clear-cut 
and in general, contradicting the public 
perspective. Funding to support regional 
infrastructure projects and to stimulate 
demand locally, as well as public-private-
partnership were among the important 
solutions listed, while further liberalization 
was almost not mentioned at all. Companies 
were generally aware of the diversity of 
demand, and even the necessity of 
investment to improve “mentalities” by 
means of education and subsidies to 
encourage electronic alternatives 
(eGovernment) was mentioned. They 
understood that where service provision is 
not profitable, market forces and “universal” 
(national-level) intervention cannot help: but 
more targeted regional, local intervention is 
needed, and they all suggested the state 
should take responsibility for it. 
In sum, the above may leave little 
doubt if any as to the difficulty of coming up 
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with generalisations, typologies, clear 
examples. Even so, Figure 20 attempts at 
this by tracing a possible connection 
between perceptions of inequalities and the 
public will to interfere. Methodologically, 
this exercise combines qualitative and 
quantitative tools; the data was collected by 
means of questionnaires including both 
closed and open questions; assessing 
answers in ‘quantified’ categories can be at 
times problematic. 
There were very few regulators and 
ministries who responded to the 
questionnaires and quite much uncertainty 
and subjectivity was communicated in those 
answers. In some cases where both the 
regulator and the ministry responded, there 
were clashing views and inconsistent 
information provided; and some incongruity 
within the answers by individual countries 
occurred, too. Besides, little information 
was gained as to the demand side (usage) of 
ICTs. 
Still, it can be maintained that 
monitoring on the sub-national level was 
scarce at the most. However, due to the 
commercially sensitive nature of the 
information, it could only be a national 
authority trusted with the aggregation of 
data on the regional and municipal levels 
collected from different service providers – 
as it was suggested by some respondents 
from the private sector, too. 
Inequalities across national territory 
were recognised by most of the countries, 
yet there was none which had a concrete 
national policy framework to deal with it. 
However some regulative tools and targeted 
incentives were in use in a few cases, and 
acknowledged as important in others.  
Most of the governments had done 
little in this field still, leaving much to the 
market to decide. On the other hand, the 
private telecom sector expected the public 
sector to handle the issues of social justice 
and regional development in terms of ICTs.  
Besides shared tendencies and 
general problems, it is evident that the 
countries studied were (and generally, are) 
at different stages and on different routes in 
developing their ICT sector. They bear 
several individual traits which predetermine 
territorial relations, the weighing of these by 
policy-makers, as well as the possible scope 
of public intervention. Therefore, more in-
depth country studies are needed to confirm 
these observations and to get a more detailed 
and inclusive picture of the interaction of 
ICT investments, government policy, and 
actual access in individual countries. The 
national level indeed, matters. 
 
 
3.4 Summary  
 
3.4.1 Summary in terms of access and the 
different perspectives on the I.S.  
 
a) “What shifts in objectives can be 
recognised in international guidelines to 
promote the development of an inclusive 
I.S., esp. in terms of access and digital 
divides?” 
 
The global urge to privatise and 
liberalise the telecommunications sector in 
the early nineties found good justification in 
the standpoint that ICTs have currently been 
the determinants of social change. This 
chapter provided evidence of some 
hindrance both in the UN and in Europe to 
the shift from this technocratic-deterministic 
viewpoint to a more complex, people-
centred and cultural approach towards the 
I.S. In rhetoric, seeds of a more culture-
sensitive and inter-relational perspective 
appeared early, as well as concerns with 
social and regional inequalities in the 
benefits of technological developments. Yet 
it has taken many years for this view to be 
applied in practice both in the United 
Nations and the European Union.  
Consequently, access was initially 
understood mostly in physical and financial 
terms, and hence investments into research 
for developing ICTs and the liberalisation of 
the telecommunications markets were the 
priorities set. Monitoring has been carried 
out by implementing indicators of physical 
access and basic take-up, and generally 
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carried out on the macro- and meso-levels 
only.  
As a result of escalating discussions 
between these international organisations 
and various social partners (i.e. the 
academia, and the civil society), a move in 
focus to the mental factors, and the content 
of access commenced. This has manifested 
in the promotion of new and relevant lines 
in research. Soon, along with some social 
problems surfacing, and assisted by better 
comprehension of the dynamics between 
society and ICTs, the need emerged for the 
construction of more complex indicators and 
models for benchmarking, as well as the 
necessity to look into the finer patterns of 
spatial inequalities in I.S. developments. 
Recent international summits and 
documents have indicated a concrete appeal 
to the national governments and their 
competent authorities to take up this task.  
 
 
3.4.2 Actors and scales: international 
concern with micro-level inequalities and 
the regional dimension 
 
b) “When and in what forms did the local 
and regional dimension enter the UN’s and 
the EU’s perceptions of the I.S.?” 
 
Issues such as the liability of 
national public authorities to correct market 
failures in ICT-supply and to help 
underserved rural regions; sub-national 
regional benchmarking of I.S. 
developments; as well as the significance of 
the diversity and relevance of local and 
regional digital content were first 
introduced in the UN at the Geneva World 
Summit of the Information Society in 2003. 
There had been much international discourse 
preceding this, however, which can be 
described the simplest as the struggle 
between the ‘traditional’ technological, neo-
liberal perspective maintained by the ITU 
and the major IT companies and their 
critique, a ‘humanrightist’, culturally 
sensitive movement of a very diverse set of 
public, private, civil organisations and 
representatives of the academia. It is 
interesting to observe that these two strands 
of debate can be more or less identified via 
their focuses on different components of the 
access problem. While the former has been 
more preoccupied with the physical and 
commercial issues, the latter is calling for 
more attention to the mental readiness for 
the valuable use of ICTs, and to the 
problems related to content.  
In the Bangemann Report in 1994, 
some concerns were expressed as to 
territorial divergence in the I.S. 
developments, but only between countries. 
Concerning the regions and the peripheries, 
the experts saw ICTs rather as a 
straightforward solution to many of their 
problems, such as geographical remoteness. 
 The regional dimension has got 
stronger in the European discourses along 
with the strengthening claims for multi-level 
governance; and with the realisation that as 
territorial cohesion is a precondition to the 
Lisbon 2000 objectives (growth and 
competitiveness), exploiting the local and 
regional potentials is a key to actually 
achieve these aims. As it was illustrated in 
3.3.3, thematic maps based on national 
statistics (and dominating studies and 
political documents till very recently), failed 
to show the finer-grained spatial digital 
divides between urban and rural areas, for 
instance; neither could describe the degree 
of disparities within each country. The latter 
however is as much as a problem for overall 
national growth and stability as it is on the 
European level. The acknowledgement of 
these insufficiencies finally manifested in 
the Commission’s appeal to national 
authorities for monitoring spatial processes 
within countries (little result of this could 
yet be seen in 2003, as indicated in 3.3.4); 
its own launch of benchmarking projects on 
the subnational level; its more conscious 
expansion of existing financial instruments 
for the benefit of regional I.S. development 
projects; as well as in its support to regional 
initiatives for networking and best practice 
dissemination.  
 
  
 
65
3.4.3 Summary in terms of networks 
c) What functions have the international 
organisations taken up regarding the 
development of the I.S.? What is the best 
way to define their role? 
In both international examples, 
much pressure was exerted by actors outside 
the UN and EU political circles. Besides the 
private sector, the civil society has been 
rather active in pushing the organisers of the 
WSIS and the European Commission in a 
direction that would give them more voice 
in shaping the political agendas of the I.S. 
Networks of regional and local projects 
could work their ways into the broad policy 
framework of the EU as recognised partners 
and experts in the field of I.S. development 
practices.  
These networks and forums of 
different social partners are a great asset to 
the Commission. They participate in 
research, help to attain regular 
benchmarking, monitoring and the diffusion 
of socio-technological innovations. In sum, 
they are channels to invest the efforts and 
the funds available from the common budget 
efficiently and ‘in place’. Furthermore, the 
propositions by the international 
communities suggest that national 
governments are important players in this 
context, as well:  they can and should 
promote, support, organise and draw 
information and other resources from, these 
networks. 
At a fast glance, the EU has much 
in common with the UN in its approach to 
I.S. It gives guidelines and sets objectives, 
organises strategic forums, performs 
benchmarking, publishes statistics (ranks its 
countries,  implementing the ‘name and 
shame’  incentive), supports the 
dissemination of best practices, orders and 
finances research, and gives a voice in 
policy-shaping to the national, regional and 
local actors. Besides, the EU has established 
financial instruments which can be drawn on 
by local I.S. development projects, too. 
Though there is still much to do in all these 
terms, it seems that I.S. policy in Europe is 
taking up the form of some ‘open method of 
co-ordination’ where the Community leaves 
quite much space for the bottom-up 
initiatives to express their virtuosity, yet 
takes up the role of a knowledgeable and 
carefully listening conductor.  
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4 THE NATIONAL LEVEL: TWO 
EXAMPLES 
 
4.1 Introduction: choices, questions, 
methods 
 
Information societies in different 
countries evolve along divergent paths, and 
are shaped by special national 
characteristics.76 These characteristics are 
on the one hand, cultural and economic 
features that have evolved throughout 
decades and centuries, embedded in 
individual historical contexts and 
geographies; and on the other hand, they can 
be more directly linked to current visions, 
policy strategies and practical decisions and 
measures to attain a competitive and 
socially-economically sustainable I.S. 
Naturally, these factors (cultural, 
economic and policy related) are not entirely 
separate, as for instance, the former 
determines the action space (limitations and 
opportunities) for the latter; and political 
decisions and institutions influence societal 
behaviour and value system. Much evidence 
is presented for this in the following two 
examples, i.e. the national case studies of 
Finland and Hungary.  
Nevertheless, cultural and historical 
legacies cannot be held responsible for all 
the achievements, nor for the flaws of 
national I.S. policies and intervention. This 
chapter also justifies the claim that national 
authorities do have an important and active 
role in shaping their information societies. 
In fact, strong political commitment is a 
critical condition, especially since I.S. 
development coincides with modernising the 
working mechanisms in the state itself.  
 
 
4.1.1 The choice of Finland and Hungary 
 
Conscious of the ostensibly 
redundant selections of these two countries 
(predestined by the author’s origin and 
current residence), no systematic 
                                                 
76 Németh, S. 2005. 
comparison is attempted here between the 
two countries, but some underlying 
regularities are highlighted concerning their 
part in the endeavours towards a both 
competitive and spatially / socially inclusive 
I.S.  
Still, the similarities and differences 
between “Nordic” Finland and “Post-
Socialist” Hungary are meaningful to the 
context of this research. As regards the 
parallel characteristics: both countries are 
relatively small in (concerning their 
populations especially); located at the 
eastern fringe of the current territory of the 
European Union, “between East and West” 
in culture; speaking languages 
characteristically incomprehensible for the 
rest of the world; with long-established, 
resource-based rural activities as organic 
parts of their national identities and images; 
and with traditions of centralised 
administration and relatively strong local 
governments. Yet, in terms of their 
population densities, physical geographical 
features, the engines of their economies, 
their recent political histories and inherited 
legacies, the levels of and disparities in, for 
instance, the living standards and 
technological infrastructures; as well as 
considering several aspects of social attitude 
to (e.g. trust in), state power, institutions and 
civil action, Finland and Hungary are rather 
dissimilar.  
The meaning of the term 
‘information society’ may be delineated in 
many ways and for several different 
purposes (see above in 2.2), and its 
development can be measured via a diverse 
set of variables. There have been many 
attempts to follow these developments over 
the past decade or so and rank the countries 
of the world or Europe.77 Drawing on these 
statistics, the maps in Chapter 3 show 
considerable territorial differentiation 
between some characteristic groups of 
countries in Europe, and a little diversity 
within those groups as well. 
                                                 
77 See 3.3.3, and Table 5 below for IDC ISI; or 
Eurostat, ITU, OECD, WEF and UN rankings. 
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It seems that the Nordic countries 
are closer than others to realising the 
information society. Finland is among them, 
and in fact, this small nation situated in the 
north-eastern periphery of the continent has 
been recently referred to as a kind of a 
special ‘model’ of the I.S., to be followed, 
or at least, critically learn from.  
Some justify the existence of a 
Finnish I.S. by a simple reference to Nokia, 
the world leader in mobile communications. 
This company, however ‘global’ it has 
become in terms of its markets and its 
networks of sites and partners involved in its 
production and development activities, is of 
Finnish ‘nationality’. Also, it seems that 
Nokia has a well distinguished place in the 
heart and sense of pride of the Finnish 
society and economy.  Others accentuate the 
extensive usage of network technologies and 
interactive applications in public services for 
the benefit of the people. More arguments 
speak of the high computer and Internet 
literacy (‘network readiness’) among the 
Finnish population, or the internationally 
recognised excellence and technologically 
oriented nature of the Finnish education 
system. Fewer accounts inform us about a 
unique techno-culture and spirit as some sort 
of Finnish hacker legacy, as well as some 
remarkable innovative bottom-up 
developments in this country which aim at 
making the I.S. more inclusive and socially 
equal than it would be otherwise. In 4.2, I 
give an overview of most of these aspects, 
summarising some of the academic, political 
and more popular accounts on the features 
and the assumed origins of the Finnish I.S. 
Next, the conditions in Hungary for 
building an I.S. are described. In the case of 
this country, a more detailed explanation is 
necessary concerning the impacts of the 
transition on the social and political-cultural 
environment; as the latter constitute the 
foundation and the action space for the 
creation of the I.S. The stressful and 
unstable times since Hungary’s (re-)entrance 
to Capitalism, Democracy and her first 
experiences of being part of an increasingly 
globalised world did not allow for a 
consistent and continuous political 
development in terms of any sector. This is 
even the more valid regarding the 
establishment of a national I.S., which needs 
to be integrative and cross-sectoral by 
nature, and built on relatively dependable 
social interactions. Also, since I.S. as a 
national programme entered political 
thinking in this country later, basically with 
her prospects of accession to the European 
Union coming closer, real political 
commitment and implementation has 
reached lower levels than in Finland.  
Nevertheless, Hungary has made the 
initial steps, showed some of her unique 
potentials and interest in information and 
knowledge based progress, and has had the 
first experiences of both success and failure 
on her way towards the I.S.   
 
 
4.1.2 Questions and methods 
 
Consequently, the central questions 
calling for answers in this chapter are:  
 
a) What are the main and specific elements 
of the Finnish I.S. model, and how has the 
implementation of the national strategy 
progressed? 
 
b) How have the governments of Hungary 
perceived the way towards the I.S. and 
where has implementation of concrete 
programmes taken this country in the past 
approximately 10-15 years? Is there an 
evolving ‘Hungarian model’ of the I.S.? 
 
 And at last, as a link between 
national and local/regional issues and 
competencies in these two countries, it is 
interesting to see: 
 
c) How much concern is expressed in the 
national I.S.-related documents and actual 
programmes in these two countries about 
territorial inequalities and the regional 
development of the I.S.? 
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As mentioned earlier (2.5, and 3.3-
4), country and region specific historical and 
cultural characteristics result in the 
emergence of different national types, or 
models of the I.S., so do Finland and 
Hungary vary in terms of their paths taken 
and their results achieved. Consequently, I 
use two different methods of presentation. I 
take a mostly institutional approach to the 
Finnish I.S., and a more chronological 
perspective to the Hungarian national 
developments, indicating that the Hungarian 
I.S. is based on less established structures 
and mechanisms, and is featured by more 
discontinuities compared with the more 
continuous evolution of the Finnish I.S.  
Not mastering yet the exotic 
language of the Finns, I had some 
limitations in doing research about Finland. 
However, not too much. Most of the 
important national and regional policy 
documents I wanted to draw on are available 
in English, and so are the relevant 
publications and news online. Yet, I am also 
aware that information targeting 
international audience may contain some 
bias towards the success of the Finnish I.S. 
Then again, looking into academic accounts 
published (in English) by more informed 
Finnish and foreign researchers on the topic 
may compensate for this potential ‘patriotic 
partiality’. It is also important to include 
here the fact that by living and working in 
Finland, as part of the Finnish I.S. myself, a 
first-and experience as a user, consumer, 
and actor has also contributed to the picture 
I provide. 
Obtaining information about the 
national political developments in Hungary 
was naturally not restricted by language but 
was made difficult by my geographical 
distance, being located mainly in Finland in 
the period 2001-2007. Naturally, shorter and 
longer (yearly) visits home for actual field 
work, and contacts with Hungarian 
researchers working in the field 
compensated much for my general physical 
absence, and so did the increasingly 
available digital material published by 
competent national authorities and 
specialised research communities. Besides, I 
relied on online journals and newspapers, 
newsgroups and forums critically discussing 
the development of different types of access 
and the politics of I.S. in general. 
 
 
4.2 Finland: a model of connectedness  
 
According to a survey conducted by Statistics 
Finland from 15-74 years olds approximately 2.7 
million Finns or circa 70% used the Internet since the 
beginning of January. (…)  The number of users has 
grown among all age groups; however, the use 
among those over 50 years of age has increased the 
most. (…) In April 2004 nearly 2.4 million or 61% of 
15-74 years old had their own e-mail address. Among 
the youth between 15-19 the percentage was 89%. 
(e.Finland and Statistics Finland, 20th August, 2004.) 
 
People over fifty find that the Internet makes it easier 
and faster for them to take care of daily shopping and 
banking matters, as well as reducing related 
expenses. (…) … they see the Internet as broadening 
their worldview and bringing new content into life. In 
their opinion, the Internet does not alienate people 
from their immediate surroundings; quite the 
contrary, what ever alienation there may be, it is due 
to other factors. (Tuorila, 2004.) 
 
 
4.2.1 Finland ranking high 
 
Finland is frequently mentioned as 
one of the most successfully and fastest 
developing information societies.  There are  
few relevant variables according to which 
this country is not among the top five in 
European or in the top ten even in global 
rankings, despite its being situated in a 
geographical periphery, and having the 
lowest population density on the continent.  
Table 5 shows the good positions of 
Finland in the world according to four 
composite variables and their summation in 
the I.S. index. Besides, Appendix 4 provides 
more detailed evidence in figures for the 
persistent Nordic accomplishments and 
Finland’s particular lead concerning the 
development of diverse content, as well as 
the ‘depths’ to which online applications are  
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Table 5. Ranking according to the 2003 figures of the Information Society Index and its four 
component ‘infrastructure pillars’ 
 
 
 
exploited by society in order to achieve more 
efficient information flows.78 
Another example is the Network 
Readiness report by the World Economic 
Forum, Finland topped the list of 82 nations 
in 2003 (having stepped up from the third 
position in 2001), preceding the U.S., 
Singapore and Sweden. Within the overall 
‘Readiness Component Index’79, Finland's 
strongest results were in mobile Internet and 
broadband access, and the quality of local IT 
training programmes; and there were top 
scores    in   public   access  to   the   Internet,  
                                                 
78 See also Figure 24 in 4.3.2 below for more 
comparisons within Europe concerning Internet usage. 
79 NRI (Network readiness Index) is defined as "the 
potential and degree of preparation of a community to 
participate in the networked world, participate in and 
benefit from the ICT development.” The component 
indices are ‘environment’, ‘readiness’ and ‘usage’, 
which are all broken down into sub-indices on the 
levels of the individual, business and the government. 
Besides, telecommunications infrastructure and 
market, as well as the political and regulatory levels 
are assessed (WEF, 2001-2002; Skidén 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
government online services, and the general 
capacity for innovation. Considering the 
‘Usage sub-index’, Finland obviously 
showed its strength in the government area, 
and it was number one in terms of the use of 
online payment systems, of Internet 
transactions with the government, and also, 
the number of company websites.  Based on 
these findings, the report pointed out Finland 
(along with Singapore and Korea), as a role 
model for other nations in their endeavours 
towards an ICT excellence (Skidén, 2003).  
What is more, the dynamics and 
innovation has been kept up. Publications on 
market research show that the diffusion of 
newer ICTs have been increasingly replacing 
older ones: in 2004, the popularity of 
broadband (BB) connections in particular, 
has been growing rapidly, as modem and 
ISDN customers have changed over to ADSL 
and other BB services, and new subscribers 
generally (Åkermarck, 2004; Tuomi, 2004). 
 
 
 
(Source: IDC, 2004.) 
ISI Top 10 Computer Telecoms Internet Social Total ISI 
Denmark 3 9 8 5 1 
Sweden 10 7 1 3 2 
United  States 1 20 10 9 3 
Switzerland 2 15 9 13 4 
Canada 5 24 2 7 5 
Netherlands 4 12 15 10 6 
Finland 14 10 4 1 7 
Korea 20 1 5 23 8 
Norway 11 19 3 4 9 
United Kingdom 8 22 12 8 10 
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4.2.2 The Finnish ‘national I.S. model’  
 
The Finnish success story or ‘ICT 
miracle’ has generated a lot of interest, and 
its foundations have been researched by 
many. Several theories have been formed and 
many authors emphasise some individual 
catalysing factors behind the developments 
(Paija, 2001). However, (keeping in mind 
also the arguments presented in Chapter 2 
about the intricate relationships between 
technology, society, culture, time and space) 
it is true that “(a) nations natural, 
technological, financial, human and 
collectively shared resources and 
competencies, its economic activities and 
institutional features co-evolve” (Oinas, 
2007:1228), so a comprehensive clarification 
of the Finnish question would be the most 
suitable.  
A relatively inclusive explanation is 
sought for instance, in the work titled “The 
Finnish Model of the Information Society” 
(2001) by Castells and Himanen. It is a 
relatively comprehensive and synthesising 
attempt at revealing the unique aspects of and 
the drivers behind, the Finnish 
accomplishments. The authors use mainly the 
institutional and evolutionary approaches to 
shed light on Finland’s latest transformation. 
Castells and Himanen proposed that 
all societies can be considered information 
societies which are strong in ICTs (in terms 
of the infrastructure and the production of 
these technologies) and in ‘knowledge’ 
(R&D, human capital). An economy can be 
regarded dynamic if it is internationally 
competitive and innovative, and if its 
business enterprises are successful.  A society 
can be called an open society if it is so 
politically and towards the global processes, 
and if it has a strong and active civil sector. 
In these terms, the authors argue, Finland is 
an open and dynamic information society and 
economy (2001:6-14). Besides, Finland 
continues to be a welfare state, i.e., an 
egalitarian society with an extensive public 
sector and income redistribution (Kiander, 
2004: 1). 
However, the highly developed I.S.  
experienced in Finland today is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, and was directly 
preceded by a serious recession (e.g. Oinas, 
2005). In the first half of the 1990s, Finland 
fell into an “exceptionally severe economic 
crisis”, a situation comparable to that of the 
countries worst hit by the Great Depression 
in the 1930s (Kiander, 2000: 5).80 Finnish 
GDP shrank by 10-12 percent between 1991-
93 and the unemployment rate increased 
from about 3 percent in 1990 to 17-18 
percent in 1994 (Kiander 2000, 2004a).  
In socio-psychological terms, this 
crisis caused a sense of uncertainty linked 
with “the growing mismatch between the old 
mental frames, values and norms of people 
and their new experiences in the rapidly 
changing techno-economic environment” 
(Schienstock and Hämäläinen, 2001:34)81. 
Although the impact of the depression varied 
with different groups of people, as well as 
across regions and sectors (due to differences 
in wealth and labour market positions, and in 
economic and production structures 
respectively), the Finnish society had to face 
new problems: “a realisation of a systematic 
risk in banking, large scale long-term 
unemployment and social exclusion, and the 
question of the sustainability of advanced 
welfare provisions” (Kiander, 2000: 6).   
Nevertheless, in the past years, 
Finland has shown remarkable development 
according to more general economic 
indicators. In the second half of the nineties 
the annual growth rate of the GDP exceeded 
5%, and based on a global competitiveness 
study by the World Economic Forum, 
                                                 
80 Kiander (2000, 2004a,b) discusses the roots of the 
crisis in detail. It was partly due to the general 
recession in Europe (that was connected to the 
currency crisis in 1992), but it was also the after-effect 
of the economic ‘bubble’ that had grown from a debt-
financed boom in the late eighties.  
81 See 4.3.1 for to some extent, similar uncertainties 
society faced in Hungary at the same time. Also, the 
conflict and compromises between freedom and 
security in ‘liquid modernity’, discussed for example, 
by Bauman, 2001 (2.2.2, Table 1). 
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Finland was first in 2001, 2003, and 2004; 
and second in 2006. (WEF)82  
So what actually has happened in 
the last, roughly ten years? Is it really this 
recent and short period of time where the 
reasons for success should be looked for?  
There have been both longer continuities 
from earlier periods and more recent 
disruptions in the forms of reforms and new 
elements which dynamised the economy, 
together resulting in this remarkably fast 
recovery. 
In the face of the economic shocks 
and the industrial restructuring, political 
governance and corporatist institutions in 
Finland could stay more or less stable:  
decision making continued to be based on 
consensus building; the structures of the 
welfare state (even after modifications which 
cut many privileges) were kept. The central 
labour market institutions (the strong trade 
unions and the centralized income policy) 
have been left almost unchanged. (Kiander, 
2004a.) 
Besides, structural changes, 
reorganisation of business processes, some 
cuts in public expenditures were necessary. 
These however, could not take place without 
public support: new behaviour patterns on 
the part of the citizens, who had to maintain 
their trust in each other and the State, and 
work even harder. In fact, Finland has been 
listed among the most trusting societies in 
recent studies, which could be in part 
explained by subjective well-being (i.e. by a 
generally high life satisfaction and relatively 
low levels of anxiety; Delhey and Newton, 
2003, drawing on Euromodule 1999-2001; 
Inglehart, 1999). 
Finally, it is very likely, that the 
rapid economic growth since the mid-nineties 
has occurred also on account of the 
expansion of the ‘informational economy’, 
the Finnish IT sector. Technological 
revolution of course, has its roots in earlier 
socio-economic developments; it also has its 
important continuities. In the following, these 
                                                 
82 Rankings for the years 2001-2002, 2003-2004, and 
2004-2005.   
continuities and reforms, and their relations 
are described in some more detail. 
 
 
Nokia, the networking company and a new 
business culture 
 
It would be oversimplification to 
attribute the recent achievements by Finland 
exclusively to the success of the well-known 
mobile telecommunications company Nokia; 
or to assume that at the core of the Finnish 
I.S., the plain formula operates that the 
wealth created by this company covers the 
expenses of the Finnish welfare state.  
Nevertheless, Nokia has obviously 
had an important and direct role in the 
exceptionally speedy economic growth in 
Finland in the second part of the 1990s. It 
had become the most valuable company in 
the EU by 1999, and was at the same time, 
ranked globally number 9 in this respect; 
besides, the high-technological cluster 
emerging around it (concentrated 
geographically mainly in the south-
southwest), can justly be called the engine of 
the Finnish economy. 
Indirect impacts, i.e. those reaching 
to the general business culture in Finland, 
might be even more important to the 
country’s recovery.  Nokia pioneered in 
Finland in intra-firm restructuring as well as 
inter-firm networking (Mäkinen, M. 1995; 
Ali-Yrkkö, 2001). Very much like the entire 
national economy, this company had to face 
crisis in the early nineties. It could be saved 
from bankruptcy only by its comprehensive 
and innovative reconstruction, i.e. by 
introducing a new business model, new 
organisational and production structure, new 
financial basis, and by shifting its product 
markets (see more detailed descriptions on 
this and the Nokia Values in Castells and 
Himanen 2001: 15-27; Mäkinen, 1995; Ali-
Yrkkö, 2001 and 2002; and Schienstock and 
Hämäläinen, 2001:75-151; Oinas, 2005; and 
Tukiainen, 2003).  
As a result, the company conducts 
active ‘alliance policy’, puts much effort into 
improving    its   networking  capacities.  The   
 
 
Figure 22. Nokia’s network environment (based on Ali-Yrkkö, 2001:42; supplemented). 
 
 
number of its inter-firm alliances has 
increased considerably in the past decade or 
so: the web around Nokia comprises 
“‘horizontal’ alliances between competitors, 
‘diagonal’ alliances between companies in 
different industries and ‘vertical’ alliances 
between buyers and suppliers” (Ali-Yrkkö, 
2001:12; see Figure 22 for Nokia’s network 
environment).  
In fact, it is the very nature of 
Nokia’s industrial profile that pushes it to 
network extensively: timed-based com-
petition (i.e. short product life cycles and 
terms of delivery times), and uncertainties 
(the difficulties of forecasting demand and 
future  [technological] development) require  
 
 
 
obtaining information and knowledge 
incessantly. This can be done most 
ingeniously through cooperation with other 
companies and organisations; even with 
competitors.  
Regardless of the degree and nature 
of their linkage to Nokia and the ICT-
production sector, sub-contracting and 
supplying partners, and competitors had to 
reorganise their business processes, 
internationalise their operation in a like 
fashion and under the same restructuring 
pressures. They started to exploit ICTs to 
increase the efficiency of knowledge flows, 
established      R&D     units    abroad,     and 
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globalised their services and markets83. By 
networking, they all could gain much from 
the know-how existing within the Finnish 
ICT cluster (Ali-Yrkkö, 2001). 
In sum, a wider transformation of 
business culture took place in the early 
nineties, in which Nokia was a “flagship 
corporation”, perhaps a crucial initiator: a 
paradigm shift in the use of ICTs by firms 
matched with the establishment of a trustful 
environment facilitating knowledge sharing; 
new organisation forms flattening hierarchies 
and introducing horizontally connected and 
semi-independent work groups, and 
increasing inter-firm cooperation 
(Schienstock and Hämäläinen, 2001).  
The network economy however, 
does not stop at the borders of the business 
sector. 
 
 
The Finnish national innovation system:  
interactive frameworks and creative 
atmosphere 
 
Institutional embeddedness and 
social welfare are vital to the sustenance of 
innovation and growth in the private sector. 
The network logic, quite predictably, can be 
traced in the whole social system.  
The ‘Finnish model’ is a much more 
complex organism than to depend on the 
well-being of a single, though influential, 
company, or an industrial cluster. At the 
basis of its existence, there lies a much 
broader foundation which is to be found in 
wider social relations, and the national 
innovation system (NIS). The intentional 
creation of the Finnish NIS started in the 
mid-1960s. Finland was the first country to 
implement the NIS concept (initiated and 
promoted by the OECD) as a fundamental 
category of its science and technology policy 
(Oinas, 2005:1235).  
Naturally, the profound and strategic 
deployment of the ICTs themselves plays an 
                                                 
83 In 2006, Nokia had eight production unites outside 
Europe: in Brasil, Mexico, the USA, and in two in 
India, two in China, and one in South Korea (NOKIA 
website). 
important role in the efficient performance of 
this ‘organism’. What makes the Finnish I.S. 
particular is the intricate ways in which the 
functions of the welfare state are 
interconnected with the new, knowledge-
intensive economy emerging along with the 
‘informational’ developments.  
This is the feature distinguishing 
Finland from other relatively distinct types of 
the I.S., such as the more ‘authoritarian’ one 
developing in Singapore, and the market-
oriented and more ‘capitalist’ I.S. model of 
the Silicon Valley, USA. It is not surprising 
therefore, that Finland has come out as world 
leader in the ‘society’ pillar of IDC’s 
Information Society Index (see Table 5 
above; and note in what aspects the US, 
Korea, Sweden are at no. 1 positions).  
Castells and Himanen present a 
complicated diagram to demonstrate how the 
services and functions of the welfare state are 
thought to supply the foundation for the 
rather complex structure which can be 
referred to as the Finnish ‘national 
innovation system’, ‘innovation milieu’, or, 
actually, the Finnish model of the I.S. 
(2001:95). It suggests in fact, that everything 
is connected to everything else, which may 
cause some doubts. On the other hand, it is 
evident that Nokia itself is engaged not only 
in business alliances but in important non-
business partnerships, too (App. 6). Some 
more detailed explanation in the following 
may help to overcome disbelief. 
 
At the core of the Finnish innovation system, 
there is a highly connected set of centrally 
funded national educational and R&D 
institutions, and related public organisations; 
and high-quality and free of charge public 
and tertiary education, with an enhanced 
system of universities. 
The Finnish success in Pisa (2000, 
2003), a three-year international survey of 
the knowledge and skills of 15-year-olds 
carried out in every three years in the main 
industrialised countries, is another frequent 
fact brought up in the context of human 
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capital.84 Besides Finland’s top scores in 
reading, mathematical and scientific literacy, 
the high level of equality and the underlying 
equal opportunities are striking features of 
Finnish education in international 
comparison. Actually, the results were a 
source of “great joy but at the same time a 
somewhat puzzling experience to all those 
responsible for and making decisions about 
education in Finland” (Välijärvi et al., 
2002:3).  
The findings encouraged education 
researchers to reflect upon the possible 
reasons. The outcome was the general 
conclusion that “there is, … no one single 
explanation for the result” but “a web of 
interrelated factors having to do with 
comprehensive pedagogy, students’ own 
interests and leisure activities, the structure 
of the education system, teacher education, 
school practices and, in the end, Finnish 
culture” (ibid.). In any case, Finland has 
taken up the role of a model in this regard, 
inviting foreign experts to study their system, 
and exporting it to such geographically and 
culturally distant countries as China, for 
instance (e.Finland, 2004c).  
The financial situation of the 
educational sector in Finland started to 
improve considerably with the decision and 
guidance of the Science Policy Council and 
the funds from the Finnish Academy in the 
1960s. As a result, already in the 1970s, 
                                                 
84 PISA assessed young people’s capacity to use their 
knowledge and skills in order to meet real-life 
challenges, measured literacy in three domains, 
reading, mathematics and science. In 2000, reading 
literacy was given a special priority; in 2003 the main 
domain was mathematical literacy. Students had to 
comprehend key concepts, and to apply knowledge 
and skills in different authentic situations. Besides, 
information was also collected on student attitudes and 
approaches to learning. Finnish students’ ranked no. 1 
in 2000 in reading literacy (interpreting texts, 
retrieving information) matched with a high level of 
equality (i.e. low standard deviation); no. 4 in 
mathematical literacy (understanding change and 
relationships, and space and shape) also very equally 
distributed, and were positioned no. 3 in mean 
performance of scientific literacy  (life and health, 
earth and environment., technology). (Välijärvi et al., 
2002; e-Finland 2004a, b.)  
twenty universities were functioning in the 
country (while in the fifties, there had been 
only two towns in Finland with 
comprehensive universities). This had 
important implication to a regionally more 
even distribution of jobs and development 
potentials, too.85  
There are technologically oriented 
universities in Helsinki, Oulu, Lappeenranta 
and Tampere. Compared internationally, the 
cooperation between universities and state-
owned research institutes, and the business 
sector is more widespread than it is 
elsewhere (Paija & Rouvinen, 2004).  
 
Since the late 1960s, several key institutions 
have been founded or renewed.  
A national institutional and financial 
infrastructure has grown to provide the 
foundation for the development of education, 
basic and strategic research and innovation in 
Finland. The most significant of these 
institutions and some of the important 
linkages and complementarities between 
them are given a more detailed account in the 
following.86 
The Science and Technology 
Policy Council (founded in 1986, Valtion 
Tiede- ja Teknologianeuvosto) is the prime 
source of R&D policy of the government. It 
gives advice concerning the national R&D 
budget and the medium/long term goals in 
the strategic development and coordination 
of Finnish science and technology policy. It 
is also responsible for the functioning of the 
national innovation system as a whole. The 
Council is a serious and rather influential 
body in international comparison, organised 
directly under the Prime Minister. It is made 
up of  “the main cluster actors around the 
same table” (Paija, 2001:52) including 
basically all imaginable interested parties: 
eight key ministers, ten high-level 
representatives from universities, key 
                                                 
85  See more concerning regional dynamics in 4.3.1. 
86 The main sources I rely in this section: Castells and 
Himanen, 2001; Paija, 2001; Markkula, 2003, and the 
Internet pages of the organisations. 
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personalities from Finnish industries (e.g. 
Nokia’s CEO), leaders of the Academy and 
Tekes (see below), and directors of the 
employers’ and employees’ organisations. 
The Academy of Finland (Suomen 
Akatemia) operates under the administration 
of the Ministry of Education; it was reformed 
in 1969. The Academy gives long-term 
funding for high-quality scientific research, 
and acts as an expert body in science policy. 
It also ensures reliable evaluation and 
promotes extensive international co-
operation. Besides its Board and 
Administrative Office, it is made up of four 
thematic Research Councils responsible for 
the main fields: Biosciences and 
Environment, Culture and Society, Health, 
and Natural Sciences and Engineering.  
Sitra (Suomen Itsenäisyyden 
Juhlarahasto), the National Fund for 
Research and Development was founded in 
1967. It is “an independent public foundation 
under the supervision of the Finnish 
Parliament… (whose) activities are designed 
to promote the economic prosperity of the 
Finnish people” (Sitra web site). Castells and 
Himanen call it the ”Public Capitalist”  
(2001:32) because it does not give funds for 
technology R&D per se but it is more like a 
venture capitalist organisation financing 
promising and innovative start-ups in co-
operation with another fund (Tekes). Sitra 
had a major share in drawing up the second, 
revised national information society 
strategies, too (1998).  
Between 1994 and 1998, a 
noticeable and conscious shift in focus took 
place in national I.S. thinking and policy: the 
first version of the national I.S. strategy 
published in early 1995 was concentrating on 
technologies and the economy, while the 
revised strategy published in Dec. 1998, was 
titled Quality of Life, Knowledge and 
Competitiveness, and was composed of 
spearhead-projects such as electronic 
transactions, telework, sustainable I.S., 
personal navigation, e-learning, local I.S., 
content industry, and knowledge-intensive 
work (Hanhike and Nupponen, 2000).  
The strategy work has been 
coordinated by the Information Society 
Council (Tietoyhteiskuntaneuvosto) since 
2003, and the latest (third) strategy, for the 
period of 2007-2015 was published in 
September 2006 (see Figure 24 below). The 
I.S. Council  chaired by the Prime Minister, 
replaced the former “Consultative Committee 
on I.S.”. It is “a negotiation body … for 
coordinating cooperation between 
administrative branches and between 
administration, organisations and business 
life” involved in developing the I.S. Its 
appointment is connected to Matti 
Vanhanen’s term as Prime Minister, who also 
chairs this body. It meets three times a year, 
and monitors policy impact and efficiency, 
puts forward proposals on I.S. policy, and 
has been reporting on the progress of the 
National I.S. Programme (2003-2007; see 
Box 3) to the Government. (I.S. Council, 
website.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 140 measures with the participation of 
several Ministries and the Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2003-2007. 
 
• Implementation of the broadband strategy so 
that fast and reasonably priced connections 
are provided to all citizens by 2005. 
• Reforming Government Information 
Management. 
• Developing the interoperability of 
information management in public 
administration and cooperation related to 
information society. 
• Information campaign promoting general 
awareness of electronic services. 
• Information society cooperation between 
large cities. 
• Raising the level of public sector funding of 
R&D. 
• Common platform for ‘eIdentification’ and 
‘ePayment’. 
 
Box 3. Examples of projects in the Finnish 
National I.S. Programme, 2003-2007. 
(Source: Gov. Policy Programmes / I.S., 
2006). 
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Tekes or the National Technology 
Agency (Teknologian kehittämiskeskus) is 
„the main channel for business-oriented 
public research and development finance” 
(Castells and Himanen, 2001:31). 
Established in 1983, it focuses especially on 
developing enterprises which produce 
exportable products and services. Tekes 
maintains close links with both the Academy 
and Sitra, yet it preserves significant 
autonomy from ministries (which is a unique 
feature in comparison with similar 
institutions internationally).  The Agency has 
funded several successful Finnish technology 
firms, and played an important role in 
Nokia’s development, too. Tekes proactively 
initiates joint research and technological 
programmes with universities and the private 
sector, and also provides financial support to 
industrial projects and individual projects in 
research institutes in a reactive way if they 
come up to certain criteria: esp. if they are 
innovative and risk-intensive.87 
One other important quality 
rewarded by the Agency is the ability and 
extent of networking between the various 
participants who are engaged in particular 
R&D projects. To promote this idea, the 
Agency often recommends partners – also 
from abroad88 - for particular themes and 
purposes, and it also carries out continuous 
                                                 
87 An ambitious goal of Tekes’ has been the FinnWell 
technology programme which aspires to develop 
Finland’s healthcare system into Europe’s best. To 
achieve this goal, the FinnWell projects aim to 
strengthen the linkages between healthcare 
organisations and technology companies. iWell, a 
previous healthcare-oriented programme  initiated by 
the Agency, which ended in 2003, addressed health 
from the viewpoint of service users, while FinnWell 
combines the interests and needs of organisations, 
service providers and clients (Virta and Tekes, 2004; 
Tekes website). This course shows a very conscious 
developing strategy. 
88 Just one interesting example for the international 
role Finnish Tekes has taken up, is its activities in 
China:  it opened its Shanghai office in Sept. 2004, 
committed to strengthen the cooperation between 
these key technology players in these two, very 
different-sized, and geographically as well as 
culturally rather distant countries.  (See e.Finland 
08.10.2004). 
monitoring and evaluation of the 
programmes and projects undertaken. So 
Tekes can be justly called the “‘weaver’ of 
networks and ‘godfather’ to new ICT 
companies” (Paija, 2001:53).  
TIEKE, the Finnish I.S. 
Development Centre (Tietoyhteiskunnan 
kehittämiskeskus ry) is a non-profit and 
neutral organisation defining itself as the 
“meeting point for I.S. developers”. Its 
mission is to network its members for the 
enhancement of I.S. expertise and tools. It 
has two main strengths. One is its wide 
membership, which “mirrors an entire 
spectrum of Finnish society and all key 
players in the information society”: over a 
hundred companies in ICT development, 
manufacture, marketing, and organisations 
who deploy these technologies and services, 
as well as several ministries and public 
agencies. The other is the flexibility of its 
focus and aims, which “reflect the rapidly 
changing ICT environment … (changing its) 
course from time to time according to need”. 
Networking and interoperability are 
perceived to be the main requirements at the 
moment, so they have been currently in 
TIEKE’s focus, too (see also the section on 
e.Finland below). 
The Finnish government has a firm 
belief in developing the I.S., since they see 
that it is the way to guarantee future 
economic success for the nation. So finally, 
there needs to be a mention here of a 
Parliamentary organ that supports politicians 
in this resolution of theirs. It is the 
Committee for the Future89 (Tulevaisuus-
                                                 
89 The origin of the Committee dates back to the midst 
of the severe socio-economic crisis (1992), when the 
majority of the MPs approved a legislation suggesting 
the Government should provide them with a report 
about the country’s long-term development trends and 
options. Consequently, the Parliament appointed a 
‘Committee for the Future’ on a temporary basis for 
this purpose, and the first report was submitted in 
October 1993. Soon after, the Parliament decided that 
the Government should present them a ’Futures 
Report’ at least once in each electoral period. In late 
1999, along with the revision of the Constitution, the 
Committee for the Future was granted a permanent 
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valiokunta – TuV), which is responsible for 
‘inventing the future’, and as such, is 
considered a “truly unique Finnish 
innovation” (Markkula, 2003). It formulates 
and evaluates the Government’s regularly 
submitted reports on the 5-15 years’ future of 
Finland, prepares recommendations on 
various future related questions, and assesses 
technological development and its societal 
consequences.  
With a regard to I.S., which is 
indeed a key vision and strategy for the 
future of Finland, the Committee have 
advocated certain crucial measures. The 
applications and opportunities offered by 
ICTs must be within everyone’s reach in 
order to help a faster development of on-line 
services in the public sector, and for this 
research has to be stepped up as a joint 
project shared by the government, 
municipalities, and the companies operating 
in the field. The Committee has had also an 
important role in the high levels of central 
R&D financing. Besides, public support of 
creative projects that have the potential to 
enrich regional innovation systems and local 
economies has been urged.  
Not surprisingly, the Committee 
itself cooperates widely, basically with all 
institutions mentioned above, and naturally, 
with the Finnish Government and Ministries. 
Also, it works together with various foreign 
parliaments and other international 
organisations and institutions specialising in 
the survey of future development trends and 
options, and civic organisations (see: the 
Committee’s website).  
 
The State has for long enabled and 
encouraged innovation and growth in the ICT 
industry and market.  
Some initial advantages were rooted 
in special historical situations matched well 
with public sector responses favouring 
competitive and innovative markets and the 
                                                                          
status, starting from March 2000 (Parliament of 
Finland website; Markkula, 2003). 
 
build-up of technological expertise. Besides, 
there has been a more consciously planned 
course of telecom liberalisation and 
deregulation policy followed by the State. 
Finland’s success with ICTs should 
not be perceived to be exclusively an internal 
phenomenon of this specific sector. It is 
rather the “context of a cross-sector cluster” 
(Paija, 2001:51; my highlights) that is at the 
heart of the remarkable growth of the Finnish 
telecommunications industry. As a rule, the 
competitiveness of a cluster depends on the 
political, institutional and cultural 
environment in which it functions. A very 
important aspect of this context is the fact 
that the cooperation network of the ICT 
companies extend into other industries, as 
well as into spheres of research and 
universities. Very recently, this networking 
has increased suddenly. Reasons for this 
could be the requirements to spread the risk 
that is so typical of the sector and to take 
advantage of external expertise and 
information.90 Compared internationally, the 
collaboration between Finnish private firms 
and public research institutes has been 
outstandingly broad.  
There is “a long self-strengthening 
and complex development process that 
started in institutions, organisations and 
throughout society as far back as the eighteen 
hundreds” (Paija, 2001:51). It seems that in 
Finland it was a set of certain successive and 
‘enabling’ public sector decisions – not all 
deliberate and part of a conscious strategy, 
though – which ignited development 
processes. Four examples of this follow here. 
First of all, the structure of the 
Finnish telecom markets was unique already 
at its earliest decades (from the late 19th 
century) because it encouraged interaction 
between operators and equipment suppliers: 
the Finnish Senate, then under the Russian 
Empire, created many private licences for 
telecommunications activities to get round 
Russian telegraph regulations. Therefore, 
there was no such monopoly situation in 
Finland as in other countries; competition 
                                                 
90 As mentioned above concerning ‘Nokia’s web’. 
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was inherent to the telecom market from the 
start.  
After gaining independence in 1917, 
the state telecom operator was established to 
keep up the telegraph and army telephone 
networks that were left behind by the 
Russians. Thus a duopoly of private and 
public telecom markets emerged in Finland, 
which secured a good basis for equal 
competition once liberalisation took place in 
the 1990s. Elsewhere in the world, difficult 
regulation was needed to guarantee 
conditions for fair competition when 
monopoly markets were disclosed; Finland 
was spared this problem. 
Secondly, foreign equipment 
suppliers could freely enter the Finnish 
markets, unlike in other countries, where 
national suppliers had the benefit of a 
monopoly position. This secured further 
sources of technological innovation and 
learning. There were over 800 operators in 
Finland in the 1930s. They attracted 
innovative equipment dealers from abroad, 
too, who were pleased to test their latest 
technology in Finland (e.g. Sölvell & Porter, 
2002; Finnfacts). 
Thirdly, and as a consequence of the 
above, the operators were compelled to build 
up technological expertise of their own that 
could enable them to integrate the different 
manufacturers’ network components, and so 
could make them “expert customer” (Paija, 
2001:52). This knowledge was later utilized 
by the nascent domestic component industry, 
the precursors of Nokia, in fact. 
Finally, this expertise was 
uncovered and activated by the State again. 
This was done through calls for tenders 
announced for to find technological solutions 
matching the requirements of different public 
institutions, e.g. the National Defence, the 
State Railways (VR), and the Border Guard. 
Hence the Finnish domestic 
telecommunications component industry 
came into being in the sixties through the co-
operation between the public and the private 
sector. The peak of this partnership was the 
establishment of the Nordic Mobile 
Telecommunications (NMT) network in the 
seventies. Once again, the standards of the 
NMT were made open to boost competition 
in the market, which resulted in the Nordic 
region becoming the largest mobile 
communications market in the world by the 
early 1980s. (Paija, 2001:51-52). 
It was in the eighties when 
information technology started to get some 
emphasis in political circles (see also above 
the years of foundation of Tekes and the 
Science and Technology Policy Council). 
Around this time, liberalisation was a key 
driver of further progress, it brought about a 
revolution in digital and wireless 
communications. This time the push came 
from the side of the private sector. Originally 
the analogue NMT licence was the monopoly 
of the public telecom company, to which the 
private network providers responded by 
setting up local and regional radio telephone 
networks, which was, on the other hand, 
within their legal rights. So the private sector 
was operating without country-wide licences 
first, hoping that a national licence would be 
granted to them soon.  
After some more pressure and 
political struggle, these hopes were realised, 
and private telecom companies could take 
great and perfectly timed advantage of 
digitalisation.91 By 1994, old laws on data 
transfer rights had been reformed, and the 
telecommunications market had been fully 
liberalised. Finland was one of the first 
countries in the world to achieve this. The 
opening of markets has covered the whole 
Finnish telecommunications sector since, 
resulting in strong competition, considerably 
low prices and a wide selection of high-
quality services (ESPON, 2002-04). 
                                                 
91 In Finland, telecommunications operations were 
opened up for competition in the early 1990s: in 1990, 
the markets of GSM networks and data transfer were 
liberalised, and “full-fledged competition in local, 
trunk and international telecommunications began in 
1994” already. Nowadays, one only needs to notify 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications to 
establish telecom services in Finland, and only the 
construction of cellular networks requires a 
government licence (Tuomi, 2004: 8; Cairncross, 
1995).   
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In addition, the liberalisation of the 
capital markets provided an extra source of 
risk capital, the lack of which had been a 
major barrier to new business activity up till 
the 1990s. This measure also ensured a 
further momentum to the growth, diversify-
cation and internationalisation of the Finnish 
ICT cluster, and for instance, helped Nokia 
also, to become a dominant actor in the 
global market (Paija, 2001:53). 
 
Direct public R&D funds have been 
upgraded gradually since the early 1980s. 
 
As early as in 1982, the Finnish 
Government decided to raise national 
research and development expenditure from 
1.2 per cent to 2.2 per cent of the GDP. In 
1996 a further increase to 2.9 per cent of the 
GDP was resolved to achieve by 1999, 
despite the fact that the Finnish economy had 
hardly started to recover from its deep 
recession period. This later goal was fulfilled 
already in 1998, so yet a higher rate of 
growth was set to be accomplished by 
2000/01, by which time R&D budget had 
reached 3.2 per cent of the GDP. (Castells 
and Himanen, 2001). By 2005, this figure 
had grown to 3.5 per cent (see Figure 23 
below).  
Finland’s determined investment in 
technological development even during the 
economic downturn in the early nineties may 
be credited to the joint vision and 
determination of the members of the Council 
to get “Finland back on its feet through 
know-how” (Paija, 2001:53), as well as the 
political influence and dedication of the 
Committee mentioned above. 
 
State organisations and public services have 
set an example in using ICTs and central 
funding aims at the promotion of best 
practices.  
 
In Finland, “the general societal 
view is that national parliaments should 
generate preconditions for efficient, 
innovative activities by citizens and 
communities, and show examples of such 
activities in their own work, with the overall 
purpose being to improve the quality of life” 
(Markkula, 2003).   
More generally, this requirement has 
been fulfilled in terms of providing a high-
quality and ‘welfare’ educations system 
encouraging life-long learning, a favourable 
environment for business and investments, 
the promotion and extensive support of 
research, and establishing a virtually all-
inclusive framework for flexible networking 
and cooperation.  
In addition, more concretely, public 
and governmental organisations themselves 
have led the way in using and providing 
services via ICTs. Various user-friendly 
solutions have been implemented ranging 
from innovative e-governance and e-
democracy practices; ICTs applied 
extensively in both traditional and ‘virtual’ 
education, in public libraries, by public 
transportation companies; organisational, 
municipal and regional authorities’ websites 
and portals, community intranets, etc. 
 The existence of such a portal as 
“e.Finland - Technology Serving People / 
The Window to Finnish I.S.” 
(www.e.finland.fi), together with the 
incredible amount of up-to-date information 
available at its site, is more than convincing. 
eFinland.fi is constructed and maintained “in 
wide cooperation with several ministries and 
national promoters of information society.”92 
Its purpose is “to provide all interested 
parties a single site offering a concentration 
of Finland's information society activities, 
thus eliminating the need to search for 
information from several sources.” It shows a 
tremendous national interest in promoting 
best practices, the latest technological 
applications and IT know-how. Significantly, 
it is the embodiment of a deliberate 
advertisement of Finland to the world as “a 
                                                 
92 Members of the consortium are: the Ministries for 
Foreign Affairs, of Finance, of Transport and 
Communications, the National Technology Agency 
(Tekes), the Finnish Information Society Development 
Centre (TIEKE). 
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country where Information Society of 
tomorrow is a reality today”.93  
In 2004, the Finnish Prime 
Minister’s Best Practices Award, and the 
competition for high-quality Internet services 
in public administration announced by the 
Ministry of Finance had 266 entries. The 
most popular divisions were training and 
studies, social welfare and health, and 
electronic commerce, and a total of 68 
Internet services from the central 
government, local authorities and public 
administration participated. The idea of 
giving out such prizes comes from the 
deliberation to increase public awareness of 
I.S.-related best practices, to “showcase top-
quality Internet services and solutions that 
are functional and useful from the point of 
view of citizens”, and to promote their 
diffusion throughout the entire community. 
Innovation and further development of 
current practices are expected to gain 
impetus as a consequence, and such 
competitions are also hoped to make it easier 
for innovations to reach the international 
market (Ahonen and Ala-Harja, 2004). 
 
There have been substantial investments into 
innovation by the private sector, too.  
 
 
Figure 23. Investments into R&D in Finland, 
billion euros 
 
                                                 
93 This claim can be found in the introductory article 
of the eFinland portal (see References).  
Besides the generous public support 
of R&D, re-investment by the private sector 
into their research and development activities 
remains significant (In fact, private R&D 
expenditure has exceeded the amount of total 
funding by the state.) In 2005, for example, 
over 70 per cent of the total investments into 
these activities in Finland were by the private 
sector (by comparison, the same figure was 
57 per cent in 1991; Castells-Himanen 2001: 
34; see also Figure 23.) Nokia is the major 
player in private R&D investments. 
 
 
Some special historical conditions encoura-
ged telecom innovation. 
 
Not all developments have been the 
results of the conscious strategy and planning 
of the past couple of decades: ‘good fortune’ 
and lucky timing also have played a 
significant part (Paija 2001:53). 
Two instances of unplanned but 
lucky events have been mentioned above 
already, which had further consequences. 
The political dependence of Finland within 
the Russian Empire until 1917 created the 
situation that (despite repeated requests by 
the Finnish Senate,) telegraph lines 
constructed on their territory remained under 
Russian control (surely, for their military 
strategic importance). So when just a year 
after the invention of the telephone (1877) 
the first telephone line was laid in the Grand 
Duchy of Finland, the Senate perceived a 
chance for achieving national independence 
embodied in the creation of several private 
licences for telephony separate from the 
Russian telegraph infrastructure.  
The other interesting incident of 
several coincidences was set off by a 
‘fossilised’ imperial regulation about data 
transmission rights, and the ‘short-
sightedness’ of policy-makers wrangling 
over the GSM licence till the early 1990s. As 
a result, private telecom companies were 
refused the analogue NMT network licence 
in the 1980s, and consequently, they 
responded by creating their own regional 
radio telephone networks, and just a few 
(Source of data: Tekes & Statistics Finland.) 
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years after, as new market entrants they 
could take full advantage of the digital GSM 
licence (e.g. Radiolinja Ltd.). The timing 
was, by chance, perfect: adequate networks 
and competition in the market had already 
been given, and just by the same time, the 
suitable mobile phone technology had 
become available, too (e.g. Nokia, and 
several competitors).  
Surely, there is always continuity 
behind changes, so the NIS and recent policy 
innovations in Finland are also rooted in 
more enduring, cultural-historical aspects. 
Explicit and long-standing features of the 
broader Finnish society have increased the 
nation’s capacity to transform. Oinas (2005) 
mentions the relatively tight social networks 
and cross-sectoral linkages that have been 
permitted by the small size of the population, 
and the legacy of a “forest sector society”; as 
well as social cohesion coming from diverse 
sources such as the free public school 
system, the summer cottage tradition, student 
union politics, the unique national language, 
and arenas that link cross-sectoral elites. 
These later, i.e. the ‘discursive institutions’, 
Oinas argues, helped to establish strong 
commitment by the government to 
technology-driven development from the 
1960s, as well as facilitated the policy-
institutional changes in the early 1990s. 
Forums of cross-sectoral elites have been 
crucial in the coordination of the current 
emergence of a “state-enhanced, innovation-
oriented system where firms play a more 
prominent role” than before (ibid: 1237). 
Besides, Finnish national identity 
has been an interesting question for a long 
time, in the contexts of their long historical 
struggle for independence, their strong sense 
of survival in biological-climatic, as well as 
in economic and political terms, their 
emphasized wish to belong to the ‘West’, 
their relatively recent accession to the 
European Union and their successful 
integration into the global economy. 
According to some authors (e.g. Castells and 
Himanen, 2001:84-93; Oinas, 2005) these 
features of a unique historical heritage, 
geographical and geopolitical situation partly 
explains why the new knowledge-based, 
information society is becoming probably the 
latest ‘national project’ or self-definition of 
this people, both through more natural socio-
psychological processes as well as a result of 
some deliberate identity-shaping by the state. 
 
The creative Finnish hacker culture and 
values have been prompting wider ‘social 
innovation’.  
 
The term ‘hackers’ do not 
necessarily stand for computer criminals 
operating on-line (the later sort might better 
be called ‘cracker’ to make the difference 
explicit), but simply for “individuals, who 
believe in their ideas and start to realise them 
with passion … who love programming and 
networking with others to do it” (Castells and 
Himanen 2001:38). They are usually students 
who emerge from departments of informatics 
at technological universities, and who are 
often driven by the mere excitement they get 
from problem solving and not by an interest 
in profit (at least in the beginning, which 
generosity has been made possible by the 
right for free study and an advantageous 
student grant system in Finland; Paija, 
2001:53-54). Besides, Patomäki notes that an 
interesting driver of early hackerism in 
Finland was the country’s peculiar geo-
political position and closeness to the  Soviet 
Union which “forced technology-freaks to be 
creative when ready-made solutions were 
available to others in the West” (2007:144). 
(Allowing access to high-tech innovations to 
countries so dangerously near to the 
Communist Bloc was considered a risk. This 
concern played an important role in the 
1980s in the case of Hungary and the young 
computer enthusiasts there, too; see below.) 
Often, hackers train themselves 
further in some special field, and later, 
launch some private enterprise based on 
software they have developed themselves, or 
start working for a telecom giant. Yet in any 
case, they stick to the concept of open-
source, rely on mutual trust and a sense of 
fair play among their professional society, so 
they make their results and ideas public in 
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order to let their colleagues all over the 
world, develop their software or other 
inventions further.  Famous Finnish hackers 
are: Johan Helsingius, who operated the 
world's most popular anonymous re-mailer 
(and had some problems with the Finnish 
police consequently); Tatu Ylönen, the 
inventor of the SSH encryption software 
(1995); Jarkko Oikarinen, the  developer of 
the Internet Relay Chat, Linus Torvalds, one 
of the most genuinely respected hackers in 
history and the ‘father’ of the Linux 
operation system (1991)94; Ari Lemmke, who 
has supervised the work of a group of 
Helsinki students who developed the first 
network browser with a graphical interface 
called ‘Erwise’. 
However, the most significant 
innovation coming from Finnish hackers was 
not a technological but a social one. Their 
example has been inspiring for many of the 
young, not exclusively computer-minded 
innovators. Other bottom-up developments 
have been realised based on co-operative 
networking and the open-source model which 
are not necessarily taking advantage of the 
latest technologies. Himanen has famously 
termed the quintessence of all these as ‘social 
hackerism’ in his book titled The Hacker 
Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age 
(2001).95 
An interesting ‘outsider’s account’ 
on the Finnish hacker culture and its special 
social context justifies Himanen’s view, 
which is given by a journalist in the well-
known British daily, The Guardian (see Box 
4). He expresses admiration and even some 
envy for this phenomenon, which is so “un-
American”, and drawing a bitter comparison 
                                                 
94 The Linux operating system is in fact, gaining 
popularity: between 2001-2004, It doubled its share of 
home and office computer op. systems in the world, 
and in 2004, in its ‘place of birth’, the University of 
Helsinki, Linux is being introduced as an alternative 
to Windows (Nurminen, 2004).  
95 The hacker values: “promote passionate and freely 
rhythmed work; the belief that individuals can create 
great things by joining forces in imaginative ways; 
and the need to maintain our existing ethical ideals, 
such as privacy and equality, in our new, increasingly 
technologized society.” (Himanen, 2001:  iv). 
between the Finnish ‘hacker ethic’ and the 
‘British Protestant ethic’. It seems that the 
former is a more viable strategy in the 
‘information age’ than the later, which is 
known to have been the driver behind 
industrial revolution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How depressing it was to step off the Finnair 
plane, still enthused by the experience of a 
prosperous society of mass scholars, inventing 
the future at their leisure, and walk into the pre-
election brutalities of New Labour. Everyone to 
work, says the chancellor Gordon Brown, no 
matter what the job entails, no matter how 
pointless it is. For in the land of New Labour, the 
soul's play-day is still the Devil's work-day; and 
idleness delivers the poor onto his scaly hands.  
For it's the soulful, playful, scholarly "idleness" 
of hackers… All those world-changing, freely-
gifted innovations produced - HTTP, TCP/IP, 
Perl, Apache, Sendmail, and Linux - have 
provided the very backbone for the network 
economy.  …  
Rather than coercing the poor into their brain-
destroying Mc Jobs, perhaps the chancellor 
should be thinking about how to make them all 
ethical hackers. (…)  
(I)f you're knowledge-rich and facilities-rich as 
well then experimentation and creative play 
become your vocation. Look at pop music, 
fuelled by passion, technology and a lot of 
unspecific fiddling around. Hackers and rockers 
are spun from the same ethical DNA.  
So it's possible that some unemployable, 
disaffected kid, glommed on to a PC for days, 
nights and months on end, supported by free 
education and decent social support, could come 
up with the next geek miracle for Britain. But as 
long as the Protestant work ethic dominates 
government thinking, targeting resources to 
shape a nation of dutiful workers instead of a 
nation of unruly players and creators, that's an 
unlikely scenario.  
(Pat Kane, 2001.)  
Box 4. Impressions by a foreigner: Finland 
as a nation of “unruly players and creators.” 
(S.: Kane, in The Guardian, 29.03.2001.) 
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Figure 24. The construction of the National Knowledge Society for Finland, 2007-2015 
 
 
Mr. Kane had surely been much 
influenced by Himanen’s work and some 
other similar accounts on the lives and work 
of hackers and the Finnish education system. 
Also, the title of Himanen’s book evokes a 
clear and intended association or implication 
to Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (1902), so the 
comparison above between the British and 
the Finnish structures and attitudes is 
certainly not a coincidence. Nevertheless, 
this view ‘from outside’ may be an indication 
of the fact that culturally embedded attitudes  
do make a difference, as well as that there is 
a  certain   ‘spirit’  behind  the  growth  of  an  
 
 
advanced I.S. This spirit may be just natural 
to those who share it, yet rather alien, 
incomprehensible, yet often enviable to those 
who do not.  
Finally, I quote some thoughts from 
Paija and Markkula (with my own highlights 
added to words I consider to be of key 
importance.) The citation from the former 
author, I reckon, may refer to all the above 
factors and actors – ranging from 
collaboration in research and development, 
shared interests    in    market   liberalisation,  
historic coincidences and opportunities taken 
advantage of, through funding mechanisms 
based on complementariness, the role of the 
“Human-centric and competitive Finland 2007-2015” 
 Transforming Finland into an  
internationally attractive, people-centred and 
competitive knowledge and service society 
Good life in I.S. 
Competent and 
learning 
individuals and 
work communities 
Ideas into products 
and services; 
innovation system 
reform 
Finland as a 
People-oriented 
and competitive 
service society 
Trust in I.S. services and actors 
Socially and regionally even I.S. development 
A compatible and unobstructed I.S. infrastructure 
Work, family life and leisure time set in balance 
(Translated from Harjuhahto-Madetoja, 2007 / National I.S. Programme) 
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state and public policies, to the Finnish 
networking spirit and hacker ethic fostering 
the legendary open-source model. The later 
quote in fact, has the same  message  comple- 
mented with an indication how I.S. should be 
rather considered as striving to realise a 
‘knowledge society’, and accentuates the 
importance of networking, cooperation, the 
abilities to trust, to  understand, and 
communicate with each other.  
 
The development of the competitiveness of a country 
and its companies is closely bound up with the 
operating environment and its internal dynamics. … 
 
There is no such thing as a universally applicable 
‘cluster policy’. The best way to encourage more 
innovation and competitiveness is to create a 
framework for uninhabited interaction between 
cluster operators, both private and public. (Paija 
2001:54.) 
Human capital has extremely close connections with 
social capital, due to the fact that learning is a highly 
communal event and joint process, in addition to its 
strongly individual aspects. Social capital is generated 
by an intellectual culture … Essential components of 
social capital include networks, work processes, 
atmospheres, shared values and work methods, 
trust, and the capacity to think and interact with 
other people.  (…) Innovativeness generates 
innovativeness – but only in a trustworthy and 
trusting growth environment. To be reliable, one 
must rely on others. (…) In an innovative 
environment, working relationships are often networks 
and networks “emerge” from the environment. (…) 
Educating people in creativity and responsibility 
from early childhood is a serious challenge to an 
information society. To achieve this goal, we must 
aim for a knowledge society. (…)  Knowledge is 
something that we already have within our reach.  
 
What will be required next are the capabilities to 
apply and to exploit knowledge, to get along and 
learn together with people from different cultural 
backgrounds, and to learn to use and develop further 
responsible and effective knowledge management on 
both personal and societal levels. (Markkula 2003) 
 
In sum, see Figure 24: it clearly 
reflects the central ideas expressed in the 
citations above. It is drawn from the national 
vision of the I.S. in Finland for the coming 
eight years (the third I.S. strategy period: 
2007-2015). The focus has shifted from an 
ICT-utilising to a knowledge-based society, 
and the objective of a socially and spatially 
equal I.S. has become more pronounced as an 
important foundation. Certainly, the 
construction of the building blocks has 
started already, and Finland’s intention to 
continue on the same path is obvious: 
towards a “people-centred and competitive 
knowledge and service society”. 
 
 
4.3 Hungary: building an I.S. under 
pressures  
 
With an area of 93,000 km2 and a 
population of approx. 10 million, Hungary is 
a small-to-medium sized country in its more 
immediate region, Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). Central in Europe may it be 
geographically, Hungary is currently a 
periphery in economic and political terms; 
and is a rather insignificant player in global 
economy. Still, this country has attracted 
much attention in the past few decades by 
trying to break out of this position and to hit 
a confident and independent, yet not isolated 
path of development.  
Abandoning old habits and 
structures, however, and finding an ‘own 
way’ always take a long time. An obvious 
sign of this is that since the change of its 
political regime in 1989/90, Hungary has 
been most frequently referred to as a former 
Socialist (or Communist) country, a former 
Eastern Bloc country, and transition 
economy, etc.  
Economic, social and political 
transition has taken place in divergent ways 
in the CEE region. Hungary has also shown 
some specific traits, which are discussed by 
scholars and analysts in an ever expanding 
literature since the early 1990s.  Not going 
into all the detail, I give a brief account first, 
on what I find especially important about the 
developments in the past almost two decades. 
I explain some of the aspects of the transition 
process which have contributed to a 
particular social environment or ‘social 
quality’ in Hungary.96 The social 
                                                 
96 Social quality is composed of four major conditions: 
socio-economic security, social inclusion, social 
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environment is essential to understand when 
looking at the development of the I.S. in its 
fullest meaning, i.e. in its non-technocentric, 
cultural interpretation (see 2.2.2), or as a 
communication society (see e.g. the 
international developments of I.S. discourses 
in 3.2.1). (Post-)transition Hungarian 
phenomena such as the missing democratic 
channels for interest articulation and poor 
transparency of political decisions are 
indeed, aspects that deserve some attention 
here. 
Afterwards, telecommunications and 
I.S.-related policy developments are 
described along several important phases and 
episodes: the continuities from before 
transition, the privatisation and liberalisation 
process and some other education and 
content related issues in the nineties; 
awakening political vision and commitment 
around 2000-2003; and the developments 
during the years after EU accession. Along 
these lines, I present an overview of access-
development and compare Hungary’s 
(changing) positions to the rest of Europe 
(and Finland) when possible.  
Clearly, the approach here is less 
institutional than in the above description of 
the Finnish I.S., and instead, it is more 
sequential due to the fact that the direction of 
I.S. developments in Hungary has been only 
recently established, and the necessary 
institutions are just evolving. However, by 
the end of this section, the shape of some sort 
of a special ‘Hungarian model’ will emerge.  
 
 
4.3.1 Post-transition and pre-EU pressures, 
continuities and challenges 
 
“We could become the southernmost Scandinavian 
country, but if political destructiveness, the limitless 
hunger of the elites, resigned apathy, the praise of 
ignorance, and the absence of the performance 
principle will dominate, we easily could become the 
northernmost Balkan state.” (Dessewffy, 2006; 
translated by S.N.) 
 
                                                                          
cohesion, and social empowerment (Altorjai & 
Bukodi, 2005). 
Hungary is known for having been 
one of the first among the countries under 
Soviet influence to introduce a few reforms 
already from the late 1960s; and then to 
actually carry out a ‘peaceful revolution’ in 
1989/90 introducing a democratic multi-party 
system, and a market economy. In historical 
retrospect, this latter event, i.e. the ‘regime 
change’, was just one important step along 
the longer path of transition97. Besides this 
major turn in 1989, the transition from State 
Socialism to democracy and market economy 
has been both pushed on by, and loaded with, 
embedded social-historical continuities, 
path-dependencies. These continuities were 
either proactively helping or disturbing social 
adjustment to the upcoming new 
circumstances and challenges, depending on 
the context, the specific aspect, and the phase 
of the transformation.98  
In the early 1990s, Hungary had 
some obvious advantages over other Eastern 
Bloc countries since some experimentation 
with economic reforms and the initial steps in 
democratisation had already taken place 
decades before the actual change of the 
system99. For example, “gradual 
marketisation” (Laki and Szalai, 2006:323) 
                                                 
97 I am inclined to use transition as an equivalent of 
transformation (e.g. as in Kornai, 2006); and I use 
regime change or system change when I refer to the 
concrete event of 1989/90. 
98 See for example accounts in: Adair, 2002; Delhey 
and Newton, 2003; Győrffy, 2006; Herrschell, 2007; 
Kozma, 2005; Laki and Szalai, 2006; and the more 
concrete individual references below.  
99 The first such reforms were carried out already in 
the late 50s, when the kolkhoz system and the use of 
obligatory targets in agricultural production were 
abandoned. In 1968, the launch of the New Economic 
Mechanism put a definite end to command planning 
and introduced some profit oriented incentives. As the 
state itself, started to persuade people to rely more on 
themselves, a sizeable second economy had emerged 
by the 1980s which operated through market 
mechanisms. This had resulted in relatively higher 
living standards (compared to other countries of the 
Eastern Bloc); and a spontaneous privatisation (i.e. 
without public control) that facilitated a gradual 
liberalisation of exchange and interest rates by 1989. 
These helped an easy shift to market economy, 
making hyperinflation and “macroeconomic shock 
therapy” unnecessary in Hungary.  (Győrffy, 
2003:240-241) 
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in the 1970-80s had resulted also in an 
‘entrepreneurial boom’ in the early 1990s; 
(ibid; and Nemes-Nagy, 1995:7), as well as 
in a relatively speedy development of a new 
entrepreneurial strata.100 Also, as Adair puts 
it, “the process of democratisation in 
Hungary was initiated by Communist-era 
networks of technocrats and intellectuals” 
(2002:52), which began to democratise the 
one-party regime already between 1985 and 
1989; and hence there was a peaceful 
reorganisation of the system.  
Nonetheless, besides these positive 
aspects, continuities in the transformation 
process have had drawbacks and negative 
implications to stabilisation, modernisation, 
and democratisation.  
First, Hungary’s famous “Goulash 
Communism” (gulyás-kommunizmus) could 
only be maintained by considerable 
overspending by the state and consequent 
debt accumulation, which latter was 
accelerated by the oil crises in the 1970s. 
Gross debt had reached USD 21 billion or 
65% of the GDP by 1989 (OECD, 1991:37), 
which was exceptional among the Socialist 
countries at that time.  
Second, the legacy of the past seems 
to last in forms of certain routines, like that 
of public overspending. Though some crucial 
measures by the first democratic government 
(1990-94) could nearly balance the national 
budget, keeping the fiscal policy tight (e.g. 
the introduction of several taxes, decreasing 
redistribution and welfare services) for a 
longer period of time was difficult not only 
because of a coinciding global recession, but 
also ‘politically’ (e.g. Gyõrffy, 2006). The 
government could not face the prospect of 
the whole country turning against them 
because of the stern social costs of the 
                                                 
100 Laki and Szalai give several examples in their 
study for the benefits of early reforms on 
entrepreneurship after transition. An important link 
between past and future was the “peculiar process of 
‘learning by doing’ in the uncontrollable conditions of 
the planned economy … in the difficult years of their 
private business start-ups” which later “enabled the 
new entrepreneurs to promptly invent and apply 
innovative solutions in response to the sequence of 
sudden difficulties they faced…” (2006:339). 
reforms.101 Society already was paying a 
high price: structural unemployment rose 
from virtually, zero to close to 20% 
nationally in two-three years. The previously 
less noticeable inequalities in income 
suddenly became very obvious across the 
Hungarian society and the national territory, 
and continued to increase during the 
transition years (e.g. Csaba, 2000; Kornai, 
1994 and 2006; Nemes-Nagy 1995, 1996; 
Horváth, 2000; see also 5.3.1 below). 
The old routine of overspending, 
unfortunately, has been kept up by the 
succeeding governments, regardless of their 
party-affiliation. An exception to this was a 
‘stabilisation package’ introduced in March 
1995. The set of reforms (named ‘Bokros-
package’ after the Minister of Finance) was a 
combination of extremely harsh monetary, 
fiscal and income policies which caused a lot 
of controversy and made its inventor the 
most unpopular figure of his country (Keay, 
1996), as well as much likely, cost the 
socialist Government (1994-1998) its next 
term. It came as a surprise (as it had been 
drafted in complete secrecy), and it was a 
real shock to society; but it saved the country 
from financial collapse, and returned her 
international credibility (Gyõrffy, 2006: 
245).102  
                                                 
101 The inability to deal with disagreements and with 
‘being despised’ seems to be present on many levels. 
Hollander (2006:36) says that “genuine and durable 
political pluralism requires a capacity to tolerate the 
strains of disagreement, to coexist peacefully with 
those we deeply disagree with about important public-
political matters and social values” and adds, that 
“even highly educated Hungarians … find such 
disagreements alarming and difficult to live with... 
They are stunned and uneasy when free expression 
brings to the surface nasty, divisive sentiments.”  
102 Somewhat typical of the political culture, Mr. 
Bokros was forced to resign in mid-term, by his own 
government, as soon as the threat was gone. As an 
article in International Herald Tribune pointed out: 
“…his proposals to raise the retirement age and 
restructure the pension system, bringing in the private 
sector -- a first in post-Communist Central Europe” 
were ahead of his time; and “´(c)learly, it was all too 
much for the left of the party, which felt that the man 
widely viewed as the ‘most unpopular in Hungary’ 
was too much of an electoral liability.” 
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It is important to note that the likes 
of the Bokros-package could not be a 
plausible routine solution in the future. 
Firstly, because it was the threat of imminent 
crisis in 1995 that finally forced all major 
political actors to recognise the need for this 
sharp intervention. Secondly, “long-term 
sustainability cannot be based on exceptional 
leaders”, but on an institutional framework 
where “people do not have to be wiser or 
more trustworthy than they are to make the 
system work” (ibid: 255). The unfortunate 
fact is, that personalisation (instead of 
institutionalisation) of politics is indeed, a 
known trait of Hungarian people’s attitude to 
policy decisions and their outcomes (Korkut, 
2005). Third, “a culture of stability cannot be 
established on surprise elements”   (Gyõrffy, 
2006: 256); but on transparency, i.e. people’s 
continuous information about, involvement 
in, and their understanding of the necessity 
for certain critical decisions, and reforms.  
From about 1997, Hungary started 
to show again an improvement in her 
macroeconomic performance. In a relatively 
short period of time, most of the initial 
structural problems were solved; post-
Socialist Hungary seemed to have managed 
to enter not only Capitalism, but liberal and 
global Capitalism. As a promising pioneer, 
much faith was invested in the continuation 
of her progress. In terms of GDP per capita 
and its annual growth, decreasing 
unemployment rates and incoming foreign 
direct investment, Hungary was among the 
most successful of the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries (following only 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic; e.g. UN 
statistics).  
Hungary was the first in the CEE 
region to apply for European Union 
membership103 (1994); and by the end of the 
decade, her accession had become more 
                                                 
103 Yet this was not the first time for Hungary to show 
interest in the E.C.: at secret negotiations in the mid-
1980s, political and economic leaders in Hungary 
applied for membership in the European Economic 
Community, and then, it was rejected. However, 
shortly after the collapse of the old regime, Hungary 
entered diplomatic relations with the E.C., and the 
association agreement was signed at the end of 1991. 
realistic and was supported in Hungary both 
by the major political parties and the 
population. The “need to revise Hungarian 
identity so that it can respond to the demands 
of the modern world” emerged; and it did not 
only in the political rhetoric, but as an 
“essential requirement for guaranteeing the 
relevance of the undertaking in the minds of 
Hungarian citizens” (Kosztolányi, 2000). 
Importantly, EU accession was, 
however, generally perceived not as a threat 
but as a guarantee of national survival 
(progress, preservation of distinctiveness, 
language, material and cultural prosperity, 
and stability), and as the antipode to the 
dangers of “staying outside in the Era of 
Globalisation” (ibid). After 1989/90, the 
event of the EU accession in 2004 was the 
second “emphatic experience of the ‘kairos’” 
(i.e. a decisive historical momentum; “the 
right time to do something”; adopted from 
Kozma, 2005:491, 497) for the Hungarian 
people; a feeling of achievement coupled 
with rising hope. 
Nevertheless, difficulties re-emerged 
after the turn of the millennia, which could 
be attributed to external (global economic) 
and internal (policy-related) factors, and as a 
consequence, much of the earned 
comparative advantage was lost in the course 
of a few years. “As the hopes of the 
transition for better living standards remained 
unfulfilled, people became increasingly 
distrustful of political institutions and 
disillusioned with the political elite” 
(Győrffy, 2006:251). Unsatisfied 
expectations (concerning the results of both 
the transition process and EU accession) 
sowed the seeds of social conflicts that would 
spring up again and again in the consequent 
years and even, decades.  
Indeed, after a short period of 
stabilisation in Hungary (ca. 1997-2000), old 
routines of overspending continued. The tight 
macroeconomic policies were loosened again 
without much consideration of perhaps, the 
bad timing (i.e. another global recession). 
The approaching new elections in 2002 
increased spending, and the new Government 
had very little space for cutting it after 
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having promised the contrary in the election 
campaign. Higher the deficit was rising, the 
less transparent public finances became (ibid: 
247). The combination of keeping 
information back concerning the actual 
situation, and promising higher living 
standards has been brazenly used in order to 
win public support in political struggles. 
For the purposes of the present 
study, a rather persistent problem has to be 
underlined here, which lies behind many of 
the weaknesses of current societal relations 
in Hungary, hindering their development and 
corrupting their functions, and thus holding 
back economic stabilisation and further 
democratisation. It is something which no 
single governing party or coalition can be 
rationally expected to have the means and the 
power to eliminate in its four-year term. It 
concerns social and political trust, and the 
“difficulties in the orientation of interests” 
(Tóth, 1998:8), an inherent feature of this 
post-Socialist and yet, pre-modernised 
society.  
Transition in Hungary, indeed, did 
not take place in a few months; and it had not 
been accomplished even by the accession to 
the European Union in 2004. It was, or 
rather, has been a lengthy and weary process 
of some ten-fifteen (or more) years, complex 
with upheavals and setbacks, crises along the 
way. It has worn out society and societal 
relations to an extent which may undermine 
the further stages of democratisation. 
The economic and political 
developments described above, not 
surprisingly, were accompanied by 
increasing social and political distrust, and 
pessimism. Especially, the lack of trust in 
political institutions, in the political elite, and 
in politics in general has to be stressed. This 
is a problem deeper than and far beyond, the 
first disillusionments after the initial “sense 
of euphoria and triumphalism” (EBRD, 
1999) over the system change. Many refer to 
the situation in the recent years as a “moral 
crisis”, and an environment “fertile for 
populism” (Gyõrffy, 2006:251, Hollander, 
2006:35-36104).  
In his work titled Spheres of Interest 
after the Political Transition in Hungarian 
Society (1998), Tóth argues that social-
political transition is always an evolutionary 
and multidimensional process of several 
different continuities and interruptions, from 
a stage left behind, to a new system not yet 
attained. This causes many discrepancies to 
the system of social institutions. Despite the 
introduction of parliamentary democracy, 
some  hierarchical structures from State 
Socialism have prevailed in Hungary after 
1990, and transition in fact, has been taking 
place more or less through the elite’s interest-
bargains, “above the heads” of the masses. 
Distrust in state power is almost an inevitable 
outcome of this situation (Dombi, 2001; 
Korkut, 2005 on ‘elitism’; Marková, 2004).   
Moreover, Tóth explains, that there 
are “silent pursuits of interests”, which are 
voiceless because they do not even appear in 
the “sphere of interest articulation”, since 
society on the whole, is ‘not ready’ in terms 
of institutions, culture and mentality, for 
their presentation, aggregation and communi-
cation” (ibid: 9, translation and italics by 
S.N.). The author referred to the early 
nineties when saying: 
 
Today’s Hungarian society, in a “blissful” state of pre-
modernisation, is still characterised by a state of 
inconsistent recognition and awareness of self-interest. 
This is primarily because of the lack of state resources 
for the establishment and especially the maintenance 
of a public field for exercising political power as well 
as a middle-level for the harmonisation of interests, 
and last but not least, for comprehensive social-
economic agreements.  (Tóth, 1998: 11; translated by 
S.N.) 
 
                                                 
104 Referring to a concrete incident of this moral crisis 
in 2006, Hollander claims that “Hungarians were more 
outraged by the lies of their high-ranking officials than 
by their politics (and the objective conditions resulting 
from them)” and he concludes that moral indignation 
is a more powerful force in political conflicts than 
material interest” (2006:36). This at least, suggests 
that pragmatism may not be among the most important 
features of either the leading elite or the general public 
in this country; and I myself see a point in this claim. 
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Nevertheless, the absence and / or 
the underdeveloped nature of suitable 
institutions and the missing channels for the 
articulation of interests were a critical 
problem not only directly following the 
system change, but they are unfortunately, 
valid to the current state of affairs in 
Hungary, almost two decades later. The 
actual leadership, the political elite needs to 
take more responsibility for this situation and 
as Dombi puts it, “politics-makers sooner or 
later should realise that although, they may 
own power temporarily, they are first and 
foremost servants of the common people, not 
their masters” (2001:9).  
In sum, elitism, the personalisation 
of politics, populist tendencies, as well as 
poor transparency have characterised 
political developments in Hungary since the 
1990s. Besides, the continuing search for 
and the many conflicts around, national 
identity, the lack of trust in the leadership, 
and the missing democratic channels for 
interest articulation are aspects that are 
especially relevant to the development of an 
information society in Hungary.  
As indicated in the previous chapters 
(in relation to processes both internationally, 
and in Finland), I.S. is being increasingly 
defined as a ‘network society’, and more 
importantly, as a ‘communication society’ or 
an ‘interactive society’ (e.g. Dombi, 2001; 
Farkas, 2002; Pyati, 2005): social networks 
are strongly associated with institutions and 
trust-relationships; the promotion of e-
government, the provision of interactive 
digital services and information flows 
between the state and the citizens are 
imperative elements of both on-line content 
development105 and democratic transparency. 
Therefore, in addition to the 
enquiries worded above, two further 
questions specific to the ‘Hungarian model’ 
(see question b) above) call for some 
investigation, or at least, consideration:  
 
                                                 
105 See the discussion above in 2.3.2 for instance, the 
UN and EU guidelines, as well as the example of 
Finland. 
b/1 How have ICTs and the promotion of 
digital content been employed to improve the 
channels of interest articulation in Hungary?  
 
b/2 How much have the old legacies in 
institutions, culture and mentality been 
making the application of these new 
technologies difficult? 
 
 
4.3.2 I.S. in Hungary 
 
The forming of an information society in Hungary is 
not a political issue dependent on terms of 
government. With a collective effort, we have to 
achieve our goals within ten years! 
 
(HISS: the Hungarian Information Society Strategy, 
2003: 3) 
 
 
Along with the tasks directly related 
to the transition process, the 1990s presented 
another challenge to Hungary: the necessity 
to join and be an active participant of, the 
‘new economy’, the global I.S. and the 
related innovation processes. More than 
fifteen years had to pass from the first 
attempts to establish the fundamentals of 
these developments by means of sectoral 
policies until the emergence of some  
political commitment and a more integrated, 
comprehensive approach to the I.S. taken up 
by the state.  In the following, this progress is 
described in two, more or less distinct 
phases, focusing especially on the role of the 
central government, but also with some 
implications to the involvement of other 
actors. (However, the latter are given more 
emphasis in 5.3).  
I start with the more immediate pre-
transition period and the first ten years after 
the change, highlighting some of the legacies, 
continuities, as well as interruptions and 
reforms which have been relevant, for 
instance, to the social acceptance of  the new 
technologies, or to the initial infrastructural 
disadvantages in Hungary. Then I describe 
the main foci of policy attention, as well as 
the achievements and the difficulties since 
about 2000, right before and after Hungary’s 
  
 
91
EU accession. The latter incident divided the 
past 6-7 years into two phases that roughly 
represented the preparation and the first steps 
in the implementation, of a national I.S. 
strategy.  
 
Continuities and reforms (1990s) 
 
The basics of mental access: affinity for 
using ICTs  
 
During the 1980s, inevitable 
changes took place in Hungary (and in the 
Eastern Bloc in general), a few of which 
were linked in some way or another to the 
informational-technological developments in 
the West. The collapse of the Socialist 
regime itself could be associated with at least 
two technologically related facts.  
Firstly, some essential ICTs were 
increasingly available in the Eastern Bloc 
(television, photo copying machines, fax, and 
the first PCs), which made state control over 
the flows of information in society more and 
more difficult. Communication had indeed a 
high political value for the reason also that 
authoritarian structures in the last few 
decades, had been able to uphold their status 
quo only by the regulation, filtering and the 
deliberate shaping of social and political 
information networks. Therefore, it is no 
wonder that, as Tamás argues: “the increased 
access to social information, the liberation of 
communication from under earlier controls, 
and the disputes over the relationship 
between the new publicity and regulation … 
produced the most serious political conflicts 
of the decade following the establishment of 
the new democratic political order” 
(2001:61-62).  
Secondly, the pre-transition blunder 
is often referred to in retrospect that while in 
the West, ‘the revolution of chips’ was being 
prepared, in Hungary a ‘country of iron and 
steel’ was under construction even in 
information technology (consider for 
instance, hardware dependency, as well as 
the dominance of electric engineering and 
programming in technological training; 
Magyar & Z. Karvalics 2000:511). Isolated 
from the global processes and without the 
function of market mechanisms, 
technological development was imposed on 
society more as an exogenous and 
independent force than integrated with it and 
its actual needs, which resulted in a low 
efficiency of investments into R&D (Tamás, 
2001:45). Socially relevant technological 
innovation had been de facto for many 
decades limited by the political and 
economic isolation of these countries from 
the West, i.e. by the CoCom embargo.106 All 
these aspect had yielded in a considerable 
technological gap between the two worlds, 
making the Socialist economies incapable to 
compete with the market economies by the 
1980s. 
This problem, however, was 
recognized by the Socialist-Communist 
regime, and so they looked for ways to go 
around the CoCom limitations. These ways 
in fact, were offered by the societal processes 
themselves which were the outcome of the 
loosened state control on information about 
developments in the West. One way was the 
so-called ‘private import’ of technological 
goods (Dessewffy, 2002). Among the 
Socialist countries, Hungarians had the 
greatest freedom to travel to the West, and 
the neighbouring Austria was a favourite 
destination for their masses of tourist-
shoppers. This was how the first personal    
computers were ‘imported’ semi-legally in 
parts or in one piece to be either resold 
domestically, or be kept by young techno-
enthusiasts who gave rise to a self-educating 
‘Commodore-64 subculture’. They freely 
distributed programme codes broken for 
reuse; some of them became ‘hackers’, others 
set up private enterprises or took up public 
employment in the information sector in the 
nineties. Meanwhile, the state at least, 
tolerated and did not try to officially prevent, 
this and other ways of diffusion of computer 
skills in the eighties (Dessewffy, 2002). 
                                                 
106 CoCom: Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls, placing embargo on exports from 
Western countries to the Socialist Bloc for the time of 
the Cold War.  
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However, this growing affinity for 
ICTs had remained limited to these specific 
groups of the Hungarian society. Research 
found that the majority of the people were 
still unfamiliar and / or even, suspicious 
towards personal computers in the nineties 
(Csákó, 1998;  BME-ITTK & TÁRKI, 2001), 
including those educators whose very task 
was to introduce ICTs in public schools and 
universities.  
The first years of the 1990s might 
well have been the moment for public 
intervention to mobilise and efficiently 
organise this existing human capital and 
promote ‘access’ in educational institutions. 
However, for many understandable reasons 
(lack of resources and attention due to the 
confused condition of the country) this 
intervention happened only in the later 
nineties. Therefore, neither the development 
of e-literacy and openness among the general 
population, nor the emergence of domestic 
ICT innovations could occur in this early but 
rather crucial stage. 
Another important and in a way, 
controversial legacy, as well as a factor 
significant both to the mental capacities 
(skills and openness) to use ICTs and to the 
access and creation of content on the global 
media, is language barriers or linguistic 
incapacity. Firstly, Hungarian content stays 
mostly incomprehensible and therefore, 
inaccessible to the rest of the world; the on-
line presence of the national culture has a 
rather limited audience globally. It is an even 
more important problem that only a very 
little percentage of Hungarians can make 
themselves understood in another language 
(Eurobarometer, 2005; Dessewffy, 2002), 
and therefore it is more difficult for them to 
be aware of and identify with, much of the 
world outside. The inability to understand 
English can already discourage or even 
completely block people from using the 
Internet. Neither can they easily 
communicate and network internationally 
and draw from resources that are potentially 
available via the World Wide Web.   
In Hungary, the situation was 
especially bad in this respect in the early 
nineties, when most of the active population 
had no foreign language skills at all (except 
for some knowledge of Russian, ‘on paper’, 
included formerly in their public education as 
compulsory). With time, a new generation of 
young adults started to emerge who had some 
sufficient skills in English or German; yet 
Hungary is still lagging behind most of 
Europe in this respect.107  Moreover, great 
disparities in language skills exist across the 
national territory, following urbanisation 
patterns and west-east divides (see also 5.3), 
and adding to other disadvantages in ‘access’ 
to information and knowledge. Linguistic 
incapacity has for long been a “barrier to 
Hungary’s becoming a Knowledge Society” 
(Dessewffy, 2002); and it is partly the reason 
for info-pessimism, influencing motivation to 
use ICTs in Hungarian society. 
 
Upgrading physical access: the national 
backbone network and the public 
telecommunications infrastructure 
 
An important initiative in the late 
eighties (1986) was the launch of the 
National Information Infrastructure 
Development (NIIF) Program by the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the 
National Committee for Technological 
Development. Its aim was the creation of a 
nation-wide computer network for R&D 
institutions, universities, collages, and public 
collections (libraries, archives), as well as 
some other major public institutions in 
Hungary, allowing them already in the 
immediate pre-transition years to access 
basic services such as e-mail, file-transfer, or 
remote log-in (NIIF). So by 1990, the basic 
elements of the domestic research network 
                                                 
107 In 2005, 71% of surveyed Hungarian population 
(aged 15 years and over) claimed to master only their 
mother tongue. This is contrary to the tendency that 
small EU member states (with not widely spoken 
national languages) have better foreign language skills 
in general. In this ranking, Finland was positioned 
much above the EU-25 average (50%) with its 66% of 
foreign language speakers (among which about two-
thirds mentioned English as a second-third language). 
(Eurobarometer, 2005.) 
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had been set up. Following the political 
change, and the establishment of Hungarnet 
(Hungarian Academic and Research 
Networking Association, 1991) representing 
the user communities, international 
connections could be formally created. All 
the relevant ministries and the National 
Scientific Research Fund (Országos 
Tudományos Kutatási Alapprogramok; 
OTKA) joined the Programme soon, and from 
1992, regional networking centres were set 
up to integrate local services to the central 
ones. The number of users doubled yearly to 
reach almost 100,000 by 1995. Since, much 
technological development has taken place, 
international connectivity has increased 
further supported by various EU 
initiatives.108  
Yet, having acknowledged the 
relative readiness of the backbone network 
for the intellectual and administrative elites 
and their activities, one should not forget 
about the poor state of the basic 
telecommunications infrastructures in the 
nineties. This was also associated with pre-
transition processes. The old regime had been 
trying to keep up the short-term contentment 
of the society (by loosening control, and 
introducing some economic reforms, as 
mentioned above) in order to prevent 
insurgences. This could be maintained only 
at the cost of neglecting long-term 
investments (Tamás, 2001:61); i.e. into 
transportation, telecommunications and 
public utility networks. However, as a 
consequence, living standards were inclined 
to drop considerably on the long run.  
So, the condition of the 
telecommunications infrastructure in 
Hungary was rather miserable in 1989, even 
in quantitative terms. An interesting point to 
make here is related to the fact that since the 
cycles of the different ICTs have been 
                                                 
108 Access speeds and data transfer capacities of 
NIIF/HUNGARNET have been improved by for 
example, the TEN, QUANTUM, GEANT projects of 
the EU. By early 2006, over 600,000 users from about 
500 institutions (ca. 6 % of the Hungarian population) 
has access to advanced infrastructure and services via 
the academic and research network. (NIIF) 
progressing rather fast in the world, the 
indicators to be used to see their development 
in a given country needs to be revised from 
time to time. In Hungary, this has been even 
the more relevant because at the time of the 
system change (1989/90), the country’s level 
of development could be described with 
indices such as the number of fixed telephone 
lines per 100 inhabitants and the length of 
waiting lists109. Then, the failure to meet 
even quantitative demand, and shortcomings 
concerning the very basic qualitative features 
were the sources of major problems. 
However, the first post-Socialist 
government recognised early the urgent need 
to upgrade basic telecommunications 
infrastructure. This was achieved by a radical 
measure: through the prompt privatisation of 
the Hungarian Telecommunications 
Company, Matáv. It was sold to a German-
American consortium, with a legally 
guaranteed monopoly in telephone services 
till 2001 to encourage fast results.  
Consequently, fixed line telephony diffused 
remarkably fast. The telephone cable 
network was modernised and efficiently 
expanded to the whole national territory. The 
earlier indicators became more or less 
obsolete. Waiting lists virtually disappeared 
by the middle of the decade, as everyone who 
wanted a fixed line could get it fast. The 
diffusion of telephones in households 
reached its saturation point in mid-2002 
(HIF, 2000-2007) as mobile telephony hit a 
faster rise; and then, even slightly dropped, 
just as it happened in most other countries. 
The digitalisation of the fixed network 
commenced at a fast pace (the proportion of 
digital connections in the network reached up 
to over 91% by the end of 2000; TEP, 2000.) 
The physical foundations for a greater variety 
of telecom services had been created.  
 
                                                 
109 The number of fixed telephone lines per 100 people 
was 5.8 in 1980 and still below 10 in 1990 (TEP, 
2000). At the end of the 1980s, one had to wait eight 
years on average for the installation of a new 
telephone line in Hungary (Dessewffy, 2002). There 
existed settlements without a single telephone 
connection.  
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Figure 25. Estimated number of Internet users per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
 
Rapid spread of mobiles and insufficient 
Internet diffusion at the end of the 1990s 
 
The two ICT technologies in vogue 
in the latter nineties were mobile 
communications and the Internet. The 
diffusions of these two solutions in the 
society, with regards to subscription numbers 
and usage have been rather different in 
Hungary. The mobile network covered the 
whole country and included the majority of 
the population in a matter of a few years, 
while the network of Internet technologies 
diffused slowly and selectively (see also 
5.3.1 about territorial tendencies). This has 
more or less been a trend in other countries, 
too, yet the gap between the growths of these 
two telecom sectors has grown bigger in 
Hungary; which can be attributed to some 
specific CEE or Hungarian traits. The 
expansion in the usage of mobile phones in 
society  surpassed   all  expectations  in Hun- 
 
 
gary. While forecasts in 1994 (when GSM 
services were launched in the country) 
projected a maximum of 1 million 
subscribers (ca. 10% of the total population) 
by 2000, there were 2 million cell-phone 
users (20%) already by the middle of that 
year. This expansion even accelerated 
afterwards: 7 million subscriptions (70%) by 
early 2003 and over 10 million (100.4%) by 
early 2007 (100.4%; HIF 2000-2007). 
There have been several factors 
driving the rapid diffusion of mobile phones 
in Hungary. Besides their fashionability (i.e. 
that of a social status symbol); their practical 
utility, more precisely, the flexibility and 
freedom they offer their users can be 
mentioned. Dessewffy (2002) emphasizes 
however, that individual freedom in the 
nineties was valued even higher among the 
Hungarian population   (and in most of the 
CEE region) than by other, more mature 
democracies because of the low reliability of 
0
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institutions and the state. Besides, in 
Hungary, this problem with trustworthiness 
has been not only a subjective or perceived 
one (which may be the case in some western 
societies) but based on experiences of 
everyday life. Low trust has been to a great 
extent rooted in objective circumstances in 
healthcare, public transportation, police, 
administration and other public services (see 
also the explanation above in 4.3.1). What is 
more, the success of mobile telephony in 
Hungary occurred in spite of the fact that 
mobile services (calls, text messaging) have 
stayed above the price levels in Western 
Europe.110 This shows that trust in 
institutions has been so low and individual 
independence valued so high that people 
were ready to sacrifice even beyond their 
financial means for to secure the later.   
 Internet use is also likely to enhance 
individual freedom, yet its expansion in the 
society has been one of the greatest failures 
in the course of Hungarian I.S. development 
so far. Some of the reasons for this have 
already been discussed above (language and 
ICT skills). Nevertheless, the greatest barrier 
was a long lasting monopoly situation in 
telephone services and the provision of 
Internet services.  
Although both the private sector and 
the European Union were urging telecom 
liberalisation from 1994 (Bangemann Report, 
see 3.3.1), in fixed line telephone services, it 
had not happened in Hungary till 2001 when 
the concession rights of the incumbent Matáv 
came to an end. As a result of the monopoly, 
prices continued to stay very high (esp. as 
compared to income levels in Hungary; see 
Figures 8-10 above). This was a major 
hindrance to the diffusion of Internet usage, 
in general, and to the spread of Internet into 
households in particular. Figure 25 indicates 
clearly the main point of divergence between 
the diffusion trends in Hungary, the CEE and 
EU regions, and the Nordic countries. 
                                                 
110 In 2002, for example, mobile call tariffs in 
Hungary were equal to those in Finland, while average 
wages in manufacturing, for example, were only about 
20-25% in Hungary of the Finnish figure (UN 
statistics). 
Indeed, after 2000, a sharp rise is observable 
in Internet usage in Hungary which was due 
to the liberalisation and a special discount 
package (named ‘Mindenkinek’ – For 
Everybody; launched in April 2000) 
introduced by Matáv to boost off-peak usage 
and save its position in the market (Molnár, 
2002). 
Results from various researches and 
surveys in the late nineties (and early 2000s) 
indicated the general problem. If access was 
from home, it was still dominated by narrow- 
band solutions: analogue modem (‘dial-up’), 
and ISDN technologies at the turn of the 
millennia. Usually, however, access to and 
usage of, the Internet was more likely to be 
from the workplace, the school and public 
access points set up especially by civil 
initiatives.111 These later have been playing 
an important role especially in peripheral and 
underserved areas because both narrow- and 
broadband applications have been rolled-out 
unequally across the national territory, 
following existing disparities in economic 
growth, income levels and general living 
standards (see 5.3). 
Other negative aspects of Internet in 
Hungary were the lack of regional co-
operation in the CEE region in terms of 
infrastructure development (not to mention 
any harmonisation of services and joint 
content production). The interesting situation 
persisted that if an electronic message was 
targeted to a neighbouring country, it had to 
travel via the United States (Dessewffy, 
2002). Cooperation across the CEE occurred 
from the late nineties however, between civil 
society organisations, and among the 
different groups of the Hungarian minorities: 
they recognised the potentials of the ICTs to 
strengthen cultural links with the mother 
country and ease political and identity-related 
tensions in the regions. (Nevertheless, the EU 
accession of many of the CEE countries 
brought some improvement regarding 
collaboration between the states.) 
 
                                                 
111 Probably, it was not a coincidence that it was then, 
in the late nineties, when the movement of the 
telecottages got a real momentum. (See 5.3.2 below.) 
Access in education by Sulinet (‘phase 1)’: 
the launch of a public initiative 
 
• Targeted financial encouragement of 
demand for ICT tools (Sulinet Express, 2003-
2006): with a focus on the younger generation, 
families with children, and teachers as well as 
other public and civil servants, through special 
tax allowances (i.e. for buying PCs and other 
digital tools, a tax allowance of ca. €250 or HUF 
60,000).  
• Improving mental access in target 
groups: organising training for teachers in 
specialised or general ICT skills, as well as in the 
specific ways of employing the technologies 
efficiently in teaching their particular subjects on 
different levels.  
• Developing relevant and useful content: 
creating, collecting, and pooling modern 
curricula, on-line material, teaching aids, 
standardised databases, etc. to support the 
educators in their work; offering these resources 
on-line, and in other forms (multimedia 
packages). 
• Enhancing networking and 
interactive on-line information processes between 
actors in the education sector: Sulinet portal, a 
virtual surface for the communication between 
the different communities involved (the Ministry 
of Education, the teachers, the students, and their 
parents), and experimentations with e-learning. 
Box 5. Sulinet ‘phase 2’ ambitions.  
                                                
Magyar and Z. Karvalics point out 
(2000) that education has always been 
considered a strategic sector in the CEE 
region. It was also the only field in which, 
Hungary was able to come quite close to the 
level of world standards (as it is indicated in 
brain-drain maps). “Glorious and noble 
tradition is, however, in vain if school as an 
institution does not adjust to the 
informational challenges” (ibid: 518). The 
Hungarian government seemed to have 
recognised this relatively early when it 
initiated the Sulinet (‘Schoolnet’) 
Programme in 1996.  
As mentioned above, schools have 
been one of the major sites of access to 
Internet since the late nineties. Sulinet has 
had many short and long-term aims touching 
on several (i.e. the physical-financial and 
infrastructural, mental, content-related) 
aspects of access in education.112 The first 
phase of the programme however, focussed 
almost exclusively on the physical-
infrastructural integration of schools into a 
national network, to achieve a decentralised 
public education and equal opportunities in 
every region of Hungary (Nagy & Kanalas, 
2003:40).  
The Ministry of Culture and 
Education gave the task to a consortium 
made up of the incumbent Matáv, and two 
other bigger companies, who could then 
subcontract the construction of different 
parts of the network to local telephone 
operators. On a first, higher level, a 
backbone structure (2 Mbps) was built 
which was directly joined to the optical 
cable ring of Matáv, and which facilitated 
linkages to the regional nodes and 
international networks (via Hungarnet). On a 
second, lower level, the schools were 
connected to this backbone frame. From 
1997, over 1,500 institutions were included 
in the common network: approximately 850 
 
                                                112 Information about the Sulinet programme is from: 
the Sulinet website; HVG, 2007; Magyar, 2001:224; 
Nagy & Kanalas, 2003:40-41; and Szekeres, 1998.   
secondary schools (all secondary schools 
were linked before the end of 1998), 350 
primary schools, hundreds of libraries and 
student housing complexes, and so on, from 
about 300 municipalities.113 Initially, 
schools with more than 500 students 
received 64 Kbps ISDN connections, 
smaller ones were connected with telephone 
modem (dial-up). Capacities of the network 
on both levels have nevertheless, increased 
after 2000, with the emergence of broadband 
solutions (but selectively, more probably in 
bigger secondary schools). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 The integration of primary schools, some 3,000 in 
total, has not been completed to date (09.2007). 
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Surely, the creation of the physical 
network was to be followed with more steps 
that would improve especially the ICT skills 
among teachers, as well as networking and 
on-line content for educational activities 
(see Box 5); however, most of these 
measures were launched only after 2002. 
 
 
Show of commitment (after 2000) 
 
The advanced countries have, in the past five to ten 
years, experienced a dramatic expansion in the use of 
information-communication technologies, and 
Hungary has only succeeded in keeping pace with 
them in resolving the historically disastrous situation 
in the availability of fixed telephone lines and in the 
area of mobile telephone services. 
 
In December 2002, only three tenth of Hungarian 
population used computer regularly or occasionally, 
and only 17 per cent used the Internet on a weekly 
basis at least. The vast majority of Internet users have 
never made a purchase via the Internet. 
 
(HISS, 2003: 14, 12) 
 
Taking stock  
 
Internet diffusion in society 
remained one of the main targets of criticism 
after the turn of the millennia. Despite this, 
in early 2002, Matáv cancelled its ‘For 
everybody’ discount package, as well as its 
earlier ‘150-forint’114 offer to use telephone 
connection for Internet during the night.115 
These measures however, were followed by 
immediate reaction by the users: they either 
reduced their minutes spent on-line or 
withdrew their subscriptions from home 
                                                 
                                                
114 150 Hungarian forints (HUF) were then equal to 
approximately 60 eurocents (05.2002). 
115 Matáv argued that these deals had caused them a 
deficit of several hundreds of thousands of euros. Yet 
in reality, since these had concerned the off-peak 
hours, they considerably expanded the use of the 
Matáv-network capacities, and therefore had meant 
increased revenues for the company. Molnár (2002) 
draws attention to the fact that Matáv implemented a 
unique accounting method: it compared its profits to 
a potential net income which would have occurred if 
the Mindenki-package customers had connected to 
the Internet within the more expensive peak-hours 
instead, paying the regular charge by minute.   
altogether and looked for other alternatives 
to access Internet (i.e. from the workplace or 
libraries).116 About 39 thousand households 
were affected by Matáv’s decision, which 
represented 18% of all households that had 
had Internet connection (Molnár, 2002). The 
incumbent suggested that these households 
should switch to ADSL. However, at the 
time, ADSL services could not mean an 
attractive and feasible enough option for 
most of the people in Hungary because of 
their limited availability across the country 
(see 5.3.1 below; and e.g. Erdőháti, 2002; 
Molnár, 2002), and the fact that they all of a 
sudden, meant a huge leap in costs.117 Rural 
areas especially, where incomes were lower, 
were left with little if any prospect, not to 
mention the fact that in villages and smaller 
towns, ADSL was not even technically 
available. 
The conduct of Matáv also 
confirms the claim by some observers (e.g. 
Fischer, 2005) that despite the fact that by 
2002 competition had significantly 
improved in the telecommunications market, 
the monopoly behaviour of companies 
persisted. For several decades the rule had 
been that the service provider dictated the 
conditions and the consumers had only the 
“right to suffer” (ibid): this was the formula 
before the system change when people had 
to queue for telephone lines, and during the 
1990s because of the monopoly granted to 
Matáv. It had produced a generation of 
consumers who were unaware of their 
consumer rights and the means to exercise 
 
116 Many users returned to the rather slow and less 
reliable tariff-free Internet services (e.g. Freestart) 
which they accessed via telephone-modem kits again, 
facing the phenomenon of ‘World Wide Waiting’ (a 
cynical expression often used by irritated net-surfers) 
instead of the benefits of the World Wide Web. 
117 Matáv’s ‘Home ADSL’ (introduced in mid-2002) 
cost an initial opening payment of 120 euros, and the 
monthly subscription fee of 61 or 53 euros per 
household, depending on the length of the contract 
(Figyelőnet, 2002). Considering the fact that the 
minimum wage in 2002 was around 200 euros (raised 
by a government decree in 2001 from about 100 
euros) in Hungary, this was a price affordable to few 
families. 
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those. So, even after liberalisation, these 
consumers stayed defenceless and confused 
in a multi-player market environment with 
complicated tariff systems, misleading and 
incomplete information in mobile and 
internet contracts (e.g. in loyalty contracts), 
and other rather unethical tricks used by 
companies in competing for customers. 
The Sulinet Programme also slowed 
down significantly after its school network 
infrastructure had been more-or-less 
completed. The change in government in 
1998 probably was one of the reasons for 
this. The programme was re-launched in 
2003 with a next phase, the Sulinet Express 
initiative (see Box 5 above), but it was much 
criticised from the beginning. Evaluations 
were contradictory by the different political 
groups and stakeholders, and the whole 
issue became, like many other state 
initiatives in ‘transitioning’ Hungary, a 
political battlefield. It was mostly seen as 
inconsistent, irrelevant to its original 
purposes, irresponsibly costly to the state 
budget and not achieving even its 
quantitative targets (HVG, 2007). Many 
attacked the government for giving unfair 
privileges to certain companies within the 
Sulinet Express framework, to ones also, 
which were owned by politicians. However, 
the managing authorities felt that they had 
achieved a lot: by the end of 2005, 150 
thousand new PCs had been purchased by 
households, half a million computers were 
upgraded and some 600 thousand families 
had bought different ICT tools, while public 
education institutions had received hardware 
worth almost 25 million euros (HVG, 2005). 
Around the turn of the millennia, 
and on the threshold of EU accession, the 
political and academic elite evaluated the 
conditions in Hungary also in terms of its 
responses to the challenges and 
opportunities of the I.S. Besides the 
improvement in basic physical ICT 
networks, the nineties could be characterised 
by a few scattered and at least, partially 
successful initiatives by the state to promote 
‘mental’ readiness of the population for 
these technologies. However, the different 
interventions were lacking co-ordination.  
Most of the assessments in fact, 
were more negative than positive, and called 
for urgent action. Magyar118 bitterly pointed 
out in 2001 that Hungary was not only 
lagging behind the West but many of the 
other formerly Socialist countries, who have 
taken over very fast: Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovenia, and in some respects, Lithuania 
and the Czech Republic had passed Hungary 
in I.S. developments (2001:223). “So, while 
the Hungarian political elite makes pride in 
referring to the richness of Hungary in 
human capital, the conditions for this human 
capital to be actually utilized are missing” 
(ibid: 203, translation).   
The most important observation by 
analysts was that there was no coherent 
vision available of a Hungarian I.S., and if 
there was any perspective, its main rhetoric 
was about the threat of becoming a loser, a 
country and economy lagging behind, or at 
least, about the need to catch up, and follow 
those more developed others (Pintér, 2000b; 
Z. Karvalics, 1998). Truly, this pessimism 
was rooted in numerical facts. Yet, 
importantly, there was no coherent political 
agenda showing a way out, no coherent 
national strategy, which linked the I.S. to the 
actual social-economic and cultural context 
in Hungary. The whole issue was very much 
an isolated political concept, without much 
meaning to the average citizen, and with 
little true understanding by the political 
community either.  
A major change was much 
anticipated in the early 2000s, and it seemed 
to have arrived in 2002/2003, when some 
important legislative measures were taken 
(pressed by EU accession, for the most part), 
and professional and political debates had 
culminated in the drafting of the National 
Information Society Strategy.  In the 
following, I provide a brief overview of this 
and two related documents published in 
2003 and 2006.  
                                                 
118 Bálint Magyar was the Minister of Education in 
Hungary during the periods 1996-1998 and 2002-
2006.  
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Making a strategy: assessment, vision, 
implementation and monitoring 
 
The Ministry of Informatics and 
Communications drafted a country report in 
late 2003, both in the Hungarian and English 
languages, and much in the spirit of ‘being 
ready for accession’. This 30 page long 
study, The Hungarian Information Society 
on the Eve of Accession to the European 
Union: snapshot and strategic objectives can 
be considered as a preface to the actual 
National Strategy. It gives a summary of the 
already existing foundations, as well as the 
shortcomings and the objectives of 
developing the I.S. in Hungary. Each main 
dimension of access is taken into 
consideration: physical and financial access 
(e.g. the backbone infrastructure, telecom 
market liberalisation and the fast diffusion 
of mobile telephones), investment into 
human capital (mental access; esp. the 
Sulinet Programme); and content 
development (e-commerce and distance 
work, e-government, on-line health care, the 
National Digital Data Bank, etc.) 
Also, the most important I.S.-
related legislative measures are mentioned 
that had been partly or fully realised by 
2004. Already in 1998, Hungary agreed to 
adjust and streamline her legal system to 
fulfil the so-called Acquis Communitaire119, 
and to bring national policies and 
programmes into line with the broader and 
even non-binding EU guidelines and 
recommendations. Naturally, this had been 
completed by 2004, and in terms of I.S., too. 
While the legal background for cost-based 
connection fees and universal service 
obligation still required some adjustment120, 
                                                 
                                                                         
119 The Acquis Communitaire is a body of EU 
regulations and practices to which candidate 
countries are expected to conform to be allowed to 
join the integration. For the enlargements in 2004 and 
2007, it included 31 chapters, of which competition 
policy (6), education and training (18), telecom and 
information technologies (19), culture and audio-
visual policies (20) were the most relevant to I.S.  
120 In 2003, a new telecommunications law was 
drafted to result in a drop in telephone call charges, 
as well as in the requirement imposed on companies 
the directives on e-commerce had been fully 
implemented, as well as the satellite and 
cable broadcasting acquis, the legislation on 
intellectual property rights and industrial 
property protection.  
At several points in the discussions 
in this ‘snapshot’ paper, the problems with 
spatial inequalities, social inclusiveness, and 
content are mentioned. The following are 
probably the most important observations: 
 
• Half of the (already very low 
number of) connections to Internet from 
home were realised via analogue (dial-up) 
connections, while close to 30% had 
broadband. 
• However, more than 75% of the 14-
17 years old were frequent users (partly due 
to Sulinet.) The usage rates of internet 
correlated with educational attainment in 
Hungary more than it did in the EU-15. 
• The digital divide was greater in 
Hungary than in the EU-15 countries in 
average; and the main reasons behind the 
gaps were both financial and cultural. 
Digital illiteracy, missing language skills, 
and the lack of attractive content were 
recognized shortcomings.  
• Spatially, there were considerable 
digital gaps between the major cities and the 
smaller municipalities; and differences could 
be observed also between greater regions. 
• Market incentives could not be 
sufficient to bring infrastructure and services 
into under-served regions. However, policy 
intervention was seen as something that 
might itself create digital gaps by giving 
preference to one social group or type of 
region above the others. 
• The positive role of telecottages 
(community access points) to help rural 
communities join the I.S. was given much 
credit to (see 5.3).  
to contribute to a national ‘universal access fund’. It 
came into effect in 2004, the year of Hungary’s 
accession to the EU. 
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• While e-commerce had been 
developing relatively fast (also due to proper  
legislation), e-government was rather poor: 
about 40% of the public services could be 
accessed on-line but 85% of these were in 
the category of simple information 
provision.121 Besides, efficient inner 
processes of administration, uniform data 
management, and the integration of services 
and applications in the government were still 
missing.   
A much more thorough and 
complex document, the actual Hungarian 
Information Society Strategy (HISS, 2003) 
declares its main purpose as: 
 
“to review and to systematise the tasks related to the 
formation of the information society in order to 
ensure that the responsibilities arising therefrom – to 
be fulfilled by the whole society – will take place in a 
coordinated manner”  
(HISS, 2003:5, original emphasis).  
 
The strategy-makers’ awareness of the 
social and cultural problems, the former lack  
                                                 
 Box 6. Six objectives and the strategic vision: eHungary on two pillars 
121 I.e. the lowest level of government on-line see 
Figure 3 in 2.3.2). 
 
 
 
of a coherent approach, and the timing of 
their work is indicated also by the six 
objectives they defined (see Box 6), as well 
as by the fact that (beyond the usual rhetoric 
in I.S. documents (e.g. competitiveness, 
prosperity), they claim that the HISS is most 
of all a social programme, which requires a 
positive change in attitudes by everyone. 
The Government's responsibility is however, 
to take the initiative: set an example, and 
help other creative forces to unfold. 
In its first section, the HISS 
describes rather realistically the current state 
of affairs in terms of: infrastructure, content, 
IT skills, legal and social environment, equal 
opportunities, R&D, the IT industry – and 
the shortcomings and challenges seen in all. 
Then, the document explains the current 
economic, political technological, cultural, 
and regulatory circumstances and tendencies 
that were expected to have an impact on the 
potentials to develop these fields. 
Consequently, the vision of the 
future is outlined: eHungary standing on two 
major pillars, which are claimed to be in 
harmony with the EU programme ‘eEurope 
2005’. Even though this formula may imply 
eHungary  
for a modern European Hungarian Republic: 
conscious and organized nation-development 
through the application of ‘informatized’ processes 
and the implementation of electronic services; mass 
accessibility of these services and development of a 
manifold and versatile information culture. 
First pillar:   
 
“modernization of 
processes through 
the application of 
information and 
communication 
technologies.” 
Second pillar:  
 
“electronic services 
– modernization of 
services with the 
aid of information 
and communication 
technologies” 
The six objectives of forming the national I.S. 
Strategy: 
 
1) to make it clear to everyone that Hungary had 
no choice but “to enter the age of 
information, as intensely and innovatively as 
possible”; 
2) to present a comprehensive vision, complex 
and co-ordinated set of plans, and operative 
programmes for their realisation; 
3) to ensure that these would promote the 
growth and competitiveness of the economy; 
4) to prove that ICTs are effective tools, and 
thus establish the prestige of the IT sector; 
5) to comply with the expectation from the EU 
with this document and so be entitled to 
community subsidies; 
6) to offer a basic plan, a guiding principle, and 
organizational scheme. 
 
(Source: based on citations from HISS, 2003: 3, 22)
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some simplicity and a slightly 
technologically-deterministic approach, the 
Strategy is actually much aware of the 
interdependencies and cross-sectoral nature 
of the tasks involved in realising this vision. 
It defines two major horizontal objectives 
(R&D and equal opportunities) and four 
fields of intervention (content and services, 
infrastructure, knowledge and skills, and 
legal and social environment). All these six 
areas of I.S. policy contain actions that are 
relevant to both the 'informatisation’ of 
processes (pillar 1), and the implementation 
of electronic services (pillar 2).  
 Without going into further detail 
about the content of the Strategy, I want to 
draw attention to some of its interesting 
features: 
• The claim is clearly and often made 
in the text that this was the last chance to 
prevent a kind of ‘national tragedy’: now, or 
never. I.S. is “the only real alternative” (3) 
to “catch up and join the advanced European 
information societies” (11), because “we 
have lost our relatively good position we 
had in the ‘90s, we have fallen behind in the 
rankings” (12), etc. 
• Surely, the timing is also relevant 
because of the approaching accession to the 
EU. Yet, it is finally understood and 
acknowledged that the lack of political 
consensus, integrity and continuity, as well 
as the lack of social awareness and public 
support had so far disrupted a continuous 
policy development and efficient 
implementation.  
• As the third (best) scenario for 
Hungary, the following is included: 
“Learning from the Finnish or Irish 
example, for instance, it [i.e. Hungary or the 
Hungarian I.S.] attempts to develop more 
dynamically in several areas of the 
information age, and gain a better position 
among the European knowledge societies” 
(11). However, there is no mention in what 
way these examples should be followed, and 
what those areas are concretely where 
Hungary could achieve a competitive 
advantage. This leaves the impression in me 
that in fact, the strategy is more realistic 
than visionary, and it is ‘content’ with 
achieving the middle scenario, i.e. keeping 
the position of Hungary and not falling more 
behind other countries of Europe.   
• It is recognised that I.S. is the only 
possible means to simultaneously attain both 
fundamental development goals: improving 
economic competitiveness, and a better 
living standard (social welfare) in the 
country. Since these two aims (as it was 
internalised in the Finnish developments; 
see in 4.2) also depend on each other, 
neither can be neglected, but they should be 
systematically integrated.  
• Also, already on the first page, and 
then later in the assessment of the political 
and social environment and tendencies, the 
issue of low social / public and political trust 
is brought up. On the one hand, the 
strategists believe that “the widespread use 
of processes and services supported by the 
latest solutions of information technology, 
as well as social cooperation, will contribute 
to achieving social welfare and public trust.” 
(3) And turning the table around, the lack of 
interest in using Internet had been partly due 
to “suspicion towards ... service providers, 
as well as distrust” (18). How to trigger 
positive changes in these aspects is still 
more of a question in the Strategy then an 
answer. Implicitly however, the state’s 
initiative in to develop user-friendly and 
interactive e-administration services is 
proposed as a solution to start with.   
• The systematic way the Strategy 
organises the extremely complicated set of 
different problems, objectives and means of 
intervention demonstrates the effort to 
integrate and co-ordinate the vertical 
(sectoral) policies with the horizontal ones. 
The framework used in the document is 
rather practical for implementation: the 
different types of so-called ‘high-priority 
programmes’ were to be elaborated at the 
cross-sections of these vertical and 
horizontal lines and pillars.  
• The Strategy itself, however, does 
not want to be more than a guiding principle 
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and an organizational scheme; so it has few 
concrete examples to offer about ways of 
intervention. What is nevertheless expressed 
is that via concrete legal procedures 
programmes proposed by private, public and 
civil actors will be selected from, and then 
integrated into the HISS implementation 
scheme (of co-ordination, co-funding, and 
monitoring by the Ministry and its 
responsible institutions).  
For the complex strategy making 
and co-ordination tasks, new and 
unconventional governmental institutions 
had to be created. First, in 2000, the 
Hungarian Government appointed a 
Commissioner for ICT (2000) within the 
office of the Prime Minister. In 2002, it was 
replaced by a separate Ministry of 
Informatics and Communications.  
However, establishing the Interministerial 
Committee on Information Society (ITKTB) 
within this Ministry in 2003 was a most 
essential decision: a co-ordinating body with 
a diverse membership and several 
professional sub-committees. Its 25 
members with voting rights are the deputy 
state secretaries responsible for I.S. affairs at 
the different ministerial departments; and 
with consultation rights, 39 representatives 
are delegated from interested public 
authorities (for instance, the National Tax 
Office, and the National Health Insurance 
Fund), from related business, R&D and civil 
associations (e.g. the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Hungarian Association of IT 
Companies, Janos von Neumann Computer 
Society Association, Hungarian Association 
of Content Industry). The creation, 
monitoring and the yearly revision of the 
national I.S. strategy and  have been the 
main tasks of its Strategy Planning 
Subcommittee. Other subcommittees were 
established along the main lines of the 
strategic objectives and high-priority I.S. 
programmes: on e-administration (e-
government), on the National Digital 
Content, on the Public Net (KözHáló) 
programme, on information systems security 
and on satellite navigation. The 
Development on I.S. Subcommittee is 
responsible for integrating I.S. development 
into the broad National Development Plan, 
as well as for promoting public-private 
partnerships. 
 
(Own photo, 2005) 
Figure 26. eMagyarország (eHungary) point 
road sign.  
 
During the first three years of 
implementation, different ministries and 
departments took charge of elaborating and 
launching various high-priority programmes 
under the supervision of the Interministerial 
Committee. The Centre for Electronic 
Government within the Prime Minister’s 
Office has been responsible for 
eKormányzat 2005. The Ministry for 
Economy and Transport has been managing 
the KözHáló (PublicNet) programme, which 
aims to set up a public utility ICT network 
that provides local governments and local 
public institutions as well as civil 
organisations with access to the Internet. By 
2006, over 5,000 broadband terminals had 
been installed in schools, and the 
programme also supported the creation of 
3,000 eHungary points (PIAPs, ICT and 
information centres, in some cases 
community access points built on existing 
telecottages, see in 5.3.2). After two years of 
preparation by the Ministry of Informatics 
and Communication, the National Digital 
Data Base (NDA) opened for the public in 
June 2004, and it has been continuously 
developed: a catalogue of Hungarian 
cultural content. Also, the digital knowledge 
 102
base of the Sulinet network (curricula, tests, 
simulations and other education-supporting 
material on-line) expanded considerably in 
2005-2006. Loosely connected to these 
major programmes, innovative initiatives 
emerged with the participation of the civil 
society such as the creation of the IT-mentor 
profession (e.g. to complement PIAPs with 
skilled assistants).  
In 2006, the Interministerial 
Committee published a report on the 
implementation (2002-2006) and the 
impacts of the above mentioned and other 
key programmes. Despite the achievements, 
the main conclusion of the assessment was 
that since 2002, Hungary had managed only 
to keep its relative position in the world and 
in Europe with its I.S. development, and the 
only field where it had gained some 
advantage was e-government. Yet, because 
of the still low penetration rates, few people 
actually benefit from these services. 
Realising many of the ambitious plans was 
made more difficult by a political and 
financial crisis in 2006 that forced the 
Government to introduce budget-tightening 
reforms.  Moreover, institutions closely 
related to I.S. policy kept on being replaced 
and reformed. The Ministry of Informatics 
and Communications itself was abolished in 
2006 (most of its tasks related to I.S. were 
transferred to the Ministry of Economy and 
Transport.) 
Since about 2000, the issue of 
creating an I.S. has been an object itself, of 
the competition between the major political 
parties in Hungary. They tried to win public 
attention and support by endorsing their own 
‘Tourist’s Guides’ to the I.S., by binding the 
cause (and the merits from its expected 
triumph) exclusively to themselves, i.e. to 
their governmental term(s) (Dessewffy, 
2002). This has on the one hand, helped 
public awareness increase and invigorated 
political discourse about the I.S. On the 
other hand, it has also resulted in 
discontinuities, incoherence in plans and 
implementation, some steps backwards, as 
well as in scepticism appearing in academic 
and civil circles concerning the credibility of 
the national I.S. project. One of the 
weaknesses of the Hungarian national I.S. 
politics has been the fact that it was not 
reaching across the whole political society, 
and therefore it has not been so far embraced 
by the general public either.  
Anyhow, the publication of the 
Hungarian Information Society Strategy 
(2003) was most probably a watershed. It 
was a crucial event not only as an externally 
pushed adoption and adaptation of the 
corresponding documents and programmes 
in Europe, but also as a first show of 
commitment by the state to provide the 
necessary institutional coordination and 
support to the previously rather sporadic I.S. 
development initiatives. 
 
 
4.4 Summary  
 
In the following, I sum up the results from 
the above analyses based on the three 
question put in the introduction of the 
present chapter (4.1).  
 
a) “What are the main and specific elements 
of the Finnish I.S. model, and how has the 
implementation of the national strategy 
progressed?” 
 
In Finland, the construction of the 
I.S. can be seen partly as a strategic choice 
(deriving from the 1990s crisis), but also as 
a continuation of a long-term survival 
strategy; and linked to the investments into 
the national innovation system.  
If we extend the interactions 
between companies and public authorities to 
the wider society, the basis of the Finnish 
I.S. model is essentially a social innovation 
environment or a ‘cross-sector cluster.’ It is 
a complicated and interconnected system of 
the corporate-business sector, the Finnish 
state and the universities, as well as the 
individual and ‘civil’ innovators. After over 
a decade of planning, the ‘I.S. cause’ has 
integrated into the wider national 
development strategy. 
 103
In sum, Finland can be considered 
an advanced and socially rather inclusive 
information society. This observation is 
based on a deeper analysis of interactions, 
and not only indicated by the clear-cut 
figures in global ranking lists. The wide 
acceptance and ultimate use of technology 
(in everyday life, and of ICT as being at the 
centre of political debates and budgetary 
decisions) come from both a general sense 
of social security and trust in the state, as 
well as practical individual experience of 
the usefulness and ease of the new 
technologies. Trust is an important focus of 
the coming National I.S. Programme, too, 
where it is also understood as the basis for 
people’s willingness to rely on I.S. services 
and actors. 
Whether the Finnish I.S. model can 
stay a leading ‘best practice’ depends much 
on how it can retain this implication to 
welfare as well as its relevance to economic 
competitiveness. This on the other hand, is a 
matter of the self-innovating capacity of the 
national innovation system.   
 
b) “How have the governments of Hungary 
perceived the way towards the I.S. and 
where has implementation of concrete 
programmes taken this country in the past 
approximately ten-fifteen years? Is there an 
evolving ‘Hungarian model’ of the I.S.?” 
 
While in Finland, we can talk about 
several revisions of I.S. strategies and an 
arsenal of networked institutions and some 
crystallised routines to invent, organise, 
implement and monitor those, the Hungarian 
developments towards an I.S. are quite 
recent and in a flux, therefore they may be 
described best in a chronological manner. 
 Hungary has inherited substantial 
infrastructural weaknesses from the 
Socialist Era. It is understandable therefore, 
that the focus of policy in the early nineties 
was to bring this very basic infrastructure to 
level with the western standards. The little 
resources and attention available were 
focussed on this most urgent challenge.  
Also, some unfavourable legacies 
of the old era as well as the transition 
process itself have created a special social 
environment or ‘social quality’ in Hungary 
which has not been particularly supportive 
of carrying through a national vision, a 
practical and integrated cross-sectoral 
strategy and programming of such a venture 
as the development of a “European 
Hungarian” information society. Still, efforts 
have not been completely unsuccessful: 
building on positive continuities and 
introducing a few timely reforms in the 
nineties helped the country overcome some 
of the most important shortcomings in basic 
physical and mental access. This however is 
not sufficient for Hungary to become and 
stay competitive. The strategic moment was 
evidently missed in the nineties, though not 
without some understandable and objective 
reasons.  
One can talk about real political 
commitment only from around 2000-2003. 
The moment then, however, was less 
coupled with the sense of ‘kairos’ and 
confidence than with that of urgency and 
fear: the prospective of acting too late (and 
thus being taken over even by the other CEE 
countries) was felt almost as a threat to 
national survival.  
Yet then, the I.S. strategy was 
accepted by the Government as a cross-
sectoral strategy and a social programme. 
Remarkably, it paid attention to all 
components of access, and it recognised the 
crucial interrelationships between (the lack 
of) social / public trust, and the (insufficient) 
usage of ICT-supported services by people 
and institutions. 
In the circles of the Hungarian ‘I.S. 
elite’ (researchers, strategists, journalists, 
politicians, etc. discussing this problem), the 
awareness of a Scandinavian (or more 
appropriately, a Nordic) model has many 
interesting implications. First, they 
distinguished between different types of I.S. 
even within Europe. Second, they realised 
that many similarities exist between these 
countries and Hungary (size, geopolitical 
positions, cultural resources, etc.) Thirdly, 
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and probably most importantly, the Nordic 
I.S. is seen as a model to adopt (with some 
inevitable modifications) since it 
successfully and naturally integrates those 
two main goals which cause much of the 
headache for Hungary since transition: 
better life for citizens and a consequently 
greater social and political trust, and 
increasing competitiveness of the economy.  
In view of the above, the Hungarian 
I.S. Strategy has all what it takes except for 
maybe three important issues: 
 
1 There has recently been slightly 
more confidence among the political and 
intellectual elite concerning the results from 
implementing the Strategy. The question is 
whether they can help the broader society 
internalise this sense of purpose, and 
acknowledge the importance of the ‘I.S. 
cause’ as something that is in their own 
interest, and not just a political show, and a 
way for the rich to get richer…  
 
2 To achieve this, the development of 
on-line interactive content serving 
administrative procedures between citizens 
and the public institutions has got much 
attention in the recent years. However, 
actual usage of these services (the Internet 
subscription rate) is still low, restraining 
their upgrading and customisation through 
feedback, and preventing the development 
of an on-line culture (see questions b/1 and 
b/2). The special invention Hungary should 
come up with to her own benefit and helping 
also other transitioning countries, is the 
method to break the vicious circle around 
distrust. The problem is pointed out in the 
Strategy, but no clear directions to solve it 
are indicated. 
 
3 Finally, financial depression and 
the yet weak and rather changeable 
institutional background keep on inhibiting 
the realisation of the strategic ambitions. 
Probably, implementation would be more 
efficient if the limited resources were 
invested first in a more concentrated way, 
i.e. into a specific but decisive field that 
could be a Hungarian ‘strength’, and which 
then could work as a catalyst for the 
expansion of other areas. However, I.S. 
involves all strategic sectors (education, 
telecommunications, healthcare, state 
administration), which are not only 
underfinanced, but have a highly politicised 
nature, not to mention the horizontal 
components of the national I.S. strategy, 
regional development, and R&D. Among 
these circumstances and the sharpening 
regional competition, Hungary is still 
challenged to find her ‘own way’, her own 
model not just in the meaning of ‘type’, but 
‘good example’. 
 
c) “How much concern is expressed in the 
national I.S.-related documents and actual 
programmes in these two countries about 
territorial inequalities and the regional 
development of the I.S.?” 
 
In the case of Finland, regional 
inequalities in the diffusion of ICTs have 
been a rising issue with the second version 
of the strategy, and it has been receiving 
more attention since. It is found in the 
foundation of the ‘edifice’ of the National 
Knowledge Society (Fig. 24). The actual 
way to tend to them is not interfering with 
the market processes directly, but 
encouraging public-private-partnerships and 
networking, by promoting competition 
between good-practices (particularly the 
local solutions in specialised services such 
as e-health), by granting special awards, by 
supporting  research, evaluation studies, and 
by dissemination via the on-line media 
itself. 
In the case of Hungary, many 
revised international examples had been 
already available to rely on by the time of 
the national I.S. strategy was drafted; so it is 
not surprising that the issue of elevating 
spatial inequalities was incorporated as a 
horizontal objective. However, even before, 
there had been considerable awareness in 
general, of the rapidly escalating regional 
inequalities and social disparities since 
1990. This understanding was also projected 
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to the technological-infrastructural aspects 
of the I.S. (see also Figure 20 in 3.3.4 
above), as well as concerning related skills, 
and available content. As a solution, market 
incentives are considered, but more 
importantly, the encouragement of public-
private partnerships (a special work group is 
devoted to this within the Interministerial 
Committee for I.S.). A working example for 
the later is the cooperation between the 
state’s KözHáló and eHungary programmes 
and the civil association of telecottages. 
According to the report in 2006, disparities 
have not decreased according to most 
aspects of access, so equal opportunities will 
have to be a high priority in the future, too.  
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5 THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
DIMENSIONS OF THE I.S.: 
EXAMPLES FROM FINLAND 
AND HUNGARY 
 
5.1 Introduction: questions, 
approaches and methods 
 
Some aspects in the cases of Finland 
and Hungary described above imply that 
from the perspective of I.S. strategies, 
achieving social inclusiveness of economic 
growth is as important a goal (and as 
fundamental a precondition) as the expansion 
and efficiency of the national economy is. 
The national authorities in most of the 
European countries, as well as the European 
Union (as shown in 3.3.4 and 3.3.1) 
acknowledge that social inequalities in terms 
of access in the I.S. have obvious 
manifestations in the geographical space, too. 
Relatively irrespective of the actual stage of 
I.S. development the countries have reached, 
national governments are aware of the 
emerging territorial disparities in the possible 
and accomplished benefits from ICTs,122 and 
the regional inequalities in citizens’ prospects 
of becoming a full member of the I.S.  
As already suggested in different 
sections above, as a logical assumption and 
as findings from policy documents, surveys 
and interviews, spatial patterns of 
development are not changing considerably 
in the ‘information age’. Micro- and meso-
scale patterns of territorial digital divides in 
terms of the different components of access 
and their various, reciprocally reinforcing 
combinations tend to emerge along 
traditional spatial inequalities within 
countries. One of the aims of this chapter is 
                                                 
122 In line with my definition of ‘access’ (see 2.3.2 
above), by potential benefits, I mean the existence of 
physical and financial access to ICTs as tools.  By 
accomplished benefits I mean the actual value gained 
from the constructive usage of these tools which 
require higher levels of openness, language skills, and 
digital literacy (‘mental’ access), as well as relevant 
and reliable content and services  on-line. 
to show clearer evidence for these 
statements, and answer this question:  
 
a) Are the long-standing centre-periphery 
relations and the urban-rural divides 
reproduced in course of the diffusion of ICTs 
and their valuable applications? 
 
Besides presenting the regional 
inequalities in access to ICTs within Finland 
and Hungary, the focus of this study shifts to 
the sub-national actors. Concerning them, 
the question I try to answer is: 
 
b) What interactions have been in the 
Finnish and Hungarian local cases between 
the bottom-up initiatives and the top-down 
policies of the national actors? 
 
Locally instigated and (at least, in 
their respective regions) innovative I.S.- 
solutions in Finland and Hungary are 
presented below: a community intranet well 
embedded into the regional and national 
ambitions for an I.S.; and the telecottages in 
Hungary mushrooming from the mid-nineties 
to serve especially the smaller village 
communities which faced accumulated 
social-economic disadvantages during the 
transition years.  
Some actors who are involved in 
these examples, of course, are familiar 
already from the previous two chapters: 
telecommunications companies, international 
agencies, the nation state and its institutions 
of research and education, professional and 
civil networks, and the local people as both 
‘users’ and innovators. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to see: 
 
c) how these actors can handle the task of 
improving access to ICTs and utilise their 
benefits for local / regional development. 
 
Concerning the methods and sources 
of information, in researching the Finnish, 
North Karelian regional and local 
developments, I relied much on the related 
policy documents and the available spatial 
statistical data and scientific articles, 
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evaluation studies written by well-informed 
researchers at the Karelian Institute, Joensuu. 
However, to get also some first-hand 
experience and personal impression, I carried 
out own empirical field work in the region 
(in the autumn of 2003, and during shorter 
visits later): interviews with actors at both the 
Regional Council in Joensuu, and in some of 
the rural communities in the province where 
the studied intranet project was introduced.  
During my work I found little 
linguistic barrier. Although some local 
publications, newspaper articles and detailed 
project plans were only available in Finnish, 
I could always find ways to get closer to the 
content with some help from my 
interviewees and colleagues. The managers 
of the Oppiva Pohjois-Karjala project 
granted me unlimited personal access to the 
community intranet itself, allowing me to 
observe its functions directly.   
In my investigations about general 
and ICT-related territorial developments in 
Hungary, I relied on available spatial 
statistical data and review scientific articles 
and thematic volumes written since 1990 by 
Hungarian experts of the topic. Concerning 
the evolution of the Hungarian telecottage 
movement, I used first of all interviews with 
key actors tracked down via a ‘snowball 
method’. I performed some fieldwork both in 
the physical and virtual environments. I paid 
visits to the Budapest headquarters of the 
Telecottage Association, as well as to several 
telecentres in the Hungarian countryside; 
participated in some of their meetings and 
conferences. I carried out an on-line survey 
of telecentres in a selected rural region. I 
regularly visited their on-line locations, 
forums, and debates to stay up-dated with the 
developments as much as possible. Besides, 
over a period of 3-4 years (2003-2006), I 
received much information in print or in 
digital form from them and other Hungarian 
researchers involved in the movement or at 
least, in this topic: books and scientific 
studies, training materials, newspaper 
articles, and links to useful Internet websites 
and forums. 
 The last case study in this chapter, 
and in the dissertation, is unique in the way 
that it does not only connect the Finnish and 
Hungarian local / regional case studies, but, 
from the local actors’ point of view, brings 
together many of the processes and 
perspectives discussed in terms of 
international I.S. guidelines and institutions 
(Chapter 32), and the respective national 
developments (Chapter 4). It helps answering 
both questions a) and b). In producing this 
final study, half by chance and half 
intentionally, I took on the role of a 
participant observer, or even, action 
researcher. The details and circumstances of 
this method are presented in 5.4. 
 
 
5.2 Sub-national developments in the 
Finnish information society 
 
5.2.1 General and ICT-related inequalities in 
Finland 
 
Finland has shown many positive 
results and advantages in both the 
technological and the social-human 
‘infrastructures’ of the information and 
network society. Nevertheless, some 
challenges and problems exist; “important 
reservations” are added even by Castells and 
Himanen in their description of the Finnish 
I.S. model that concern mainly spatial 
dynamics, more specifically, inequalities 
across the national territory (2001:62).  
This might sound strange in view of 
the inclusiveness of the Finnish welfare 
system and especially to those who are 
familiar with the situation in some other parts 
of the world. However, Finland has territorial 
disparities and relatively marginalised or 
disadvantaged regions as opposed to the 
south and south-western economic ‘core’ of 
the country. This centre-periphery relation is 
observable on different regional scales in the 
country, in terms of economic dynamics, 
employment opportunities, and to some 
extent, infrastructure, as well as in living 
standards and consequent migration patterns.  
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In a so sparsely populated country as 
Finland, regional socio-economic processes 
may be followed easiest through observing 
migration patterns over time. The implication 
of population densities is perhaps stronger 
here than elsewhere: economic growth 
attracts labour, and inhabitants are the 
essential foundation and the precondition for 
further growth, investments and the 
continuation of public services in a region 
(Gløersen et al. 2005). 
Migration patterns have changed 
many times since the Second World War in 
Finland, particularly from the point of view 
of rural areas, semi-peripheries and smaller 
municipal centres. The post-war settlement 
policy helped rural growth, but then, from the 
mid-1960s, the fast growth of the national 
economy triggered migration from the rural 
areas to both the major urban nodes and the 
urban-rural fringe, as an increasing number 
of people could be employed in 
manufacturing and the service sector. 
Besides towns, the 400 centres of rural 
municipalities could benefit from the new 
jobs created by the expansion of the welfare 
state. During the recovery phase of the 
1990s, migration accelerated again, but in the 
opposite direction, following more the spatial 
logic of the ‘new economy’: it targeted 
especially the major cities in the S-SW core 
area, and not the outlying rural-provincial 
centres. After, in the prosperous and more 
stable late-nineties, the semi-peripheries 
became attractive again for a time. 
(Tykkyläinen, 2006:153.) Most recently, 
migration increased again into the southern 
bigger urban centres and the spatial re-
concentration of public sector jobs is 
expected to start to some extent due to 
national economic efficiency considerations.  
Overall, the rural peripheries, i.e. 
very sparsely populated regions dependent on 
their relatively distant rural centres (the 
“intensely rural” areas: most of Northern 
Finland excluding Oulu, and vast areas of 
Eastern Finland) have been loosing 
population for many decades. However, the 
regional ‘urban’ centres of these peripheries 
have had to adjust to a more changeable 
situation over time. Their ability to keep their 
inhabitants and enterprises, to retain their 
customers and tax-payers, and consequently, 
maintain a sufficient level of public services 
and infrastructure, however, has been crucial 
for their depopulating hinterlands as well.  
In Finland also, the general socio-
economic inequalities are followed and as 
well as reinforced by digital gaps – which 
however small might seem in international 
comparison, do exist in Finland, and will 
continue so unless they are attended to in a 
knowledgeable way. The locations of ICT 
production and R&D, the availability of 
physical network infrastructures and related 
services, as well as other, non-technological 
components of access all show territorially 
unequal patterns in Finland.  As mentioned 
above (in 4.2), the vigorous expansion of the 
telecommunications equipment industry and 
services was one of the sources of Finland’s 
speedy recovery from its deep recession in 
the early nineties. An important feature of the 
IT sector, besides its high capacity of wealth 
creation, is that its higher-value and skill-
intensive activities are much concentrated 
and clustered in a few localities.123 Recently, 
this has led to a significant increase in spatial 
divergence in economic development in 
Finland, too.  
These current spatial developments 
are characteristic to the new, global pattern 
of restructuring and urbanisation: 
metropolitan regions “concentrate most of 
the innovation, the directional activities, 
cultural amenities, and wealth creation 
capacity in each country” (Castells and 
Himanen, 2001:63124). Large conurbations 
are being formed which functionally connect 
formerly separate urban centres. The most 
important cause-and-effect chain leading to 
these disparities is triggered by the 
                                                 
123 Nokia has research and product development units 
in the Helsinki metropolitan area (e.g. Espoo), and in 
Tampere, Jyväskylä, Salo, Turku and Oulu (company 
website). Oulu, situated more north on the western 
coast, is the only Nokia-location outside the core 
region. 
124 See also other works by Castells, e.g. I 
[1996/2000]: Chapter 6.   
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favourable employment opportunities offered 
in, and the consequent migration of the (esp. 
young and high-skilled) population to, the 
Helsinki area (Uusimaa) and Southern 
Finland.  
Furthermore, taking a look at the 
basic ‘physical’ infrastructure of the I.S., i.e. 
the network infrastructures and services, a 
similar spatial pattern of divergence has 
emerged in Finland to those observable in 
other countries. However, it makes a 
difference which sub-sector of telecommuni-
cations one considers, and when.  
There are no territorial disparities in 
fixed-line telephony, the whole network is 
digitalised in Finland125, and ISDN access 
services are available to nearly all 
households (ESPON 2002-2004). In general, 
‘older’ ICTs having approached their  
saturation points in the market, show a 
spatially more equal picture than newer, 
more advanced ICTs, such as broadband 
(BB).126 An exception from this spatial logic 
has been observed in mobile telephony, 
which (as in most of the developed countries) 
diffused much faster and more pervasively in 
society than any other ICTs, reaching close 
to 100 percent in approximately five years.127  
The diffusion of BB accessibility 
had a considerable regional variation in 2002, 
and showed much consistence with general 
socio-economic indicators (population 
density, unemployment rates and net 
migration figures). The territorial pattern in 
                                                 
125 Technically, the diffusion of broadband is not 
limited by the capabilities of the basic 
telecommunications infrastructure: Finland has been 
among the first countries to digitalise its telecom 
networks; it had achieved a 100% digitalised network 
by 1996 already, before for instance Sweden 
(1997/98), the USA, and Korea (after 2001). (Tuomi 
2004: 5-6.) 
126 See 2.1.4. 
127 Reasons behind this include the obviously lower 
costs of covering the whole country with the network, 
the high number of competitors in the market, the 
consequent relative inexpensiveness of mobile phones 
and subscriptions, as well as the easiness of use of this 
technology (requiring neither much investment from 
the households’ budget, nor special IT skills by the 
customers). 
Finland according to a composite ‘BB 
accessibility index’ was basically identical 
with the fine-grained patterns in population 
density, i.e. urban concentrations (Eskelinen 
et al., 2003; see Figure 27). The smaller the 
scale one observes inequalities at, the more 
differentiated the picture becomes. There are 
extensive regions in the North and the East 
with larger areas lacking sufficient services 
and / or competition of ISPs128, resulting in 
unfavourable monopoly situations and higher 
prices. There is a similar situation in areas 
outside municipal centres, where there is a 
lack of physical access to high speed 
networks. Surely this is the consequence of 
market rationales129. 
This is by far not unique in Europe; 
the situation is rather similar even in densely 
populated countries. Since technological 
development does not seem to wait for the 
un-served areas to catch up, a new digital 
gap has started to take shape due to the 
spatially differential access to broadband 
(BB). This is getting increasingly important 
in terms of competitiveness of companies, 
consequently, in their location choices, and 
therefore, for the economic attractiveness of 
localities and regions. Nevertheless, BB 
divides are already expected to decrease, for 
instance, with the development of wireless 
BB technologies.  
The question may occur still, 
whether BB, or in general, the currently most 
up-to-date and fastest network technology, is 
really that important. How much of its 
advantage over lower speed technologies is 
emphasized by business commercials, and 
how much of it is really needed in concrete 
local contexts in peripheral areas? Is there 
any reasonable hope for those rural and 
unprofitable regions in Finland (and 
elsewhere) that they can ever, in a self-
sustainable way (without long-term public 
subsidisation)    have   the   same   level   and  
                                                 
128 ISP: Internet service provider. 
129 See 3.3.4 and the results of ESPON 1.2.2, 2003-
2004. 
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Explanation: maps A, B - dark: concentrations of population and BB accessibility; 
map C - dark: higher unemployment rates; map D -  black: positive net migration, 
grey: net migration between 0 and -5%, white: outmigration exceeding 5%. (Sources: 
ESPON 1.2.2; Statistics Finland.) 
D. Net  migration, 
1991-99. 
 
  C. Unemployment 
1990-99 (%; S.F.) 
 
 
A. Population density, 
2002 (ESPON) 
B. Broadband 
Accessibility Index, 2003 
(ESPON) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Spatial inequalities in Finland in terms of population density, broadband infra-
structure, unemployment, and net migration 
 
 
quality of network access as available in 
urban areas?  
Broadband has been recently 
receiving more attention at the European as 
well as the national level, which is due to 
various reasons connected to the dynamic 
and interrelated development of technologies, 
content and on-line services.130 Several 
applications that involve transmission of data 
in audio and video forms require high-speed 
connections for not only business but in 
households, too (Eskelinen et al. 2003). 
Besides, BB has the advantages of 
short connection set-up time, and a 
predictable flat-rate pricing that allows the 
user to be ‘always on’.131 No wonder that 
those people in Finland, who started to 
subscribe to BB in 2003, increased their 
Internet use significantly (on average, by four 
 
                                                 
130 See e.g. 2.3.2. 
131 See more in 2.1.4. 
 
 
hours per week). What is more interesting is 
that this increase was the most substantial in 
sparsely populated areas (Tuomi 2004:11). 
This might indicate that people in Finland do 
see the potentials of more advanced 
electronic communication in resolving 
geographical isolation, and it is very probable 
that the BB gap will not deepen further. 
However, the question then follows: how 
could there be demand for higher levels of 
services (i.e. BB) in regions where service 
providers have not yet turned up in great 
enough numbers to ensure competition and 
lower prices? Where does this demand come 
from? Some solutions are proposed in 4.3.2 
and 4.3.3. 
A synthetic I.S. index was construc-
ted by ESPON 1.2.3 incorporating more 
elements of access the actual take-up of 
ICTs, to trace national and NUTS2 regional 
inequalities across Europe (see Appendix 
5B).  The map shows that in general, the 
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country effect prevails but besides, the core-
periphery pattern of intra-country disparities 
can be observed in each case, Finland 
included.  “The capital regions and core areas 
are typically in a better position, whereas the 
remote and peripheral regions, such as 
eastern Finland, seem to generally lag behind 
the national averages” (Frank et al., 
2006:114). The authors observe also, that 
based on this index, regional differences are 
relatively bigger in Finland than could be 
expected from its remarkable performance as 
a country.  
The reasons for this are more 
connected to the permanent structural and 
institutional preconditions of the knowledge-
based economy than to the temporary 
situations in the spatial patterns of network 
expansion and technological innovation 
cycles.  
Although, the innovation infrastruc-
ture itself (universities, national institutions 
and Centres of Expertise, science parks) has 
also become rather even regionally in the 
past one or two decades (as mentioned in 
4.2.2), it is the capacity to utilise this 
infrastructure that varies still spatially. This 
capacity is different among regions according 
to their industrial structure, private sector 
R&D activity, as well as according to their 
individual roles within the national 
innovation system. Due to the logic of funds 
allocation by the national innovation system 
in Finland, the more technologically oriented 
universities of the four biggest centres 
(Helsinki, Tampere and Turku in the core 
region, and Oulu in the north-northwest) can 
receive more support because they cooperate 
more with private (IT) enterprises. (Frank et 
al., 2006). 
    
 
5.2.2 A regional initiative for I.S. 
development: the case of North Karelia  
 
North Karelia (Pohjois-Karjala, see 
Box 7 and Appendix 7), is the easternmost 
province of Finland. It has been a rural 
periphery for a long time, with a regional 
economy depending almost exclusively on 
forestry, small-scale family agriculture, and 
some metal and machine industry.  
The migration patterns described 
above (4.3) have been experienced in North 
Karelia as well. The region can be divided 
into a distinguished urban centre, the 
provincial capital of Joensuu and its 
hinterland made up of some adjacent ‘rural 
core’ and an extensive ‘rural remote’ area.  
From the point when regional policy 
in Finland could no longer support traditional 
rural manufacturing and public services (as it 
used to during the high times of the welfare 
state) North Karelia had to find new 
resources to restructure its economy. Since 
the mid-1990s, the Structural Funds and 
other ways of assistance by the European 
Union have been of much help in this. (Oksa, 
2001). 
 One major element in the 
development plans of North Karelia has been 
for almost a decade, the promotion of a 
‘regional information society’. As a result, 
during a sequence of elaborate strategies, 
concrete programmes and applied projects,  
North Karelia has successfully combined 
ICTs and network solutions with some of its 
traditional sectors and unique resources, in 
order to increase the competitiveness of its 
rural economy and generally improve living 
conditions in its communities. 
 
 
The first North Karelian I.S. strategy  
 
As the first major step, a document 
titled By Joint Work Party to the 
Information Society - Information Society 
Strategy and Action of North Karelia 1999-
2006 was adopted by the Regional Council 
as early as in 1999 (see Box 8), also as an 
integral part of the Provincial Plan and 
Regional Development Programme 1998-
2006 (POKAT). Drafting this document 
took place in 1997-1998 as part of the 
NOKIS (North Karelia Towards I.S.) 
programme, an EU-financed pilot within the 
Regional Information Society Initiative 
(RISI) scheme. 
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North Karelia is one of the 20 provinces (maakunta) of Finland as part of Eastern Finland (Itä-
Suomi) macro-region (lääni). Since 2005, North Karelia has consisted of three districts (seutukunta): 
Pielinen Karelia in the north and Central Karelia in the south with four municipalities (kunta) each; and 
the Joensuu district in the centre, including eight municipalities with the city of Joensuu among them.  
Joensuu, with a population of over 57,000 people (2004), was but a small town of manufacture 
and trade till the late-1800s, when it got the rights for commerce and the local sawmills started to 
prosper. Water traffic was improved by the construction of the Saimaa Canal in 1856, and so trade 
between the regions of North Karelia, St. Petersburg, and also, Central Europe was made possible. Only 
more recently, has this small agrarian town grown to become the vital centre of the province. Its 
population has more than doubled since the 1950s along with the industrialisation and urbanisation of 
Finland and the decentralisation of the service sector in the second part of the 20th century. The 
establishment of the University of Joensuu in 1969 and its following expansion have been fundamental to 
the development of the city.  
Joensuu is justly referred to as “the forestry capital of Europe”, and the region of North Karelia 
is recognized as the “capital region of European forests”: the region concentrates forest know-how, 
education and research connected to forests and forestry. The University has a separate Faculty of 
Forestry, the North Karelian ‘University of Applied Sciences’ (Polytechnic), too, has a strong forestry 
and wood-industry profile. The European Forest Institute (EFI) and the only Finnish Centre of Expertise 
in Wood Technology and Forestry are located in Joensuu.  
Besides forestry and wood processing industries, public administration, health and education, 
healthcare and social work contribute to  the regional economy to a greater extent in North Karelia than 
in Finland in general (according to their share of the regional and national GDPs).    
Life here has always been marked by clean environment and extensive waterways, a peaceful 
and safe lifestyle and housing close to nature. Despite these precious resources and the recent 
modernisation and restructuring, the province faces the common problems of peripheries: 
unemployment, ageing population, and out-migration. North Karelia (as well as the whole macro-region 
of Eastern Finland), remained an Objective 1 assistance region eligible for the Structural Funds of the EU 
for the period 2000-2006, and is eligible for further support in the next programming period. 
Population density, 2002.      
       (inh. / km2; Stat. Fin.) 
North Karelia (Pohjois-Karjala) is located 
in the easternmost corner of Finland, 440 km 
(within an hour’s flight) N-NE from the capital, 
Helsinki. It is bounded by the Federal Republic of 
Russia along a 296 km long stretch of the eastern 
national border. The province has an area of 21,585 
square kilometres, 70 per cent of which is covered 
by forest and 18 per cent (ca. 3,800 km2) by water, 
as Finland’s sixth biggest lake, Pielinen is found 
here. This leaves some 12 per cent of the area 
(2,600 km2) suitable for settlements, where the 
168,300 North Karelians live (01.2006). The 
province has a population density less than the 
national average (17 people / km2), i.e. about 9 
inhabitants per square kilometre.
Box 7. The province of North Karelia. (Sources: Oksa 2001; regional website; interview 
with Ms. Ahonen, Oct. 2003; website of the Ministry of the Interior, Finland; own 
illustration) 
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Box 8. The Information Society Strategy and Action of North Karelia 1999-2006. 
(RCNK, NOKIS, 1999:57; and figure copied from the cover page). 
North Karelia I.S. Action 
Programme, 1999-2006  
 
Groups of measures in the 
three Lines of Action:  
 
1. Everyday life, work 
and the I.S. for citizens 
1.1 Development of civic 
activity and the third sector 
1.2 Development and 
exploitation of social 
technology as a part of the 
welfare cluster 
1.3 Development of village 
communities as attractive 
living environments 
1.4 The I.S. in the 
everyday life and the 
prevention of displacement 
1.5 Development of 
women’s information 
technology 
1.6 Development of work 
life 
1.7 Development of public 
services in information 
networks 
1.8 The I.S. of the youth 
2. Availability and development of information technology 
2.1 Exploitation of information technology 
2.2 Development of ICT, as well as of the technological infrastructure 
2.3 Promotion of the availability of teleinformatics 
2.4 Content production built around the multimedia 
 
3. Supporting regional development 
3.1 Development of the teleinformatics cluster 
3.2 Cooperation and development opportunities related to the communication of municipalities and 
federations of municipalities 
3.3 Development of EU-project action 
3.4 I.S. projects of the forestry cluster 
3.5 Promotion of economic life and employment 
3.6 Libraries as centres of information and regional culture 
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The long-term aim of NOKIS was 
“to make North Karelia a model province 
where all citizens, enterprises and public 
organisations can work and act as members 
of the global Information Society”. It put 
emphasis on the Social Shaping of 
Technology132, and interpreted it as a 
“dialogue between different actors in society; 
private individuals, different organisations, 
and technology developers” (Ahonen, 
2000:1). 
The regional I.S. Strategy and 
Action had in fact, been launched by the 
time the revised national I.S. Strategy by 
Sitra was out. Already in 1999, the Regional 
Council envisaged a people-centred I.S., 
with a special accent on spatial 
inclusiveness, too:  
 
The information society is an entity of interactive 
communities built by North Karelians, in which 
information technology must not lead to displacement, 
but basic services and rights have to be guaranteed 
everyone.133 
 
 
… (W)e are talking about a society for human beings, 
which is meeting new challenges and a new kind of 
action environment caused by technological 
development. (…)  
 
[Technical infrastructure] … is a tool for people… 
The citizen’s information society, however, is not yet 
here; [it] …will help people to carry out everyday 
routines easier and give them opportunities to 
influence their own life. … new possibilities … both 
for … industrial and commercial life and regional 
development.  
 
In carrying out and planning the projects, we must 
make sure that they are carried out evenly around 
North Karelia, even in the smallest municipalities. 
Therefore, knowledge concerning the preparation, 
application for and funding of the projects and project 
know-how should be transferred to the whole region 
of the province. (RCNK, 1999: 5, 34.) 
 
                                                 
132 See 2.2.2. 
133 This interpretation echoes for instance, the 
following definition given in the Finland’s Way to the 
I.S. national program: “The information society is a 
network of interaction connecting people and 
information systems for people and on people’s own 
terms” (Regional Council of N.K.  NOKIS, 1999: 5).  
This harmony in approaches was, of 
course, consciously intended, which is 
directly and clearly expressed in the first 
part (titled “the vision of the Information 
Society and the value choices”) of the 
regional Strategy with concrete references to 
and quotations from, the national 
programme, as well as to the relevant 
documents issued by the European Union.  
Furthermore, the great variety of 
the partners working together in NOKIS and 
the democratic representation in the Steering 
Committee guaranteed political neutrality to 
the regional I.S. programme, and was an 
evidence of the fact that there had already 
been “extensive consensus building on the 
I.S. in North Karelia” (ibid.)  
The inclusiveness of participants 
also ensured that ICTs, as tools for 
modernisation, were considered in many 
fields of the region’s social and economic 
life. This can be observed not only in the 
title, but the structure and content of the 
Strategy. Since North Karelia’s economy is 
dominated by forest and wood-related 
industries and research, as well as public 
services (healthcare and education, 
especially), in the application phase from 
1999, several projects aimed at enhancing 
the competitiveness and efficiency of these 
sectors. The forestry and welfare clusters in 
the region have proved to be fertile grounds 
for I.S. and ICT applications. (See also the 
groups of measures in Box 7.) 
Besides these two areas, the I.S. 
Strategy of North Karelia defined another 
line of development: “the teleinformatics 
cluster.” This area of business was then 
made up of some sixty, rather small 
enterprises (3-5 people on average) in North 
Karelia, much concentrated in Joensuu. It 
was very new to the region, but it was 
developing rapidly. Over a third of the 
businesses involved were selling equipment 
and programmes, another less than third 
were engaged in software production, and 
few provided Internet and communication 
services (RCNK, 1999:47). On the other 
hand, the conditions in the region (for 
instance, the high level of education and the 
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existing technological skills) were perceived 
good, and the advantage from the growth of 
this cluster (quality job creation, keeping 
young experts within the province, prospects 
for cooperation and markets beyond the 
province and internationally) were 
elaborated. Their most important features 
were that they: 
• to strengthen programming, 
communication and the so-called ‘neo-
media’, the line of business that was based on 
multimedia and Internet;  
• to enhance cooperation between the 
enterprises within the province, and their 
networking with larger companies from 
outside North Karelia; 
• to give more information to the local 
IT businesses about public financing 
opportunities; 
• to encourage small enterprises to 
specialise and become sub-contractors of big 
IT companies; 
• and to achieve a spatially more 
deconcentrated location of the sector within 
North Karelia. 
 
These political commitment and 
visions were followed with much concrete 
action. Several I.S. pilot projects were 
funded via another EU initiative, the 
Innovative Actions134 (I.A.). The first I.A. of 
Eastern Finland (covering North Karelia and 
three other provinces: North and South Savo 
and Kainuu) was titled Modern Network 
Periphery (MONEP, 2002-2004). 
The total budget of this phase was 
near 3.8 million euros, made up of payments 
by many different stakeholders following 
the general principle of additionality. The 
EU provided over 75% of this from the 
ERDF (European Regional Development 
Fund). About 7% of all costs were 
contributed by the Finnish state; private 
companies added a substantial 14%, and 
other public funds gave about 4%.  
                                                 
134 See more on the Innovative Actions and the Eris@ 
network in 3.3.2 above. 
During the period 2002-2004, 
twelve pilot projects were funded by the 
programme across Eastern Finland135, and 
three provincial I.S. strategies were  
• developed innovative solutions for 
the social welfare and health care sectors, as 
well as for production and marketing of 
‘natural products’, paying much attention on 
the region’s characteristics and needs and to 
complementariness to the Objective 1 
programme in Eastern Finland136;  
• generated new forms of cooperation 
utilising ICTs: created five new operation 
modes and services and fifteen technological 
innovations in total; bridged over the 
traditional barriers between the public, 
private and civil sectors, combining their 
different viewpoints and interests by means 
of, for instance, promoting discussion 
between technology developers and potential 
customers about the opportunities of ICT 
solutions on the one hand, and the users’ 
concrete needs and wishes; 
• resulted in the formation of new 
enterprises in the region; 
• laid much emphasis on monitoring 
and evaluation of results and impacts, on the 
continuation of the projects after the 
programme period, as well the transferability 
of the results; 
• aimed at harmonising I.S. strategies 
and developments in the four provinces 
within Eastern Finland via a closer 
collaboration of the different regional actors; 
• were ‘internationalised’ through 
their participation in European networks of 
I.S. expertise;  
                                                 
135 There was much interest: in total, 48 pilot-project 
ideas were received and four development 
organisations applied for funds.  
136 In the selection of pilots, attention was paid to the 
degree the proposed projects would provide additional 
value to the current Objective 1 programme in the 
region. Since the later did not have enough 
consideration for the health care and welfare sectors, 
these two were in the focus of MONEP. 
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• and in general, they aimed at 
overcoming ‘social challenges’ rather than 
technical ones: targeted at improving the 
learning environment and networks for 
innovations within the region, and integration 
of the new solutions into people’s everyday 
life.  
The managing authority of MONEP 
was the Regional Council of North Karelia, 
taking much initiative and having the 
longest experience in regional I.S. 
developments. Yet, the Steering Committee 
was made up of representatives from all four 
provincial councils, and the Ministry of 
Interior; as well as expert members from 
national organisations such as Tekes, and 
Sitra137. MONEP therefore was not the least 
a spatially isolated process. Great accent 
was placed on publicity and dissemination 
via for instance, the maintenance of a 
programme web-site reporting on progress 
and achievements; other printed and digital 
publications (brochures, a book, a CD-Rom, 
and articles in regional newspapers and the 
Eris@ newsletter); and through information 
events, professional meetings, and press 
conferences which could draw in further 
interested partners and participants from the 
region and beyond. 
It is also important to note that on 
the regional level, too, the focus of projects 
has obviously shifted towards the creation of 
a great diversity of relevant content and 
communication systems, and towards a 
specifically suitable integration of the 
human and technological components of 
knowledge and information networks. This 
approach indeed, was realised in concrete 
solutions tailored to the rural-peripheral, 
sparsely-populated setting of the region (see 
example actions and projects in Box 9). 
 The first I.A. of Eastern Finland was 
followed by a similar programme for the 
period   2006-2008,    with  a  budget  of  3.6 
million euros. It concentrates on welfare 
ICTs both as a source of regional 
competitiveness and new business 
                                                 
137 See above in 4.2.2. 
opportunities and to improve services for the 
population. 
In sum, North Karelia gave a well-
timed regional response to the national 
political developments related to I.S.,138 
being also aware of international (European) 
trends in policy and EU funding schemes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Interview with Ms. Satu Ahonen, Regional Council 
(October 2003). 
Action 1 
1 Converged modern networks. 
E.g.: Web-based service for forest owners 
2 Start-up of natural resource based modern 
enterprise. 
E.g.: Local food market-place 
3 Development of the characteristics of the 
home page system, i.e. portal.  
E.g.: Service Models to radiology 
Action 2 
1 New regional network solutions.  
E.g.: Tikka Multicast, video system integra-
tion into business network activities 
2 Development and creation of products of the 
regional network information contents. 
E.g.: Team Work in the Social Sector, for 
social workers in sparsely populated areas;  
Meta Course, model for data transfer in 
home nursing. 
Action 3 
1 Learning networked localities. 
E.g.: Comprehensive local networking in two 
citizen network – the ’oppiva’ projects in 
N.K. by Glocal Ltd.;  
Revision of the I.S. Strategy for N.K.  
2 Research, transfer of best practices 
Action 4: Accompanying measures 
1   Networking, partnership, cooperation 
2   International cooperation 
 
Box 9. MONEP 2002-2004 actions in 
Eastern Finland and example pilot projects 
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Admittedly, the regional I.S. 
programme was founded on local initiatives. 
Since the beginnings (NOKIS), and similarly 
to the way the national I.S. strategists (e.g. at 
Sitra) were looking for some successful 
regional realisation of their aims, North 
Karelia has been seeking relevant local 
initiatives within its own territorial-
institutional framework. Innovative local 
applications were sought after especially 
which could be the realisation of the ‘people 
first’ values declared in both the national and 
regional documents. The following section 
presents an early and probably, ‘trend-
setting’ example for this situation. 
 
 
5.2.3 The Learning North Karelia projects 
“The basic idea of this project is "learning by doing". 
The local people working and studying in the project 
are responsible for the technical building and 
maintenance of the data system as well as the visual 
planning and contents. If they don’t know or can’t 
solve a problem, they work and study for the answer. 
One person doesn’t know everything but a group can 
brainstorm anything.” (OPPK website) 
Although there had been several 
projects in the region that fruitfully 
combined technology and rural development 
objectives before the late 1990s139, the 
Learning North Karelia community intranet 
(citizens’ network) project (OPPK: Oppiva 
Pohjois-Karjala; kansalaisverkko) launched 
in 1998 was the initiative that has been able 
to achieve much success and recognition in 
Finland and also, internationally.  
The OPK project addressed the 
weaknesses in the region in terms of all 
components of access to ICTs, information 
and knowledge, concentrating on the general 
population and the inclusion of those 
inhabitants and enterprises living and 
working in sparse settlements far away from 
the provincial centre, Joensuu.  
In four consequent and overlapping 
project phases, OPPK had covered the 
                                                 
139 E.g. telecottages in the 1980s, and some early 
forms of local networks (Oksa 2001: 2). 
whole province of North Karelia by 2005, 
starting with the most remote municipalities 
and finishing up with Joensuu and its 
immediate surroundings:  
• From April 1998 to March 2000, the 
Learning Upper North Karelia project 
(Oppiva Ylä-Karjala) covered the western 
part of Pielinen Karelia: Valtimo, Nurmes, 
Juuka. 
• From April 2000 to  December 
2001, the Learning Hills of Karelia phase 
(Oppiva Vaara-Karjala) covered the rest of 
Pielinen Karelia and the eastern part of the 
Joensuu district: the municipalities of Lieksa, 
Ilomantsi, and Tuupovaara 
• Between 2001 and 2004, the 
Learning Central Karelia project (Oppiva 
Keski-Karjala) aimed at extending the 
intranet and its services to the southern 
municipalities of North Karelia: Kesälahti, 
Kitee, Värtsilä, Tohmajärvi, Rääkkylä, 
Outokumpu and Polvijärvi. The remaining 
urban core of Joensuu and its surroundings 
were also considered, but were found less 
relevant to the project’s mission. 
Since its beginnings, OPPK has 
been built on three major pillars, which in 
fact, embrace ‘access’ in its most compre-
hensive sense. Education and technical 
counsel service; free ‘physical’ access 
points; and the software, content for a 
community network were provided as part 
of the scheme. However, the details and the 
remarkable arrangement and connection of 
these three pillars into a functioning and 
locally fitting construction were also 
important factors in success. 
 
1 Educating locals in ICT skills, 
providing continuous assistance and services 
to users.  
Unemployed locals were trained to 
be later working in the project itself: they 
were given jobs consequently in network 
maintenance and administration and were 
employed also as trainers and helpers of 
other residents (future users of the intranet) 
in the region. This pillar therefore was to 
enhance ‘mental access’ – skills and 
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openness for ICTs among the residents of the 
municipalities. The peer-training practice 
added considerably to the regional 
development potentials of the project, as well 
as to the self-esteem of the local population. 
It also proved that people accept new 
technologies and ideas more willingly if they 
are instructed by someone who is familiar to 
them, i.e. a neighbour, a kin, a friend from 
the same village or town – rather than an ‘IT 
professional’ assigned from a university or a 
company. 
2  Providing free internet access points.  
Over a hundred so-called ‘nettikioskit or net-
kiosks were established scattered in the 
region. This was necessary for achieving 
inclusiveness (i.e. ‘financial-economic’ 
access) despite the fact that from the late 
nineties the number of households having 
PCs connected to the net was increasing 
relatively fast in Finland, also in NK. (See 
photos in Figure 28.) 
3  An easy-to-use community intranet 
(kansalaisverkko). 
The community network sustains 
locally and regionally relevant information, 
interactive services and other useful and 
interesting substance for the citizens (i.e. 
elements of content-related access and local 
utility). The choice of the client programme 
“First Class” fits in well with the local 
context, too: it provides a very user-friendly 
interface (a personalised ‘desktop’ for each 
user), a logical, multi-layered and flexibly 
extendable structure of content, to which all 
public, private and civil actors are invited to 
contribute and link up to. The network can 
be entered also from the World Wide Web, 
making it possible for the user to stay 
connected with their home community life 
while away. As for the physical network, the 
main server is located in Nurmes, and the 
households, schools, local authorities and 
enterprises can link up to it via any type of 
network technology, narrowband connection 
is still not an obstacle. 
Besides, the fortunate timing and 
“coincidences”; the great variety and 
number of actors involved in the success of 
the OYK and its follow-ups are notable. 
First, the thought of the project occurred in a 
local working group whose task was to find 
new uses for the building of a school in 
Nurmes that had been closed. As the 
Regional Council had I.S. development 
among its priorities, it supported the 
proposal of the local I.S. project. The main 
funds for the project came from Sitra, yet 
the local municipalities, the district labour 
office, and the Regional Council of North 
Karelia also contributed to it financially. In 
certain phases, EU funds contributed also 
(MONEP, 2002-2004). 
It was a significant momentum that 
Sitra showed remarkable interest in this 
local-regional I.S. experiment. It also co-
financed the first evaluation study on it, and 
commissioned afterwards further reports on 
its developments (Oksa 2004).140 The 
initiator and designer of the project was 
suggested that he should set up a private 
enterprise (Glocal Ltd.) which would act in 
the future as advisor and exporter of his 
special expertise, in order to help further 
regions in Finland and abroad to achieve 
similar results. His and his colleagues’ 
special “community network know-how” 
was soon utilised in the national programme 
called Learning Regions (OSKU: Oppivat 
Seutukunnat, 2000-04) financed and co-
ordinated by Sitra, where eight further pilot 
regions in the country were selected for 
testing the community network idea more or 
less keeping its original elements (see Figure 
29).  Consequently, the key activists in the 
North Karelian project have become known 
nation-wide,   and their success has attracted 
international interest, too (e.g. EU 
organisations    promoting     I.S.   have    got 
                                                 
140 Since 1998, rural researchers Jukka Oksa and Jarno 
Turunen (Karelian Institute, Joensuu, Finland) have 
carried out extensive and detailed research on the 
history, factors of success, and follow-up 
developments of the Learning Upper Karelia project, 
and published several articles about their findings in 
both Finnish and English (see the References).  
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Figure 28. Four examples of nettikioskit – free internet/intranet access points set up by the 
Learning Upper Karelia project, 1998-1999 
 
 
interested, and world-famous I.S. theorist, 
Manuel Castells paid a visit to see the North 
Karelian practice in 2000.) 
The project has also relied much on 
public-private partnerships, the involvement 
of local governments, schools, libraries, 
small businesses, etc. has been vital in terms 
of all three pillars.  The number of the 
active users of the community intranet has 
been rising fast, and it grew especially 
dramatically in the first two years, by the 
end of which 25 per cent of the population 
of the project area at the time was registered 
(Oksa – Turunen 2000). 
Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the first phase of the project more-or- 
less covered the area of the so-called 
“Pielinen-Karelia”    (made  up   of  Nurmes, 
Lieksa and Valtimo), which is known to 
have faced most severely, the problems of 
unemployment,    decreasing  incomes  from 
 
 
 
forestry and agriculture, the out-migration of 
the young, and difficulties in sustaining 
public services and infrastructure (Oksa 
2001; see also the tables in Appendices 10 B 
and C). 
Although the basic telecommu-
nications infrastructure had been a given 
asset for long, narrowband had remained till 
very recently the technology the average 
user (connected at home) can rely on.141   
                                                 
141 It is also notable that IT professionals in Joensuu 
did not see possibilities in co-operating with the 
Learning Karelia project for the reason that their idea 
of ICTs and solutions is different: “...it is quite 
interesting that if you think about this citizen network 
– they are very suspicious, these Science Park people 
about that… They don’t understand (it)… I think one 
reason is that it’s not invented there … well, that’s 
why they don’t believe that’s real business…” 
(quoted from project manager Mr. Koskikallio, 
2003). 
   (Own photos, 2003.) 
From the top left corner: access point at Kolinportti roadside service centre (petrol station, café-restaurant, 
shops, bank, etc.); nettikiosk in a small handicrafts shop, by the municipal office and in the library in Valtimo. 
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To sum up, in its local context, the 
OPPK project was highly relevant; what is 
more, it targeted exactly those challenges 
that were mentioned in the regional I.S. 
strategy documents and among the priorities 
of the national policy, too.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Oppiva Seutukunnat – Learning 
Regions in Finland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Subnational developments in the 
Hungarian I.S. 142 
 
 
5.3.1 General and ICT-related inequalities in 
Hungary since the beginnings of transition 
 
 
General spatial inequalities 
 
As illustrated also in the Finnish 
example, the degree of inequalities in 
subnational territorial development is always 
determined on the one hand, by the structure 
of the economy and the spontaneous market 
processes, and on the other hand, by the 
objectives and actual practices of the national 
economic and regional policies (Kiss J., 
2003). In pre-transition Hungary (more 
precisely, from the 1960s), redistributive 
policies achieved a relatively lower level of 
inequalities within Hungary than what the 
situation was in the West. An important way 
to achieve this was the deliberate 
industrialisation of several, traditionally 
agrarian, towns in the countryside: state 
industrial investments targeted a selection of 
these, and resulted in their catching up to the 
rest of the country and in absolute terms, in 
significant modernisation of their local 
economies and employment structures. This 
speeded up out-migration for jobs from the 
smaller settlements within these regions. 
Since it was definitely not among the 
political priorities to prevent this (but quite 
the contrary), their physical and institutional 
infrastructures eroded fast, with the living 
standards and their population. (Perczel, 
2003, Enyedi, 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 This chapter is partially based on the author’s paper 
for the 43rd ERSA Congress, (Jyväskylä, 27-30 
August 2003), and is in part outcome of research 
being carried out for the ESPON 1.2.2. project. (see 
References). 
 
4 
6 
5 
7 
8 
11  9 
10 
1-3 
(Based on www.oskut.fi). 
Explanation: 1-3. OPPK – North Karelian projects; 
4. Northern Lapland (Pohjois-Lappi); 5. Kainuu; 6. 
Pieksämäki district (PiiSavo project); 7. Padasjoki 
district (ePäijänne); 8. East Uusimaa (Kehä 5); 9. 
East Turku; 10. Maunula in Helsinki (Nettimaunula); 
11. Turku archipelago 
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Figure 30. Macro- and subregional socio-economic inequalities in Hungary, 2002 
 
Then, spatial inequalities in Hungary 
were growing fast with political and 
economic transition from 1989/90, and their 
pattern also changed. As soon as market 
forces had been let loose, many 
municipalities and regions that enjoyed 
relative prosperity under Socialism suddenly 
faced depression, and the living standards in 
bigger urban centres and small villages 
polarised further.  
On the macro-regional scale, a 
‘west-east slope’ in economic well-being and 
average incomes appeared in Hungary 
(Figure 30, A). A reason behind was that 
foreign direct investment (one of the most 
crucial ‘dynamic’ factors) particularly in and 
around Budapest and in the north-western 
regions, did not cross the line of the Danube 
for a long time, and therefore, in the 1990s, 
Eastern Hungary benefited from it only to a 
limited extent.  Another  major  distinction in 
 
 
 
spatial development has existed for long 
between the capital city (Budapest) and its 
region versus the ‘countryside’; the 
divergence of which increased further after 
1990 (Fig. 30, B). In addition to these two 
features, at a lower, sub-regional level, a less 
straightforward pattern of inequalities have 
emerged in Hungary, though these rather blur 
than overwrite the above-mentioned major 
macro-regional tendencies. (Faluvégi 2004; 
Nemes-N., 1995, 1998a) 
The map in Figure 30 shows this 
fragmentation after twelve years of 
transition: 150 statistical sub-regions of 
Hungary (each made up of several 
municipalities) were classified into five 
categories according to a complex 
development index (Faluvégi, 2004:10- 
15).143 This fragmented spatial structure has 
                                                 
143 The ‘complex development’ indicator was created 
via factor analysis; the factor selected in the end 
covers over twenty independent variables on socio-
 (Adapted from Faluvégi, 2004:17; A, B, C added).  
 1.22 –  3.86 Dynamically developing (22) 
 0.50 –  1.22 Developing (25) 
-0.33 –  0.50 Catching up (55) 
-0.91 – -0.33 Stagnating (35) 
-1.51 – -0.91 Lagging behind (13) 
 
B 
A
C 
A:  'West-east slope' 
B:  Budapest vs. countryside 
C:  Old industrial axis 
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emerged due to local-regional combinations 
of negative and positive factors alike. On the 
one hand, structural crises selectively hit 
these regions and their included 
municipalities: affected those especially, 
which had earlier specialised in the 
traditional branches of manufacturing (i.e. in 
particular, the eastern regions of the old 
industrial axis stretching from Central 
Transdanubia to the north-easternmost corner 
of Hungary, Fig. 30, C) or had only 
agriculture as the basis of their economies 
(most of rural Eastern Hungary and the SW 
region, S. Transdanubia). On the other hand, 
capitalisation on local, especially, human 
resources contributed to the success of some 
sub-regions and municipalities in Central and 
W-NW Hungary, and also within the 
otherwise less developed regions. “After 
1990 villages entered ‘the market of 
settlements’. Their position, their pathway 
was determined by their geographic location 
and transport links, natural and environ-
mental conditions, labour-market status, the 
condition of the local society and their 
purchasing power among several other 
factors” (Beluszky & Sikos, 2007). 
Along with political transition, 
administration of the country was 
decentralised, and local self-government 
replaced the socialist ‘district.’ Many local 
governments have gained the ownership of 
land, businesses and property from which 
income could be obtained, and they were 
given the right to decide on their own 
budgets. Besides, local governments also 
were given a lot more responsibilities than 
socialist districts had ever held before: 
greater roles in education, health care, 
housing, and public works. However, 
typically, local tax revenues and additional 
income gained from own assets cannot cover 
the increased expenses. This has been 
certainly the case with most of the small rural 
communities in problematic regions, where 
due to the deteriorated state of infrastructure 
and the low economic basis for revenues 
                                                                          
economic development. Other similar classifications 
of sub-regions have been calculated and mapped by 
the Central Statistical Office (www.ksh.hu), too. 
(aging population and little entrepreneur-
ship), the provision of the very basic 
functions leave little budget for the 
governments to spend on social services for 
their populations, or support local economic 
development programmes. In concrete 
figures, from a relatively recent survey: 98% 
of all villages have no nursery school, 45% 
lack a kindergarten, 55% an elementary 
school, 56% a police presence, 69% a 
veterinary surgeon, 42% a district nurse, 75% 
a pharmacy, 60% a post office and 61% a 
club for the elderly (Halloran – Calderón V., 
2005). Over a thousand rural municipalities 
(32% of all villages) have less than 500 
inhabitants; and besides missing these 
institutions in place, access to them in other 
settlements nearby is limited by a poor (and 
still, deteriorating) public transport system. 
Nonetheless, these difficulties of 
adaptation to the changed social-economic 
and political environment have been to some 
extent counterbalanced by new possibilities 
(offered by the same transformational 
processes) which could facilitate local 
growth and improved competitiveness. As a 
result of what Faluvégi and other authors 
referred to as “new active components” or 
‘dynamic factors’, the development – and 
deployment – of the information 
technologies, the expanding transport 
networks, and the increasing role of services, 
as well as the practice of more efficient 
human resource management, considerable 
changes were expected in the early 2000s in 
the socio-economic spatial structure 
(2004:4). The latter aspect (the promotion of 
human capital) has been considered as a key 
task in rural-peripheral areas: their 
population is lacking certain levels and types 
of education and skills, and therefore, 
represents only a potential labour resource. 
Two logical questions arise from the 
above: how these continuities (legacies, 
difficulties) and new development potentials 
are reflected by the spatial inequalities in I.S. 
development in Hungary in / after transition; 
and how much ICTs could contribute, as new 
‘active components’ to levelling out the 
disparities across the country? (Or: have they 
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helped, at all, in decreasing the inequalities?) 
In short, similarly to the Finnish case: it is 
essential to understand whether the diffusion 
of different information and communication 
technologies can be regarded as a new 
symptom of, as well as a new factor in, 
spatial convergence or divergence in 
Hungary. 
 
 
ICT-diffusion in Hungary  
 
 
 
Figure 31. Number of telephone main lines 
per 1,000 inhabitants in Hungary (150 sub-
regions), 2004 
 
Just as international organisations 
have tried to benchmark the development of 
the I.S. on different territorial scales, and 
most recently on the sub-national scale, 
similar ventures are being currently 
undertaken by Hungarian regional scientists, 
geographers and experts of various other 
fields, as well as by planning institutions. 
The question, what indicators are available 
and can be used to measure informational 
development on the sub-national level, has 
always been a central one. Learning about 
the spatial variation in these factors 
separately may significantly contribute to our 
understanding of why and to what extent 
regional inequalities in I.S. development 
resemble or deviate from the already existing 
spatial patterns in economic growth.  
The overview of the changes in the 
telecommunications sector and of the 
national I.S. political intentions and 
aspirations (4.3) suggest that also in 
Hungary, the emergence of ICTs and related 
services has been one of the most visible 
dynamic factors in the transformation of the 
economy and everyday life in general. In the 
following I give a few illustrations of their 
spatial diffusion patterns. Because of the 
scarcity of data, only three technological 
indicators are included, representing different 
‘depths’ of access, and applied to different 
regional scales. The diffusion of fixed 
telephone main lines (Figure 31) and the 
proportion of ISDN lines to 1000 main lines 
(Figure 32) are indicative of ‘realised’, actual 
physical access (show the spatial diffusion of 
usage, subscriptions – inclusive of 'financial 
access’, too). The areas covered by ADSL 
services illustrate only potential physical 
access (the roll-out) of a more advanced, 
broadband technology, by a single (though 
major) service provider in Hungary. I 
consider the following points to be the most 
important observations: 
The spatial diffusion of fixed main 
lines and ISDN all indicate the traditional 
west-east and Budapest vs. countryside 
divisions in Hungary, which were generally 
present in the 1990s according to several 
socio-economic indicators (such as GDP per 
capita, taxable income levels, FDI). Most 
probably however, the access to ISDN in 
reality showed a more detailed pattern, with 
higher concentrations of ISDN lines in major 
urban localities.  
The diffusion of ISDN, although the 
scale of the maps below does not allow 
differentiation within counties),  followed a 
typical course of the time: starting in the 
capital and its region, then  continuing in 
most of the western part of the country, 
leaving much of the eastern area relatively 
underdeveloped. It is also visible in the maps 
and diagrams of Figure 32 that after a certain 
length  of  time,    regions  outside   Budapest  
 
 
(Source: CSO/KSH, Hungary.) 
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Figure 32. ISDN lines per 1000 inhabitants in the 20 county-level regional units in Hungary, 
relative to Budapest (Bp.= 100).
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Figure 33. Contrasting spatial variation in population and ADSL coverage of the 150 sub-
regions in Hungary, 2003.  
 
 
(Source of data: CSO / KSH and service provider Axelero Internet, member of 
the Matáv Group.) 
A
B
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started to catch up to each other (and thus 
differences decreased within the 
countryside, see the diagrams), while the 
level of ISDN penetration in them never 
reached that of the capital. The reason for 
this is very likely to be the emergence of 
alternative, and more advanced 
technologies, namely broadband 
applications (Internet via cable TV and 
ADSL; see above in 4.3). 
As regards ADSL infrastructure and 
service provision, map 33/A illustrates the 
territorial differences of accessibility by 
potential subscribers: it does not indicate 
real diffusion (unlike subscription data 
would be, if they were available). Still, it 
was linked to spatial patterns of demand 
assumed or even observed by the service 
provider using direct market surveys, or 
available regional socio-economic data. 
(Nevertheless, it is questionable whether 
supply and demand are always well 
matched.)  
Consequently, the territorial pattern 
of this ‘potential physical access’ to Internet 
via ADSL was fine-grained in 2003. The 
traditional east-west slope was not very 
significant any more. Compared to the 
spatial distribution of population in Hungary 
(33/B), it becomes obvious that the key 
guideline for the Internet provider is 
population density, i.e. the perceived size of 
the market. Also, densely populated regions 
are generally more urbanised and so they 
have more diverse economic bases with a 
higher share of services and business 
activities which are considered major 
consumers of ICTs.144  (See also Figure 34). 
                                                 
144 Note the exception of the group of sub-regions in 
Békés County (in the south-easternmost corner of 
Hungary). The total absence of ADSL here is due to 
the fact that the map is based on Axelero / Matáv 
Group data and in early 2003, Békés was the only 
county in Hungary that belonged altogether to 
another service provider. Hungarotel owned the 
concession rights here as a minor fixed line 
competitor of the incumbent Matáv, but in fact, it was 
only in April 2003 when first, in some parts of the 
two biggest towns (Békéscsaba, Orosháza) ADSL 
was made available by Hungarotel. This company, 
too, chose the areas which they considered the most 
surely profitable, to test the new ICT. 
 
Figure 34. ADSL provision in settlement 
categories (pop. size) in Hungary, late-2003; 
by Axelero Internet.  
 
 
It is easy to predict in which 
regions Axelero would invest and provide its 
different levels of broadband services in the 
future, following concentrations of 
population which are assumed to secure 
profit. The only reason for developments to 
happen otherwise (i.e. sparsely populated, 
poorer regions having access first) could be 
Universal Service Obligation extended to 
broadband. This is, however, very unlikely 
in Hungary in the foreseeable future since 
that there is no such case in more advanced 
EU member states either (see 3.3.1 and 
3.3.4; also BT, 2007). A frequent argument 
against the inclusion of BB within the scope 
of USO is the claim that for enhancing e-
inclusion, besides ‘connectivity’ (physical-
financial access), societies have to 
concentrate more on improving ‘content’ 
and ‘capability’ (mental access).  Besides 
the programmes introduced by the national 
government in Hungary (4.3), there has been 
many initiatives from below (by local and 
regional actors) targeting these three C’s. 
The most prominent of these, I think, is the 
telecottage movement.  
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5.3.2 A bottom-up initiative: the telecottages 
(1994 - ) 
 
Early developments: Csákberényi Teleház 
setting an example  
 
As already mentioned, one of the 
gravest legacies of the Socialist era in rural-
peripheral areas was concerning infra-
structure, this meant serious problems with 
insufficient sewage systems, the ‘standard’ 
of dirt roads, and a poorly developed 
telecommunications network. In 1990, only 
about 9 per cent of the population had fixed 
telephone lines installed at home, the 
majority of which were concentrated in the 
capital and the bigger cities (HÍF). Many 
villages had just one public telephone, or 
even no connection at all but the one in the 
neighbouring municipality. As mentioned in  
4.3.2 above, the urgency of the situation was 
recognised by the state soon, which, when 
privatising the sector, obliged the national 
telecommunications company to improve 
the inclusiveness of its services (i.e. to 
impose universal service obligation in turn 
for granted monopoly). Therefore, fixed line 
telephony diffused remarkably fast, 
especially from the mid-nineties. This also 
contributed to the environment encouraging 
the creation of the first telecottages 
(Hungarian ‘telecentres’), adding to the 
economic necessities and opportunities 
outlined above. 
The idea of the ‘multipurpose 
telecentre’ was not altogether new in Europe 
in the 1990s; it is said to have been 
‘invented’ in Sweden a decade earlier (see 
Box 10 below).  Yet, since the essence of 
telecentres is that they “can be used for any 
purpose by anyone, … according to 
demand” (Németh, E., 1997), it is no 
wonder that they have spread since in many 
developed and developing countries, and 
The Swedish Härjedalens 
Telestuga in Vemdalen (a village 450 km 
north of Stockholm) is known as the 
ancestor of all telehouse initiatives in 
Europe. It was founded by a much-travelled 
Danish man, the interpreter and translator 
Henning Albrechtsen, who settled down in 
this small village when his retirement was 
approaching. The region of Härjedalen was 
facing serious problems: due to its extremely 
low population density (1 inh. / km2), and 
poor connections and accessibility it was 
losing especially the young and active 
segments of its population, as well as its 
local businesses.  
Albrechtsen got the idea of opening an ‘everyone’s office’ from a seminar presentation on rural 
development in 1985 (delivered by the Danish Jan Michel), and established the telestuga in Härjedalen 
after a few months (13th Sept. 1985) equipped with 19 personal computers, a fax machine and other office 
tools, as well as with three trained staff. Albrechtsen himself, could take advantage of this facility in his 
work as a translator, while he also gave others the opportunity to do distance work (or ‘telework’). The 
small local factories could establish connections with businesses further away, and soon received orders, 
could fully use their capacities again, and could even hire more employees – and the regional economy 
started to grow.  The initial investment of 1 million Swedish krona (ca. USD 170,000) was offered as 
contributions from the state, the incumbent telecommunications company, the local government, however, 
the telestuga became self-sustaining very soon.  
In the early 1980s, there had already been similar attempts in other countries (e.g. telework 
centres in France and Great Britain) but those were much less focussing on their communities than 
Albrechtsen’s telecottage. 
(Based on: interview with Mr Gáspár, 2003; Andrew Bibby, 1995; Global Ideas Bank; Hautaviita, 2000.) 
Stockholm 
Härjedalen 
(S.: www.harjedalen.se, 
edited by S.N.) 
Box 10. The story of ‘the very first’ telecottage, Härjedalens Telestuga in the 1980s 
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have taken up  various ‘national shapes’, 
incorporating various levels of ICTs.  
The telecottages in Hungary are 
adopted–adapted variants of especially this 
Nordic ‘innovation prototype’. Hungarian 
librarians collected and translated accounts 
on the first Swedish example, its transfer 
into Finland, and also some similar cases 
from other Western European countries. In 
1992, they published this information in a 
booklet and circulated it within their 
national library network as a recommended   
solution   for   small   village libraries in 
Hungary to sustain their services in the 
difficult economic situation. Soon a so-
called ‘telecorner’ was set up in 
Nagymágocs  (Csongrád County,   Southeast 
 
Hungary), an agriculture-based municipality 
of 3,500 inhabitants, yet this attempt failed 
within the same year. According to some 
accounts, there was a problem with the staff, 
and another reason could be that it had only 
a single purpose, the modernisation and 
extension of the local library services (ITU 
2001). However, another telecottage was 
founded in 1994, in Csákberény, a small 
hill-side community in mid-western 
Hungary (Fejér County; pop. 1,300). It was 
born in the same year when the village got 
its first fixed telephone line (see Box 11). 
‘Csákberényi Teleház’ proved to be much 
more permanent than Nagymágocs 
‘telecorner’; it has been functioning for over 
twelve years. 
  
Box 11. The story behind the establishment of Csákberényi Teleház: the ‘Reference Telecottage’ 
About four years after the political and economic transition began in Hungary, on 14 July 1994, Mr. 
Mátyás Gáspár, a college professor in Budapest (teaching public and community management, as well as 
community informatics) founded Csákberényi Teleház in his second-home village located in Fejér County, 
Central Transdanubia.  
A short time before this, Mr Gáspár had come across a pamphlet about international examples of 
rural telecentres, compiled and translated by a librarian and disseminated in the national library network.  
Then, “the idea had been nursed for two years in the minds of some local residents of Csákberény: the public 
administration manager, the mayor, and some other inhabitants were considering launching a local 
community-development programme” (Gáspár, interview, 2003). For the purpose of its management, they 
needed a separate office, a house which had many essential tools in one place: a computer, photo copying and 
fax machines, other office equipment for different tasks. It also had to provide public space, a shared room for 
the local community. 
Since, Mr. Gáspár has been managing the Teleház together with his wife, Mária Takáts. They were 
also the ones to initiate the establishment of the civil organisation called Hungarian Telecottage Association 
(HTA), which Mr Gáspár served as President for a decade (1994-2004).  
 
The building 
converted to fit the 
purpose is in fact, a small 
traditional Hungarian 
village house, located in 
the village centre close to 
the primary school, the 
post office, and the 
church. 
  
 
 
 
 
The government of Csákberény recruited locals who had the skills to use the equipment and could 
explain others how to take advantage of them, as well as who had the understanding of the problems and 
interests of the local residents.  
(Sources: interviews, www.telehaz.hu, Gáspár – Takáts, 1997) 
Distance between  
Csákberény and 
Budapest: 65 km  
Székesfehérvár (county seat): 25 km 
Cs 
Fejér  
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New participants sparking off a movement  
 
Although, Csákberényi Teleház was 
the outcome of a local, bottom-up initiative 
in 1994, it did gain support from the 
Ministry of Welfare, too. This indicated 
some early interest on the part of the 
national government despite the fact that at 
this time, telecottages were not regarded by 
higher politics as an innovation to include in 
the national development plan. 
Nevertheless, the founders of the 
first successful telecottage had another 
ambitious plan in mind, by which they also 
hoped to draw the attention and the support 
of national and international authorities and 
organisations. They decided to share their 
experiences and their expertise in 
telecottage-production with actors in other 
rural municipalities, and spread the use of 
this new tool in community development 
throughout the country and even beyond 
Hungary, across the CEE region. This could 
have not taken place without new 
participants, a heavy reliance on networking 
and the ICTs themselves, and the national 
‘institutionalisation’ of the project. After the 
first telecottage proved functional and 
sustainable, a series of processes was set in 
motion, which has ultimately led to the 
highest number of telecentres per population 
in the world.  
In 1995, the Hungarian Telecottage 
Association (HTA) was established as a civil 
organisation under the leadership of the 
telecentre manager in Csákberény (Mr 
Gáspár) with the aim of disseminating 
knowledge on telecottages in the country. 
The year 1996 meant a major turning point: 
the ‘Network for Democracy Program’ 
(DemNet) was launched to support civil 
society organisations financed by USAID 
through United Way International. It helped 
establishing over 30 new telecentres in 
Hungary in 1997-98. Some municipalities 
could also draw support from EU pre-
accession funds for their telecottage 
development. In late 1997, the Hungarian 
Government finally made its move towards 
the telecottages. On the first Hungarian 
Telecottage Symposium, the National 
Telecottage Programme (NTP) was 
announced in 1998. Along with the 
organiser HTA, representatives of several 
ministries, public and private organisations 
participated in the meeting, which gained 
excellent publicity in the press. The 
Government offered HUF 100,000,000 
(445,000 ECU) from the state budget, which 
complemented with additional available 
resources, was calculated to be enough for 
developing about 150 new telecottages. The 
Association set the rules and conditions for 
the newly established telecottages, making 
sure that the original idea and ‘spirit’ would 
be preserved and that the telecottages would 
be sustainable on the long run. In the late 
1990s, optimistic prognoses were made for 
the future about the increase in the number 
of telecentres in the country (see in Box 12). 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Users, interests and partners in 
the telecottage: the idea of an intelligent 
locality 
 
The use of telecottages: technology, 
information, community and learning 
 
The HTA defines the mission of 
telecottages in the Hungarian context as an 
integral part of the ‘intelligent locality’ 
concept (Figure 35):  
 
(Adapted from Nagyné T. in Bihari, 
1999:45.)
 
Civil Private
Intelligent 
Locality 
State 
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A telecottage is a community and service 
organization that ensures access to information and 
communications tools, information and services, 
provides users professional and trained help and 
addresses additional local community needs.”  
 (It)  “can operate in many types of institutions and 
legal entities (independent institution, library, 
community house, school, post office), and it is not 
classifiable in a single service branch or economic 
sector, but in its own hybrid organization and 
organizational cooperation,  i.e. usually owned by a 
civil organization, hosted in the local government, 
and operated by a private company…” (Gáspár in 
Telefalu, my emphases and translation.) 
 
Telecottages generally, can play an 
important role in relieving all three 
limitations in ‘access’ to knowledge and 
resources in rural, peripheral regions in 
Hungary:  the lack  of  ‘hardware’, the prob- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lems with ICT skills and knowledge, as well 
as the motivation barriers. Nevertheless, the 
assortments of services they provide, and 
their ‘accommodators’ (host and operator) 
determine how they can achieve all or parts 
of these tasks. These, on the other hand, are 
just as diverse as the villages and 
communities they serve across the country 
(see also the detailed account on the SGP 
telecentres below). Some of them are housed 
in separate, purpose-built ‘cottages’, while 
many of them occupy a room in the local 
administration building or the library 
(Murray, 2001, Gáspár, 2003). Relatively 
few of them are truly multi-purpose 
community spaces with the newest 
technology. Still, in general, they are able to 
provide access to ICT, information and 
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Box 12. The number and spatial distribution of telecottages in Hungary, 2004. 
In 2004, there were 533 telecottages 
functioning in Hungary. Their network covered 
most of the country, but there was a generally 
higher density in regions where the settlement 
pattern is denser and characterised by small rural 
units with a couple of hundred inhabitants living 
in each. This is the case especially in two counties 
in Transdanubia (i.e. in SW/W. Hungary). Though 
for instance, Heves County (in N. Hungary) has 
fewer telecottages than its settlement pattern and 
socio- economic situation would render necessary, 
in general, more telecentres have emerged in 
peripheral regions facing the most serious 
problems during the transition years. 
The actual and predicted numbers of telecottages 
in Hungary, 1994-2004 (prognosis: 2000)
S.: www.telehaz.hu, 2004 
Telecottages per 10.000 inhabitants in Hungary, 
2004 (sub-regions; NUTS 4)  
Cities other than Budapest with pop. > 100.000 are 
excluded. 
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knowledge as well as new and popular 
community space for the residents and 
enterprises in their neighbourhood: 
• ICTs and simple office services 
As mentioned also in 4.3.2, in 2003 
Internet in households was still little 
diffused in Hungary (8 % of the population), 
yet about 15-17% actually used the Internet 
(HÍF, BellResearch) dominantly at the 
workplace, in schools, and public facilities, 
such as telecottages and libraries. This 
indicates a substantial demand for public 
(physical / financial) access points. Figure 
36 shows that in telecottages, connection to 
the Internet (surfing, looking for 
information), office facilities and e-mail 
were among the most popular service-
categories in the late 1990s according to the 
proportion of visitors using them.   
• Information and training centres 
Many telecottages have come up 
with more creative ‘information products’ 
and more complex functions to stay useful 
and keep up with changing social and 
technological conditions. The profile of the 
most successful examples includes locally 
and regionally relevant information and 
knowledge-intensive, specialised services 
that support entrepreneurship and rural 
development projects.  
 
 
Figure 36. The most popular services by 
telecottages. 
 
Rural entrepreneurs face several 
problems including the lack of information, 
their perceived and actual isolation, and 
poor infrastructure being the most crucial 
ones. Therefore, inexpensive office space 
and equipment, Internet services, consulting, 
forums and training, new ways of marketing 
and networking with other SMEs in and 
beyond their region mean a huge advantage 
to them (Beaton, 2002). An increasing 
number of telecottages has recognised the 
significance of this, especially in connection 
with village tourism, organic farming, agro-
market-information, and telework.  
Institutionalised in the framework 
of the NTP, many telecottages took up the 
role of EU-related information centres (the 
Csákberény 'Referencia Teleház’ was among 
the first to do so opening a so-called 
European Information Point in 2003). 
Orientation about the LEADER+ 
programme for rural development has 
recently become almost a standard item 
included in telecottage websites. Many of 
the telecentres assist in applications for 
funding, provide training in project 
management and initiate development 
projects themselves.  
These activities have especially 
been important for the fact that on the sub-
national level, the whole idea of 
communities and regions being actively 
responsible for their own future and 
sustainability still needs to be implanted into 
the ways social actors in Hungary think 
about their individual and community lives. 
The additionality principle in funding, 
applying for aimed grants, drawing up local 
and regional development strategies, co-
operating across sectors and geographical 
boundaries, coming up to fixed standards 
and participating in monitoring activities, 
etc. are all present in the NTP. Making 
people learn these through practice on the 
local level in order to realise their local 
interests and ambitions had been a way of 
preparing society for the EU regime. This is 
indeed, vital in the case of regions that go 
through restructuring and need a 
diversification of their economies.  
It is obvious from Figure 36 that 
besides technology and information 
services, telecottages have been popular also 
(Based on Molnár, 2000.) 
SERVICE CATEGORY                           USERS  
                                           % of all visitors 
1 Office services  
  (Photo-copying, fax, etc.)    85 
2 Provision of community space  75 
3 Access to Internet    61 
4 Universal information services  57 
5 Computer games    51 
6 Counselling     50 
7 E-mail     44 
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for their community space function, their 
good atmosphere and interesting cultural 
programmes. It is rather indicative that 62 
per cent of telecottage visitors claimed in 
2000 that the life of their communities has 
changed positively since their telecentres 
were set up. It is true, that this improvement 
had been due partly to the fact that 
Hungarian telecottages are not only public 
access points, but community access points, 
and that they often fulfil tasks that make up 
for missing public services (Molnár 2000). 
The community space function may be 
realised through informational activities 
such as editing locally relevant digital and 
printed newspapers, radio programmes, to 
housing social events, organising fairs, 
meetings of civil organisations, providing 
room for different training and leisure 
activities for children and the elderly. So, 
telecottages can have a significant 
associational power.  
Besides, the responsibilities taken 
up by individual telecentres may be 
basically anything to meet emergent local 
need. It is included clearly in the HTA 
Statutes that telecentres, if necessary, should 
assist municipal governments in the 
provision of public services under individual 
contracts. This has been especially important 
in the smallest villages where the relevant 
institutions are missing or forced to work in 
very difficult circumstances (see also 5.3.1). 
A teleház therefore, can function as a post 
office, or even, some sort of a health and 
family centre, can arrange the transport of 
children to distant schools, or act as a tax 
advisory or unemployment office. 
Telecottages often provide room for and 
cooperate with the ‘village caretaker’ 
(falugondnok) in these functions.145  
                                                 
145 The ‘village-caretaker’ concept was also the result 
of a civil initiative in the early nineties, and had 
developed into a network of undertakers working in 
over 820 small villages across the country by 2005, 
institutionalised and funded early by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs in 1991. The network is administered 
by a national association (Magyar Tanya- és 
Falugondnoki Szövetség since 2000) and several 
regional civil organisations.  
 
Internal and external exchange of 
knowledge, ‘export’ of expertise  
 
The telecottages have acquired 
immense experience in matching ICTs with 
community development and in practical 
organisational issues. Best practices  are 
circulated in the Hungarian network (largely 
supported by ICTs), and are published and 
shared widely, resulting in synergies, 
increased tacit and explicit knowledge stock, 
new associations, and encouraging even the 
physical mobility of the actors in forms of 
participation in seminars, training sessions, 
cultural exchanges. From 2004, most of the 
telecottages were included in the eHungary 
programme of the Government (see about 
KözHáló in 4.3). This was a much 
debated146 but eventually, a practical 
solution for at least two reasons. It helped 
the ‘eHungaricised’ telecottages to up-grade 
their technological standards (while they 
could continue their other cultural and social 
functions). In turn, newly established 
eHungary access points could get training 
and assistance (e.g. through the telementor 
network) from the Telecottage Association 
to develop towards becoming a telecottage 
in their location. 
Also, already since 1998, building 
on their know-how experience, the 
International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), in cooperation with the HTA and the 
International Association of Teleservice 
Centres have organised several conferences 
for a broader geographical dissemination of 
this special know-how.  
Naturally, through existing cultural 
links, and having societal features rooted in 
shared historical experience, the 
neighbouring countries of Hungary 
                                                 
146 Some telecottages chose not to be part of the 
KözHáló public network for various reasons such as 
distrust, concerns about the conditions they needed to 
fulfil, or wanting to stay independent. During the 
interview with the head of the Association in late 
2003, he said,  however, that one of the weaknesses 
of the telecottage movement was its being little 
standardised and very heterogeneous, which limited 
their ability to become a potential partner in 
providing public services across the country.  
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(especially Serbia and Romania) have been 
the first to be interested in telecottage 
practices. There are examples of direct 
cross-border networking between Hungarian 
telecottages and others in for instance, 
Voivodina and Transylvania. In 2004, Mr 
Gáspár gave up his active presidency of the 
HTA to found the European Union of 
Telecottage Association (EUTA) to provide 
these accomplishments a greater scope and 
publicity, and some presence on the 
international political scene: it cooperates 
with the International Association of 
Community TeleService Centers and the 
WSIS (see 3.2). EUTA is an international 
civil organisation including seven member 
associations147, and the experience of some 
1,000 telecentres (2007).  
 
5.3.3 A study on the Southern Great Plain 
Telecottage Region, Hungary 
 
As the number of telecottages was 
approaching 200 in Hungary, it was practical 
for the national association to set up seven 
regional divisions with representatives in the 
HTA board. However, the telecentres in the 
Southern Great Plain had already established 
their separate civil organisation ‘from below’ 
(see Box 13 about the region, and Figures 30-
33 in 5.3.1 concerning its position in the 
country).  
The SGP Telecottage Association 
(Dél-alföldi Teleházak Egyesülete, DTE) was 
founded in 1999 by 21 telecottages to make it 
easier for them to engage in partnerships with 
other regional actors: telecommunications 
and other companies, non-profit 
organisations, as well as the Regional 
Development Agency and the county 
governments. The Association aims at 
increasing the number of and the knowledge 
about, the telecottages in the region; and at 
integrating their activities with other 
(regional and national) development plans 
and programmes. They have been successful 
in achieving much along these goals:  
                                                 
147  Hungary, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Estonia (in 2007). 
• By 2004, the number of telecottages 
had nearly quadrupled (to 73). 
 
• The SGP Telecottage Region had 
participated in several fruitful partnerships 
with other NGOs, and some ministries, 
regional employment centres, etc. for 
example: 
 
 to further educate and place young 
unemployed people into jobs in 
telecottages (distance work and 
‘telementor’ projects),  
 to train telecottage staff in 
environmental issues and sustainable 
development (2005), 
 for an efficient distribution of welfare 
services by means of ICTs in the 
southern part of Csongrád County 
(2004),  
 and to train  interested e-Hungary points 
to become more like a teleház, a 
community access point integrated into 
their local social and institutional 
contexts (2007). 
 
 
The SGP Telecottage Region is 
particularly advanced in innovative 
information and communication services. For 
instance, their on-line search-engine helps in 
finding adequate project partners and 
sponsors, thus encouraging joint applications 
for funding and collaboration in the region. 
Also, the telecottage known as the official 
media centre of the HTA is located here 
(7Határ Studio / Teleház in Mártély): it has 
taken up a central role in dissemination and 
documentation of successful telecottage 
practices in the SGP, and in the promotion of 
regional identity and cultural resources. The 
regional association has been also more 
active than other regions in strengthening 
links across the national border both towards 
Serbia and Romania by organising 
conferences, mutual visits, and training with 
the foreign partners.  
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Szeged – regional capital, county seat 
The office of SGP Telecottage Assoc. (DTE): 
Telecottage Resource Centre 
Serbia
Romania
Area: 18,339 km2 (20% of the total 
national territory.) 
Population: 1.3 million  
Pop. density: 73 inhabitants per km2  
 
A distinctive settlement structure: big 
cities (the three county seats, among 
them the university city and regional 
centre, Szeged), rural towns, large 
villages and many scattered farmsteads. 
So, besides a higher-than-average rate 
of urban population (65.6%) and 180-
200,000 people (44% of the rural pop.) 
living on distant farms.  
 
Aging demographic structure and the 
out-migration of the young is a problem 
in most of the region.  
 
Accessibility is relatively better in the north-western part of the region, however, the M5 highway had 
not reached Szeged before 2005. Most of the municipalities in Békés County and along the borders 
have rather poor accessibility on road to the rest of the country via M5, as well as to the county seats or 
the sub-regional centres within the SGP Region. 
Industrial production rates are relatively 
low partly for the inherited significance 
of the food and textile branches and 
partly for the lack of investments and 
scarce foreign capital. The region is rich 
in natural and cultural resources for 
high quality agricultural production (not 
only of the popular ‘hungarica’, such as 
paprika), eco- and cultural tourism 
(nature reserves, spas, folk art and 
traditions); however, much investment 
is still needed into the modernisation of 
these sectors. The SGP is second in the 
country after Central Hungary 
considering tertiary educational and 
research institutions, and the size of its 
human capital; however many of these 
activities are under-resourced and much 
of the innovation network is 
concentrated in Szeged.  
 
 (Sources: SGP Regional Development Agency, 2003; KSH/CSO Hungary) 
Box 13. The Southern Great Plain Region, Hungary.  
15 to 30 minutes 
30 to 40 minutes 
> 40 minutes 
Accessibility* of the nearest 
highway junction 
from SGP municipalities 
8 min. to 1 hour 
1 to 1.5 hours 
> 1.5 hours 
Averaged accessibility* of 
the 3 nearest  sub-regional 
centres 
* Duration of travel, 2001
100 km 
100 km 
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This seems to be an interesting 
incidence of regionalism in comparison with 
the top-down ‘regionalisation’ of the HTA 
organisation. The efforts of the SGP 
Telecottage Region indicate a tendency 
which complements the still rather 
centralised institutional system of regional 
policy in Hungary.148 
A logical question is whether 
networking among the individual telecottages 
is particularly intensive within this special 
regional context. This assumption is 
encouraged by the facts that telecentres are 
equipped with the tools and experience 
necessary for cost and time-efficient 
communication, and that most of them have 
learnt their ‘trade’ from each other (see 
Figure 38 for the spatial clusters of 
telecentres according to their birth-years, for 
instance). Below, I briefly review some of 
the most important results of my survey-
based research carried out in 2005 which 
focussed on telecottages in the SGP Region. I 
aimed especially at understanding how their 
sustainability, managing-operating body, 
their ICT equipment and service-profiles, 
and their networking activities are related to 
each other (see the use of ICTs in this data 
collection and other information about the 
survey in Appendix 8.) 
One of the major findings is that 
relatively few of the SGP telecentres are truly 
multi-purpose community spaces, and / or 
equipped with the latest technology. Often, 
they specialise in simpler office services and 
have just narrowband connections, a few 
PCs, and rather limited opening hours. Some 
                                                 
148 In Hungary, SGP and the other six planning and 
statistical regions have development councils and 
agencies, but no governments and administrative 
powers. The Act on Regional Development (1996, 
1999) introduced the objectives and the institutional 
system of regional policy in Hungary. Following the 
latest amendment (2006), there are 5 sub-national 
levels. The macro-regions (3; NUTS 1), planning and 
statistical regions (7; NUTS 2), and the sub-regions 
(168; LAU 1 / NUTS 4) are not public administration 
units. Counties and the capital (20; NUTS 3) and the 
municipalities (3152; LAU 2 / NUTS 5) are the spatial 
units of traditional public administration with local 
self-governments since 1990 (CSO/KSH, Hungary). 
 
of these, however, can boast with tens of 
civil organisations cooperating with them in 
organising cultural and other local events, 
activities. At the other end of the scale there 
are telecentres ‘armed’ with the latest arsenal 
of networked computers and other digital 
tools, and fast Internet (e.g. some of the 
libraries which joined also the e-Hungary 
programme). Not all of them can offer 
technological expertise, and many of these 
seemed less active on the socio-cultural side. 
They have diverse perspectives on their 
future sustainability, too (Figure 37). My 
interviews and observations also confirmed 
that the telecottage scene in the SGP region 
is rather heterogeneous. Based on the 
questionnaires filled in by the 29 respondents 
(40% of telecottages in the region), three 
basic types – or survival strategies – can be 
outlined. 
First, many telecentres have sought 
the support of their municipality; these are 
owned partly or completely by their local 
governments and housed in the library, the 
village school or located in the municipal 
office itself. Their existence and the 
employment of at least one staff is more-or-
less secured (see the information on staff in 
Table 6). However, there are some risks. 
These telecentres are usually more dependent 
on local political developments (i.e. elections 
every four years, which, in Hungary a 
genuine factor of uncertainty). Also, their 
locale (e.g. a ‘silent’ library or a too ‘formal’ 
office within another institution) may limit 
their community-space function. 
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Figure 37. Respondent telecottages in the SGP region about their visions of their future 
sustainability 
 
 
 
Table 6. The distribution of respondent SGP telecentres (29) according to the number and type 
of employee and the managing-operating organisation. 
 
Table 7. The distribution of respondent SGP telecentres (29) according to the level of ICT 
equipment and the managing-operating organisation. Survey: Sept.-Oct. 2005. 
 
 
 
ICTs / managing-operating org. 
Local gov. 
(or local gov. + civil 
org.) 
Private 
enterprise 
Civil 
organisation 
 
In total 
 
Low level 4 (33%) 0 4 (25%) 8 (28%) 
Medium level 7 (58%) 0 7 (44%) 14 (48%) 
High level 1 (8%) 1 5 (31%) 7 (24%) 
In total 12 1 16 29 
(*Based on the number of PCs with Internet connection, bandwidth of Internet connection;  
%: managing-operating organisation type = 100%) 
(29-1 telecottages: one TC completed the questionnaire only partially)    Survey: Sept.-Oct. 2005. 
43% (12): 
the TC is sustainable 
for many more years 
18% (5): the TC will manage to 
function for another 1-2 years 
28% (8): the future of the 
TC is very uncertain 
11% (3): the TC can be 
sustained maybe for 
another year 
 
Staff     /   managing-operating org.  
Local gov.  
(or local gov. + 
civil org.) 
Private 
enterprise 
Civil 
organisation 
 
In total 
 
Volunteer(s) 0 0 3 (19%) 3 (10%) 
1-2 part-time staff 2 (17%) 0 2 (12%) 4 (14%) 
1 full-time (and maybe 1-2 part-
time) staff 
8 (67%) 0 7 (44%) 15 (52%) 
More than 1 full-time employees 2 (17%) 1 (100%) 4 (25%) 7 (24%) 
In total 12 1 16 29 
(%: managing-operating organisation type = 100%)                                         Survey: Sept.-Oct. 2005 
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Figure 38. The distribution of the 72 telecottages included in the survey according to their years 
of opening in SGP municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. The distribution of respondent SGP telecentres (29-1)* according to their visions of 
their sustainability and their connectedness**.  
 
Survey: Sept.-Oct. 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey: Sept.-Oct. 2005. 
1997-1999  (12)  
2000-2002  (44) 
2003-2004 (15) 
2005        (1) 
No TC       (183) 
Sustainability  / 
connectedness  
No 
connections 
Low 
connectedness 
Medium 
connectedness 
High 
connectedness 
In total 
Very uncertain 5 (41%) 2 (18%) 1 (50%) 0  8 (28%) 
Maybe for a 
year 
1 (8%) 2 (18%) 0 0 3  (11%) 
1-2 years for 
sure 
2 (17%) 0 1 (50%) 2 (66%) 5  (18%) 
On the long run 4 (33%) 7 (64%) 0 1 (33%) 12 (43%) 
In total 12 11 2 3 28 
Notes: 
 
*One TC completed the questionnaire only partially; %: all in the class of popularity /column/ = 100%) 
**Connectedness: measured by the number of references to the TC by other (respondent) SGP 
telecottages. 
 
No connections: not mentioned by any of the other TCs in the region  
Low connectedness:  mentioned by 1-2 other TCs in the region. 
Medium connectedness: mentioned by 3-4 other TCs in the region. 
High connectedness: mentioned by 5 or more other TCs in the region. 
. 
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Figure 39. The distribution of SGP telecottages mentioned by respondent 
telecottages according to the frequency of reference 
 
 
 
Second, a number of telecottages 
organize themselves around local-regional 
civil society groups. They are usually very 
lively and popular, and are engaged in 
diverse cultural and other local activities. 
Their ICT infrastructure varies from very 
poor to modern, and in fact (based on the 
small survey, had slightly better technology 
in general, than the telecottages owned 
partly or completely by the local 
government; see Table 7). Third of them 
however, have to rely on volunteer and part-   
time labour. Their sustenance depends on 
foundations such as the National Civil Fund, 
from which support has been more and more 
difficult to obtain; but they increasingly use 
the opportunities provided by the EU. Civil 
telecottages are still the most common (e.g. 
two-thirds of all telecottages) in the SGP 
region, and I had the impression several 
times that their managers (often doing 
volunteer work) are among the more 
optimistic and enthusiastic ones, too. 
The third strategy is to start a 
locally or regionally relevant, information-
intensive business, focusing on a set of 
services (counselling, media, training, etc.). 
They naturally have permanent staff and a 
competitive level of ICTs. Their 
sustainability depends on the enterprise and 
its ability to fill a niche in their respective 
areas, yet there is a risk of their becoming 
purely profit-oriented, and attracting only a 
selected segment of the local society (the 
one private telecentre in the region which 
responded in the survey do not belong to this 
later category; the others are closer to a 
well-equipped internet café or shop with 
office services). 
 
 
 
(Note: including all references, i.e. also the 25 TCs in the SGP region which were 
mentioned but which themselves did not respond in the survey).  
Survey: Sept.-Oct. 2005. 
More than 4 TC-managers mentioned the telecottage as their connection   (5) 
3-4 TC-managers referred to the telecottage as their connection     (8) 
1-2 references         (30) 
There is no telecottage in the municipality, or it was not mentioned at all (213) 
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Figure 40. Telecottages in the Southern Great Plain Region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Own photos, 2004/2005). 
1. Telecottage combined with the village library, cultural centre, and the club for the elderly in Kamut (civil org.); 
2. telecottage in the municipal library and cultural centre in Algyő (local gov.); 3. telecottage specialised in EU 
information for farmers in Ruzsa (civil association supported by the local government), and 4. a very active 
telecottage on the Serbian border in Röszke (civil organisation with the local gov. and cable TV company among 
the members, building provided in school-yard by the local gov.). In the centre: a lonely farmstead near Ruzsa, 
Csongrád County. 
1 
2 
4
3 
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Many positive and fewer negative 
examples can be found for all three kinds. 
Of course, most of the telecottages are 
hybrids (e.g. public-civil) or transforming 
from one to the other to keep the telecottage 
relevant amidst the changing circumstances 
and the arising new opportunities. 
Continuity is a very important factor in 
sustainability, especially in terms of the 
human  element  and   local   embeddedness.  
 
 
 
 
This is observable for instance in the 
problems caused by frequently changing 
staff and managers, which most often has 
been the outcome of the lack of money, and 
in fewer cases, of political and other 
personal conflicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41. Inside and outside the telecottage in Kondoros, Békés County, SGP Region 
 
Kondoros:  
 telecottage 
by a civil 
organisation 
(Own  photos, 2005). 
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Information from the survey and 
the interviews also suggested that those 
telecottages which have managed to keep up 
their work in their municipalities for a 
longer time (more than 4 years), and have 
established a distinctive profile for 
themselves, specialized in something are 
also the ones which network with more 
telecottages in the region and beyond, even 
across the national border. They have earned 
a good reputation, much respect, and many 
friends within the national organisation; and 
several  younger  telecentres have  relied  on 
 
 
them for advice, technical help, and 
cooperation. These few important ‘nodes’ in 
the region have a significant associational 
power both bonding within their own village 
or small town, and bridging their localities 
via other telecottages to neighbouring and 
more distant regions (see Figure 38). It is 
important to note that their managing-
operating organisation is dominantly civil or 
hybrid: working in close cooperation with 
other private and public entities, and are 
supported by the local government in form 
of a salary or a building (e.g. in Röszke).  
 
Figure 42. 7Határ Teleház and Studio Ltd. in Mártély, Csongrád County 
 
 
 
 
szobeszed.7hatar.hu/ 
web.radionews.hu:8016 
Mártély 7Határ Teleház 
(Sources: own photos from 2004; photos from 2006 provided by 7Határ, Ltd.; 
Telecottage local radio website) 
From top left to bottom right: Mártély, Fő utca (main street) where the telecottage is located (2004); 
local youth learning to make film with the help of the telecottage (2006); the manager (2004-), and the 
founders of the telecottage  (and Studio Kft.) in front of the Teleház created in an old traditional village 
(2004); three photos of the studio and the common room of the telecottage (2006); Studio Kft 
interviewing Mr Gáspár, HTA head in Budapest (2004); picture from the website giving access to the 
local Szóbeszed (~ ‘tittle-tattle’) radio produced in the telecottage with daily live broadcasting. 
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Kondoros teleház (Figure 40) cooperates 
with over a dozen civil groups, and although 
does not own the latest technology, it offers 
social space made attractively furnished 
with local cultural treasures. Among the 
major nodes that were detected by the 
survey, the telecottage in Mártély is the only 
to be owned by a private company; however, 
it also fulfils many civil functions.  
The survey found only a looser set 
of relationships horizontally, and a few 
important and popular telecottages as major 
nodes of information and knowledge flows 
instead of a strong and inclusive network of 
telecentres across the region. However, it 
seems based on the above, that the viability 
of telecottages is linked with their ability to 
cooperate with a diversity of partners within 
and outside their localities. The frequency of 
(net)working with other telecentres in and 
beyond their region is also connected to 
their longer term sustainability. This last 
observation is most likely to be supported by 
the last case study in this dissertation, since 
one of the actors involved in it is Mártély 
7határ Teleház, the multimedia telecottage 
(see photos in Figure 41 above). 
 
 
5.4 Cooperation across space and 
cultures for a local solution 149 
 
“Tell me and I'll forget. Show me and I'll remember. 
Involve me and I'll understand.” 
Confucius 
 
5.4.1 Introduction: research ideals and 
approaches 
 
The following study is an extension 
of the previous sections in terms of its 
subject, as well as considering the shift in 
epistemological stance, methodology and 
style. It reports on the birth and evolution of 
cooperation between the Finnish and 
Hungarian local actors which are 
introduced above; their joint planning of an 
                                                 
149 This section is a revised version of the studies 
published in Finnish (Maaseudun Uusi Aika, 2006/3), 
and in Hungarian (ISTRI: Kutatási Jelentés 2005). 
innovative ICT application for the 
development of a set of rural municipalities 
in Hungary. It brings together on the one 
hand, the international / European 
dimensions of I.S. policies and values 
(Chapter 3), and on the other hand, local-
regional development (5.2 and 5.3) that 
comes from practices that have emerged in 
two distinct national contexts (Chapter 4). 
In fact, this last case study is an 
actual spin-off from doing research 
presented in 5.2-3. My work related to the 
bottom-up and civil involvement in 
developing I.S. was first characterised with a 
still more or less detached stance from the 
cases, and it was learning about the specific 
development projects in the two countries 
separately. Meanwhile, gradually, I was 
personally drawn closer to the objects of my 
research, to the point when I found myself 
connecting them. 
As indicated in 5.2-3 above, North 
Karelia and the rural settlements in the 
Hungarian countryside (including those in 
the Southern Great Plain) show similar 
symptoms, i.e. of rurality and under-
development, and a particular relationship 
between people and technological 
innovation. Consequently, the objectives and 
the tools of the Finnish and Hungarian 
solutions show a lot of similarities, too.  
Already while working on the 
North Karelian and SGP studies separately, 
interesting analogies and even some 
concrete linkages emerged between the two; 
there were some recurring stories which 
could not be a total coincidence. So, I put 
aside the data tables and maps for a time, 
and drew a blank sheet (or rather, opened a 
new .doc file, to be more authentic here.) I 
decided that I should give testimony to 
networks that have been at work; the 
information and communication webs of 
people and technology which somewhere 
and at different times have connected even 
the developments in Finland and Hungary. 
Furthermore, as this last case study 
shows, the spatial-economic settings of the 
two cases introduced in the above, are 
relevant also as the origins of the different 
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experiences of the cooperating partners. 
Again, spatial-cultural (geographical) 
contexts do matter.  
The similarities and especially, the 
differences come out more visibly when the 
two contexts meet in some way. They were 
given the possibility to come together 
directly by my field work in both regions. 
However, their cooperation was an outcome 
of several more, both human (social) and 
technological factors: the former especially, 
motivated, the later mainly facilitated it. 
I am able to write this account on 
the evolution of such networks after having 
acknowledged that I am a part of them - 
both in a technological and a social / human 
way. As a researcher in social sciences I 
have experienced that as soon as I leave my 
desk – or to be more accurate, already the 
instant I open a chat session or send e-mails 
out, I myself have an impact on the 
researched. Providing I am conscious of and 
responsible for this effect (which I hope and 
believe, I am) – I have an active role, 
function and position in the networks I 
study. Hence is this study also an 
experiment for me with a new approach, 
methods and ways of presenting my ideas. 
 Initially, the closest definition of 
my doings while connecting people and 
ideas was participant observation of 
processes using ethnographic methods. 
These represent a humanistic, interpretative 
manner instead of a positivist stance. Rather 
than testing hypotheses, participant 
observation and ethnographic research 
examine few examples or just one case, and 
place emphasis on exploring the characters 
of individual social phenomena. They 
typically use unstructured data, and 
explicitly interpret them in terms of the 
meanings and functions of human actions, 
presenting results primarily by means of 
verbal description and justification.  
(Denzin – Lincoln, 248-9.)   
The most recent phase of my 
involvement with the Finnish and Hungarian 
local ICT-developers’ work resembles to an 
embryonic form of participatory action 
research (PAR), as it matches the following 
of its main aspects. It is aware of its 
intervention in the context that it is working 
within. It “sets out to explicitly study 
something in order to change and improve 
it”, yet it may (as in my case) also be 
motivated by the experience of some 
successful solution, provoking a desire to 
reproduce or extend that practice. PAR has a 
double aim: 1) “to produce knowledge and 
action directly useful to a group of people”; 
and 2) “to empower people at a second and 
deeper level through the process of 
constructing and using their own 
knowledge” (e.g. consciousness-raising; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 327-28). Finally, PAR 
“is active co-research, by and for those to be 
helped”, “action which is researched, 
changed and re-researched, within the 
research process by participants” – and not 
just research that we hope will be pursued 
by action (Wadsworth 1998, my italics).  
This last instance is particularly 
true to the case in focus here because even 
in the course of its first planning phase, 
strategies and priorities of the joint project 
were several times re-considered by the 
partners while their knowledge was 
expanding and the circumstances were 
changing. 
Finally, I am able to give an insight 
of I.S. at work because I have had the 
possibility to meet and get inspired by, a 
range of interesting and committed people in 
both Finland and Hungary. I try and mention 
most of them in the following pages, also in 
acknowledgement of, and encouragement to 
their work and in appreciation of the 
assistance they have given me.  
 
 
5.4.3 The story of cooperation 
Mártély “meeting”  Nurmes,  and Nurmes 
seeing Mártély 
 
As I mentioned in 5.1, the interviews 
with the intranet-developers and the 
telecottage activists in 2003-04 were all 
rather unstructured, and the way of selecting 
the targets was basically a snow-ball 
method, while following the lines of the 
  
 
145
stories I heard. In Finland, I started by 
consulting researchers who knew a lot about 
the kansalaisverkko development and its 
general background, and who could direct 
me to people at the Regional Council and in 
the Oppiva Pohjois Karjala projects. 
Therefore, very soon I could meet some key 
personalities of both national-regional and 
local significance. They shared with me 
their, at many points interconnected, stories 
and their more general ideas concerning 
people and technology in the Finnish 
countryside. Besides, occasionally they 
asked me whether I knew of any comparable 
initiatives from my native country. In 
response, I told them what I then knew 
about the Hungarian-style telecentres. 
I had truly a positive experience in 
Finland, therefore I was encouraged to 
follow the same technique and find the main 
figures of the teleház movement in Hungary. 
I had known about the existence of 
telecottages for years, and had visited one of 
them about seven years before. Emboldened 
after some consultation with sociologists 
working on the I.S. field in Budapest, I 
began my search by sending an e-mail 
straight to the founder of the first teleház 
and leader of the Association, explained him 
about my interest, and asked him for an 
interview. I was very pleased by his prompt 
reply, and also because the meeting turned 
out to be an exciting discussion rather than a 
one-sided interrogation. Soon I got the 
privilege of participating in official meetings 
of the telecottage organisation, to be present 
even when important decisions were 
negotiated. Besides, Mr Gáspár invited me 
to another, less official meeting where I 
could have a lot of informal and more 
relaxed conversation with telecottage 
activists and supportive mayors from all 
over Hungary. 
This occasion was in fact, a ‘post-
new-years’ party’ held in January 2004, but 
convened also to talk about the future of the 
movement. It was hosted by the tiny south-
western village of Alsómocsolád (358 
inhabitants, 2004) the mayor of which is a 
prominent supporter of the movement. He 
and the local teleház-manager seemed to 
know and even be friends with several other 
activists from the whole country. Two 
telecottagers, Árpád Csernai and Anita 
Hegedűs from Mártély in the Southern Great 
Plain Region, were also among those who 
heartily accepted the invitation, despite the 
long drive amidst snowdrifts. They showed 
much interest in my work and life in 
Finland, this “little-known country in the 
distant north”. Soon, after the more serious 
part of the meeting had been concluded, and 
at just about the time when the atmosphere 
started to get quite casual, they appeared 
with a camera and a dictaphone. I realised 
that I had been picked as a fresh ‘topic’ by 
two professional journalists. The interview 
was soon after published in one of the 
electronic forums they edit and manage, 
Teleház Magazin (see the link in the 
References), with the title referring to 
Finland as “The land of virtual 
telecottages.” 
The party over, I needed to return to 
the capital city, which was quite a challenge 
after midnight from this tiny back-of-beyond 
place. The drive home was long enough on 
the icy roads for some more friendly chat. 
So, I could found out more about the special 
orientation of their teleház in Mártély, i.e. 
that it is also the official media centre of the 
Hungarian Telecottage Association, and that 
Árpád had been for years one of the seven 
regional representatives of the HTA board 
(naturally, of the SGP). What is more, I was 
offered the unique opportunity to join their 
film-making team in their tour around 
telecottages later that month, when I could 
conduct some interviews myself as well as 
could get access to their recorded material.  
The documentary tour included 
several telecentres in the SGP region, and 
also reached across the southern border to 
some teledomovi in Voivodina, Serbia  
(where Árpád was originally from). During 
these days I was also telling the Mártély 
telecottagers about my work, and the North 
Karelian community intranet and its 
Nurmes-based inventor. Then already, I 
sensed their interest and openness from the 
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questions they put to me. Soon after I 
returned to Finland, at their request, I 
connected them to Mr Koskikallio via e-
mails and chat sessions.  
Mártélyi Teleház saw a possibility 
to extend the life-span and modernize the 
activities of their telecottage preparing it for 
the times when people even in rural 
Hungary can have fast internet connections 
in their homes. Furthermore, they 
recognised the strengths of the intranet as a 
tool to modernise and integrate their already 
working platforms – the local and regional 
portals, the on-line magazine they edit, the 
local radio they operate, and the 
documentary movies they make and publish, 
for instance. They also considered a possible 
documentary tour to North Karelia as a way 
to obtain new filming material, which, 
Mártély telecottage being a private 
enterprise, was an important motivating 
factor, too. 
Similarly, the Finnish partner saw a 
business opportunity and an interesting 
challenge in cooperating with Mártély, and 
was also convinced of the appropriateness of 
the timing for introducing the community 
intranet concept in Hungary. Certainly, the 
shared problems of rurality and the basic 
common approach in solving them (i.e. the 
ICT-orientation; dealing with all levels of 
access simultaneously, and tailoring the 
solutions to local community needs, etc.) 
provided a solid ground for co-operation. 
 
The initial joint plans 
 
During the different phases of 
planning the hybrid application, 
communication has been dominated by e-
mails and chat sessions, sometimes having 
both, or rather all three, cooperating partners 
on-line simultaneously (since I increasingly 
considered myself as a partner, too). This is 
not surprising considering that I myself was 
living in Joensuu, the urban centre of North 
Karelia, the intranet-innovator was working 
in the distant municipality of Nurmes, and 
Mártély is situated some 2000 km away 
from both of these places. It is therefore no 
wonder that the personal technical skills and 
the easy physical access to ICTs have been a 
crucial condition to all parties involved. 
Several interesting issues have 
come up; some were related more to ICTs 
(see Box 14); while some – even more 
intricate ones – were concerning national 
and local policy and political issues and 
mismatches of different nature: financial 
asymmetries, unfamiliarity with each other’s 
ways of thinking, the different cultural 
settings, bureaucracies and mentalities. Yet 
probably the greatest problem for me, and I 
assume, for the whole cooperation, was a 
more straightforward one: the lack of a 
common language (in its literal meaning), 
and hence an over-dependence on my 
person as a mediator. 
The peak of the cooperation was in 
the summer of 2004 when the Finnish 
partner travelled to Hungary (for an 
international conference organised by Eris@ 
in Budapest; see 3.3.1). After the event, and 
then a short meeting with the head of HTA, 
Mr Koskikallio visited Mártély and its 
neighbourhood for a couple of days, where 
he could meet the local partners face-to-face 
and experience some of the good and the not 
so good sides of the ‘rural Hungarian 
realities’. These later aspects however, were 
not discouraging the least, rather the 
opposite: there were problems to solve, an 
interesting challenge. A concrete project 
plan was drafted within a few weeks 
including a visit and training seminar in 
Finland. The types and the combination of 
network infrastructure were considered 
which could be the most suitable for the 
region’s settlement pattern and social 
composition; the means of setting up the 
intranet kiosks in Mártély and its sparsely 
populated   outlying   areas  were  discussed,  
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The initial idea of the hybrid solution was a simple one:  
 
1. Using the already existing ICT- and knowledge-assets of Mártély Teleház, similar training 
seminars can be organised first with the involvement of Finnish expertise, later through local 
teachers. 
2. Additional free intranet-points could be set up using older PCs in and around the village.  
3. The software licence used by the NK kansalaisverkko (after translating it into Hungarian), the 
network-maintenance and management services by Glocal Ltd. and the server machine located 
in Nurmes can be hired by the local community for a rather low yearly charge per user. 
4. The content of the community intranet should be then shaped locally with the involvement of all 
sectors, in which the experiences of the Finnish partner can be used, too. 
 
Having these so established, the issue of the locally used network technology rose: what is the best 
choice in the case of this community for the provision of data flow at a sufficient speed/quality, at a 
reasonable cost?  
 
Are there local Internet-providers to make a partnership with? Should there be a single network 
solution, or rather a combination of the most suitable ones? Should Mártély wait for the national 
intervention, i.e. ADSL to reach every single locality in the country within 1-2 (?) years, or rather take 
measures on its own in advance to gain some competitive advantage in time as compared to other 
localities in the region?  
 
What is sufficient speed of Internet access in the case of a community which is just learning to use ICTs 
and an intranet to access regional services, information and realise their individual and common goals? 
Should a fixed telephone line and modem based solution be enough, or would it mean very soon a 
drawback as it will found the grounds of a new digital gap, that is the ‘broadband gap’ between Mártély 
and other settlements? Maybe xDSL-based or other forms of broadband is a necessity only in ‘hot 
spots’ of the village, like the Teleház, the free Internet kiosks, the school, the local authorities, and the 
Civil Ház (a centre for the local civil society), while household terminals could connect up to the local 
server(s) with their telephone lines.  
 
Cable TV, on the other hand seems to be a perfect solution in the case of Mártély, and it does indeed 
allow for faster data flow: the Teleház managers understand that local people are much more willing to 
support the installation of cable TV, and in the more compactly settled (old and new) parts of Mártély it 
is a feasible technology. The village is expected to have its sewage system constructed in the very near 
future, why not use the ditches at the same time to lay these cables? Would that be a technologically 
sound solution, though? (Or should there be separate ditches dug for the cables?) Still, in the later case 
it would save some costs (reducing engineering costs) if the two constructions happen simultaneously. 
How about the households/farms situated in a scattered way in the outlying area? For them, microwave 
technology could be the network technology that makes sense.  … 
Box 14. Planning the community intranet in Mártély: questions related (not only) to 
network infrastructure.  
  
 
148
and the initial terms of the contract between 
Glocal Ltd. and Mártély 7Határ Teleház and 
Studió Ltd. were established.  
To be able to get the project 
actually started, the telecottagers began 
fund-hunting with the jointly prepared 
documents in their locality (yet with little 
hope for more than moral support from their 
community), as well as by responding to 
national tenders that matched any 
components of the project: developing the 
technological infrastructure, training, or 
introducing ‘e-governance’. They kept on 
trying during the next ten months or so. The 
lack of capital in Mártély to cover the ‘own 
share’ of the total budget was a crucial 
problem, but it was overcome by different 
combinations of resources from local 
enterprises, including 7Határ Studió itself, 
and some support from the local 
government. However, their applications 
failed one after the other, and the partners 
had some lengthy pauses in their interaction, 
due to being busy with other projects and 
losing hope. 
The last attempt at getting funding 
was made in early 2006, this time, from the 
European Union. In fact, it was I who had 
come across the tender on-line on a 
computer in Mártély telecottage, a few days 
before my return to Finland. The partner in 
Nurmes was informed in an e-mail right 
away, and communication gained some 
impetus again. In Finland, we drafted an 
improved project proposal with Mr 
Koskikallio, communicating via the Internet 
with Mártély as well as a third, French 
partner (see excerpts from the project 
proposal in Box 15). 
This time, the community intranet 
project plan was adjusted to fit the European 
Union’s town-twinning initiative. The 
participation of Nurmes in Finland, Mártély 
and its neighbourhood in Hungary, and 
Privas, a small town in Rhône-Alps region 
in France meant that municipalities from 
three EU member states of different age 
(and therefore, different experience of the 
European regime and identity) were drawn 
together. Mártély had much fewer residents 
(1,300) than the other two municipalities 
(towns of ca. 9,000 and 10,000 people), but 
it was seen as a potential node that would 
bring into the project some other villages 
near it with telecentres (which, based on the 
survey I report on in 5.3.3, was a rational 
anticipation).  
It is obvious, that the technologies 
to be used and the emphases of the initial 
project idea had to be slightly updated and 
adjusted to the requirements of the funding 
organisation (the Directorate General 
Education and Culture of the European 
Commission). First of all, this time more 
significant financial commitment was 
required on the part of the three municipal 
governments. Second, the production of 
content was more emphasized than the 
actual technological solutions. The ultimate 
aim was to generate discussions and learning 
between these actors in the three 
municipalities about local identity, 
‘Europeanness’, and networking; in this, the 
intranet was the innovative tool besides 
other, traditional practices in town-twinning. 
Beyond their local tasks each partner had to 
fulfil, a very fitting division of labour among 
the partners was defined. In short, Nurmes 
was responsible for the ICT infrastructure 
supporting the intranet, further adjusting the 
system to the needs of the virtual agora, and 
was put in charge of the related 
technological training and maintenance. 
Mártély was to document and disseminate 
the achievements of the project as a good 
practice (via EUTA, for instance) and ensure 
innovative convergence of different media 
via the Internet; and the French partner was 
given the task of developing content around 
the theme of local and European identities.  
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Call for Proposal DG EAC No. 24/05 
 ‘Promotion of active European citizenship’ – Support to town twinning actions: Conferences, training 
seminars and information campaigns  
 “To involve citizens closely in reflection and discussion on the construction of the European Union; 
To intensify links and exchanges between citizens from the countries participating in the programme; 
To promote and disseminate the values and objectives of the European Union…” 
 
“The general aim of the project is to strengthen and consolidate the cooperation between three 
municipalities / regions in three different member states of the European Union. This we wish to achieve 
with the help of new information and communication technologies that suit the purposes of the town-
twinning movement in Europe. This relatively micro-scale experiment, if successful could serve as a best-
practice model for other municipalities in Europe. 
 
In spite of the many differences between our regions, we do face very similar kinds of challenges in the 
near future. We all are rather remote/peripheral regions with many common problems - and we all share 
the common strong belief in future. We are also convinced that with our common efforts for a better 
future, we are able to give our modest contribution in coming up to the new challenges the whole EU is 
facing at present. 
 
In the present situation, it is very important to create new cost-effective means, media and channels for 
inclusive cross-cultural dialogue between geographically distant communities. This can bring the (local, 
national and trans-national) decision processes nearer to "grass-roots level citizens". 
 
The main aim of the project is to create a new tool for cooperation between regions, and European citizens 
which complements traditional ways of communication. During the project we will create a common 
Intranet-system for the three participating municipalities, and with the help of common meetings and 
seminars we will teach and train the ways to utilize this new media for deepening communication and 
cooperation between them, and their citizens. The aim is to create a "virtual agora" open to every citizen 
in these municipalities. With the active participation of these citizens the shape, looks, content of this 
virtual agora will be shaped according to the users’ tastes and needs. 
 
With the Virtual Agora project… 
 
o …we want to create a functioning model for the new kind of international cooperation between 
regions. We can create a ground for cooperation between different sectors and actors (schools, 
cultural organisations, local administration, different social, age and interest groups, etc.) During 
the project we will recruit and educate officials and members of different civic organisations to 
utilize the possibilities of the Intranet-system, so that the maximum benefit can be achieved. 
o …we want to prove that the diversity of localities across Europe is a strength rather than causing 
inefficiencies and conflicts: if the right means and channels of communication are implemented, 
the people are able to find a common voice and work fruitfully together.  
o …we wish to spread our knowledge and experience to other regions with similar kind of 
problems and challenges. We also hope that working together we could further develop our 
model and make it even more effective. Our aim is to document both the pros and cons of our 
experiment. We really hope that this documentation can create a good "best practice" to adopt and 
adapt by other municipalities/regions. We are also prepared to give a detailed and interesting 
account of the main phases of the project in the form of a documentary movie (the Hungarian 
partner is responsible for that part of the dissemination work). We are also prepared to invite 
representatives from our neighbouring municipalities to the project conferences and training 
sessions. That is an important part of the dissemination process of our experiences. 
Box 15. Excerpts from the project proposal ‘Virtual Agora’, 2005 (Source: documents from 
Glocal Ltd.) 
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Unfortunately, in early 2006, this 
application sent in the first round was turned 
down. What is more, the publication of the 
decision on the EU website, was late (which 
fault was admitted also by the responsible 
authorities), so much that it was several days 
after the final deadline set for the second 
round of applications. Having missed the 
last opportunity that year, all partners gave 
up, and stopped planning altogether. Mártély 
was little willing to start negotiations about 
related financial issues with their local 
government (local elections were during the 
autumn of 2006). Glocal Ltd. started 
focussing more on the developing countries 
in marketing their intranet idea, sensing that 
2006 was probably the last year when it 
could still hold some relevance in Eastern-
Central Europe. 
 
 
5.5 Summary  
 
5.5.1 Summary in terms of digital divides 
and inequalities in access 
 
a) “Are the long-standing centre-periphery 
relations, the urban-rural divides 
reproduced in course of the diffusion of 
ICTs and their valuable applications?” 
 
In general, regions with a lower 
density of population and enterprises in 
Finland lag behind the national averages 
concerning especially the availability and 
diffusion of higher-tier ICT infrastructures, 
and applications for growth-oriented 
strategic economic activities. The location of 
the IT industrial cluster and R&D activities, 
the spatial patterns in ICT roll-out and 
investments by network service providers 
favour the core areas and urban centres in 
Finland as opposed to the areas in semi-
peripheries and distant rural regions. 
Besides, general social and economic 
inequalities that relate to the levels of I.S. 
readiness (mental access), intensity (usage) 
and impact (content, utility) variables show 
a similar territorial pattern (however, not as 
divergent as in the case of, for instance 
Hungary.) 
Although the networking insti-
tutions of the Finnish innovation system 
have several benefits to the overall national 
performance, and have achieved in some 
ways a relatively even web of institutions 
across the land (e.g. universities and science 
parks), they are less efficient in addressing 
the problem of distant rural regions and 
semi-peripheral areas. Some negative bias is 
built into the logic of R&D funding towards 
regions with less IT-oriented and more 
traditional economic profiles: for the sake of 
national efficiency and growth, state 
endowments concentrate more on those 
sectors and regions where private funds are 
already significant and increasing.  
In the case of Hungary, a series of 
evidence is given above to show how old 
spatial structures are being reproduced in the 
diffusion of ICTs (despite the fact that the 
indicators used do not show the demand 
side). It is observable nevertheless, that in 
recent years the macro-regional differences 
have decreased while the finer grained 
spatial inequalities between urban and rural 
municipalities and sub-regions have become 
more prominent – for the same reasons as 
explained above in relation to Finland (and 
internationally: see 3.3.4).  
 
 
5.5.2 Summary in terms of different spatial 
and political scales 
 
b) “What interactions have been in the 
Finnish and Hungarian local cases between 
the bottom-up initiatives and the top-down 
policies of the national actors?” 
 
In terms of spatial and regional 
development in the ‘information age’, even 
in a highly equal society as Finland, 
peripheral and rural areas deserve some 
special care. Yet this does not necessary 
have to be in the form of direct subsidies for 
ICT infrastructure – which, as a matter of 
fact, is an alien idea to current global (and 
European) trends in flexible restructuring 
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and political processes. Although in their 
case, physical access to the networks can be 
achieved at generally lower standards than 
in urban areas, they are not doomed to be 
losers.  
In Finland, appropriate and original 
responses have been given to these 
challenges by local and regional initiatives, 
such as the North Karelian I.S. strategy, its 
extension to the region of Eastern Finland, 
and one of its local ‘offsprings’, the 
Learning N. Karelia community intranet. 
These, on the other hand were well-received 
and helpfully reacted to by the national 
authorities.150 In my view, this 
complementariness has been due to the 
coexistence of a clear national commitment, 
of the Finnish ‘cluster policy’, the public-
private partnerships between administration, 
research and business, the favourable 
national and European funding possibilities, 
the creativity of some individuals and their 
ability to trust in their regional and national 
governments and their bureaucratic 
procedures. 
All these make Finland obviously 
more successful in developing an inclusive 
I.S. than most of the other European states, 
more-than-basic infrastructure is available 
across the whole national territory and 
content-development has been promoted in a 
conscious way both from top-down, and 
bottom-up. 
As regards the Hungarian cases, 
again, a slower evolution of cooperation can 
be traced from the mid-nineties between the 
state and the ‘grass-roots’ in terms of I.S. 
development (and in general). The first 
telecottages were created by local 
individuals for their communities to be that 
‘new active component’ or ‘dynamic factor’ 
offered by the emerging information age, 
which pulls their villages out from their 
distressed situations. Besides, they tried to 
provide for missing public services and 
infrastructure, those which the state could 
not supply. Initially, much effort from below 
was necessary, to raise public awareness and 
                                                 
150 See also the relevant conclusion (answer to the 
question ‘c’) in 4.4. 
recognition by the Government of their 
achievements. This caused a delay of some 
4-5 years in truly harnessing the potential in 
these local institutions (which is a 
considerable length of time considering the 
technological nature of these innovations). 
Finally, in the late nineties, the cooperation 
between the civil and private sectors, some 
help from the State, as well as to a rather 
significant sum of foreign donation could 
allow telecottages to start mushrooming 
throughout Hungary. The Government’s 
ambition to comply with the European 
guidelines concerning PIAPs gave an extra 
impetus to work together with the civil 
movement, acknowledge and relying on 
their accumulated know-how about 
efficiently integrating ICTs in the life of 
rural communities. 
 
 
5.5.3 Summary in terms of socio-
technological networks 
 
c) “How can these actors handle the task of 
improving access to ICTs and utilise their 
benefits for local / regional development?” 
 
The ‘three pillars’ of the Finnish 
community intranet project and the mission 
of the Hungarian telecottages have a lot in 
common on the subject of this question: 
 
1 They use both the modern 
technologies and the real (teleház) or virtual 
(kansalaisverkko) community spaces, as one 
another’s ‘hook’, or motivation. On the one 
hand, they attract people with technologies 
to participate in the community and connect 
to resources outside it. On the other hand, 
they manage to draw people closer to these 
technologies by satisfying them in their 
needs for self-expression, socialisation, and 
exchange of ideas, learning, leisure and 
entertainment.  
2 Therefore, in their respective 
cultural settings and technological 
circumstances, both ‘projects’ have a great 
potential in raising trust in their 
communities in ICTs, in services, and last 
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but not least, their institutions. Trust – and 
social capital – is both an important 
condition for and product of, their 
networking. 
3 Also as a consequence (of no. 1), 
tool and the purposes invisibly merge; and 
usage is increasing both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. The latter is visible in the 
achievements of both the intranet and the 
telecottages, in the creation of locally and 
regionally relevant content as well as in 
intensive networking.  
4 Networking is innate to both 
innovations. This is not merely the direct 
outcome of employing ICTs in their 
practices, though they help as a (relatively 
inexpensive and to their geographical 
conditions, well-suited) tool. The fact that 
both ‘projects’ had to recruit and keep up the 
interest of different local (i.e. public, private 
and civil) parties, regional actors, and 
national stake-holders is one of the reasons 
for their tendency to connect actors 
horizontally and vertically. Also, their 
‘learning by doing’ practices make them 
open to external information and actors. 
Their eagerness to share their success – out 
of pride and / or for profit (for the survival 
and up-grading of their innovation) – 
encourages them to join already existing 
networks (the Karelian project becoming a 
member of Eris@), or create and extend 
their own (HTA, SGP Telecottage Region, 
EUTA in the Hungarian example). Also, 
their ‘learning by doing’ practices make 
them open to external information and 
actors.  
5 The example of Nurmes and 
Mártély trying to work together shows this 
latter instance clearly; and the fact that they 
could not achieve their goal does not mean 
that other similar efforts could not be 
successful. However, some of the 
asymmetries which caused a problem in 
their cooperation could be attributed to the 
fact that these two partners had not shared a 
single network of local I.S. innovations. 
More concretely, for instance, Mártély 
Teleház had not been aware of the existence 
of the European IANIS / Eris@ or RISI 
initiatives, and the opportunities these could 
have offered, while the Finnish project 
leader could not entirely understand the 
actual scope of the telecottage movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
153
6. Conclusions 
 
 
Figure 43. Unraveling the main and sub-research questions organised along the main concepts 
of access, actors and scales, and networks.  
 
 
6.1 Answers to the main research 
questions 
 
As I indicate in Figure 43 above 
(expanded from Figure 5), the questions I 
answer at the end of each empirical chapter 
serve to find answers to the four initial main 
research questions (RQs). The first three 
RQs take access, scales / actors, and 
network as their respective foci of 
perspective, and the combination of the 
findings from Chapter 3 (international 
cases), Chapter 4 (the national case studies) 
and Chapter 5 (investigations on the sub-
national level) help answering their 
interrogatives.  Finding the answer to RQ 4 
on the other hand, is less straightforward in 
this regard. Though it is concerned with I.S. 
development by national actors, and 
therefore relies mostly on sub-questions 4A 
and 4B, it incorporates a lot of other issues, 
too.  
 
RQ1 What are the factors behind the 
differentiation in access, the emergence of 
digital divides concerning the rural 
peripheries of developed countries? 
 
Access is a rich concept in the 
interpretation put forward in this 
dissertation. It is proposed that access needs 
to be understood as a combination of 
physical-infrastructural, financial-economic, 
and educational-cultural (mental), as well as 
content related elements. These are the 
general aspects of an individual’s (or a 
household’s, a business’s) access to 
information, knowledge, communication, 
and learning; and ultimately, to the benefits 
of the emerging I.S. In the empirical studies 
above, much evidence is found for the 
emergence of urban-rural (centre-periphery) 
digital divides of different extent in the 
countries of Europe, and more specifically, 
within Finland and Hungary.  
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Figure 44. Conclusions from the case studies: problems with access to ICTs in rural-peripheral 
areas and small rural communities. (Arrows indicate influence.) 
 
The growing concern with spatial 
developments on the UN and EU agendas, 
the results from the surveys with national 
public and private actors, as well as my 
interviews and personal observations about 
local and regional initiatives in the past one 
and a half decades, verify the preliminary 
assumption that rural-peripheral regions 
and communities are in a distinguished and 
vulnerable position in emerging information 
societies. Figure 44 below gives an 
overview of the main factors identified 
(expanded from Figure 2).  
The first observation is that rural-
peripheral areas in Finland and Hungary 
(and in other European countries in general),  
 
 
 
have been less attractive for telecom 
infrastructural investments, and are usually 
the regions where the state-of-the-art ICTs 
become potentially available only with a 
considerable delay relative to core regions 
and urban centres. The only exception to this 
has been the spatial diffusion of the use of 
mobile telephones. There is strong evidence 
that telecommunications companies (esp. 
those which construct the network 
infrastructure) go first to places dense with 
population, businesses and other 
information-intensive activities (education, 
research, administration) to ensure their 
profit; and so rural areas are supplied with 
these technologies only subsequently, if at 
all. 
(un)motivating use 
Human capital 
• Lower educational  
    and e-literacy levels; 
• aging population;  
• less experience / 
confidence with innovative 
technologies; 
• lower (English) language 
skills. 
             Special need for 
• Locally relevant & 
produced content; 
• user-friendly & affordable 
services; 
• easy adaptability to  
changing needs; 
• aid for participative 
community development. 
 
 
 
Lower income levels 
+ 
Higher prices 
Sparsely populated regions, 
with greater distances from 
centres: 
• Lower (perceived and/or 
actual) profitability;  
• technical constraints;  
• less variety of ICT available; 
• fewer service providers 
in the market. 
“There is no connection
available where I live”.  “It is too expensive for me.” 
“There is nothing interesting 
to find there.” 
“I don’t understand it.  
I don’t know how to use it.” 
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Second, households in rural-
peripheral regions do not represent an 
affluent and motivated demand for higher-
level telecommunications services; and this 
is because they have generally lower income 
levels and a more aging demographic 
structure. This weak (actual and perceived) 
demand results also in low levels of 
competition between service providers in 
these regions, which in turn, leads to higher 
prices. This was the situation in North 
Karelia in the late-nineties, and is definitely 
valid to the small village communities in 
Hungary. Consequently, even if connections 
are in place technically, without intervention 
(special motivating programmes and 
subsidies) the numbers of subscriptions for 
Internet will stay low in these regions.  
In this regard, advanced 
information societies have achieved 
relatively more, partly because the diffusion 
of ICTs have been going on for a longer 
period of time making society more 
responsive and technological adoption 
cycles more rapid (as the case of the Nordic 
countries shows). However, even in Finland, 
territorial disparities, the urban-rural digital 
divides do exist.  
A third and very important claim is 
that being motivated to use Internet (or even 
subscribe for it at home) is a crucial factor in 
the cost vs. benefit dilemma (i.e. the choice 
influenced by tariffs and income levels is a 
value-based decision). Inherent to the 
demand side, motivation comes from the 
group of features I summed up in the notion 
of ‘mental access’. Several of the cases 
presented in this dissertation underline that 
these include not only the basic and more 
specific ICT-skills (e-literacy), but the more 
general affinity and some attitudinal features 
(openness, curiosity) towards technological 
innovations, and importantly, towards 
foreign  languages (especially English).  
Further motivation elements, which 
are closer to the supply side, include aspects 
such as the user-friendliness of ICTs and the 
richness and relevance to the actual needs, 
of the provided services and on-line content. 
Of course, inter-linkages exist here as well. 
The perception of the benefits from usage 
depends also on the potential user’s mind-
frame, i.e. both skills and attitudes. Also, 
more sophisticated and higher-value content 
necessitates more skills on the user’s side; 
and better-skilled users are able to modify 
and create content (e.g. websites, blogs, etc.) 
themselves for their own or their 
communities’ purposes. On the other hand, 
the availability of a diverse and useful 
content contributes to the improvement of e-
literacy among the population. Evidence for 
this is provided in this dissertation in the 
example of the continuously expanding and 
diversifying list of telecottage functions on 
the one hand, and by the fact that the general 
users of the intranet in North Karelia have 
gradually grown more-or-less over-skilled 
compared to the relative simplicity of the 
original intranet content.  
Peripheral regions and small rural 
communities meet challenges in all the 
mentioned regards. The fact (and the 
consequences) of the out-migration of the 
young and the higher-skilled poses a major 
problem to both Eastern Finland and the 
villages in the Hungarian peripheries. 
Having to support an already very dispersed 
and sparse population, infrastructures are 
increasingly difficult to keep up in rural 
Finland; and with the political-economic 
transition, many of the small local 
governments have had to face financial 
crisis in Hungary, where schools and other 
basic services had to be ‘rationalised’ over a 
short period of time. The amenities that keep 
the active-age population in place and 
encourage local entrepreneurship, the 
services that support the improvement of all 
kinds of (financial, human and social) 
capital, also include telecommunication and 
information infrastructures; hence the 
vicious circle of missing access components 
is established in these regions. 
The digital divide(s) between 
centres and peripheries, between rural 
communities and towns exist because of the 
mentioned causes and their mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms. Intervention is 
necessary in the affected regions of Finland 
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and Hungary. The next logical question 
concerns on what level and what kind of 
intervention is required in these mechanisms 
in order to ignite positive tendencies. 
RQ 2 What are the suitable points of 
intervention to help resolve digital divides? 
What are the different actors’ roles and 
responsibilities at a) the international or 
European, b) the national and c) the 
regional/local levels in order to achieve a 
spatially more inclusive I.S.?  
The Finnish and Hungarian national 
developments (programmes and strategic 
plans), as well as the initiatives taken by the 
Regional Council of North Karelia, the 
community intranet project launched from 
Nurmes, and the approach taken up by the 
Hungarian Telecottage Association, all 
indicate that combining and harmonising 
investments into the different components of 
access is the key to successful intervention. 
 In these terms, there is no single 
ideal point of intervention providing that the 
basic physical infrastructure (e.g. telephone 
connections suitable for Internet access in 
the Hungarian countryside and in North 
Karelia) have already been established. 
Securing competition and affordable prices 
of services (via both market liberalisation 
and national regulation); improving and 
motivating demand by developing the 
‘mental’ factors (e.g. through general public 
education and particularly targeted training 
in ICT skills); and the creation of content by 
many partners, are the most productive if are 
co-ordinated and simultaneously attended to. 
The ‘pseudo-quotes’ (representing 
general reasoning and attitudes) and the 
arrows connecting the different aspects are 
included in Figure 44 above to emphasize 
the fact that individual perceptions, beliefs 
play an important part in the decisions about 
whether to purchase, subscribe to, and use 
ICTs or not. There are many different 
objective and subjective factors behind the 
reasons for (not) doing so, and 
understanding their mechanisms is crucial 
for efficient intervention. 
Controlling these mechanisms and 
underlying cycles is in no way simple, but 
that also means that the interactions between 
the several aspects of access to technologies, 
information and learning provide many 
points for intervention in disadvantaged 
regions. Depending on the individual 
context, policies and actions may aim at the 
following: 
1 The provision of basic 
infrastructure and network services is a 
logical precondition to further development: 
making them both available and relatively 
affordable for the target population is a 
challenge in peripheral and thinly populated 
regions. Subsidies for service providers, tax 
allowances for ICT purchases, creative low-
cost ICT solutions, and the establishment of 
public access points are suitable means. 
2 Relevant education, training and a 
good working example can open minds up to 
ICTs, and create interest and initiative in 
society: see for example, the national Sulinet 
Programme and the work by individual 
telecottages in Hungary and the community 
intranet project in North Karelia.  
3 From the first cycle of active users, 
pilot projects and their evaluation, actual 
social needs come to surface; and 
technologies, solutions and content may be 
further developed, and disseminated along 
those requirements. The Finnish examples of 
regular monitoring and assessment of 
programmes and pilot projects by 
governmental organisations, public R&D 
institutions, in close cooperation with IT 
companies (see the national innovation 
system in Finland), as well as the attempts at 
the adjustment of a best practice to fit other 
regions (OSKU) follow this line of thinking. 
In Hungary, the practices of monitoring, 
evaluation and revision of strategic I.S. 
objectives have existed since about the 
acceptance of the national I.S. strategy 
(2003), yet the required institutions and 
procedures are not efficient, and solutions to 
integrate feedback from consumers are 
scarce (besides, there is not yet a critical 
mass of users in many cases, to do so). 
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However, the monitoring and dissemination 
of the telecottage-practice in Hungary and 
beyond, too, helped by the nation-wide civil 
organisation of HTA, and more recently, 
through its institutionalisation by the state 
are positive examples. The European 
network of Eris@ and similar international 
forums facilitate these functions, as well. 
4 A good quality and quantity of 
content motivates usage further. Increased 
usage creates routine and confidence in 
services offered via ICTs, as well as in the 
authorities and organisations which provide 
them. The mechanism that offers a positive 
input into social and political confidence is 
(or should be) an especially relevant 
component in recent I.S. strategic thinking 
in Hungary. A great routine of usage has 
been achieved by and large in Finland in 
many fields of social and economic life, and 
it is matched by constant technological and 
service innovation.  
5 Then, widespread usage in fact, 
triggers a more stable and substantial 
demand for higher quality services and 
boosts up ICT markets and innovation. 
While this has been the case in Finland (and 
evidently, facilitated by the existence of an 
advanced IT cluster in the country), it is still 
more-or-less missing in Hungary in general. 
However, in certain technologies (mobile 
phones), and concerning certain target 
groups (e.g. the higher-skilled and young; 
and the active users of telecottages) similar 
tendencies may be observed in Hungary, 
too. 
Also as a consequence, digital 
literacy and interactivity in society is 
promoted in the long run, and in conjunction 
with technological development. The 
increased and more qualified demand and 
the feedback from users can help innovation 
and encourage further investment by the ICT 
sector (developers, infrastructure and service 
providers). More inclusive and better 
services, as well as a greater proportion 
(mass) of the population on-line both 
facilitate and necessitate more diverse 
content. The amount and quality of locally 
produced on-line information and services 
can therefore increase and content becomes 
more responsive to actual needs. This later 
brings an important benefit to the 
development of rural economies and local 
communities within a globalising world.  
Intervention can occur at any point 
in these cycles with the condition that it is 
not the only focus of attention, and 
providing that it is accompanied with due 
concern with other aspects of promoting 
access. However, the creation of basic 
facilities and the establishment of a first 
good working example require particularly 
more attention and financial support, since 
market forces alone, may not initiate them or 
respond to the early developments 
sufficiently, especially in peripheral regions, 
rural and sparsely populated areas. Also, this 
crucial step calls for cooperation between 
many actors both within and outside the 
particular region. So the second part of the 
question comes into focus: who should do 
what? The division of labour and 
responsibilities between spatial and political 
levels is complex. 
Though initiated by local and 
regional actors, the accomplishment of the 
OPK community intranet project in North 
Karelia was based on a broad spectrum of 
collaborating partners and stake-holders 
(local initiative, regional and national 
support, EU funding and a European 
network; public and private organisations; 
research institutions), as well as on an 
auspicious timing. As to the other case 
study, the Hungarian telecottages have been 
drawing on much volunteer work and local 
partnership-building with civil groups, local 
governments and businesses; while for many 
years were lacking sufficient support by the 
state (funds, as well as other assistance, 
public recognition). The situation was 
changed to some extent with the eHungary 
Programme within the framework of the 
National I.S. Strategy; however, that was 
some ten years after the establishment of the 
first telecottage. Nevertheless, already in the 
early years of the telecottage movement, the 
Telecottage Association established contacts 
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with the ITU (UN) for the purpose of 
promoting their practices in the world, and 
to stir the interest of the national 
government by showing them that their 
work was recognised internationally. Also, 
different EU resources have been utilised by 
individual telecottages, and more recently, 
their presence internationally has been 
represented by the initiative of HTA to form 
the European-wide civil organisation, the 
EUTA.   
These examples, however, can be 
described from the points of view of 
international organisations; these 
collaborative processes are also in their 
interests. For instance, the European Union 
strives to be competitive with the United 
States in the global informational economy, 
and an important condition for that is the 
promotion of the demand for, and the 
innovation in ICTs. Urging its member 
states via direct sector-oriented legislation, 
and non-binding guidelines, a co-ordination 
of objectives and funds, to liberalise their 
telecom markets, incorporate the subject into 
the national educational curricula, and to 
develop content – all aim at these goals.  
Competition exists of course, 
between nation states and regions, so these 
objectives more or less appear there as well. 
Besides, budget constraints force national 
governments to look for partners in order to 
carry out the strategic measures and 
investments. In Finland, the national 
authorities set up good partnerships with 
business, and could recognise opportunities 
to embrace innovative regional and local 
initiatives. In Hungary the state realised the 
strategic significance of the I.S. rather late. 
It was also slow in comprehending the real 
value of the achievements of the telecottage 
network: a potential for re-allocating some 
of the central responsibilities, as well as for 
a unique Hungarian innovation. However, in 
2003, the national stake-holders made a 
clear commitment here, too, and started to 
build up the institutional framework, with 
more or less success. 
Another important finding from the 
case studies is that the specific socio-
economic features of a country, a region or a 
locality (their centre-periphery positions, 
settlement patterns, economic profiles, 
affluence of their populations, their 
demographic structures, ‘social qualities’, 
etc.) determine what types of ICT 
infrastructure, training, and content 
development are required for raising an I.S. 
within their respective frameworks. 
Therefore, any intervention into the 
development of these many dimensions of 
access should take place also with great 
attention to distinctiveness in terms of space 
and time (geography, history and culture).  
This imperative is taken into 
account by Finland when consciously 
shaping and promoting its own model of the 
I.S. also as a kind of new and progressive 
national identity and image. Strategy 
designers in Hungary has been facing the 
problem concerning the extent and the way 
of incorporating national peculiarities – 
traditions, continuities – as constructive 
components of the Hungarian ‘model’ of the 
I.S., that is, a revolutionary image.  
Studying the issue of spatial-
cultural distinctiveness and diversity on the 
very local level, the example of the 
telecottages comes in handy.  They grew out 
from local needs and initiatives when there 
was no public (educational) programme 
pursuing the I.S. yet, and when the 
construction of the national infrastructure 
had just gathered impetus. In a few years, 
the Hungarian government launched Sulinet 
as an appropriate response to the skills-
related problem, yet it failed to sufficiently 
include certain segments of the society. In 
peripheral regions and isolated villages, the 
need to bring these technologies close to the 
whole community, to the young and the 
older alike, was recognised. Civil and public 
telecottage activists and entrepreneurs acted 
on these requirements in their individual 
contexts while learning from each other’s 
solutions within the expanding telecottage 
network. Embedded well into their particular 
social and cultural environments, they have 
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an inherent sensitivity towards the actual 
local needs, and therefore can easier respond 
to them. The function of the telecottages as 
mentors and technology-mediators therefore 
has not lost its relevance despite the 
undoubtedly significant achievements of the 
national Sulinet programme.  
The same can be observed in the 
Finnish case study. Despite the overall 
advanced state of the I.S. at the time in 
Finland, improving mental access to motivate 
the population for the use of the community 
intranet, and ICTs in general was still an 
obvious necessity in North Karelia in the late 
1990s, and especially regarding certain 
groups of the society, the unemployed and 
the older cohorts of the population. 
Therefore, peer-training constituted one of 
the major pillars of the Learning North 
Karelia project.  
Also, the local projects in both 
countries recognised that introducing ICTs 
necessitates the approach of learning by 
doing, facilitating the sense of achievement 
bit by bit. So however tempting it may be for 
the trainers and experts, a too ambitious and 
complicated tool must be avoided because it 
can easily discourage application, and can 
lead to the exclusion of many potential users.  
The technology (software) introduced in the 
community intranet project in North Karelia 
suited well both the functions and the 
population it was to serve. Also, the most 
successful telecottages have managed to 
develop technological service profiles most 
relevant to the places they operated in: 
besides some standard facilities, they 
specialise in supporting ethnic minorities, 
assisting elderly people, accommodating, 
informing, training, and networking local 
enterprises, and so on. 
It is also notable that especially in 
Hungary, local actors and civil society were 
rather proactive in terms of the softer 
components of access development. This is 
understandable for at least, two reasons. 
First, digital literacy, openness to ICTs, as 
well as online content and services are issues 
that require relatively more ‘human touch’, 
more locally specific care than for instance, 
the competition in the provision of 
broadband services may request. Second, 
while authorities ‘above’ were preoccupied 
with the difficult tasks of improving the 
supply-side, i.e. the physical and partly, the 
financial access to ICTs, the demand side 
already called out for attention: communities 
and the civil society from ‘below’ started to 
show the locally specific problems and 
opportunities regarding I.S. development. 
Although, in Finland, the state pioneered in 
content development (helping to create a 
critical mass of on-line services and useful 
information to motivate more extensive 
usage), I still consider the role of local and 
regional initiatives there as well, important in 
keeping up the development of human capital 
and relevant digital content; i.e. sustaining 
the demand side, also as a basis for further 
infrastructural development (as indicated by 
the ‘cycle’ above).  
In sum, concerning the 
responsibilities on the international, national 
and local-regional levels, there is nothing like 
a clear-cut division. From the case studies 
above, it is obvious that each and every 
component of access should receive some 
attention on all regional-political scales. 
Table 9 above (expanded from the basic 
Figure 4), in a far not all-inclusive way, 
summarises the roles and competencies and 
some of their actual examples, manifestations 
on the three spatial-administrative scales. 
RQ 3 Is the diffusion of ICTs or the 
emergence of an I.S. making horizontal 
interactions and flows more powerful, and 
thus administration and decision making 
more transparent and democratic? 
Based on the different case studies 
presented in this dissertation, there is no 
straightforward yes or no answering this 
question. Nevertheless, it has become 
obvious that the multi-sectoral nature of both 
regional socio-economic development (as a 
policy field, as well as the process) and the 
I.S. development project make them highly 
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Table 10. Findings from the case studies for and against the claim in RQ 3. 
  
 
RQ3:  
“… I.S. or the diffusion of ICTs 
making horizontal interactions 
and flows more powerful, …?” 
Indicating  “yes” Indicating  “no” 
International – EU, UN (Ch. 3) 
WSIS portals and several related 
portals; EU on-line, Eris@ network; 
forums drawing a greater diversity 
of views and interests into the 
international I.S. debate (human 
rights, censorship, digital solidarity 
fund, e-governance).  
Joint, multi-level monitoring, 
applying an open method of co-
ordination. 
The actual presence at central 
debates in the forums is still limited; 
major political and business 
interests are difficult to influence 
from a distance by the emerging 
networks of politically and 
financially weaker actors 
(developing countries, smaller 
businesses, academia, civil actors).  
FIN (4.2) 
Public administration on-line, 
e.Finland portal, active e-presence.  
On-line services offered by regional 
and local authorities (showing good 
example), educational institutions, 
businesses; transparent government; 
working interactivity in services. 
This is most probably not directly 
due to the I.S. and the new ICTs, but 
deeper social attributes (e.g. 
political trust, egalitarian values.)  
National (Ch. 4) 
HUN (4.3) 
Interministerial Committee on I.S. 
e-government portal, experiments 
with interactive services (digital tax 
registration) 
The lack of social and political 
trust: low confidence in the public 
sector; more focus on individual 
freedom and coping than on 
community and cooperation.  
ICTs are not enough to change this 
in the short term; the centrally-
vertically controlled mechanisms 
are reinforced, with inefficiencies. 
FIN  
N. Karelia 
and intranet 
project 
(5.2) 
The essence of the intranet is to link 
people (public, private and civil 
actors) in a community, and with 
other communities in the region 
with shared forums, services and 
regionally relevant information. 
The intranet has lost some of its 
attraction as Finnish content and 
services on the World Wide Web is 
increasingly accessible to the 
population in the region (changing 
technological and social realities) 
HUN 
telecottages 
(5.3) 
Fast diffusion of innovation helped 
by the network of local telecottage 
projects, loosely co-ordinated from a 
centre. An on-line system of 
publishing good practices, and 
information about funding 
possibilities. Emerging “teleház-
regionalism” in the SGP. 
Telementor-network. 
Telecottages are very heterogeneous 
not only in terms of their ICTs, 
skills and attitudes towards 
networking.  
Local-regional  
(Ch. 5) 
FIN-HUN 
local-local 
cooperation 
(5.4) 
Partners finding and communicating 
with each other via ICTs (e-mail, 
chat); search and application for 
(EU and other) funds via Internet. 
Effective ICTs, effective 
communication was inhibited by 
missing language skills, and little or 
no personal acquaintance with each 
other’s contexts. Face-to face 
meetings are important.  
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communication-intensive fields. They both 
involve much interaction between many 
different stakeholders operating on different 
(vertical) geographical and political scales, as 
well as ranging ‘horizontally’ from big and 
small businesses through politics, public 
research institutes and governments, to the 
(global and local)  civil societies. The 
different parties (both the traditional ones, as 
for instance, the nation states in charge of 
controlling telecommunications and the IT 
companies developing the tools; and the 
relative newcomers, such as the EU, the civil 
society, and local communities) have their 
own special awareness of, and therefore 
various approaches to, the I.S. and its 
territorial implications, which later in the end 
gradually emerge from a fusion of these 
many standpoints and interests. Conflicting 
views are not rare between the different 
sectors and actors; neither are the 
possibilities for cooperation and the 
occurrence of win-win situations.  
ICTs, as tools are definitely utilised 
in this respect, as several examples from the 
case studies indicate: the application of e-
commerce solutions by enterprises; websites, 
portals, interactive on-line services 
maintained by international agencies, 
national and local governments and public 
authorities; and the extensive use of the 
Internet by less and more organised civil 
networks and individuals seeking flexibility 
and freedom from traditional authoritative 
structures. Several examples for these can be 
found in both the more advanced I.S. of 
Finland, and the less developed Hungarian 
context. The difference is however, in the 
scale and culture of usage, and the 
interactivity, interoperability between the 
different applications. The former is related 
to the mental components of access, and the 
latter is linked more with the availability and 
the quality of content, and with the general 
construction of social-administrative 
systems. 
The relative cost efficiency, 
adaptability and distance-bridging capacities 
of ICTs have made them popular means of 
communication between business and the 
public sector, among businesses, and in 
public-civil relations, too. However, another 
important point here is that ICTs are not 
accepted for all purposes, and especially, that 
they are rarely used as exclusive tools. 
 Firstly, much confidence on both 
communicating parties, sufficient positive 
experience from a longer routine of usage is 
required for a near-to-complete reliance on 
ICTs in, for instance e-banking, e-shopping, 
and electronic public services (which, has 
had too short time to evolve in Hungary yet; 
but which has been adapted in Finland in 
many fields of social interaction).  
Secondly, face-to-face meetings, 
physical proximity and familiarity with both 
the subjects and objects of communication 
are still inevitable for human beings and their 
different organisations for a full 
understanding of the matter. A negative 
example for this is provided by the study on 
the cooperation project between the Finnish 
and Hungarian local actors: constructive 
communication could not be maintained (esp. 
amidst the difficult objective circumstances) 
very long because motivation and 
enthusiasm, as well as confidence between 
the partners and in the success of the project 
faded fast when meetings could only take 
place in digital space. A deeper, personal 
acquaintance by the Hungarian partners with 
the local achievements in North Karelia 
would have helped much. A positive example 
for this same feature is the idea that both the 
Finnish intranet project and the Hungarian 
telecottage movement incorporated into their 
practices: the peer-training practice and the 
focus of the needs and the lives of actual 
communities were combined with the 
advantages of the ICTs in reasonable ways. 
In Table 10 above, more positive 
and negative instances based on the case 
studies are listed, grouped according to 
whether they point towards approving or 
rejecting the thesis worded in the initial 
research questions. 
In sum, ICTs – as any technological 
innovations – are social creations; the 
products of societies where an increasing 
significance has been attached to information 
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and knowledge flows and communication 
processes. The diffusion and development of 
these technologies in turn, generate greater 
flows of intellectual assets and more 
intensive communication and interactivity. 
Since digital networks have been only to a 
very limited extent centralised and 
supervised, ‘only’ the mental capacities (and 
to some extent, the affluence) of the users 
restrict their social inclusiveness; and 
therefore have the potential to allow for 
communication and flows regardless of 
traditional hierarchical, administrative 
structures (across borders, social standing, 
religion, gender, professions, distance etc.) 
However, financial access, and cultural-
mental openness to technologies discriminate 
across societies (hence the digital divides), 
and content, since it is human made, partially 
reproduces old barriers, too (on-line services 
restricted by language, fee, password, 
membership, etc.) 
 
RQ 4 What can Hungary learn from the 
achievements of the “Finnish model”? 
In Chapter 4, I.S. developments in 
Hungary and Finland are studied from the 
perspectives of national authorities: the 
‘official’ national visions and images, central 
institutions, strategies and programmes. In 
absolute, numerical terms, the comparison 
between the state of the I.S. in Finland and 
Hungary is straightforward. Despite the fact 
that the degree of difference varies 
depending on which technological or other 
aspect is observed, Hungary’s lag behind 
Finland can be measured in several years, if 
not a whole decade. However, there are 
important qualitative conditions behind the 
concrete figures of ICT diffusion and the 
levels of usage: 
  
1 the design of the national I.S. 
strategies, the degree of commitment by the 
government (and the connection with these to 
international processes and guidelines); 
 
2 the level of national concern with 
regional inequalities (the disadvantaged 
peripheries), the degree of harmony between 
bottom-up and top-down actions; 
 
3 and the institutional background for 
I.S. development and networking between 
national actors. 
 
Concerning the first aspect, an 
initially more sectoral and technological 
orientation to developing the I.S .featured the 
national approach in both countries 
examined. It was revised and elaborated into 
a cross-sectoral social innovation programme 
in Finland sooner, in Hungary a bit later. In 
the latest up-dates of both national I.S. 
strategies and visions (in Hungary: in 2003; 
in Finland: in 2006) much concern is 
expressed with the promotion of e-literacy 
and positive mentality, as well as with the 
development of advanced on-line content.  
Most probably, the experts drafting 
the strategy in Hungary had taken a look at 
many international examples after 2000 (and 
were aware of the guidelines and 
recommendations by the UN and the EU). 
Surely, they had examined the Finnish 
strategy, too (to which there are some 
concrete implications in the Hungarian 
documents). Two important features 
indicating this are the focus on ‘service 
society’ and the significance attributed to 
trust.  
The dedication of the Finnish 
government to become a leading national 
model of the Information Society has been 
evident since the mid-nineties while in 
Hungary, because of the difficult social and 
economic conditions during the first ten 
years of transition, commitment came later, 
and more in the spirit of urgency and 
catching up than of becoming a leader. In 
both cases, however, these developments 
were urged both by a domestic need for 
modernisation and restructuring, as well as 
the external pressures of globalised 
competition, and the requirements and 
opportunities coming from their membership 
of the European Union.   
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Secondly, regional and social 
equality in I.S. development has become a 
clearly expressed aim in the latest Finnish 
approach, and is one of the two crucial 
horizontal objectives of the Hungarian I.S. 
Strategy, too. There may be, however, some 
difference in this regard. In Finland, equality 
has recently been seen as more-or-less 
existing (as part of the welfare model), 
providing a foundation for trust in I.S. 
services and for the whole construct of the 
‘Knowledge Society’. In the Hungarian case, 
regional disparities in opportunity are 
expressed more in terms of a serious problem 
to overcome – which originates in the 
generally high political and public awareness 
of increased socio-economic inequalities 
across the country since the 1990s, (and 
especially between urban and rural areas.)  
The third important feature of 
national perspectives on I.S. is the 
institutional background to its 
implementation. It is almost unnecessary to 
say, after the lengthy description of the 
Finnish national innovation system, and the 
forming of a inter-sectoral Information 
Society Council in 2003, that there is a well-
established and adaptable network of a 
diverse set of institutions and actors working 
together to achieve the national I.S. 
ambitions. Probably, it is not absolutely 
perfect, but it is a system that has had some 
time to evolve, has been tested for many 
years, and has the ability to adjust itself 
relatively flexibly to future challenges. On 
the other hand, the formation of the 
Hungarian I.S. is still in a very unstable 
phase, it can be more characterised in terms 
of an evolution and fluctuations than with a 
‘system’. To cut a long story short, in 
Hungary, establishing institutions that 
promote horizontal connections and 
networking among public, private and civil 
actors has started, however, I see it more of a 
goal yet than the means of developing the 
I.S.     
In Chapter 5, the conditions of I.S. 
in these countries are looked at more from 
the point of view of the people living in the 
rural peripheries, looking at both the fact of 
spatial inequalities and examples of local and 
regional initiatives trying to reduce them. 
Taking these into consideration, the 
following observations can be made: 
 
1 In both countries, regional 
inequalities in terms if I.S., or the spatial 
manifestations of the ‘digital divides’  
generally follow the traditional disparities in 
population density, urbanity, and income, as 
well as in the levels of education and 
economic growth, etc. because of the same 
market mechanisms and the interactions 
between the different dimensions of access.  
 
2 The importance of regional I.S. 
strategies and local partnerships for 
innovative actions has been recognised in 
both countries, however, there is a 
considerable difference regarding the timing 
of this recognition between the Hungarian 
and Finnish cases. 
In Finland, this happened relatively 
early, in the late-nineties, and more-or-less 
simultaneously by actors on various political 
levels. The top-down initiatives were clear 
and consistent enough for the sub-national 
actors to suitably adjust their development 
objectives and programmes, and therefore it 
was relatively easy to get support and 
recognition ‘from above’.  
In Hungary, the social, political and 
economic instabilities since the 1990s have 
not allowed the national level the required 
resources (of, time, money, constructive 
thinking) to formulate and communicate a 
coherent vision, consequently, the message to 
citizens and their communities about the 
challenges and opportunities linked with an 
I.S. has been very weak and unclear. 
Nevertheless, the structural problems and 
deficiencies directly hitting rural 
communities triggered grass-roots action 
already in the early 1990s, and could achieve 
a lot in rural areas in terms of introducing 
new opportunities by means of the ICTs. The 
local and regional activists were in this way 
more proactive in Hungary, and shaped their 
own visions and strategic goals in a much 
more practical and clearer way than the 
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national government was able to. The 
coordination of these many local efforts 
however, could not be efficient without the 
intervention of the government. How the 
civil network of telecottages and the 
governmental eHungary programme will 
continue to strengthen their cooperation 
depends especially on the level of 
commitment of the future governments, i.e. 
whether they follow through the objectives 
set in the national I.S. strategy. 
 
Understanding these qualitative 
(institutional and cultural) aspects is the way 
to find lessons for Hungary and, in general, 
for any country which is trying to catch up to 
the leading nations in I.S. development.  
The Finnish example shows that 
cautious reforms of the national innovation 
system can already mean a considerable 
competitive advantage for a country. 
Realising this, Finland has been trying to 
take up a role in the European Union as an 
‘I.S. laboratory’. Yet it is also clear that such 
reorganization cannot be carried out in a 
matter of even a decade, for this system is 
reliant on intricate and sensitive conditions as 
trust in the government, historic identity, 
ethics and values are, for instance. 
Consequently and most importantly, there is 
no concretely prescribed way how an 
‘enabling atmosphere’ or a well-functioning 
‘framework for interaction’ has to look like. 
The Finnish model has grown out of a special 
context, during a longer period of time 
influenced by several peculiar circumstances, 
and will continue to develop likewise. What 
could be learnt from is the ways of 
maintaining political and other networks that 
in fact, do the work of I.S. development.  
Copying exact practices is not 
plausible without any contextualisation. The 
institutional and social-cultural characteris-
tics of the Hungarian society differ so much 
from those which have evolved in Finland 
and across the Nordic countries in general, 
that the direct insertion of best practices into 
the Hungarian / Central-Eastern European 
context is not possible. No ready model can 
be adopted as such. This is valid of course, 
on any spatial scale: to national and 
subnational (regional / local) actors. The 
example of the Finnish-Hungarian 
cooperation also justifies this claim: the 
greatest challenges in joint planning came 
from the major differences in the 
technological, social, cultural settings of the 
idea-host region and the place targeted by the 
development project.  
The institutional background for I.S. 
development in Hungary is weak, social 
acceptance or even awareness of the whole 
issue is still low, and there is little money for 
the actual projects in the state budget. All 
these, however, are closely linked with the 
political developments of the past two 
decades. Among these circumstances, 
recommendations for Hungary could be 
centred around the following three points: 
 
1 Before 2003, there had been neither 
a commitment to, nor a positive vision of, the 
Hungarian I.S.  Truly, there has been recently 
slightly more confidence among the political 
and intellectual elite concerning the results 
from implementing the Strategy. Elitism in 
I.S. policies is still a problem, however: little 
trusted by the wider public, or simply 
ignored, as ‘beyond our heads’. So, the 
question is whether leadership can help the 
broader society internalise this sense of 
purpose, and acknowledge the importance of 
the ‘I.S. cause’ as something that is in their 
own interest, and not just a political show, 
and a way for the rich to get richer… Joint 
work with civil society and more incentives to 
local initiatives, more opportunities for 
public-private partnerships can help 
eliminate this problem in the longer run.  
2 The development of on-line 
interactive content serving administrative 
procedures between citizens and the public 
institutions has received much attention in 
recent years also as a way to increase trust in 
authorities. However, actual usage of these 
services is still low, restraining their 
upgrading and customisation through 
feedback, and preventing the development of 
an advanced on-line culture. What is not 
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connected socially cannot be connected 
digitally. The special invention Hungary 
needs to come up with to its own benefit and 
helping also other transitioning countries, is 
the method to break the vicious circle around 
distrust.  
3 Developing the I.S. involves all 
strategic sectors (education, telecommuni-
cations, healthcare, state administration), 
which are not only underfinanced in 
Hungary, but are highly politicised and full 
of conflicts, not to mention the horizontal 
components of the national I.S. strategy, 
regional development, and R&D. Among 
these circumstances and under the pressure 
of a sharpening regional competition, 
Hungary is still challenged to find her own 
way, her own model not only meaning 
‘form’, but in the sense of ‘good example’. 
Implementation of the I.S. strategic 
objectives would be more efficient if the 
limited resources were invested into a 
specific but decisive field that could be a 
Hungarian ‘strength’, and which then could 
work as a catalyst for the expansion of other 
areas.  
 
 
6.2 Synthesis 
 
If we are facing in the right direction, all we 
have to do is keep on walking. 
(A Buddhist proverb) 
 
In this dissertation I have attempted 
to show the formation of information society 
through one of the infinite number of existing 
and possible cross-sections of its total 
geographical and political vertical structure. 
This research took over 5 years, during 
which time I have had to deal with a much 
moving target not only regarding 
technological realities, but the changing 
social ones. Therefore, it was a constant 
process of learning and adapting, 
understanding, and re-defining even the most 
basic concepts and relations. Just as 
information society is.  
Information, knowledge, and 
technologies get their meanings and 
importance only when they are 
contextualised. Their import depends on 
place and time and, without human agency, 
they have no meaning whatsoever. Since this 
dissertation focuses mainly on different 
social agents’ vertical and horizontal 
interactions, and collective endeavours to 
create ‘an inclusive information society’, the 
quest for answers to the research questions 
involves dealing with this contextuality and 
temporality all the time.  
Just taking one example: the same 
technology, e.g. the establishment of a public 
internet access point or a narrowband 
connection to Internet, is interpreted and 
valued in different ways by a monitoring 
organisation of the United Nations, by 
politicians working for the ministries 
responsible for telecommunications (of 
different countries), or by the R&D 
headquarters of an IT company; by a retired 
farmer, unemployed teacher, or young mayor 
in the Hungarian countryside; or by an 
entrepreneur or an international student in 
Eastern Finland. Adding the dimension of 
time to this diversity of approaches and ways 
of understanding makes it impossible to fix a 
universal significance.    
Different forms and depths of the act 
of interactive communication involve the 
encounter of these dissimilar actors and their 
perspectives and, miraculously, even if only 
temporarily, resolves the gaps and tensions 
between their ways of understanding and 
knowing. Efficient communication is central 
to the work of the UN and the EU in 
negotiating and establishing visions, 
objectives and guidelines, in mobilising other 
actors, and in monitoring and reporting 
developments. Good communication is the 
key to strengthen local communities and 
build up social capital; and it is the essence 
of a national innovation system and the 
implementation of a national I.S. strategy, 
too. Without communication, there is no 
trust, only suspicion and isolation. 
No wonder that when technology is 
created and employed for the purpose to 
enhance, or even ‘revolutionise’ communi-
cation between people, it is seen as a panacea 
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to all the miseries of mankind (at least, when 
choosing the optimistic side of the 
deterministic approach). It is however, clear 
from the above that ICTs are social creations: 
born to fulfil social demand and human 
desires, and restricted in abilities by the 
human dimension, too: people’s knowledge, 
attitudes and ethics determine their access to 
these tools as well as to the benefits they 
potentially offer. Some people with some 
specific knowledge and vision created the 
telecottage in a Hungarian village seeing its 
community at risk of getting isolated from 
information and knowledge, and the 
opportunities those can bring. However, only 
those telecentres could serve their 
communities that shaped their technologies 
to match their particular societies. Also, in 
their original form, they would not have been 
relevant in the Finnish countryside in the late 
1990s. Nevertheless, a virtual telecottage, 
that is, the community intranet, was very 
popular in Eastern Finland at the same time. 
Technology is society.   
Generally, the telecottage, in its 
many different manifestations, can be seen as 
a technology in itself, a method, technique, a 
piece of culture even, which helps a rural 
community leave its isolation and link up to 
the global flows of information and 
knowledge. The Finnish models for a 
national innovation system and a welfare I.S. 
evolved in their special context, if transferred 
directly to Hungary, most probably, would 
not work properly. However, some features 
of a good model can be (and has been) 
adopted with success, for instance, the 
decentralised, network configuration of 
participants and processes, the built-in 
flexibilities and openness of the system, and 
the implementation of I.S. objectives as a 
coherent social programme.  
The initial broad question in the 
dissertation was: How can the benefits of 
information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) and the so-called, information society 
(I.S.) be extended to rural-peripheral regions 
and communities? By tending to all aspects 
of access based on the particular needs of the 
rural-peripheral regions and their small 
communities. By mobilising all possible 
actors locally, regionally, and by providing a 
strategic vision and a reliable (institutional 
and financial) framework for their actions. 
These all require intensive flows of 
information, contrasting and revising 
knowledge, the development of know-how 
and learning skills and most importantly, a 
lot of continuous interaction horizontally and 
vertically, a joint learning-by-doing exercise.  
When well functioning, the set of 
supple mechanisms between the different 
levels, actors, interested partners enhance 
both the social and technological bases for 
the I.S., at the heart of which there is a highly 
complicated and interactive network of 
communication. The wider and the more 
diverse the selection of the networked 
participants, the broader the scale of social 
benefits becomes. If these mechanisms can 
be maintained flexibly over a long period of 
time, those seemingly ‘lucky coincidences’ 
(i.e. the kind that are pointed out in relation 
to the development of the telecommuni-
cations sector in Finland, and the success 
story of local innovations) will more 
frequently occur, becoming sort of inherent 
to the system, and the advantages can be 
maximised. 
Placing this argumentation into  
focus, the ‘thing’ most often referred to as 
Information Society, could be termed as an 
Interactive Society or Communication 
Society. Likewise, emphasizing more the 
networked form or the import of learning, it 
might as well be called a Network Society or 
a Learning Society. In fact, it does not really 
matter, since there are still those disturbing 
questions: Does it exist in Hungary (let us 
say, in 2007)? Does it exist in Finland? Is it a 
reality in North Karelia? (To whom?) Can it 
ever be an all-inclusive one? (In 
opportunities or in terms of benefits?) Based 
on the above, there is no absolute ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to any of these questions. There are 
several subjective ones, and those can be 
provided by the different actors presented 
above. On my part, the safest thing to say is 
that it depends on you, as a part of it, or as an 
outsider. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I: The information society - new ways of living and working together  
• A revolutionary challenge to decision makers  
• Partnership for jobs  
• If we seize the opportunity  
• A common creation or a still fragmented Europe?  
• The social challenge  
• Time to press on  
• An Action Plan  
• New markets in Europe's information society  
Chapter II: A market-driven revolution  
• A break with the past Ending monopoly  
• Enabling the market  
• Towards a positive outcome  
Chapter III: Completing the agenda  
• Protection of intellectual property rights (IPR)  
• Privacy  
• Electronic protection (encryption), legal protection and security  
• Media ownership  
• The role of competition policy  
• Technology  
Chapter IV: The building blocks of the information society  
• The opportunity for the Union - strengthening its existing networks and 
accelerating the creation of new ones  
• New basic services are needed  
• Blazing the trail - ten applications to launch the information society  
1. Teleworking  
2. Distance learning  
3. A network for universities and research centres  
4. Telematic services for SMEs  
5. Road traffic management  
6. Air traffic control  
7. Healthcare networks  
8. Electronic tendering  
9. Trans-European public administration network  
10. City information highways  
Chapter V:  
• Financing the information society: a task for the private sector. 
Chapter VI: Follow-up  
An Action Plan - summary of recommendations  
Appendix 1. The structure and contents of the Bangemann Report, 1994. 
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1. Technology and human skills (16 variables) 
 
1.1  Use of old and recent telecommunication technologies; accessibility and diffusion of e-
commerce applications: Internet host, telephone lines and cellular subscribers, telephone average 
cost, electricity consumption, PCs, Internet service provider charge, charge for telephone usage  for 
Internet, ISP competition, high-tech. exports, secure servers, Internet speed and access, government 
on-line services availability, Internet effects on business, laws relating to ICT use  
 
1.2 Knowledge, human skills: Internet users, gross tertiary science enrollment ratio   
 
2. Economy and innovativeness (9 variables) 
 
2.1 National: World competitiveness, GDP per capita 
 
2.2 Business efficiency: Business efficiency (world rank) 
 
2.3 Innovativeness: patents granted to residents, R&D intensity, receipts of royalties and license 
fees, scientists and engineers in R&D 
 
2.4 Labor force – job market: high-skilled IT job market, share of part-time employment 
 
3. Welfare (6 variables) 
 
3.1 Education: combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratio (%), public 
expenditure on education  
 
3.2   Health: life expectancy at birth, public expenditure on health 
 
3.3   Welfare: disparities in income or consumption: Gini coefficient; disparities in income or 
consumption: the richest 20% to the poorest 20% 
 
4. Openness (9 variables) 
 
4.1   Politics, freedom: circulation of daily newspapers, freedom of press, Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI), women in parliament, incarceration rate (imprisoned per 100,000 pop.) 
 
4.2 “Globality”: recognized refugees, environment: CO2 emissions,  
 
4.3 Environment: “greenness” of politics and population (based on election information), GDP per 
unit of energy-use. 
Appendix 2. Categories of possible variables for a broad definition of I.S.  (Following 
and extending the categories by Castells and Himanen; 2001.) 
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TNS trends (Telecommunications Networks and Services, ESPON 1.2.2, 2003) 
 
1. Distribution of questionnaires: April and May 2003, in printed copies, as attachments to e- mails, and were 
also published electronically, i.e. in the form of web questionnaires to be filled in using the Internet. 
 
2. Response rate: 15 responses from ministries/regulators from 13 countries, and 12 from companies from 7 
countries: 40% and 10-15%, respectively, of the answers minimum expected from the 29 countries. While the 
answers given by companies were judged as less country-relevant, and therefore a higher response rate was not 
that crucially important, having no ministry/regulator responses from over half of the ‘ESPON countries’ posed 
a real problem, and a serious limitation to the possible ways of analysis and interpretation.  
 
3. The quality of the responses: most of the answers were accurate enough to be accepted. Some respondents 
(see e.g. Denmark and Malta, in the tables in Appendix 2 and 3) ignored several points completely, arguing that 
no considerable territorial inequalities exist in their countries in the provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure and services – in such cases, reaction to other questions, and additional comments were instructive 
enough.  
 
4. The questions 
 
a) Two groups of questions according to two main themes on the basis of what they investigated:  
 
• Features of (perceived) territorial inequalities, and the assumed reasons behind  
• Awareness of territorial inequalities in TN&S trends, and policy intention / measures to overcome them  
 
b) Types of questions:  
 
Open questions: The answers to most of them (esp. those which can be translated, simplified into yes/no 
questions) were “scored”. However, it is important to note that these responses were rather difficult and less 
reliable to compare across countries, so they were taken as additional information, for more accuracy.  
 
Simple-choice, closed questions: The choices represent a measure on a relative scale (e.g. very even, generally 
even, generally uneven, very uneven were given scores 4, 3, 2, 1 respectively).  
 
Multiple-choice, closed questions: If each choice had a ranking dimension (e.g.: which tools of intervention, and 
how important they are…), the answers were weighted according to their importance (place in order) attributed 
to them. Without a ranking task, (e.g.: the number of territorial obligations imposed on operators), the number 
was taken as a measure (none: 0, one: 1, more than one: 2). 
 
5. Analysis of information 
a) Descriptive textual 
b) Quantified (‘scored’, as described above) and represented in a scatter plot figure along the axes of the two 
main themes of investigation: 
• The choice of questions was based on the reliability, clarity and the validity of the responses.  
• The scores given to evaluate answers were averaged and then transformed to a more convenient 0-100 scale. 
This method has however, some weaknesses to be noted (i.e. the arbitrary and debatable “quantification” of 
responses of a rather subjective and qualitative nature; attributing scores to and averaging scalar data), so the 
numbers should not be considered exact, or mappable as such (given the low response rate and small sample, the 
latter was impossible, anyway).  
• Nevertheless, categories of countries can be identified according to relative distances from “average” values, 
and the correspondence between the two measured themes. 
Appendix 3A. Method of survey and analysis: limitations and solutions  
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Appendix 3B. The list of survey questions sent to the ministries and regulators 
responsible for the telecommunications sector in the ESPON countries  
(ESPON 1.2.2 project) 
1. What are the territorial aspects of Universal Service Obligation (USO) in your country?  
2. Do you monitor the trends in territorial differences in levels of telecommunications infrastructure and 
service provision, uptake, etc? If not, why not? 
3.  What are the features of territorial evolution of telecommunications in general, and esp. of broadband in 
particular (over the last decade, or since deregulation came in; e.g. even spread vs. uneven spread)? What 
are the specificities (i.e. compared to other countries, or Europe in general) of your country in terms of 
telecoms territoriality? (E.g. peripherality, ‘extreme’ rural, mountainous areas, islands, patterns of rich and 
poor, etc.) 
4. According to your understanding, what are the drivers of this territoriality – for example, scale of markets 
(which markets?), costs of providing services, etc? Which one of these seems to be the most significant? 
5. What patterns of competition between territories concerning telecommunications can be observed? 
6. Will the deployment of advanced telecommunications services reduce or exacerbate territorial disparities 
in economic development, well-being, quality of life…? 
7. What could be done to reduce territorial disparities in telecoms provision? 
8. Are there any regulations imposed on telecommunications companies about territorial obligations? Do 
you see “territory” as significant in terms of market regulation? (E.g. concerning spatial coverage targets, 
covering rural area in return for urban licence.) 
9. Is competition ‘working’ across territories? Are there any areas in the country which do not benefit from 
competition? Are companies colluding, i.e. making separate agreements on service provision in specific 
regions? 
10. What features characterise the territoriality of local loop unbundling? 
11. How much do SMEs in rural or remote areas benefit from Universal Service Obligations? Are they 
benefiting from competition? (Or do large firms capture most of these benefits, rather?) 
12. On your opinion, should EU Structural Funds be used to support telecommunications investments in 
regions? If not, why not? If yes, what would be priorities for structural fund-supported telecoms / ICT 
investment in your country? 
13. How are telecommunications policy and spatial planning / regional policy connected? Are these in the 
same ministry? Are they integrated in any way? (I.e. through ‘joined up’ policy.) 
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11 
9 
11 
13 
12 
  
5E 
Extended IC
T usage
2 in enterprises, %
 of all eps. 
75 
65 
82 
68 
81 
  
6A
 
Enterprises interacting w
ith the public sector, %
 of 
all eps. (tw
o-w
ay interaction) 
91 (71) 
69 (57) 
92 (47) 
97
3 (62) 
85 (56) 
EE:84, G
R
:77, C
Z:75, 
EU
25:52, EU
15:50, H
U
:35, 
U
K
:33 
6B
  
Individuals interacting online w
ith public 
authorities in the last three m
onths, %
 of pop. (tw
o-
w
ay interaction) 
47 (11) 
52 (21) 
52 (21) 
55 (20) 
n. a 
LU
:45, G
E:33, U
K
:22, 
H
U
:16, G
R
:8, C
Z:7 
7 
O
nline security at hom
e: firew
all and antivirus 
softw
are updated in the last 3 m
onths, %
 of 
households w
ith Internet 
65 
83 
71 
74 
75 
C
Y
: 77, SK
:50, SI:48, 
G
E,H
U
:46, U
K
:42, EE:1 
8A
 
The share of IC
T-related occupations in the 
econom
y, 2003, %
 of all em
ployed 
23 
n. a. 
24 
n. a. 
27 
U
K
:28, G
E:22, EU
15:22, 
G
R
:14
4 
8B
 
The share of IC
T-related occupations in the private 
sector, 2001-02, %
 of the em
ployed 
10.3 
7.1 
9.4 
n. a. 
8.1 
EU
145:6.3, H
U
:7.1, 
G
E:4.7, G
R
:3 
9A
 
Students using Internet for education, training, %
 of 
all students (betw
een age 16-74) 
87 
18 
23 
21 
56 
  
9B
 
Em
ployees using Internet, %
 of all em
ployed 
(betw
een age 16-74) 
22 
3 
6 
13 
15 
  
1 data from
 2003 for Iceland,  2 m
ore then basic IC
T use = access to Internet + w
ebsite + interaction w
ith public sector online and/or banking &
 financial 
transactions and/or orders via Internet, 3 data from
 2002 for Iceland, 4 O
EC
D
: IT O
utlook 2004. 
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Appendix 5. The I.S. index defined by ESPON 1.2.3, 2006.  
5B. The composition of the ESPON 1.2.3 I.S. index.  
The ESPON 1.2.3 project took a life-cycle approach to reveal differences between the development levels 
of I.S. in 29 countries in Europe. They used eEurope and World Economic Forum (NIR) statistics, and to 
be able to calculate their average, applied linear transformation to rescale the two indices to the same 
range (0-1). The stages in the cycle, and the relevant variables: 
1. Readiness: enabling factors (basic infrastructure, affordability and skills); 
2. Intensity: availability and use ICTs. 
3. Impact: economic indicators of operational restructuring, ICT-use for social inclusion & participation. 
Impact 
Readiness 
Intensity 
5A. I.S. Performance and the evolutionary stages of I.S. in 29 European counties.  
1.0 
 
0.8 
 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
 
 
0.0 
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The Regional Information Society Initiative (RISI) 
 
RISI had 2 phases: 
• RISI 1 (including NOKIS) to form regional information society strategies, through the realisation of which 
the development would get a positive direction. 
• RISI 2: support for I.S.-applications, and their experience to be transferred to other areas.  
 
It was coordination by the Directorate Generals for Employment (DG V), Telecommunications (DG XIII), and 
Regional Policy and Cohesion (DG XVI) of the European Commission. 
RISI 1 covered 22 regions from 11 Member States were selected by the European Commission. 14 regions were 
funded under Article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund (*), and an additional eight regions received 
funding under Article 6 of the European Social Fund (**).  
Region Country Project Acronym 
Steiermark (Styria)* Austria Telekis  
Liege* Belgium Fasil  
North Karelia** Finland Nokis  
W. Finland Alliance* Finland Paraddis 
Midi-Pyrenees** France Teleparc 
Limousin* France Acti Limousin 
Poitou-Charentes* France Serise  
Schleswig-Holstein* Germany Infosh  
Bremen** Germany Brise  
Brandenburg* Germany Bis2006  
Athens** Greece Athina  
Epirus* Greece Rise  
South West** Ireland Stand  
Shannon* Ireland Shipp  
Calabria* Italy Arianna  
Murcia** Spain Essimur  
Extremadura* Spain Infodex  
Blekinge** Sweden It-Blekinge  
Vasterbotten* Sweden Ac-Direkt  
Yorkshire & Humberside* UK Compris  
Wales** UK Wis  
North of England* UK Nistrat  
 
RISI 2 had 9 pilot projects of I.S. application: 7 were “pluri-regional pilot projects” funded under  
Article 10 of the ERDF, and 2 pilots were funded under Article 6 of the ESF. 
  
Lead Region Acronym Inter-Regional Partners 
Midi-Pyrénnées (France) Enterskillsnet (6) FR,FR,UK,IE,FI 
North West Ireland (Ireland) CRISM (7) IE, BE, DK, NL, UK 
Madeira (Portugal) TOURIST (6) PT,FI,SE,IT,AU,UK 
Eje Atlantico (Spain and Port.) OUEA (2) ES, PT 
Northrhine-Westphalia (Germany) IDAN (9) DE,DE,UK,ES,BE,BE,NL,FI,SE 
Vorarlberg (Austria) RMP (4) AU, ES,FR, GR 
Crete (Greece) TEMETEN (5) GR, GR, IT, ES, FI 
NOKIS of the province of North 
Karelia was launched within RISI 1 
in 1997. 
 
It had a total budget of FIM 2.9 
million (approx. € 0.5 M); made up 
of a 50% contribution by the Finnish 
State and 50% from Structural 
Funds, from Objective 6.  
 
The partners in NOKIS were: 
 
• the Regional Council; 
• the University of Joensuu and the 
North Karelian Polytechnic; 
• the Joensuu Science Park; 
• the cities of Joensuu, Lieksa & 
Nurmes, and the Municipalities of 
Ilomantsi and Juuka; 
• the Employment and Economic 
Development Centre of N.K.; 
• Lieksa Development Agency Ltd 
(industrial park of Lieksa); 
Appendix 6. The RISI initiative and NOKIS. (Based on information: EC / European Commission) 
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* K
iihtelysvaara and Tuupovaara adm
inistrations m
erged w
ith the tow
n of Joensuu, and V
ärtsilä w
as included w
ithin Tohm
ajärvi in Jan. 2005.  
 (B
ased on data from
: N
orth K
arelia – R
egional C
ouncil.) 
A
ppendix 7B.  
D
istrict 
(seutu-
kunta) 
M
unicipality 
(kunta) 
U
nem
ploym
ent 
rate, 2004 
U
nem
ploym
ent rate 
change, 1991-1997 
(%
 points) 
U
nem
ploym
ent 
rate change  
(%
 points), 
1997-2004  
 
Em
ploym
ent in 
agriculture (%
), 
2004 
Em
ploym
ent 
in industry %
 
Em
ploym
ent 
in services %
 
Em
pl.  
sector 
unknow
n 
%
 
Juuka 
19.9 
14.2 
-6.2 
16.8 
30.6 
48.9 
3.7 
Lieksa 
23.4 
15.5 
-5.4 
10.1 
28.1 
58.5 
3.3 
N
urm
es 
19.5 
19 
-11.3 
14.4 
19.3 
63.4 
3.0 
Pielinen 
Karelia 
V
altim
o 
22.7 
20.4 
-9 
30.1 
14.4 
50.1 
5.5 
Eno 
24.1 
17.1 
-5.7 
9.3 
39.0 
49.9 
1.8 
Ilom
antsi 
24.3 
15.8 
-4 
13.0 
19.7 
64.1 
3.2 
Joensuu 
17.2 
15.5 
-7.2 
1.7 
23.7 
73.0 
1.6 
*K
iihtelysv. 
15.5 
12.8 
-9.3 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Tuupovaara 
20.1 
13.8 
-5.3 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
K
ontiolahti 
13 
12.8 
-8 
4.4 
27.1 
66.9 
1.7 
Liperi 
14 
13.7 
-5.5 
13.1 
23.8 
61.0 
2.0 
O
utokum
pu 
18.4 
14.6 
-7.4 
6.0 
33.3 
57.2 
3.5 
Polvijärvi 
19.4 
16.7 
-5.2 
24.2 
22.3 
49.1 
4.4 
Joensuu district 
Pyhäselkä 
14.7 
11.7 
-6.9 
6.8 
26.4 
64.2 
2.6 
K
esälahti 
20.3 
13.8 
-3.8 
19.0 
29.5 
48.0 
3.5 
K
itee 
16.9 
12.4 
-5.4 
13.5 
29.4 
54.0 
3.1 
R
ääkkylä 
19.3 
15.4 
-6.1 
27.5 
19.8 
48.1 
4.7 
Tohm
ajärvi 
21.9 
14.7 
-3.4 
19.3 
16.8 
59.5 
4.4 
Central  Karelian   
district** 
Vartsilä 
18.4 
17.9 
-9.6 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
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Appendix 8. Background information about the survey of telecottages in the Southern Great 
Plain Region, 09-10.2005 
 
1 Finding the targets: The list of 74 telecottages (TCs) in the region (including: respondent’s name, e-mail address, 
telephone number, TC’s address, and sometimes, the location of their websites) was obtained from the portal of the 
SGP Telecottage Association (http://www.telehaz-del-alfold.hu/). The on-line public database of the Hungarian 
Telecottage Association (http://www.telehaz.hu/) provided further information concerning the age of the 
telecottages and the identity of their managing-operating organisations. There was some inconsistency between the 
two catalogues (10 TCs were mentioned only in either the SGP or the HTA list); and in a few cases, the e-mail 
addresses were not valid. Eventually, 72 telecottages were included in the analysis. 
2 Sending out the questionnaire: I asked the TC managers to fill in the form, who I assumed to have worked there 
for longer and more permanently than the more changeable staff. I did this directly and personally in e-mail, and via 
the head of the SGP Telecottage Association. Since a significant time of their work is supposed to be on-line, I not 
only sent my request in e-mail, but also, prepared the questionnaire on-line (i.e. a form located at an URL address). 
This latter tool was practical for several other reasons: During the survey, I could not expect to be able to visit the 
target region. The answers came immediately and automatically to my e-mail account in an easy-to-interpret form. 
In case of incomplete or inaccurate answers, I had the opportunity to promptly ask the respondents to revise the 
problematic sections (and in fact, many did so). Also, this was a way to save time and trouble for the respondents, 
since they did not have to deal with attached files or printing and posting the form.  
3 The content of the questionnaire: most of the questions were closed, multiple-choice questions, or required a 
few words from the respondents.  
Part I: contact information of the respondent and the telecottage (address, organisation) 
Part II: basic information on the telecottage: year of opening, type of building, year(s) of moving and reasons for 
that, year(s) of changing management and reasons for that, technological equipment, main services, the number of 
full- and part-time staff, specialities important regionally or nationally. 
Part III: questions concerning connections with other telecottages, the regional and national Associations, and their 
local contexts: TCs they had received / given advice, technical assistance, and other kind of support from / to, TCs 
they had engaged in common projects with, and TCs with whom they would work together in the future; how well 
they know other telecottagers in the region (by name, as friends, as a frequent business relation, etc.); their contacts 
with TCs outside the region, international connections (TCs or other actors with similar goals); their relationships 
with their local authorities and organisations, and the regional and national Associations.  
Part IV: vision of their future sustainability; complementary comments and questions by the TCs.   
The purpose of the research was briefly described in the e-mails I sent. I promised the respondents to share the 
results of the research with them, 5 TC managers even asked me to do so at the end of the form.   
 
4 Response rate: After two rounds of e-
mails directly to the TCs, and a request via 
the SGP Association, by lucky coincidence, I 
could visit the SGP region and some of the 
TCs from which I was still waiting for an 
answer. Despite these efforts, by the end of 
the 5th week, only 29 TCs had completed the 
form (10 before my visit, 9 right after my 
visit, and 10 more following another, 3rd 
round of e-mails), which means a 40% 
response rate.  Since the information gained 
with Part III of the questionnaire ‘brought in’ 
25 further TCs as contacts of the 
respondents, I got some understanding of the 
relationships between 54 TCs in the SGP 
region. 
 
5 Follow-up: I published the results of the 
survey   on-line   with   the   help  of  HTA  and  
opened a   forum   on  their   portal  to   receive comments and criticism. In the following months, hundreds of visits 
were paid to the forum; however, I received there no comments. I received an e-mail from someone who had had 
much positive experience in working with the TCs in the region, and defended them against my critical (and 
provocatively ‘scientific’) conclusion that there were not much evidence for TC-networking in the SGP. 
The distribution of the 72 telecottages according to being 
mentioned (+M: 48) and having responded (+R: 29) in the SGP. 
 + M - M 
+R 17 12 
- R 25 18 
The TC responded & was mentioned by others (17) 
The TC did not respond but it was mentioned by others (25)
The TC responded but was not mentioned by others (12) 
The TC did not respond & was not mentioned by others (18)
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